A History of Sea Power Part 26

In this affair the British, it is true, had many preoccupations--the hostile Austrian fleet, the doubtful neutrality of Italy, the French troop movement; the safety of Egypt and Suez. Yet the Admiralty were well aware that the German Amba.s.sador von w.a.n.genheim was dominant in Turkish councils and that the Turkish army was mobilized under German officers. It seems strange, therefore, that an escape into Constantinople was, in the words of the British Official History, "the only one that had not entered into our calculations." The whole affair ill.u.s.trates the immense value political information may have in guiding naval strategy. The German s.h.i.+ps, though ostensibly "sold" to the Turks, retained their German personnel. Admiral Souchon a.s.sumed command of the Turkish Navy, and by an attack on Russian s.h.i.+ps in the Black Sea later succeeded in precipitating Turkey's entrance into the war, with its long train of evil consequences for the Western Powers.

_Coronel and the Falkland Islands_

In the Pacific the German cruisers were at first widely scattered, the _Emden_ at Kiao-chau, the _Leipzig_ on the west coast of Mexico, the _Nurnberg_ at San Francisco, and the armored cruisers _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ under Admiral von Spee in the Caroline Islands. The two s.h.i.+ps at the latter point, after being joined by the _Nurnberg_, set out on a leisurely cruise for South America, where, in view of j.a.pan's entry into the war, the German Admiral may have felt that he would secure a clearer field of operations and, with the aid of German-Americans, better facilities for supplies.

After wrecking on their way the British wireless and cable station at Fanning Island, and looking into Samoa for stray British cruisers, the trio of s.h.i.+ps were joined at Easter Island on October 14 by the _Leipzig_ and also by the _Dresden_, which had fled thither from the West Indies.

The concentration thus resulting seems of doubtful wisdom, for, scattered over the trade routes, the cruisers would have brought about greater enemy dispersion and greater injury to commerce; and, as the later course of the war was to show, the loss of merchant tonnage was even more serious for the Entente than loss of fighting s.h.i.+ps. It seems evident, however, that Admiral van Spee was not attracted by the tame task of commerce destroying, but wished to try his gunnery, highly developed in the calm waters of the Far East, against enemy men-of-war.

In its present strength and position, the German "fleet in being"

const.i.tuted a serious menace, for to a.s.semble an adequate force against it on either side of Cape Horn would mean to leave the other side dangerously exposed. It was with a keen realization of this dilemma that Admiral Cradock in the British armored cruiser _Good Hope_ left the Falklands on October 22 to join the _Monmouth, Glasgow_, and auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_ in a sweep along the west coast. The old battles.h.i.+p _Canopus_, with 12-inch guns, but only 12 knots cruising speed, was properly judged too slow to keep with the squadron. It is difficult to say whether the failure to send Cradock reenforcements at this time from either the Atlantic or the Pacific was justified by the preoccupations in those fields. Needless to say, there was no hesitation, _after_ Coronel, in hurrying s.h.i.+ps to the scene. On November 1, when the Admiralty Board was reorganized with Admiral Fisher in his old place as First Sea Lord, orders at once went out sending the _Defense_ to Cradock and enjoining him not to fight without the _Canopus_. But these orders he never received.

The composition of the two squadrons now approaching each other off the Chilean coast was as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------- Name | Type |Displace-| Belt | Guns |Speed | | ment |armor | | -------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|----- Scharnhorst |Armored cruiser | 11,600 |6-inch|8-8.2", 6-6" | 23.5 Gneisenau |Armored cruiser | 11,600 |6-inch|8-8.2", 6-6" | 23.5 Leipzig |Protected cruiser| 3,250 |none |10-4" | 23 Nurnberg |Light cruiser | 3,450 |none |10-4" | 24 Dresden |Light cruiser | 3,600 |none |10-4" | 24 -------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|----- Good Hope |Armored cruiser | 14,000 |6-inch|2-9.2", 16-6", 14-3"| 24 Monmouth |Armored cruiser | 9,800 |4-inch|14-6", 8-3" | 24 Glasgow |Light cruiser | 4,800 |none |2-6", 10-4" | 26.5 -------------|-----------------|---------|------|--------------------|----- Canopus | | | | | (not engaged)|Coast defense | 12,950 |6-inch|4-35 cal. 12", 12-6"| 16.5 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Without the _Canopus_, the British had perhaps a slight advantage in squadron speed, but only the two 9.2-inch guns of the _Good Hope_ could match the sixteen 8.2-inch guns of the Germans. Each side had information of the other's strength; but on the afternoon of November 1, the date of the Battle of Coronel, each supposed that only one enemy cruiser was in the immediate vicinity. Hence there was mutual surprise when the two squadrons, spread widely on opposite courses, came in contact at 4.40 p. m.

While concentrating and forming his squadron, Admiral Cradock must have pondered whether he should fight or retreat. The _Canopus_ he knew was laboring northward 250 miles away. It was highly doubtful whether he could bring the enemy into action later with his slow battles.h.i.+p in line. His orders were to "search and protect trade."

"Safety," we are told, "was a word he hardly knew." But his best justification lay in the enemy's menace to commerce and in the comment of Nelson upon a similar situation, "By the time the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no more harm that year."

It was perhaps with this thought that Admiral Cradock signaled to the _Canopus_, "I am going to fight the enemy now."

At about 6 p.m. the two columns were 18,000 yards distant on southerly converging courses. The British, to westward and slightly ahead, tried to force the action before sunset, when they would be silhouetted against the afterglow. Their speed at this time, however, seems to have been held up by the auxiliary cruiser _Otranto_, which later retreated southwestward, and their efforts to close were thwarted by the enemy's turning slightly away. Admiral von Spee in fact secured every advantage of position, between the British and the neutral coast, on the side away from the sun, and on such a course that the heavy seas from east of south struck the British s.h.i.+ps on their engaged bows, showering the batteries with spray and rendering useless the lower deck guns.

At 7 o'clock the German s.h.i.+ps opened fire at 11,260 yards. The third salvo from the _Scharnhorst_ disabled the _Good Hope's_ forward 9.2-inch gun. The _Monmouth's_ forecastle was soon on fire.

It seems probable indeed that most of the injury to the British was inflicted by accurate shooting in this first stage of the action.

On account of the gathering darkness, Admiral von Spee allowed the range to be closed to about 5500 yards, guiding his aim at first by the blaze on the Monmouth, and then for a time ceasing fire.

Shortly before 8 o'clock a huge column of flame shooting up between the stacks of the _Good Hope_ marked her end. The _Monmouth_ sheered away to westward and then northward with a heavy list that prevented the use of her port guns. An hour later, at 9.25, with her flag still flying defiantly, she was sunk by the _Nurnberg_ at point blank range. The _Glasgow_, which had fought throughout the action, but had suffered little from the fire of the German light cruisers, escaped in the darkness.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOV. 1, 1914

From _Official British Naval History_, Vol. I.]

"It is difficult," writes an American officer, "to find fault with the tactics of Admiral van Spee; he appears to have maneuvered so as to secure the advantage of light, wind, and sea, and to have suited himself as regards the range."[1] The _Scharnhorst_ was. .h.i.t twice, the _Gneisenau_ four times, and the German casualties were only two men wounded.

[Footnote 1: Commander C. C. Gill, NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, p. 51.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS]

This stinging blow and the resultant danger aroused the new Board of Admiralty to energetic moves. Entering the Atlantic, the German squadron might scatter upon the trade routes or support the rebellion in South Africa. Again, it might double westward or northward in the Pacific, or pa.s.s in groups of three, as permitted by American rules, through the Panama Ca.n.a.l into the West Indies. Concerted measures were taken against these possibilities. Despite the weakening of the Grand Fleet, the battle cruisers _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ under Admiral St.u.r.dee, former Chief of Admiralty Staff, sailed on November 11 for the Falkland Islands. Their destination was kept a close secret, for had the slightest inkling of their mission reached German ears it would at once have been communicated to von Spee.

After the battle, the German admiral moved slowly southward, coaling from chartered vessels and prizes; and it was not until December 1 that he rounded the Horn. Even now, had he moved directly upon the Falklands, he would have encountered only the _Canopus_, but he again delayed several days to take coal from a prize. On December 7 the British battle cruisers and other s.h.i.+ps picked up in pa.s.sage arrived at the island base and at once began to coal.

Their coming was not a moment too soon. At 7.30 the next morning, while coaling was still in progress and fires were drawn in the _Bristol_, the signal station on the neck of land south of the harbor reported two strange vessels, which proved to be the _Gneisenau_ and the _Nurnberg_, approaching from the southward. As they eased down to demolish the wireless station, the _Canopus_ opened on them at about 11,000 yards by indirect fire. The two s.h.i.+ps swerved off, and at 9.40, perceiving the dense clouds of smoke over the harbor and what appeared to be tripod masts, they fell back on their main force.

Hull down, and with about 15 miles' start, the Germans, had they scattered at this time might, most of them at least, have escaped, as they certainly would have if their approach had been made more cautiously and at a later period in the day. The British s.h.i.+ps were now out, with the fast _Glasgow_ well in the lead. In the chase that followed, Admiral van Spee checked speed somewhat to keep his squadron together. Though Admiral St.u.r.dee for a time did the same, he was able at 12.50 to open on the rear s.h.i.+p _Leipzig_ at 16,000 yards. At 1.20 the German light cruisers scattered to southwestward, followed by the _Cornwall, Kent_, and _Glasgow_.

The 26-knot _Bristol_, had she been able to work up steam in time, would have been invaluable in this pursuit; she was sent instead to destroy three enemy colliers or transports reported off the islands.

Between the larger s.h.i.+ps the action continued at long range, for the superior speed of the battle cruisers enabled Admiral St.u.r.dee to choose his distance, and his proper concern was to demolish the enemy with his own s.h.i.+ps unscathed. At 2.05 he turned 8 points to starboard to clear the smoke blown down from the northwest and reduce the range, which had increased to 16,000 yards. Admiral von Spee also turned southward, and the stern chase was renewed without firing until 2.45. At this point both sides turned to port, the Germans now slightly in the rear and working in to 12,500 yards to use their 5.9-inch guns.

At 3.15 the British came completely about to avoid the smoke, and the Germans also turned, a little later, as if to cross their bows.

(See diagram.) The _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, though fighting gamely, were now beaten s.h.i.+ps, the latter with upper works a "shambles of torn and twisted iron," and holes in her sides through which could be seen the red glow of flames. She turned on her beam-ends at 4.17 and sank with every man an board. At 6 o'clock, after a fight of extraordinary persistence, the _Gneisenau_ opened her sea-c.o.c.ks and went down. All her 8-inch ammunition had been expended, and 600 of her 850 men were disabled or killed. Some 200 were saved.

Against s.h.i.+ps with 12-inch guns and four times their weight of broadside the _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ made a creditable record of over 20 hits. The British, however, suffered no casualties or material injury. While Admiral St.u.r.dee's tactics are thus justified, the prolongation of the battle left him no time to join in the light cruiser chase, and even opened the possibility, in the rain squalls of the late afternoon, that one of the armored cruisers might get away. In spite of a calm sea and excellent visibility during most of the action, the gunnery of the battle cruisers appears to have been less accurate at long range than in the later engagement off the Dogger Bank.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, DEC. 8, 1914

From _Official British Naval History_, Vol. I.

_British Squadron_ _Name Type Guns Speed_ Invincible Battle Cruiser 8--12", 16--4" 26.5 Inflexible Battle Cruiser 8--12", 16--4" 26.5 Carnarvon Armored Cruiser 4--7.5", 6--6" 23.0 Cornwall Armored Cruiser 14--6" 23.5 Kent Armored Cruiser 14--6" 23.0 Bristol Scout Cruiser 2--6", 10--4" 26.5 Glasgow Scout Cruiser 2--6", 10--4" 26.5 Canopus Coast Defense 4--12", 12--6" 16.5

_German Squadron_ Scharnhorst Armored Cruiser 8--8.2", 6--6" 23.5 Gneisenau Armored Cruiser 8--8.2", 6--6" 23.5 Leipzig Protected Cruiser 10--4" 23.0 Nurnberg Scout Cruiser 10--4" 24.0 Dresden Scout Cruiser 10--4" 24.0]

Following similar tactics, the _Glasgow_ and _Cornwall_ overtook and finally silenced the _Leipzig_ at 7 p.m., four hours after the _Glasgow_ had first opened fire. Defiant to the last, like the _Monmouth_ at Coronel, and with her ammunition gone, she sank at 9.25, carrying down all but 18 of her officers and crew. The _Kent_, stoking all her woodwork to increase steam, attained at 5 o'clock a position 12,000 yards from the _Nurnberg_, when the latter opened fire. At this late hour a long range action was out of the question. As the _Nurnberg_ slowed down with two of her boilers burst, the _Kent_ closed to 3000 yards and at 7.30 finished off her smaller opponent. The _Dresden_, making well above her schedule speed of 24 knots, had disappeared to southwestward early in the afternoon. Her escape entailed a long search, until, on March 14, 1915, she was destroyed by the _Kent_ and _Glasgow_ off Juan Fernandez, where she had taken refuge for repairs.

_Cruise of the "Emden"_

Among the German cruisers other than those of Admiral van Spee's squadron, the exploits of the _Emden_ are best known, and reminiscent of the _Alabama's_ famous cruise in the American Civil War. It may be noted, however, as indicative of changed conditions, that the _Emden's_ depredations covered only two months instead of two years. A 3600 ton s.h.i.+p with a speed of 25 knots, the _Emden_ left Kiao-chau on August 6, met von Spee's cruisers in the Ladrones on the 12th, and on September 10 appeared most unexpectedly on the west side of the Bay of Bengal. Here she sank five British merchantmen, all following the customary route with lights aglow.

On the 18th she was off the Rangoon River, and 6 days later across the bay at Madras, where she set ablaze two tanks of the Burma Oil Company with half a million gallons of kerosene. From September 26 to 29 she was at the junction of trade routes west of Ceylon, and again, after an overhaul in the Chagos Archipelago to southward, spent October 16-19 in the same profitable field. Like most raiders, she planned to operate in one locality not more than three or four days, and then, avoiding all vessels on her course, strike suddenly elsewhere. During this period, British, j.a.panese, French, and Russian cruisers--the Germans a.s.sert there were 19 at one time--followed her trail.

The most daring adventure of Captain von Muller, the _Emden's_ skipper, was now carried out in the harbor of Penang, on the west side of the Malay Peninsula. With an additional false funnel to imitate British county-cla.s.s cruisers, the _Emden_ at daybreak of October 28 pa.s.sed the picket-boat off the harbor unchallenged, destroyed the Russian cruiser _Jemtchug_ by gunfire and two torpedoes, and, after sinking the French destroyer _Mousquet_ outside, got safely away. The Russian commander was afterward condemned for letting his s.h.i.+p lie at anchor with open lights, with only an anchor watch, and with strangers at liberty to visit her.

Steaming southward, the raider made her next and last appearance on the morning of November 9 off the British cable and wireless station on the Cocos Islands. As she approached, word was promptly cabled to London, Adelaide, and Singapore, and--more profitably--was wirelessed to an Australian troop convoy then only 45 miles away. The _Emden_ caught the message, but nevertheless sent a party ash.o.r.e, and was standing outside when the armored cruiser _Sydney_ came charging up. Against the _Emden's_ ten 4.1-inch guns, the _Sydney_ had eight 6-inch guns, and she was at least 4 knots faster. Outranged and outdone in speed, the German s.h.i.+p was soon driven ash.o.r.e in a sinking condition, with a funnel down and steering gear disabled.

During her two months' activity thus ended, the _Emden_ had made 21 captures, destroying s.h.i.+ps and cargoes to the value of over $10,000,000.

The other German cruisers were also short-lived. The _Karlsruhe_, after arming the liner _Kronprinz Wilhelm_ off the Bahamas (August 6) and narrowly escaping the _Suffolk_ and the _Bristol_ by superior speed, operated with great success on the South American trade routes. Her disappearance--long a mystery to the Allies--was due to an internal explosion, just as she was about to crown her exploits by a raid on the island of Barbados. The _Konigsberg_, on the east coast of Africa, surprised and sank the British light cruiser _Pegasus_ while the latter lay at Mombasa, Zanzibar, making repairs. She was later bottled up in the Rufigi River (October 30) and finally destroyed there (July 11, 1915) by indirect fire from monitors, "spotted" by airplanes.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE CRUISE OF THE EMDEN, SEPT. 1-NOV. 9, 1914]

Of the auxiliary cruisers, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_ was sunk by the _Highflyer_ (August 26), and the _Cap Trafalgar_ went down after a hard fight with the _Carmania_ (September 14).

The _Prinz Eitel Friedrich_, which had entered the Atlantic with von Spee, interned at Newport News, Virginia, in March, 1915, and was followed thither a month later by the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_.

The results of this surface warfare upon commerce amounted to 69 merchant vessels, totaling 280,000 tons. With more strict concentration upon commerce destruction, and further preparations for using German liners as auxiliaries, the campaign might have been prolonged and made somewhat more effective. But for the same purpose the superiority of the submarine was soon demonstrated. To take the later surface raiders: the _Wolf_ sank or captured 20 s.h.i.+ps in 15 months at sea; the _Seeadler_, 23 in 7 months; the _Mowe_ 15 in 2 months. But many a submarine in one month made a better record than these.

The opening of Germany's submarine campaign, to be treated later, was formally announced by her blockade proclamation of February 4, 1915.

_The Dogger Bank Action_

The strategic value of the battle cruiser, as a means of throwing strength quickly into distant fields, was brought out in the campaign against von Spee. As an outcome of German raids on the east coast of England, its tactical qualities, against units of equal strength, were soon put to a sharper trial. Aside from mere _Schrecklichkeit_--a desire to carry the terrors of war to English soil--these raids had the legitimate military objects of helping distant cruisers by holding British s.h.i.+ps in home waters, of delaying troop movements to France, and of creating a popular clamor that might force a dislocation or division of the Grand Fleet. The first incursion, on November 3, inflicted trifling damage; the second, on December 16, was marked by the bombardment of Scarborough, Hartlepool, and Whitby, in which 99 civilians were killed and 500 wounded. The third, on January 24 following, brought on the Dogger Bank action, the first encounter between battle cruisers, and one of the two capital s.h.i.+p actions of the war.

At dawn on this date, the _Derfflinger, Seydlitz_ (flags.h.i.+p of Admiral von Hipper), _Moltke_, and armored cruiser _Blucher_, with 4 light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas, were moving westward about midway in the North Sea on a line between Heligoland and the scene of their former raids. Five battle cruisers under Admiral Beatty were at the same time approaching a rendezvous with the Harwich Force for one of their periodical sweeps in the southern area. The Harwich Force first came in contact with the enemy about 7 a.m. Fortunately for the Germans, they had already been warned of Beatty's approach by one of their light cruisers, and had just turned back at high speed when the British battle cruisers made them out to southeastward 14 miles away. The forces opposed were as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Dis- | | | Best | |Dis- | | | Best British |place-|Armor| Guns |recent|German |place-|Armor| Guns |recent | ment | | |speed*| |ment | | |speed -----------|------|-----|-------|------|-----------|------|-----|-------|------ Lion |26,350| 9" |8 13.5"| 31.7 |Derfflinger|26,180| 13" | 8 12" | 30 Tiger |28,500| 9" |8 13.5"| 32 |Seydlitz |24,610| 11" |10 11" | 29 Princess |28,350| 9" |8 13.5"| 31.7 |Moltke |22,640| 11" |10 11" | 28.4 Royal | | | | | | | | | New Zealand|18,800| 8" |8 12" | 29 |Blucher |15,550| 6" |12 8.2"| 25.3 Indomitable|17,250| 7" |8 12" | 28.7 | | | | | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[Footnote *: Jane's FIGHTING s.h.i.+PS, 1914.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA]

Settling at once to a stern chase, the British s.h.i.+ps increased speed to 28.5 knots; while the Germans, handicapped by the slower _Blucher_, were held down to 25. At 8.52 the _Lion_ was within 20,000 yards of the _Blucher_, and, after deliberate ranging shots, scored her first hit at 9.09. As the range further decreased, the _Tiger_ opened on the rear s.h.i.+p, and the _Lion_ s.h.i.+fted to the third in line at 18,000 yards. The enemy returned the fire at 9.14. Thus the action continued, both squadrons in lines of bearing, and Beatty's s.h.i.+ps engaged as a rule with their opposites in the enemy order.