The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn Part 12

[Footnote 123: Statement of Colonel Thomas Grosvenor to the late David P. Hall, Esq., of New York, who knew Grosvenor well, and preserved many facts in writing in regard to his military career. Knowlton's captains were Grosvenor and Stephen Brown, of Pomfret, Conn. The detachment was on duty at the outposts on the night of the 26th. The soldier whose letter is referred to in the note preceding this was one of the "Rangers," and he states that their number was about one hundred. That Smallwood's and Haslet's regiments crossed on the 26th, we have from Smallwood himself.--_Force_, 5th Series, vol. ii., p.

1011.]

[Footnote 124: The regiments were Little's and Ward's, from Ma.s.sachusetts; Varnum's and Hitchc.o.c.k's, from Rhode Island; Huntington's, Wyllys's, Tyler's, Chester's, Silliman's, and Gay's, and Knowlton's "Rangers," from Connecticut; Lasher's and Drake's, from New York; Smith's and Remsen's, from Long Island; Martin's, Forman's, Johnston's, Newcomb's, and Cortland's, from New Jersey; Hand's, Miles', Atlee's, Lutz's, Kachlein's, and Hay's, detachment from Pennsylvania; Haslet's, from Delaware; and Smallwood's, from Maryland.

Among other artillery officers on that side were Captains Newell and Treadwell, Captain-Lieutenants John Johnston and Benajah Carpenter; Lieutenants Lillie and "Cadet" John Callender. This list is believed to include all the battalions and detachments on Long Island at the time the British attacked.]

Following in turn after Nixon and Stirling, Brigadier-General Parsons was detailed as field officer of the day[125] for the next twenty-four hours--the day of the engagement.

[Footnote 125: Parson's own statement, letter of October 5th: "On the day of the surprise I was on duty."--_Doc.u.ment_ 5.]

At about the time that Was.h.i.+ngton started to return to his headquarters at New York, on this evening, Sir William Howe began to set his columns in motion for the attack, and on the next morning, at the pa.s.ses in the hills and along their inner slopes, was fought what is known in our Revolutionary history as the battle of Long Island.

Fortunately, a point so essential to the comprehension of the progress of any engagement, the position of both armies on Long Island, just before the attack, is now known nearly to the last detail. The record here is clear and satisfactory. On the night of the 26th, the various regiments and detachments on guard at the American outposts numbered not far from twenty-eight hundred men. At the important Flatbush Pa.s.s, supporting the two or three gun battery there, and with strong pickets thrown out to the edge of the woods nearest the enemy, were posted Hitchc.o.c.k's and Little's Continental regiments, and Johnston's New Jersey battalion, the two former being commanded by their lieutenant-colonels, Cornell and Henshaw. To this point, also, Knowlton and his rangers appear to have been sent. The battery or redoubt here stood about where the Flatbush and narrow Port Road united, and was apparently no more than a plain breastwork, with felled trees in front of it, thrown up across the road, and perhaps extending to the rising ground on the left.[126] At the coast road, around and beyond the Red Lion, the guards consisted of Hand's riflemen, half of Atlee's musketry, detachments of New York troops, and part of Lutz's Pennsylvanians under Major Burd. At the Bedford Pa.s.s, to the left of the Flatbush Road, were stationed Colonel Samuel Wyllys's Connecticut Continentals, and Colonel Chester's regiment from the same State, under Lieutenant-Colonel Solomon Wills, of Tolland, who had seen service in the French war and at Havana. Still further to the left, Colonel Miles was now encamped a short distance beyond, in the woods. Between these several pa.s.ses, sentinels were stationed at intervals along the crest of the ridge, to keep communication open from one end of the line to the other.[127]

[Footnote 126: The site of this breastwork is now within the limits of Prospect Park, and it stood across what is known as "Battle Pa.s.s." Dr.

Stiles in his History of Brooklyn, and Mr. Field in vol. ii. of the L.I. Hist. Society's _Memoirs_, put a well-constructed redoubt at this point on a hill-top to the left of the road. The account in the _South Carolina Gazette_ says that the Flatbush Pa.s.s guards were posted "near a mile from the parting of the road [_i.e._, a mile from where the Flatbush Road branched from the Jamaica Road] where an _abattis_ was formed across the road, and a breastwork thrown up and defended by two pieces of cannon." In the original sketch of the "engagement," made by John Ewing, who was Hand's brother-in-law, and with him on the spot, there is this reference: "F. Where a considerable Number of our people were stationed with several Field-pieces & Breast-works made with Trees felled across the Road to defend themselves when attacked."

(_Doc.u.ment_ 15.) Colonel Miles speaks of "a small redoubt in front of the village [Flatbush]" (_Doc.u.ment_ 20.) The breastwork across the road was doubtless the princ.i.p.al defence here, and this was merely temporary.]

[Footnote 127: The number of men at each of the three pa.s.ses was about eight hundred, and on the left of these were Miles' two battalions, with perhaps five hundred men on duty. Sullivan's orders of August 25th give the detail which was to mount for picket on the following morning. This detail, therefore, was the one on duty on the night of the 26th. The order runs: "Eight hundred [men] properly officered to relieve the troops on Bedford Road to-morrow morning, six field officers to attend with this party. The same number to relieve those on Bush [Flatbush] Road, and an equal number those stationed towards the Narrows. A picket of three hundred men under the command of a Field Officer, six Captains, twelve subalterns to be posted at the wood on the west side of the creek every night till further orders."

(See also _Doc.u.ments_ 5, 18, 19.) That Miles was on the extreme left, we well know; that Wyllys was at the Bedford Pa.s.s, appears from both Miles' and Brodhead's accounts; that Chester's regiment was with him, appears from an extract quoted below--Chester's lieutenant-colonel being Solomon Wills; that Johnston was at the Flatbush Pa.s.s, appears from the same and other authorities; that Henshaw with Little's regiment was there, he himself states; that Cornell was also there with Hitchc.o.c.k's Rhode Islanders, appears from Captain Olney's narrative as given in _Mrs. Williams' Life of Olney_, and from the lists of prisoners; that Hand was at the lower road, until relieved, and Major Burd also, the major himself and Ewing's sketch both state; the New York detachment there was probably a part of Lasher's regiment. The extract referred to is from the _Connecticut Courant_, containing a letter from an officer engaged in the battle, which says: "The night before August 27th, on the west road, were posted Colonel Hand's regiment, a detachment from Pennsylvania and New York; next east were posted Colonel Johnson, of Jersey, and Lieutenant-Colonel Henshaw, of Ma.s.sachusetts; next east were posted Colonel Wyllys and Lieutenant-Colonel Wills, of Connecticut. East of all these Colonel Miles, of Pennsylvania, was posted towards Jamaica, to watch the motion of the enemy and give intelligence."]

As far, then, to the left as Miles' position the hills were as well guarded as seemed possible with the limited force that could be spared, and at the pa.s.ses themselves a stout resistance could have been offered. But it was still an attenuated line, more than four miles long, not parallel but oblique to the line of works at Brooklyn, and distant from it not less than one and a half, and at the farthest posts nearly three miles. Should the enemy pierce it at any one point, an immediate retreat would have been necessary from every other. The line could have been defended with confidence only on the supposition that the British would not venture to penetrate the thick woods, but advance along the roads through the pa.s.ses.

It will be noticed that in this disposition no provision was made for holding the fourth or Jamaica Pa.s.s far over to the left. That the enemy could approach or make a diversion by that route, must have been well understood. But the posting of a permanent guard there would obviously have been attended with hazard, for the distance from the lines to this pa.s.s was four miles, and from the Bedford Pa.s.s two miles and a half through the woods. The position was thus extremely isolated, if the troops stationed there were expected to make the fortified line their point of retreat. None were stationed there during the five days since the British landed, and it nowhere appears that any were intended or ordered to be so stationed by either Sullivan, Putnam, or the commander-in-chief. There was but one effective way of preventing surprise from that quarter, and that was to have squads of cavalry or troops constantly patrolling the road, who on the appearance of an enemy could carry the word immediately and rapidly to the outposts and the camp. But in all Was.h.i.+ngton's army there was not a single company of hors.e.m.e.n, except the few Long Island troopers from Kings and Queens counties, and these were now engaged miles away in driving off stock out of reach of the enemy. The duty, accordingly, of looking after the open left flank fell, in part, upon Colonel Miles' two battalions. Lieutenant-Colonel Brodhead leaves it on record that it was "hard duty." The regiment sent out scouting parties every day a distance of four or five miles; one hundred men were mounted for guard daily, and thirty more with a lieutenant were kept on duty on the left, evidently in the direction of the Jamaica Road. General Parsons reports that "in the wood was placed Colonel Miles with his Battalion to watch the motion of the Enemy on that part, with orders to keep a party constantly reconnoitering to and across the Jamaica road." Should he discover the enemy at any time, it would have been expected of him to report the fact at once, oppose them vigorously, and retreat obstinately in order to give time for the other detachments to govern their movements accordingly.

One other circ.u.mstance is to be noticed in regard to this Jamaica Pa.s.s. General Sullivan, subsequently referring to his connection with this battle, claimed that while he was in sole command he paid hors.e.m.e.n out of his own purse to patrol the road, and that he predicted the approach of the enemy by that road. Whatever inferences may be drawn from this is not now to the point; but we have the fact that upon the evening of the 26th he exercised the same authority he had exercised in making other details, and sent out a special patrol of five commissioned officers to watch the Jamaica Pa.s.s. Three of these officers belonged to Colonel Lasher's New York City battalion--Adjutant Jeronimus Hoogland and Lieutenants Robert Troup and Edward Duns...o...b.. and the other two were Lieutenant Gerrit Van Wagenen, a detached officer of McDougall's old regiment, and a Lieutenant Gilliland, who with Van Wagenen had crossed to Long Island, as a volunteer. What part this patrol played in the incidents of the following morning will presently appear.

Thus on the night of the 26th the American outposts stretched along the hills from the harbor to the Jamaica Pa.s.s, with unguarded intervals, a distance of more than six miles, while in the plains below lay the enemy, nearly ten times their number, ready to fall upon them with "a sudden and violent" shock. During the night one change was made in the picket guard. Colonel Hand's riflemen, who had been on almost constant duty since the arrival of the British, were relieved at two o'clock in the morning by a detachment from the flying camp, which may have been a part of Hay's and Kachlein's men, and returning to the lines, dropped down to sleep.[128]

[Footnote 128: Hand's letter of August 27th: "I escaped my part by being relieved at 2 o'clock this morning." (Doc.u.ment 12.) See John Ewing's letter and sketch.]

If we leave our outposts now upon the hills and pa.s.s into the enemy's camp on the plain below, we shall find them on the eve of carrying out a great plan of attack. The four days since the 22d had been given to preparation. On the 25th, Lieutenant-General De Heister crossed from Staten Island with the two Hessian brigades of Von Stirn and Von Mirbach, leaving behind Von Lossberg's brigade, with some detachments and recruits, for the security of that island. With this addition, Howe's force on Long Island was swelled to a total of about twenty-one thousand officers and men, fit for duty and in the best condition for active service.[129] As disposed on the 26th, the army lay with the Hessians and the reserves under Cornwallis at Flatbush, the main body under Clinton and Percy ma.s.sed at Flatlands, and Grant's division of the fourth and sixth brigades nearer the Narrows.

[Footnote 129: Extract from a British officer's letter dated, _Statton Island, August 4, 1776_: ... "We are now in expectation of attacking the fellows very soon, and if I may be allowed to judge, there never was an army in better spirits nor in better health, two very important things for our present business."--_Hist. Mag._, vol. v., p. 69.]

Outnumbering the Americans three to one on the island, Howe could lay his plans with a.s.surance of almost absolute success. He proposed to advance upon the "rebels" in three columns. Grant was ordered to move up from the Narrows along the lower road, and De Heister was to engage the attention of the Americans at the Flatbush Pa.s.s, while Clinton, Percy, and Cornwallis, with Howe himself, were to conduct the main body as a flanking force around the American left by way of the Jamaica Pa.s.s. A previous reconnoissance made by Clinton and Erskine, and information gathered from the Tories, showed the practicability of this latter movement.[130] Grant and De Heister were simply to make a show of an attack until they were a.s.sured by the sound of the firing that the flanking column had accomplished its design, when their demonstrations were to be turned into serious fighting. It was expected that by this plan the Americans stationed at the hills and pa.s.ses would be entirely enveloped and thoroughly beaten if not captured in a body. With what nice precision this piece of strategy was executed, events will show.

[Footnote 130: Stedman, the British historian, who served as an officer under Howe, says: "Sir Henry Clinton and Sir William Erskine, having reconnoitred the position of the enemy, saw that it would not be a difficult matter to turn their left flank, which would either oblige them to risk an engagement or to retire under manifest disadvantage. This intelligence being communicated to Sir William Howe, he consented to make the attempt."]

The first collision was ominous. Grant's advance-guard, marching up from the Narrows, struck the American pickets in the vicinity of the Red Lion about two o'clock on the morning of the 27th. Whether because they were all new troops, a part of whom had but just come upon the ground, and were alarmed by the night attack, or because they were surprised at their posts and put in danger of capture, or whatever the reason, our picket guard at that point retreated before the enemy without checking their march. There was hardly more than an exchange of fire with Major Burd's detachment, as the major himself writes, and in the confusion or darkness he, with many others probably, was taken prisoner. This was an unfortunate beginning, so far as our men had abandoned one of the very posts which it had been proposed to hold; but otherwise, there being other positions available, it was not necessarily fatal to the plan of defending the hills.[131]

[Footnote 131: Hardly more than a general statement can be made in regard to the attack on the pickets at the lower road. A part of them watched Martense Lane, where, it would appear from Ewing's sketch, Hand's riflemen were posted before being relieved. Major Burd's detachment, on the same authority, was probably on the direct road to the Narrows, both parties communicating with each other at the Red Lion Tavern, which stood near the fork of the roads. Grant's main column advanced by the Narrows Road, and possibly a party of the enemy came through the Martense Lane at about the same time. The skirmish Major Burd speaks of occurred in the vicinity of Thirty-eighth and Fortieth streets, on the Narrows Road, where former residents used to say the Americans had a picket guard stationed. When the enemy came up firing took place and some men were killed; and this firing "was the first in the neighborhood." The pickets retreated, though General Parsons was misinformed when he wrote that they did so "without firing a gun." There was firing, but no stand made.]

Word of the attack was quickly carried to General Parsons at his quarters and to General Putnam in camp. Parsons, as the brigadier on duty, rode at once to the spot, and found "by fair daylight" not only that the guards had "fled," but that the enemy were through the woods and already on this side of the main hills. Hastily collecting some twenty of the scattered pickets, he made a show of resistance, which temporarily halted the enemy's column.[132] At the same time Putnam, whose instructions were to hold the outposts "at all hazards" with his best men, called up Stirling and directed him in person to take the two regiments nearest at hand and march down to meet the enemy.[133]

Stirling promptly turned out Haslet's and Smallwood's battalions and marched down. Colonel Atlee, who was also ordered forward, was on the road before him, with that part of his regiment, about one hundred and twenty men, not already on picket; and Huntington's Connecticut Continentals, under Lieutenant-Colonel Clark (Huntington himself being sick),[134] and Kachlein's Pennsylvania riflemen were soon after started in the same direction. Meanwhile, within the lines, the alarm-guns were fired, the whole camp roused, and the troops drawn up at the forts and breastworks. Hand's riflemen, who had but just lain down, "almost dead with fatigue," were turned out to take post in Fort Putnam and the redoubt on its left.[135]

[Footnote 132: _Parsons' Letters._ Part II., Doc.u.ment 5.]

[Footnote 133: _Stirling to Was.h.i.+ngton, Aug. 29th:_ "About three o'clock on the morning of the 27th I was called up, and informed by General Putnam that the enemy were advancing," etc.--_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 1245.]

[Footnote 134: "Col. Huntington is unwell, but I hope getting a little better. He has a slow fever. Maj. Dyer is also unwell with a slow fever. Gen'l Greene has been very sick but is better. Genls. Putnam, Sullivan, Lord Sterling, Nixon, Parsons, & Heard are on Long Island and a strong part of our army."--_Letter from Col. Trumbull, Aug.

27th, 1776._ _Doc.u.ment_ 7.]

[Footnote 135: See references on Ewing's sketch, Doc.u.ment 15: "H. Fort Putnam where part of Colo. Hand's men commanded by Lieut C.

[Lieutenant-Colonel] Chambers were detached from the Regt. to man the fort.--I. A small upper Fort where [I] was with the Colo the Day of the Engagement." Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers says: "We had just got to the fort, and I had only laid down, when the alarm-guns were fired. We were compelled to turn out to the lines, and as soon as it was light saw our men and theirs engaged with field-pieces." Nearly all the accounts put Hand and his battalion at the Flatbush Pa.s.s during the battle on the 27th. This, as we now find, is an error. The battalion was worn out by its continued and effective skirmis.h.i.+ng since the landing of the enemy, and required rest; but of this it was to get very little, even within the lines.]

When Stirling reached a point within half a mile of the Red Lion he found, as Parsons had before him, that the enemy had met with little opposition or delay at the outposts on that road, and were now on the full march towards the Brooklyn lines. As there were still good positions which he could occupy, he immediately made a disposition of his force to offer resistance. The road here ran in a winding course along the line of the present Third Avenue, but a short distance from the bay, with here and there a dwelling which together const.i.tuted the Gowa.n.u.s village or settlement. Where the present Twenty-third Street intersects the avenue there was a small bridge on the old road which crossed a ditch or creek setting up from the bay to a low and marshy piece of ground on the left, looking south; and just the other side of the bridge, the land rose to quite a bluff at the water's edge, which was known among the Dutch villagers as "Blockje's Bergh." From the bluff the low hill fell gradually to the marsh or mora.s.s just mentioned, the road continuing along between them.[136] Right here, therefore, the approach by the road was narrow, and at the corner of Twenty-third Street was confined to the crossing at the bridge.

[Footnote 136: The writer is indebted to the Hon. Teunis G. Bergen, of Bay Ridge, L.I., for an accurate description and sketch of the Gowa.n.u.s Road, as it lay at the time of the battle. His survey is followed in the "Map of the Brooklyn Defences," etc., t.i.tle, Maps. Part II.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: [signature: Jed Huntington]

COLONEL SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT (CONN.) BRIGADIER GENERAL 1777.

Steel Engr. F. von Egloffstein N.Y.]

According to his own account, and from our present knowledge of the topography, Stirling evidently came to a halt on or just this side of "Blockje's Bergh." Seeing the British not far in his front, and taking in the situation at a glance, he ordered Atlee to post his men on the left of the road and wait the enemy's coming up, while he himself retired with Smallwood's and Haslet's to form line on a piece of "very advantageous ground" further back. Atlee reports this preliminary move as follows: "I received orders from Lord Stirling to advance with my battalion and oppose the enemy's pa.s.sing a mora.s.s or swamp at the foot of a fine rising ground, upon which they were first discovered, and thereby give time to our brigade to form upon the heights. This order I immediately obeyed, notwithstanding we must be exposed without any kind of cover to the great fire of the enemy's musketry and field-pieces, charged with round and grapeshot, and finely situated upon the eminence above mentioned, having entire command of the ground I was ordered to occupy. My battalion, although new and never before having the opportunity of facing an enemy, sustained their fire until the brigade had formed; but finding we could not possibly prevent their crossing the swamp, I ordered my detachment to file off to the left and take post in a wood upon the left of the brigade."[137]

General Parsons says: "We took possession of a hill about two miles from camp, and detached Colonel Atlee to meet them further on the road; in about sixty rods he drew up and received the enemy's fire and gave them a well-directed fire from his regiment, which did great execution, and then retreated to the hill."

[Footnote 137: _Atlee's Journal._ _Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p.

1251.]

This advantageous site, where Stirling had now drawn up his brigade to dispute Grant's progress, was the crest of the slope which rose northerly from the marsh and low ground around "Blockje's Bergh," and which to-day is represented by about the line of Twentieth Street.[138] Here was an elevation or ridge favorable for defence, and here Stirling proposed to make a stand. On the right, next to the road, he posted Smallwood's battalion, under Major Gist; further along up the hillside were the Delawares, under Major MacDonough;[139] and on their left, in the woods above, Atlee's men formed after falling back from their attempt to stop the enemy.

[Footnote 138: Probably the earliest of modern attempts to identify the site where Stirling formed his line was that made in 1839 by Maj.

D.B. Dougla.s.s, formerly of the United States Army. Greenwood Cemetery, says Mr. Cleveland in his history of _Greenwood_, owes its present beautiful appearance largely to this officer's "energy and taste,"

Dougla.s.s having been one of the first surveyors of the ground. He located Stirling's position on what was then known as Wyckoff's hill, between Eighteenth and Twentieth streets; and tradition and all the original doc.u.ments confirm this selection. This was a lower elevation in the general slope from the main ridge towards the bay. Stirling simply drew his men up in a straight line from the road towards the hill-tops, and beyond him on the same line or more in advance, was Parsons. The map in Sparks' _Was.h.i.+ngton_ putting Stirling down near the Narrows is erroneous.]

[Footnote 139: The colonels and lieutenant-colonels of both these regiments were detained at New York as members of the court-martial which tried Lieutenant-colonel Zedwitz, of MacDougall's regiment, charged with treasonable correspondence with the enemy. They joined their regiments after the battle.]

When Kachlein's[140] riflemen came up, the general stationed part of them along hedges near the foot of the hill in front of the Marylanders, and part in front of the woods near Atlee. The line had hardly been formed before it was observed that the enemy threatened to overlap it on the left, and Parsons was accordingly ordered to take Atlee's and Huntington's regiments and move still further into the woods to defeat the designs on that flank.

[Footnote 140: This name appears in other accounts as Kichline or Keichline. It is properly Kachlein, being so spelled by other members of this officer's family.]

Finding Stirling thus thrown across their path, the British also drew up in line and disposed their force as if intending to attack him at once. About opposite to the Marylanders, possibly on Blockje's Bergh, Grant posted the sixth brigade in two lines, while the fourth brigade was extended in a single line from the low ground to the top of the hills in Greenwood Cemetery.

Here, then, was a regular battle formation--Grant and Stirling opposing each other--and we may regard it with interest not only as the only line of battle preserved, on the American side at least, during this day's struggle, but as being the first instance in the Revolution where we met the British in the open field. Before this it had been fighting under different conditions--the regulars mowed down at Bunker Hill, Montgomery attempting to storm Quebec, or Moultrie bravely holding a fort against a fleet; now the soldiers on either side stood face to face, and the opportunity seemed at hand to fairly test their native courage. Greatly disproportionate, however, was the strength of these two lines. Stirling's, all told, contained not more than sixteen hundred men; while Grant's, which besides the two brigades included the Forty-second Highlanders and two companies of American loyalists, was little less than seven thousand strong. But if we find here a threatening att.i.tude, let us not expect any desperate fighting. It was not Grant's object to bring on an engagement at this early hour, now seven o'clock in the morning, for he wished to keep Stirling where he was until the other movements of the day were developed. He contented himself with appearing to be on the point of attack, and Stirling could do no more than prepare for a stubborn defence of his ground.

The first move of the British was to send forward a small body of light troops from their left, which advanced to within one hundred and fifty yards of Stirling's right. This would bring them not far from the little bridge on the road, where, from behind hedges and apple-trees, they opened fire on our advanced riflemen, who replied with spirit.

In the mean time, Stirling was reinforced by a two-gun battery from Knox's artillery, under Captain-Lieutenant Benajah Carpenter, of Providence, R.I., which was at once placed on the hillside to command the road, and, according to Stirling, "the only approach for some hundred yards," which must have been that part of the road running over the bridge. The skirmis.h.i.+ng was kept up at a lively rate for about two hours, and occasionally, it would appear, our entire line engaged in the fire. Of the particular incidents which occurred at this point we have almost nothing; but perhaps, from one or two mere references that have been preserved, the whole scene can be imagined.