The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science Science and Method Part 23

But this is not enough: for a mechanical explanation to be good, it must be simple; for choosing it among all which are possible, there should be other reasons besides the necessity of making a choice. Well, we have not as yet a theory satisfying this condition and consequently good for something. Must we lament this? That would be to forget what is the goal sought; this is not mechanism; the true, the sole aim is unity.

We must therefore set bounds to our ambition; let us not try to formulate a mechanical explanation; let us be content with showing that we could always find one if we wished to. In this regard we have been successful; the principle of the conservation of energy has received only confirmations; a second principle has come to join it, that of least action, put under the form which is suitable for physics. It also has always been verified, at least in so far as concerns reversible phenomena which thus obey the equations of Lagrange, that is to say, the most general laws of mechanics.

Irreversible phenomena are much more rebellious. Yet these also are being coordinated, and tend to come into unity; the light which has illuminated them has come to us from Carnot's principle. Long did thermodynamics confine itself to the study of the dilatation of bodies and their changes of state. For some time past it has been growing bolder and has considerably extended its domain. We owe to it the theory of the galvanic battery and that of the thermoelectric phenomena; there is not in all physics a corner that it has not explored, and it has attacked chemistry itself.

Everywhere the same laws reign; everywhere, under the diversity of appearances, is found again Carnot's principle; everywhere also is found that concept so prodigiously abstract of entropy, which is as universal as that of energy and seems like it to cover a reality. Radiant heat seemed destined to escape it; but recently we have seen that submit to the same laws.

In this way fresh a.n.a.logies are revealed to us, which may often be followed into detail; ohmic resistance resembles the viscosity of liquids; hysteresis would resemble rather the friction of solids. In all cases, friction would appear to be the type which the most various irreversible phenomena copy, and this kins.h.i.+p is real and profound.

Of these phenomena a mechanical explanation, properly so called, has also been sought. They hardly lent themselves to it. To find it, it was necessary to suppose that the irreversibility is only apparent, that the elementary phenomena are reversible and obey the known laws of dynamics.

But the elements are extremely numerous and blend more and more, so that to our crude sight all appears to tend toward uniformity, that is, everything seems to go forward in the same sense without hope of return. The apparent irreversibility is thus only an effect of the law of great numbers. But, only a being with infinitely subtile senses, like Maxwell's imaginary demon, could disentangle this inextricable skein and turn back the course of the universe.

This conception, which attaches itself to the kinetic theory of gases, has cost great efforts and has not, on the whole, been fruitful; but it may become so. This is not the place to examine whether it does not lead to contradictions and whether it is in conformity with the true nature of things.

We signalize, however, M. Gouy's original ideas on the Brownian movement. According to this scientist, this singular motion should escape Carnot's principle. The particles which it puts in swing would be smaller than the links of that so compacted skein; they would therefore be fitted to disentangle them and hence to make the world go backward.

We should almost see Maxwell's demon at work.

To summarize, the previously known phenomena are better and better cla.s.sified, but new phenomena come to claim their place; most of these, like the Zeeman effect, have at once found it.

But we have the cathode rays, the X-rays, those of uranium and of radium. Herein is a whole world which no one suspected. How many unexpected guests must be stowed away?

No one can yet foresee the place they will occupy. But I do not believe they will destroy the general unity; I think they will rather complete it. On the one hand, in fact, the new radiations seem connected with the phenomena of luminescence; not only do they excite fluorescence, but they sometimes take birth in the same conditions as it.

Nor are they without kins.h.i.+p with the causes which produce the electric spark under the action of the ultra-violet light.

Finally, and above all, it is believed that in all these phenomena are found true ions, animated, it is true, by velocities incomparably greater than in the electrolytes.

That is all very vague, but it will all become more precise.

Phosph.o.r.escence, the action of light on the spark, these were regions rather isolated and consequently somewhat neglected by investigators.

One may now hope that a new path will be constructed which will facilitate their communications with the rest of science.

Not only do we discover new phenomena, but in those we thought we knew, unforeseen aspects reveal themselves. In the free ether, the laws retain their majestic simplicity; but matter, properly so called, seems more and more complex; all that is said of it is never more than approximate, and at each instant our formulas require new terms.

Nevertheless the frames are not broken; the relations that we have recognized between objects we thought simple still subsist between these same objects when we know their complexity, and it is that alone which is of importance. Our equations become, it is true, more and more complicated, in order to embrace more closely the complexity of nature; but nothing is changed in the relations which permit the deducing of these equations one from another. In a word, the form of these equations has persisted.

Take, for example, the laws of reflection: Fresnel had established them by a simple and seductive theory which experiment seemed to confirm.

Since then more precise researches have proved that this verification was only approximate; they have shown everywhere traces of elliptic polarization. But, thanks to the help that the first approximation gave us, we found forthwith the cause of these anomalies, which is the presence of a transition layer; and Fresnel's theory has subsisted in its essentials.

But there is a reflection we can not help making: All these relations would have remained unperceived if one had at first suspected the complexity of the objects they connect. It has long been said: If Tycho had had instruments ten times more precise neither Kepler, nor Newton, nor astronomy would ever have been. It is a misfortune for a science to be born too late, when the means of observation have become too perfect.

This is to-day the case with physical chemistry; its founders are embarra.s.sed in their general grasp by third and fourth decimals; happily they are men of a robust faith.

The better one knows the properties of matter the more one sees continuity reign. Since the labors of Andrews and of van der Waals, we get an idea of how the pa.s.sage is made from the liquid to the gaseous state and that this pa.s.sage is not abrupt. Similarly, there is no gap between the liquid and solid states, and in the proceedings of a recent congress is to be seen, alongside of a work on the rigidity of liquids, a memoir on the flow of solids.

By this tendency no doubt simplicity loses; some phenomenon was formerly represented by several straight lines, now these straights must be joined by curves more or less complicated. In compensation unity gains notably. Those cut-off categories quieted the mind, but they did not satisfy it.

Finally the methods of physics have invaded a new domain, that of chemistry; physical chemistry is born. It is still very young, but we already see that it will enable us to connect such phenomena as electrolysis, osmosis and the motions of ions.

From this rapid exposition, what shall we conclude?

Everything considered, we have approached unity; we have not been as quick as was hoped fifty years ago, we have not always taken the predicted way; but, finally, we have gained ever so much ground.

CHAPTER XI

THE CALCULUS OF PROBABILITIES

Doubtless it will be astonis.h.i.+ng to find here thoughts about the calculus of probabilities. What has it to do with the method of the physical sciences? And yet the questions I shall raise without solving present themselves naturally to the philosopher who is thinking about physics. So far is this the case that in the two preceding chapters I have often been led to use the words 'probability' and 'chance.'

'Predicted facts,' as I have said above, 'can only be probable.'

"However solidly founded a prediction may seem to us to be, we are never absolutely sure that experiment will not prove it false. But the probability is often so great that practically we may be satisfied with it." And a little further on I have added: "See what a role the belief in simplicity plays in our generalizations. We have verified a simple law in a great number of particular cases; we refuse to admit that this coincidence, so often repeated, can be a mere effect of chance...."

Thus in a mult.i.tude of circ.u.mstances the physicist is in the same position as the gambler who reckons up his chances. As often as he reasons by induction, he requires more or less consciously the calculus of probabilities, and this is why I am obliged to introduce a parenthesis, and interrupt our study of method in the physical sciences in order to examine a little more closely the value of this calculus, and what confidence it merits.

The very name calculus of probabilities is a paradox. Probability opposed to certainty is what we do not know, and how can we calculate what we do not know? Yet many eminent savants have occupied themselves with this calculus, and it can not be denied that science has drawn therefrom no small advantage.

How can we explain this apparent contradiction?

Has probability been defined? Can it even be defined? And if it can not, how dare we reason about it? The definition, it will be said, is very simple: the probability of an event is the ratio of the number of cases favorable to this event to the total number of possible cases.

A simple example will show how incomplete this definition is. I throw two dice. What is the probability that one of the two at least turns up a six? Each die can turn up in six different ways; the number of possible cases is 6 6 = 36; the number of favorable cases is 11; the probability is 11/36.

That is the correct solution. But could I not just as well say: The points which turn up on the two dice can form 6 7/2 = 21 different combinations? Among these combinations 6 are favorable; the probability is 6/21.

Now why is the first method of enumerating the possible cases more legitimate than the second? In any case it is not our definition that tells us.

We are therefore obliged to complete this definition by saying: '... to the total number of possible cases provided these cases are equally probable.' So, therefore, we are reduced to defining the probable by the probable.

How can we know that two possible cases are equally probable? Will it be by a convention? If we place at the beginning of each problem an explicit convention, well and good. We shall then have nothing to do but apply the rules of arithmetic and of algebra, and we shall complete our calculation without our result leaving room for doubt. But if we wish to make the slightest application of this result, we must prove our convention was legitimate, and we shall find ourselves in the presence of the very difficulty we thought to escape.

Will it be said that good sense suffices to show us what convention should be adopted? Alas! M. Bertrand has amused himself by discussing the following simple problem: "What is the probability that a chord of a circle may be greater than the side of the inscribed equilateral triangle?" The ill.u.s.trious geometer successively adopted two conventions which good sense seemed equally to dictate and with one he found 1/2, with the other 1/3.

The conclusion which seems to follow from all this is that the calculus of probabilities is a useless science, and that the obscure instinct which we may call good sense, and to which we are wont to appeal to legitimatize our conventions, must be distrusted.

But neither can we subscribe to this conclusion; we can not do without this obscure instinct. Without it science would be impossible, without it we could neither discover a law nor apply it. Have we the right, for instance, to enunciate Newton's law? Without doubt, numerous observations are in accord with it; but is not this a simple effect of chance? Besides how do we know whether this law, true for so many centuries, will still be true next year? To this objection, you will find nothing to reply, except: 'That is very improbable.'

But grant the law. Thanks to it, I believe myself able to calculate the position of Jupiter a year from now. Have I the right to believe this?

Who can tell if a gigantic ma.s.s of enormous velocity will not between now and that time pa.s.s near the solar system, and produce unforeseen perturbations? Here again the only answer is: 'It is very improbable.'

From this point of view, all the sciences would be only unconscious applications of the calculus of probabilities. To condemn this calculus would be to condemn the whole of science.

I shall dwell lightly on the scientific problems in which the intervention of the calculus of probabilities is more evident. In the forefront of these is the problem of interpolation, in which, knowing a certain number of values of a function, we seek to divine the intermediate values.

I shall likewise mention: the celebrated theory of errors of observation, to which I shall return later; the kinetic theory of gases, a well-known hypothesis, wherein each gaseous molecule is supposed to describe an extremely complicated trajectory, but in which, through the effect of great numbers, the mean phenomena, alone observable, obey the simple laws of Mariotte and Gay-Lussac.

All these theories are based on the laws of great numbers, and the calculus of probabilities would evidently involve them in its ruin. It is true that they have only a particular interest and that, save as far as interpolation is concerned, these are sacrifices to which we might readily be resigned.