The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science Science and Method Part 15

THE CLa.s.sIC MECHANICS

The English teach mechanics as an experimental science; on the continent it is always expounded as more or less a deductive and _a priori_ science. The English are right, that goes without saying; but how could the other method have been persisted in so long? Why have the continental savants who have sought to get out of the ruts of their predecessors been usually unable to free themselves completely?

On the other hand, if the principles of mechanics are only of experimental origin, are they not therefore only approximate and provisional? Might not new experiments some day lead us to modify or even to abandon them?

Such are the questions which naturally obtrude themselves, and the difficulty of solution comes princ.i.p.ally from the fact that the treatises on mechanics do not clearly distinguish between what is experiment, what is mathematical reasoning, what is convention, what is hypothesis.

That is not all:

1 There is no absolute s.p.a.ce and we can conceive only of relative motions; yet usually the mechanical facts are enunciated as if there were an absolute s.p.a.ce to which to refer them.

2 There is no absolute time; to say two durations are equal is an a.s.sertion which has by itself no meaning and which can acquire one only by convention.

3 Not only have we no direct intuition of the equality of two durations, but we have not even direct intuition of the simultaneity of two events occurring in different places: this I have explained in an article ent.i.tled _La mesure du temps_.[3]

[3] _Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale_, t. VI., pp. 1-13 (January, 1898).

4 Finally, our Euclidean geometry is itself only a sort of convention of language; mechanical facts might be enunciated with reference to a non-Euclidean s.p.a.ce which would be a guide less convenient than, but just as legitimate as, our ordinary s.p.a.ce; the enunciation would thus become much more complicated, but it would remain possible.

Thus absolute s.p.a.ce, absolute time, geometry itself, are not conditions which impose themselves on mechanics; all these things are no more antecedent to mechanics than the French language is logically antecedent to the verities one expresses in French.

We might try to enunciate the fundamental laws of mechanics in a language independent of all these conventions; we should thus without doubt get a better idea of what these laws are in themselves; this is what M. Andrade has attempted to do, at least in part, in his _Lecons de mecanique physique_.

The enunciation of these laws would become of course much more complicated, because all these conventions have been devised expressly to abridge and simplify this enunciation.

As for me, save in what concerns absolute s.p.a.ce, I shall ignore all these difficulties; not that I fail to appreciate them, far from that; but we have sufficiently examined them in the first two parts of the book.

I shall therefore admit, _provisionally_, absolute time and Euclidean geometry.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INERTIA.--A body acted on by no force can only move uniformly in a straight line.

Is this a truth imposed _a priori_ upon the mind? If it were so, how should the Greeks have failed to recognize it? How could they have believed that motion stops when the cause which gave birth to it ceases?

Or again that every body if nothing prevents, will move in a circle, the n.o.blest of motions?

If it is said that the velocity of a body can not change if there is no reason for it to change, could it not be maintained just as well that the position of this body can not change, or that the curvature of its trajectory can not change, if no external cause intervenes to modify them?

Is the principle of inertia, which is not an _a priori_ truth, therefore an experimental fact? But has any one ever experimented on bodies withdrawn from the action of every force? and, if so, how was it known that these bodies were subjected to no force? The example ordinarily cited is that of a ball rolling a very long time on a marble table; but why do we say it is subjected to no force? Is this because it is too remote from all other bodies to experience any appreciable action from them? Yet it is not farther from the earth than if it were thrown freely into the air; and every one knows that in this case it would experience the influence of gravity due to the attraction of the earth.

Teachers of mechanics usually pa.s.s rapidly over the example of the ball; but they add that the principle of inertia is verified indirectly by its consequences. They express themselves badly; they evidently mean it is possible to verify various consequences of a more general principle, of which that of inertia is only a particular case.

I shall propose for this general principle the following enunciation:

The acceleration of a body depends only upon the position of this body and of the neighboring bodies and upon their velocities.

Mathematicians would say the movements of all the material molecules of the universe depend on differential equations of the second order.

To make it clear that this is really the natural generalization of the law of inertia, I shall beg you to permit me a bit of fiction. The law of inertia, as I have said above, is not imposed upon us _a priori_; other laws would be quite as compatible with the principle of sufficient reason. If a body is subjected to no force, in lieu of supposing its velocity not to change, it might be supposed that it is its position or else its acceleration which is not to change.

Well, imagine for an instant that one of these two hypothetical laws is a law of nature and replaces our law of inertia. What would be its natural generalization? A moment's thought will show us.

In the first case, we must suppose that the velocity of a body depends only upon its position and upon that of the neighboring bodies; in the second case that the change of acceleration of a body depends only upon the position of this body and of the neighboring bodies, upon their velocities and upon their accelerations.

Or to speak the language of mathematics, the differential equations of motion would be of the first order in the first case, and of the third order in the second case.

Let us slightly modify our fiction. Suppose a world a.n.a.logous to our solar system, but where, by a strange chance, the orbits of all the planets are without eccentricity and without inclination. Suppose further that the ma.s.ses of these planets are too slight for their mutual perturbations to be sensible. Astronomers inhabiting one of these planets could not fail to conclude that the orbit of a star can only be circular and parallel to a certain plane; the position of a star at a given instant would then suffice to determine its velocity and its whole path. The law of inertia which they would adopt would be the first of the two hypothetical laws I have mentioned.

Imagine now that this system is some day traversed with great velocity by a body of vast ma.s.s, coming from distant constellations. All the orbits would be profoundly disturbed. Still our astronomers would not be too greatly astonished; they would very well divine that this new star was alone to blame for all the mischief. "But," they would say, "when it is gone, order will of itself be reestablished; no doubt the distances of the planets from the sun will not revert to what they were before the cataclysm, but when the perturbing star is gone, the orbits will again become circular."

It would only be when the disturbing body was gone and when nevertheless the orbits, in lieu of again becoming circular, became elliptic, that these astronomers would become conscious of their error and the necessity of remaking all their mechanics.

I have dwelt somewhat upon these hypotheses because it seems to me one can clearly comprehend what our generalized law of inertia really is only in contrasting it with a contrary hypothesis.

Well, now, has this generalized law of inertia been verified by experiment, or can it be? When Newton wrote the _Principia_ he quite regarded this truth as experimentally acquired and demonstrated. It was so in his eyes, not only through the anthropomorphism of which we shall speak further on, but through the work of Galileo. It was so even from Kepler's laws themselves; in accordance with these laws, in fact, the path of a planet is completely determined by its initial position and initial velocity; this is just what our generalized law of inertia requires.

For this principle to be only in appearance true, for one to have cause to dread having some day to replace it by one of the a.n.a.logous principles I have just now contrasted with it, would be necessary our having been misled by some amazing chance, like that which, in the fiction above developed, led into error our imaginary astronomers.

Such a hypothesis is too unlikely to delay over. No one will believe that such coincidences can happen; no doubt the probability of two eccentricities being both precisely null, to within errors of observation, is not less than the probability of one being precisely equal to 0.1, for instance, and the other to 0.2, to within errors of observation. The probability of a simple event is not less than that of a complicated event; and yet, if the first happens, we shall not consent to attribute it to chance; we should not believe that nature had acted expressly to deceive us. The hypothesis of an error of this sort being discarded, it may therefore be admitted that in so far as astronomy is concerned, our law has been verified by experiment.

But astronomy is not the whole of physics.

May we not fear lest some day a new experiment should come to falsify the law in some domain of physics? An experimental law is always subject to revision; one should always expect to see it replaced by a more precise law.

Yet no one seriously thinks that the law we are speaking of will ever be abandoned or amended. Why? Precisely because it can never be subjected to a decisive test.

First of all, in order that this trial should be complete, it would be necessary that after a certain time all the bodies in the universe should revert to their initial positions with their initial velocities.

It might then be seen whether, starting from this moment, they would resume their original paths.

But this test is impossible, it can be only partially applied, and, however well it is made, there will always be some bodies which will not revert to their initial positions; thus every derogation of the law will easily find its explanation.

This is not all; in astronomy we _see_ the bodies whose motions we study and we usually a.s.sume that they are not subjected to the action of other invisible bodies. Under these conditions our law must indeed be either verified or not verified.

But it is not the same in physics; if the physical phenomena are due to motions, it is to the motions of molecules which we do not see. If then the acceleration of one of the bodies we see appears to us to depend on _something else_ besides the positions or velocities of other visible bodies or of invisible molecules whose existence we have been previously led to admit, nothing prevents our supposing that this _something else_ is the position or the velocity of other molecules whose presence we have not before suspected. The law will find itself safeguarded.

Permit me to employ mathematical language a moment to express the same thought under another form. Suppose we observe _n_ molecules and ascertain that their 3_n_ coordinates satisfy a system of 3_n_ differential equations of the fourth order (and not of the second order as the law of inertia would require). We know that by introducing 3_n_ auxiliary variables, a system of 3_n_ equations of the fourth order can be reduced to a system of 6_n_ equations of the second order. If then we suppose these 3_n_ auxiliary variables represent the coordinates of _n_ invisible molecules, the result is again in conformity with the law of inertia.

To sum up, this law, verified experimentally in some particular cases, may unhesitatingly be extended to the most general cases, since we know that in these general cases experiment no longer is able either to confirm or to contradict it.

THE LAW OF ACCELERATION.--The acceleration of a body is equal to the force acting on it divided by its ma.s.s. Can this law be verified by experiment? For that it would be necessary to measure the three magnitudes which figure in the enunciation: acceleration, force and ma.s.s.

I a.s.sume that acceleration can be measured, for I pa.s.s over the difficulty arising from the measurement of time. But how measure force, or ma.s.s? We do not even know what they are.

What is _ma.s.s_? According to Newton, it is the product of the volume by the density. According to Thomson and Tait, it would be better to say that density is the quotient of the ma.s.s by the volume. What is _force_?

It is, replies Lagrange, that which moves or tends to move a body. It is, Kirchhoff will say, the product of the ma.s.s by the _acceleration_.

But then, why not say the ma.s.s is the quotient of the force by the acceleration?

These difficulties are inextricable.

When we say force is the cause of motion, we talk metaphysics, and this definition, if one were content with it, would be absolutely sterile.