The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912 - LightNovelsOnl.com
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The future of Cuba, however, trembled in the balance but for a moment. Before "the sh.e.l.l-burred cables" had had time to quit vibrating with the question thus propounded, there came back this splendidly clean-cut answer from the President:
We must carry out the spirit and letter of the resolution of Congress [declaring war].
In characterizing Judge Gray's position, above indicated, as "surprising," no reflection upon him is intended. On the contrary, such a position, a.s.sumed by a man of such conceded intellectual probity, is illuminating as to the att.i.tude subsequently taken concerning the Philippines by the Democratic Senators who voted for the treaty. This att.i.tude is stated by Senator Lodge, in his History of the War with Spain, with all the incisive forcefulness to which the country has so long been accustomed in the public utterances of that distinguished man, and, seeing that no promise had been made, as in the case of Cuba, Senator Lodge's statement of the position of those who voted for the treaty should forever set at rest the stale injustice, still occasionally repeated, that Mr. Bryan, "played politics" in 1898-9 in urging his friends in the Senate to vote for its ratification. Says Senator Lodge (History of the War with Spain, p. 231):
The friends of ratification took the very simple ground that the treaty committed the United States to no policy, but left them free to do exactly as seemed best with all the islands; that the American people could be safely entrusted with this grave responsibility, and that patriotism and common sense alike demanded the end of the war and the re-establishment of peace, which could only be effected by the adoption of the treaty.
October 14th, Was.h.i.+ngton wires the commission that Admiral Dewey has just cabled:
It is important that the disposition of the Philippine Islands should be decided as soon as possible. * * * General anarchy prevails without the limits of the city and bay of Manila. Natives appear unable to govern.
In this cablegram the Admiral most unfortunately repeated as true some wild rumors then currently accepted by the Europeans and Americans at Manila which of course were impossible of verification. I say "unfortunately" with some earnestness, because it does not appear on the face of his message that they were mere rumors. And, that they were wholly erroneous, in point of fact, has already been cleared up in previous chapters, wherein the real state of peace, order and tranquillity which prevailed throughout Luzon at that time has been, it is believed, put beyond all doubt. But what manna in the wilderness to the McKinley Administration, now that it was bent on taking the islands, was that Dewey message of October 14th, "The natives appear unable to govern"!
On October 17th, Mr. Day wires Mr. Hay that the Peace Commissioners feel the importance of preserving, so far as possible, the condition of things existing at the time of signing the protocol, to prevent any change in the status quo. He says:
Might not our government * * * take more active and positive measures than heretofore for preservation of order and protection of life and property in Philippine Islands?
How could we, when Aguinaldo and his people were in the saddle all over Luzon, had taken the status quo between their teeth and run away with it, and were prepared to fight if bidden to halt and dismount; and, which is more, were preserving order perfectly themselves?
On October 19th, Mr. Hay repeated by wire to Mr. Day a cablegram from General Otis which said: "Do not antic.i.p.ate trouble with insurgents * * * Affairs progressing favorably."
General Otis was making a desperate effort to humor Mr. McKinley's "consent-of-the-governed" theory and programme. But it was a situation, not a theory, which confronted him.
The date of the high-water mark of the Paris peace negotiations is October 25th. On that day, Mr. Day wired Mr. Hay:
Differences of opinion among commissioners concerning Philippine Islands are set forth in statements transmitted (by cable also) herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in joint commission almost immediately.
Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid, sent a joint signed statement. They urged taking over the whole archipelago, saying that, as their instructions provided for the retention at least of Luzon, "we do not consider the question of remaining in the Philippine Islands as at all now properly before us." They also urged that as Spain governed and defended the islands from Manila, we became, with the destruction of her fleet and the surrender of her army, "as complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete the conquest save to proceed with the ample forces we had at hand to take unopposed possession." The vice of this proposition, from the strategic as well as the ethical point of view, is of course clear enough now.
Spain's government was already tottering in the Philippines when the Spanish-American war broke out. To be "as complete masters as she had been" was like becoming the recipient of a quit-claim deed. Also, ours was not a case of taking "unopposed possession." An adverse claimant, relying on immemorial prescription, was in full possession; all the tenants on the land had attorned to him, and he and they were ready to defend their claim against all comers with their lives. They reminded one of the recurrent small farmer whom some great timber or other corporation seeks to oust, patrolling his land lines rifle in hand, on the lookout for the corporation's agent and the sheriff with the dispossessory warrant.
Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid go on to say:
Military and naval witnesses agree that it would be practically as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part.
Hardly any one can fail to read with interest the following accurate and vivid picture which they give of the physical strategic unity of the Philippine Islands:
There is hardly a single island in the group from which you cannot shoot across to one or more of the others--scarcely another archipelago in the world in which the islands are crowded so closely together and so interdependent.
This explains also why the Filipino people are a people. Whenever the American people understand that, they will give them their independence, unless they get an idea that government of their people by their people for their people would be distasteful to them.
In the memorandum of their views telegraphed to Was.h.i.+ngton on October 25th, Messrs. Davis, Frye, and Reid also say:
Public opinion in Europe, including that of Rome, expects us to retain whole of Philippine Islands.
Archbishop Chapelle was in Paris at the time of these negotiations. He afterwards told the writer in Manila that he got that $20,000,000 put in the Treaty of Paris. The Church preferred that our t.i.tle should be a t.i.tle by purchase rather than a t.i.tle by conquest, and Mr. McKinley was vigorously urging the latter. Between the legal effects of the two, there is a world of difference. The Church outgeneralled the President--checkmated him with a bishop. Look at that part of the treaty which affects church property:
Article VIII. The * * * cession * * * cannot in any respect impair the property or rights * * * of * * * ecclesiastical * * * bodies.
The Church of Rome, or at least some of the ecclesiastical bodies pertaining to it in the Philippines, owned the cream of the agricultural estates. By the treaty they have not lost a dollar. It might have been otherwise, had not Mr. McKinley's original claim of t.i.tle by conquest been overcome at Paris.
Judge Day's memorandum of his own views, telegraphed on October 25th along with those of his colleagues, stated that he was unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the entire Philippine group; that
In the spirit of our instructions, and bearing in mind the often declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be consistent in demands in making peace * * * with due regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents.
Again, he says:
We cannot leave the insurgents either to form a government [he of course did not know what a complete government they had already formed] or to battle against a foe which * * * might readily overcome them.
He also was of course unaware how thoroughly anxious the Spaniards then in the Philippines were to get away, and how completely they were at the mercy of the new Philippine Republic and its forces. "On all hands"
says Judge Day, "it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government." Of course we knew absolutely nothing worth mentioning about the Filipinos at that time. Judge Day then proposes, for the reasons indicated, to accept Luzon and some adjacent islands, as being of "strategic advantage," and to leave Spain the rest, with a "treaty stipulation for non-alienation without the consent of the United States." It seems to me that Judge Day's scheme was the least desirable of all.
Senator Gray's memorandum of the same date is a red-hot argument against taking over any part of the archipelago. He begins thus:
The undersigned cannot agree that it is wise to take Philippine Islands in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of the country, declared and acted upon through our history. * * * It will make necessary * * *
immense sums for fortifications and harbors * * * Climate and social conditions demoralizing to character of American youth * * *.
On whole, instead of indemnity, injury * * *. Cannot agree that any obligation incurred to insurgents * * *. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not be our duty to stay by them at the conclusion of war * * *. No place for * * * government of subject people in American system * * *. Even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon * * * the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world * * * for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully a.s.sumed. * * *
Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word * * *. Above all let us not make a mockery of the [President's] instructions, where, after stating that we took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity * * *
and that we had no designs of aggrandizement and no ambition for conquest, the President * * * eloquently says: "It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war."
The next day, October 26th, came this laconic answer:
The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible and the former must be required.