The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century Part 2

[Footnote 12: Scelle, _op. cit._, i. p. 52 and note; Duro: Armada Espanola, I. p. 204.]

[Footnote 13: The distinction between the Flota or fleet for New Spain and the galleons intended for Terra Firma only began with the opening of the great silver mines of Potosi, the rich yields of which after 1557 made advisable an especial fleet for Cartagena and Nombre de Dios.

(Oppenheim, II. Appendix B., p. 322.)]

[Footnote 14: Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry, _op. cit._, p. 192 _ff._).]

[Footnote 15: Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry, _op. cit._, p. 192 _ff._)]

[Footnote 16: Scelle, _op. cit._, i. p. 64; Dampier: Voyages, _ed._ 1906, i. p. 200.]

[Footnote 17: Gage: A New Survey of the West Indies, _ed._ 1655, pp.

185-6. When Gage was at Granada, in February 1637, strict orders were received from Gautemala that the s.h.i.+ps were not to sail that year, because the President and Audiencia were informed of some Dutch and English s.h.i.+ps lying in wait at the mouth of the river.]

[Footnote 18: Scelle, _op. cit._, i. pp. 64-5; Duhalde and de Rochefort.

There were two ways of sending goods from Panama to Porto Bello. One was an overland route of 18 leagues, and was used only during the summer.

The other was by land as far as Venta Cruz, 7 leagues from Panama, and thence by water on the river Chagre to its mouth, a distance of 26 leagues. When the river was high the transit might be accomplished in two or three days, but at other times from six to twelve days were required. To transfer goods from Chagre to Porto Bello was a matter of only eight or nine hours. This route was used in winter when the roads were rendered impa.s.sable by the great rains and floods. The overland journey, though shorter, was also more difficult and expensive. The goods were carried on long mule-trains, and the "roads, so-called, were merely bridle paths ... running through swamps and jungles, over hills and rocks, broken by unbridged rivers, and situated in one of the deadliest climates in the world." The project of a ca.n.a.l to be cut through the isthmus was often proposed to the Councils in Spain, but was never acted upon. (Descript. ... of Cartagena; Oppenheim, i. p. 333.)]

[Footnote 19: Nombre de Dios, a few leagues to the east of Porto Bello, had formerly been the port where the galleons received the treasure brought from Panama, but in 1584 the King of Spain ordered the settlement to be abandoned on account of its unhealthiness, and because the harbour, being open to the sea, afforded little shelter to s.h.i.+pping.

Gage says that in his time Nombre de Dios was almost forsaken because of its climate. Dampier, writing thirty years later, describes the site as a waste. "Nombre de Dios," he says, "is now nothing but a name. For I have lain ash.o.r.e in the place where that City stood, but it is all overgrown with Wood, so as to have no sign that any Town hath been there." (Voyages, _ed._ 1906, i. p. 81.)]

[Footnote 20: Gage, _ed._ 1655, pp. 196-8.]

[Footnote 21: Scelle, _op. cit._, i. p. 65.]

[Footnote 22: Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.]

[Footnote 23: When the Margarita patache failed to meet the galleons at Cartagena, it was given its clearance and allowed to sail alone to Havana--a tempting prey to buccaneers hovering in those seas.]

[Footnote 24: Duhalde and de Rochefort.]

[Footnote 25: Rawl. MSS., A. 175, 313 b; Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.]

[Footnote 26: Here I am following the MSS. quoted by Oppenheim (ii. pp.

335 _ff._). Instead of watering in Hispaniola, the fleet sometimes stopped at Dominica, or at Aguada in Porto Rico.]

[Footnote 27: Duhalde and de Rochefort.]

[Footnote 28: Quintal=about 100 pounds.]

[Footnote 29: These "vaisseaux de registre" were supposed not to exceed 300 tons, but through fraud were often double that burden.]

[Footnote 30: Duhalde and de Rochefort; Scelle, _op. cit._, i. p. 54.]

[Footnote 31: Gage, _ed._ 1655, pp. 199-200.]

[Footnote 32: Duhalde and de Rochefort; Oppenheim, ii. p. 318.]

[Footnote 33: Scelle, _op. cit._, i. p. 45; Recop., t. i. lib. iii. t.i.t.

viii.]

[Footnote 34: There seems to have been a contraband trade carried on at Cadiz itself. Foreign merchants embarked their goods upon the galleons directly from their own vessels in the harbour, without registering them with the _Contratacion_; and on the return of the fleets received the price of their goods in ingots of gold and silver by the same fraud. It is scarcely possible that this was done without the tacit authorization of the Council of the Indies at Madrid, for if the Council had insisted upon a rigid execution of the laws regarding registration, detection would have been inevitable.]

[Footnote 35: Weiss, _op. cit._, ii. p. 226.]

[Footnote 36: Most of the offices in the Spanish Indies were venal. No one obtained a post without paying dearly for it, except the viceroys of Mexico and Peru, who were grandees, and received their places through favour at court. The governors of the ports, and the presidents of the Audiencias established at Panama, San Domingo, and Gautemala, bought their posts in Spain. The offices in the interior were in the gift of the viceroys and sold to the highest bidder. Although each port had three corregidors who audited the finances, as they also paid for their places, they connived with the governors. The consequence was inevitable. Each official during his tenure of office expected to recover his initial outlay, and ama.s.s a small fortune besides. So not only were the bribes of interlopers acceptable, but the officials often themselves bought and sold the contraband articles.]

[Footnote 37: Froude: History of England, viii. p. 436 _ff._]

[Footnote 38: 1585, August 12th. Ralph Lane to Sir Philip Sidney. Port Ferdinando, Virginia.--He has discovered the infinite riches of St. John (Porto Rico?) and Hispaniola by dwelling on the islands five weeks. He thinks that if the Queen finds herself burdened with the King of Spain, to attempt them would be most honourable, feasible and profitable. He exhorts him not to refuse this good opportunity of rendering so great a service to the Church of Christ. The strength of the Spaniards doth altogether grow from the mines of her treasure. Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.]

[Footnote 39: Scelle, _op. cit._, ii. p. xiii.]

[Footnote 40: Scelle, _op. cit._, i. p. ix.]

[Footnote 41: 1611, February 28. Sir Thos. Roe to Salisbury. Port d'Espaigne, Trinidad.--He has seen more of the coast from the River Amazon to the Orinoco than any other Englishman alive. The Spaniards here are proud and insolent, yet needy and weak, their force is reputation, their safety is opinion. The Spaniards treat the English worse than Moors. The government is lazy and has more skill in planting and selling tobacco than in erecting colonies and marching armies.

Extract, C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660. (Roe was sent by Prince Henry upon a voyage of discovery to the Indies.)]

[Footnote 42: "An historical account of the rise and growth of the West India Colonies." By Dalby Thomas, Lond., 1690. (Harl. Miscell., 1808, ii. 357.)]

[Footnote 43: Oviedo: Historia general de las Indias, lib. xix. cap.

xiii.; Coleccion de doc.u.mentos ... de ultramar, tom. iv. p. 57 (deposition of the Spanish captain at the Isle of Mona); Pacheco, etc.: Coleccion de doc.u.mentos ... de las posesiones espanoles en America y Oceania, tom. xl. p. 305 (cross-examination of witnesses by officers of the Royal Audiencia in San Domingo just after the visit of the English s.h.i.+p to that place); English Historical Review, XX. p. 115.

The s.h.i.+p is identified with the "Samson" dispatched by Henry VIII. in 1527 "with divers cunning men to seek strange regions," which sailed from the Thames on 20th May in company with the "Mary of Guildford," was lost by her consort in a storm on the night of 1st July, and was believed to have foundered with all on board. (Ibid.)]

[Footnote 44: Hakluyt, _ed._ 1600, iii. p. 700; Froude, _op. cit._, viii. p. 427.]

[Footnote 45: Scelle., _op. cit._, i. pp. 123-25, 139-61.]

[Footnote 46: Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar. tom. vi. p. 15.]

[Footnote 47: Froude, _op. cit._, viii. pp. 470-72.]

[Footnote 48: Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, i. ch. 3.]

[Footnote 49: Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, ii. chs. 1, 2, 11.]

[Footnote 50: Corbett: The Successors of Drake, ch. x.]

[Footnote 51: Marcel: Les corsaires francais au XVIe siecle, p. 7. As early as 1501 a royal ordinance in Spain prescribed the construction of carracks to pursue the privateers, and in 1513 royal _cedulas_ were sent to the officials of the _Casa de Contratacion_ ordering them to send two caravels to guard the coasts of Cuba and protect Spanish navigation from the a.s.saults of French corsairs. (Ibid., p. 8).]

[Footnote 52: Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tomos i., iv., vi.; Ducere: Les corsaires sous l'ancien regime. Append. II.; Duro., _op.

cit._, i. Append. XIV.]

[Footnote 53: Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 22.]

[Footnote 54: Ibid., p. 23.]

[Footnote 55: Marcel, _op. cit._, p. 16.]