The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912 - LightNovelsOnl.com
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by allaying the universal fear that we were going to do with them exactly as all other white men they had ever heard of had done with all other brown men they had ever heard of under like circ.u.mstances, viz., keep them under permanent dominion with a view of profit.
In his letter accepting the nomination for the Presidency in 1900, Mr. McKinley sought to show the Filipinos to have been the aggressors in the war by a reference to the fact that the outbreak occurred while the Bacon resolution was under discussion in the Senate. This hardly came with good grace from an Administration whose friends in the Senate had all along opposed not only the Bacon resolution but also all other resolutions frankly declaratory of the purpose of our government. The supreme need of the hour then was, and the supreme need of every hour of every day we have been in the Philippines since has been, "an authoritative expression from the law-making power of the United States"--not mere surmises of a President, confessedly devoid of binding force, but an authoritative expression from the law-making power, declaratory of the purpose of our government with regard to the Philippine Islands. Secretary of War Taft visited Manila in 1907 to be present at the opening of the Philippine a.s.sembly. In view of the universal longing which he knew existed for some definite authoritative declaration as to whether our government intends to keep the Islands permanently or not, he said:
I cannot speak with authority * * *. The policy to be pursued with respect to them is, therefore, ultimately for Congress to determine. * * * I have no authority to speak for Congress in respect to the ultimate disposition of the Islands. [186]
This bitter disappointment of the public expectation and hope of something definite, certainly did not lessen the belief of the Filipinos that we have no notion of ever giving them their independence. Had the Senate known what the Filipino commissioners were so earnestly asking of the Otis commissioners in January, 1899, the Bacon resolution would probably have pa.s.sed. In fact it is demonstrable almost mathematically that, had the Administration's friends in the Senate allowed that resolution to come to a vote before the outbreak of February 4th, instead of filibustering against it until after that event, it would have pa.s.sed. As stated in the foot-note, the roll-call on the final vote on it, which was not taken until February 14th, showed a tie--29 to 29, the Vice-President of the United States casting the deciding vote which defeated it. Much dealing with real life and real death has blunted my artistic sensibilities to thrills from the mere pantomime of the stage. But as here was a vote where, had a single Senator who voted No voted Aye, some 300,000,000 of dollars, over a thousand lives of American soldiers killed in battle, some 16,000 lives of Filipino soldiers killed in battle, and possibly 100,000 Filipino lives snuffed out through famine, pestilence, and other ills consequent on the war, would have been saved, I can not refrain from reproducing the vote--perhaps the most uniquely momentous single roll-call in the parliamentary history of Christendom [187]:
Ayes
Bacon Jones of Nevada Bate Lindsay Berry McLaurin Caffery Martin Chilton Money Clay Murphy c.o.c.krell Perkins Faulkner Pettigrew Gorman Pettus Gray Quay Hale Rawlins Harris Smith Heitfield Tillman h.o.a.r Turner Jones of Arkansas
Nays
Allison Mantle Burrows Morgan Carter Nelson Chandler Penrose Deboe Platt of Connecticut Fairbanks Platt of New York Frye Pritchard Gear Ross Hanna Shoup Hawley Simon Kyle Stewart Lodge Teller McBride Warren McEnery Wolcott McMillan
In January, 1899, the out-and-out land-grabbers had not yet made bold to show their hand, the friends of the treaty confining themselves to the alleged shame of doing as we had done with Cuba, on account of the supposed semi-barbarous condition of "the various tribes out there," leaving the possibility of profit to quietly suggest itself amid the noisy exhortations of altruism. It was not until after the milk of human kindness had been spilled in war that Senator Lodge said at the Philadelphia National Republican Convention of 1900:
We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. We believe in Trade Expansion.
Speaking (p. 82) of the meetings of what for lack of a better term I have above called the Otis-Aguinaldo Joint High Parleying Board, General Otis says in his report:
Finally, the conferences became the object of insurgent suspicion, * * * and * * * amus.e.m.e.nt.
The Filipino newspapers called attention to the fact that large reinforcements of American troops were on the way to Manila, and very plausibly inferred that the parleying was for delay only. By January 26th the politeness of both the American and the Filipino commissioners had been worn to a frazzle, and they adjourned, each recognizing that the differences between them could ultimately be settled only on the field of battle, in the event of the ratification of the treaty.
January 27th, General Otis cabled to Was.h.i.+ngton a letter from Aguinaldo, of which he says in his report: "I was surprised * * *
because of the boldness with which he therein indicated his purpose to continue his a.s.sumptions and establish their correctness by the arbitrament of war" (p. 84). General Otis was "surprised" to the last. Aguinaldo's letter is not at all surprising, though extremely interesting. It sends General Otis a proclamation issued January 21st, announcing the publication of a const.i.tution modelled substantially after that of the United States, even beginning with the familiar words about "securing the blessings of liberty, promoting the general welfare," etc., and concludes with an expression of confident hope that the United States will recognize his government, and a bold implication of determination to fight if it does not. On the evening of February 4th an insurgent soldier approaching an American picket failed to halt or answer when challenged, and was shot and killed. Nearly six months of nervous tension thereupon pressed for liberation in a general engagement which continued throughout the night and until toward sundown of the next day, thus finally unleas.h.i.+ng the dogs of war. In the Was.h.i.+ngton Post of February 6, 1899, Senator Bacon is quoted as saying:
I will cheerfully vote all the money that may be necessary to carry on the war in the Philippines, but I still maintain that we could have avoided a conflict with those people had the Senate adopted my resolution, or a similar resolution announcing our honest intentions with regard to the Philippines.
Said the New York Criterion of February 11, 1899:
Whether we like it or not, we must go on slaughtering the natives in the English fas.h.i.+on, and taking what muddy glory lies in this wholesale killing until they have learned to respect our arms. The more difficult task of getting them to respect our intentions will follow.
The Was.h.i.+ngton Post of February 6, 1899, may not have quoted Senator Bacon with exact.i.tude. But what the Senator did say on the floor of the Senate is important, historically. Under date of February 22, 1912, Senator Bacon writes me, in answer to an inquiry:
I enclose a speech made by me upon the subject in the Senate February 27, 1899, and upon pages 6, 7, and 8 of which you will find a statement of my position, and the reasons given by me therefor. Of course you cannot go at length into that question in your narration of the events of that day, but my position was that, while I did not approve of the war, and did not approve of the enslavement of the Filipinos, and while if I had my way I would immediately set them free, at the same time, as war was then flagrant, and there were then some twenty odd thousand American troops in the Philippine Islands, we must either support them or leave them to defeat and death. I do not know how far you can use anything then said by me, but if you make allusion to the fact that I was willing to supply money and troops to carry on the war in the Philippines, I would be glad for it to be accompanied by a very brief statement of the ground upon which I based such action.
The above makes it unnecessary to quote at length from the speech referred to, which may be found at pp. 2456 et seq of the Congressional Record for February 27, 1899. However, there is one pa.s.sage in the speech to which I especially say Amen, and invite all whose creed of patriotism is not too sublimated for such a common feeling to join me in so doing. Senator Bacon will now state the creed:
The oft-repeated expression "our country, right or wrong" has a vital principle in it, and upon that principle I stand.
The Senator immediately follows his creed with these commentaries:
In this annexation of the Philippine Islands through the ratification of the treaty, and in waging war to subjugate the Filipinos, I think the country, acting through const.i.tutional authorities, is wrong. But it is not for me to say because the country has been committed to a policy that I do not favor and have opposed, in consequence of which there is war, that I will not support the government.
Under the civilizing influence of Krag-Jorgensen rifles and the moral uplift of high explosive projectiles, what our soldiers used to call, with questionable piety, "the fear of G.o.d," was finally put into the hearts of the Filipinos, after much carnage by wholesale in battle formation and later by retail in a species of guerrilla warfare as irritating as it was obstinate. But they have never yet learned to respect our intentions, because under the guidance of three successive Presidents we have studiously refrained from any authoritative declaration as to what those intentions are. We are loth to hark back to the only right course, a course similar to our action in Cuba, because of the expense we have been to in the Philippines. But we also know that the islands are and are likely to continue, a costly burden, a nuisance, and a distinct strategic disadvantage in the event of war; and that Mr. Cleveland was right when he said:
The government of remote and alien people should have no permanent place in the purposes of our national life.
The mistaken policy which involved us in a war to subjugate the Filipinos, following our war to free the Cubans, will never stand atoned for before the bar of history, nor can the Filipinos ever in reason be expected to respect our intentions, until the law-making power of the government shall have authoritatively declared what those intentions are--i. e., what we intend ultimately to do with the islands. Senator Bacon's resolutions of 1899 were, are, and always will be the last word on the first act needed to rectify the original Philippine blunder, "announcing" as they would, to use the language attributed to their distinguished author by the Was.h.i.+ngton Post of February 6, 1899, above-quoted, "our honest intentions with regard to the Philippines." So eager is the exploiter to exploit the islands, and so apprehensive is the Filipino that the exploiter will have more influence at Was.h.i.+ngton than himself and therefore be able ultimately to bring about a practical industrial slavery, that common honesty demands such a declaration. To doctor present Filipino discontent with Benevolent Uncertainty is a mere makes.h.i.+ft. The remedy the situation needs is simple, but as yet untried--Frankness. The chief of the causes of the present discontent among the Filipinos with American rule is precisely the same old serpent that precipitated the war thirteen years ago, to wit, lack of a frank and honest declaration of our purpose. The trouble then lay, and still lies, and, in the absence of some such declaration as that proposed by the Bacon resolution, will always lie in what seemed then, and still seems, to the Filipinos "an evident purpose to keep the islands and an accompanying unwillingness to acknowledge that purpose." Some may object that one Congress cannot bind another. The same argument would have killed the Teller amendment to the declaration of war with Spain avowing our purpose as to Cuba. Such an argument a.s.sumes that this nation has no sense of honor, and that it should cling for a while longer to the stale Micawberism that the Islands may yet pay, before it decides whether it will do right or not, and signalizes such decision by formal announcement through Congress. To men capable of such an a.s.sumption as the one just indicated, this book is not addressed. Three successive Presidents, Messrs. McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft, have with earnest a.s.severation of benevolent intention tried without success all these years to win the affections of the Filipino people, and to make them feel that "our flag had not lost its gift of benediction in its world-wide journey to their sh.o.r.es," as Mr. McKinley used to say. But the corner-stone of the policy was laid before we knew anything about how the land lay, and on the a.s.sumption, made practically without any knowledge whatever on the subject, that the Filipino people were incapable of self-government. The corner-stone of our Philippine policy has been from the beginning precisely that urged by Spain for not freeing Cuba, viz., "to spare the people from the dangers of premature independence." The three Presidents named above have always been willing to imply independence, but never to promise it. And the unwillingness to declare a purpose ultimately to give the Filipinos their independence has always been due to the desire to catch the vote of those who are determined they shall never have it. In this inexorable and unchangeable political necessity lies the essential contemptibleness of republican imperialism, and the secret of why the Filipinos, notwithstanding our good intentions, do not like us, and never will under the present policy. How can you blame them?
Yet the more you know of the Filipinos, the better you like them. Self-sacrificing, brave, and faithful unto death in war, they are gentle, generous, and tractable in peace. Moreover, respect for const.i.tuted authority, as such, is innate in practically every Filipino, which I am not sure can be predicated concerning each and every citizen of my beloved native land. And we can win the grateful and lasting affection of the whole seven or eight millions of them any day we wish to. How? Have done with vague, vote-catching Presidential obiter, and through your Congress declare your purpose!
CHAPTER XI
OTIS AND THE WAR
Am I the boss, or am I a tool, Am I Governor-General or a hobo--hobo; Now I'd like to know who's the boss of the show, Is it me, or Emilio Aguinaldo?
Army Song of the Philippines under Otis.
"The thing is on," said General Hughes, Provost Marshal of Manila, to General Otis, at Malacanan palace, on the night of February 4, 1899, about half past eight o'clock, as soon as the firing started. [188]
He was talking about something which every American in Manila except General Otis had for months frankly recognized as inevitable--the war.
On the day of the outbreak of February 4th, General Otis had under his command 838 officers and 20,032 enlisted men, say in round numbers a total of 21,000. Of these some 15,500 were State volunteers mostly from the Western States, and the rest were regulars. All the volunteers and 1650 of the regulars were, or were about to become, ent.i.tled to their discharge, and their right was perfected by the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain on April 11, 1899. The total force which he was thus ent.i.tled to command for any considerable period consisted of less than 4000. Of the 21,000 men on hand as aforesaid, on February 4th, deducting those at Cavite and Iloilo, the sick and wounded, those serving in civil departments, and in the staff organizations, the effective fighting force was 14,000, and of these 3000 const.i.tuted the Provost Guard in the great and hostile city of Manila. [189] Thus there were only 11,000 men, including those ent.i.tled to discharge, available to engage the insurgent army, "which," says Secretary of War Root, "was two or three times that number, well armed and equipped, and included many of the native troops formerly comprised in the Spanish army."
Such was the predicament into which General Otis's supremely zealous efforts to help the Administration get the treaty through the Senate by withholding from the American people the knowledge of facts which might have put them on notice that they were paying $20,000,000 for a $200,000,000 insurrection, had brought us. This is not a tale of woe. It is a tale of the disgust--good-humored, because stoical--which finally found expression at the time in the army song that heads this chapter, disgust at unnecessary sacrifice of American life which could so easily have been prevented had General Otis only revealed the real situation in time to have had plenty of troops on hand. It is a requiem over those brave men of the Eighth Army Corps from Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and the Western States that bore the brunt of the early fighting, whose lives were needlessly sacrificed in 1899 as the result of an unpreparedness for war due to anxiety not to embarra.s.s Mr. McKinley in his efforts to get the treaty through the Senate, an unpreparedness which remained long unremedied thereafter in order to conceal from the people of the United States the unanimity of the desire of the Filipinos for Independence.
It is quite true that none of our people then in the Islands realized this unanimity in all its pathos at the outset, but it soon became clear to everybody except the commanding general. It naturally dawned on him last of all, because he did not visit the most reliable sources of information, to wit, the battlefields during the fighting, and therefore did not see how tenaciously the Filipinos fought for the independence of their country. Moreover, General Otis tried to think till the last along lines in harmony with the original theory of Benevolent a.s.similation. Hence Mr. Root's nonsense of 1899 and 1900 about "the patient and unconsenting millions" dominated by "the Tagalo tribe," which nonsense was immensely serviceable in a campaign for the presidency wherein antidotes for sympathy with a people struggling to be free were of supreme practical political value. General Otis actually had Mr. McKinley believing as late as December, 1899, at least, that the opposition to a change of masters in lieu of Freedom was confined to a little coterie of self-seeking politicians who were in the business for what they could get out of it, and that the great majority would prefer him, Otis, to Aguinaldo, as governor-general. It is difficult on first blush to accept this statement as dispa.s.sionately correct, but there is no escape from the record. Mr. McKinley said in his annual message to Congress in December, 1899, in reviewing the direction he gave to the Paris peace negotiations which ended in the purchase of the islands, and the war with the Filipinos which had followed, and had then been raging since February 4th previous, "I had every reason to believe, and still believe that the transfer of sovereignty was in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of the great ma.s.s of the Filipino people."
Yet every American soldier who served in the Philippines at the time knows that Aguinaldo held the whole people in the hollow of his hand, because he was their recognized leader, the incarnation of their aspirations. [190]