Know the Truth; A critique of the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation Part 5

Again, a clearly defined distinction may be made between them as conditions. s.p.a.ce is the _a priori_ condition of _material_ being.

Should a spiritual person, as the soul of a man, be stripped of all its material appurtenances, and left to exist as pure spirit, it could hold no communication with any other being but G.o.d; and no other being but he could hold any communication with it. It would exist out of all relation to s.p.a.ce. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the _a priori_ condition of all created being, of the spiritual as well as material. In the case just alluded to, the isolated spiritual person would have a consciousness of succession and duration, although he would have no standard by which to measure that duration, he could think in processes, and only in processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time.

Dr. Hickok has expressed this thus: "s.p.a.ce in reference to time has no significancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena as given in the internal sense only, and in these there can be only succession. The inner phenomenon may endure in time, but can have neither length, breadth, nor thickness in s.p.a.ce. A thought, or other mental phenomenon, may fill a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may be before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with any outer or inner side."--_Rational Psychology_, p. 135.

s.p.a.ce and Time may also be distinguished thus: "s.p.a.ce has three dimensions," or, rather, there can be three dimensions in s.p.a.ce,--length, breadth, and thickness. In other words, it is solid room. "Time has but one dimension," or, rather, but one dimension can enter into Time,--length. In Time there can only be procession. s.p.a.ce and Time may then be called, the one "statical," the other "dynamical,"

illimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they may be defined as follows:

"s.p.a.ce is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter.

"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence."

Both, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and illimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object may come into it; the other, that event may occur in it. There is for neither a final unit nor any limit. All objects are divisible in s.p.a.ce, and all periods in Time; and thus also are all limits comprehended, but they are without limit. Turning now from these more general aspects of the subject, a detailed examination may be conducted as follows.

The fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen above, that s.p.a.ce and Time are _a priori_ conditions of created being. We can best consider this law in its application to the facts, by observing two general divisions, with two sub-divisions under each. s.p.a.ce and Time have, then, two general phases, one within, and one without, the mind.

Each of these has two special phases. The former, one in the Sense, and one in the Understanding. The latter, one within, and one without, the Universe.

First general phase within the mind. First special phase, in the Sense.

"As pure form in the primitive intuition, they are wholly limitless, and void of any conjunction in unity, having themselves no figure nor period, and having within themselves no figure nor period, but only pure diversity, in which any possible conjunction of definite figures and periods may, in some way, be effected." In other words, they are pure, _a priori_, formal laws, which are conditional to the being of any sense as the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this sense could present no figure or period, till some figure or period was produced into it by an external agency. As such necessary formal laws, s.p.a.ce and Time "have a necessity of being independently of all phenomena." Or, in other words, the fact that all phenomena _must_ appear in them, lies beyond the province of power. This, however, is no more a limit to the Deity than it is a limit to him that he cannot hate his creatures and be good. In our experience the Sense gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the actual phenomena of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with ideal objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the physical sense, of a material object, as a house; the other, by the activity of the imaging faculty, engaged in constructing some form in the inner or mental sense, from forms actually observed. Upon both alike the formal law of s.p.a.ce and Time must lie.

Second special phase, in the Understanding. Although there is pure form, if there was no more than this, no notion of a system of things could be. Each object would have its own s.p.a.ce, and each event its own time.

But one object and event could not be seen in any relation to another object and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some ground by which all the s.p.a.ces and times of phenomena shall be joined into a unity of s.p.a.ce and Time; so that all objects shall be seen in one s.p.a.ce, and all events in one Time. "A notional connective for the phenomena may determine these phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of all s.p.a.ce and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena and their s.p.a.ce and time in an objective experience." The operation of the Understanding is, then, the connection, by a notional, of all particular s.p.a.ces and times; _i. e._ the s.p.a.ce and time of each phenomenon in the Sense, into a comprehensive unity of s.p.a.ce and Time, in which all phenomena can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, not only must each phenomenon be seen in its own s.p.a.ce and time, but all phenomena must be seen in _one_ s.p.a.ce and Time. This connection of the manifold into unity is the peculiar work of the Understanding. An examination of the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a general formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental law given by the Reason. That law, that all objects must be seen in s.p.a.ce, and all events in Time, involves the subordinate law:

_That no mind can observe material objects or any events except under the conditions of s.p.a.ce and Time_; or, to change the phraseology, _s.p.a.ce and Time are_ a priori _conditional to the being of any mind or faculty in a mind capable of observing a material object or any event_. This will, perhaps, be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However that may be, this is true, but is only _a part of the truth_. The rest will appear just below. The reader will notice that no exception is made to the law here laid down, and will start at the thought that this law lies upon the Deity equally as upon created beings. No exception is made, because none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as unqualified in its a.s.sertion on this point as in those noticed on an earlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of numbers does the law of s.p.a.ce and Time condition all intellect. The Deity can no more see a house out of all relation to s.p.a.ce and Time than he can see how to make two and two five.

Second general phase, without the mind. First special phase, within the Universe. All that we are now to examine is objective to us; and all the questions which can arise are questions of fact. Let us search for the fact carefully and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It was found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of s.p.a.ce and Time as pure conditions for matter and event. We are now to observe the pure become the actual condition; or, in other words, we are to see the condition _realized_. Since, then, we are to observe material objects and events in a material system, it is fitting to use the Sense and the Understanding; and our statements and conclusions will conform to those faculties.

We have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in the form of a sphere in which all things are included. This spherical system is complete, definite, limited, and so has boundaries. A portion of "immeasurable void"--s.p.a.ce--has been occupied. Where there was nothing, something has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our having a concept of the Universe, or of a s.p.a.ce and a time in the Universe, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying, all-pervading substance, which fills and forms the boundaries of the Universe, and thus enables s.p.a.ces and times to be. We have no concept except as in limits, and those limits are conceived to be substance. In other words, s.p.a.ce is distance, and time is duration, in our concept.

Take away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession of events which forms the duration, and in the concept pure negation is left. To ill.u.s.trate. Suppose there be in our presence a cubic yard of vacuum. Is this vacuum an ent.i.ty? Not at all. It can neither be perceived by the Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a s.p.a.ce. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube was object to us. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial boundaries. All, then, that is object, all that is ent.i.ty, is substance. In our concept, therefore, a s.p.a.ce is solid distance within the substance, and the totality of all distances in the Universe is conceived to be s.p.a.ce.

Again; suppose there pa.s.s before our mind a procession of events. One event has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession of events is a time, and the recurring event marks a period in time. The events proceeding are all that there is in the concept; and apart from the procession a conception of time is impossible. The procession of all the events of the Universe, that is _duration_, is our concept of Time.

Thus, within the Universe, s.p.a.ce is solid distance and time is duration; and neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. Let us a.s.sume for a moment that our concept is the final truth, and observe the result. In that concept s.p.a.ce is limited by matter, and matter is conceived of as unlimited. This result is natural and necessary, because matter, substance, "a s.p.a.ce-filling force," is the underlying notional upon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is truly illimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really atheism, logically follows. Again; in our concept time is duration, and duration is conceived of as unlimited. If so, the during event is unlimited. From this hypothesis idealistic pantheism logically follows. But bring our concept into the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and all ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of finding matter illimitable and the limit for a s.p.a.ce, s.p.a.ce is seen to be illimitable and pure condition, that matter may establish a limit within it. And Time, instead of being duration, and so limited by the during event, is found to be illimitable and pure condition, that event may have duration in it. This brings us to the

Second special phase, without or independent of the Universe. We have been considering facts in an objective experience, and have used therefore the Sense and Understanding, as was proper. What we are now to consider is a subject of which all experience is impossible. It can therefore be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure Reason. Remove now from our presence all material object in s.p.a.ce, and all during event in Time; in a word, remove the Universe, and what will be left? As the Universe had a beginning, and both it and all things in it are conditioned by s.p.a.ce and Time, so also let it have an end. Will its conditions cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, upon which would be imposed no conditions of s.p.a.ce and Time? These questions are answered in the statement of them. Those conditions must remain.

When we have abstracted from our _concept_ all substance and duration, there is left only _void_. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to say that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe there was void. Also, that in void there is no thing, no where, and no when; or, void is the negation of actual substance, s.p.a.ce and time. But pure s.p.a.ce and Time, as _a priori_ conditions that material object and during event may be, have not ceased. There is still _room_, that an object may become. There is still _opportunity_, that an event may occur. By the Reason it is seen that these conditions have the same necessary being for material object and occurring event, as the conditions of mental activity have for mind; and they have their peculiar characteristics exactly according with what they do condition, just as the laws of thought have their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to what they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the moral law must be given in the intuition as necessarily binding upon him; and this is an _a priori_ condition of the being of such person. Precisely similar is the relation between s.p.a.ce and Time as _a priori_ conditions, and object and event upon which they lie. The moral law has its characteristics, which fit it to condition spiritual person. s.p.a.ce and Time have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object and event. s.p.a.ce, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, and both as _a priori_ conditions of a Universe, must have the same necessity of being that G.o.d has. They _must_ be, as he _must_ be. But observe, they are pure conditions, and no more. They are neither things nor persons. The idea of them in the Reason is simple and una.n.a.lyzable. They can be a.s.signed their logical position, but further than this the mind cannot go.

The devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of the positions stated above. We have not wrought to pain such soul, but only for truth, and the clue of escape from all dilemmas. The only question to be raised is, are they true? If a more patient investigation than we have given to this subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only have failed as others before us have; but we shall love the truth which shall be found none the less. But if they shall be found true, then is it certain that G.o.d always knew them so and was always pleased with them, and no derogation to his dignity can come from the proclamation of them, however much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. Most blessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness are those pure words of the apostle John, "No lie is of the truth."

The conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to state how it is that primarily G.o.d was out of all relation to s.p.a.ce and Time. He was out of all relation to s.p.a.ce, because he is not material object, thereby having limits, form, and position in s.p.a.ce. He was out of all relation to Time, because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible objects of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can learn nothing, and can experience no process of thought. Within his mind no event occurs, no substance endures. Yet, while this is true, it is equally true that, as the Creator, he is conditioned by s.p.a.ce and Time, just as he is conditioned by himself; and it may be found by future examination that they are essential to that Self. But, whatever conclusion may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a subject, this much is certain: G.o.d, as the infinite and absolute spiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; and s.p.a.ce and Time, whatever they are, will, _can_ in no wise interfere with and compromise his perfectness and supremacy. It is a pleasure to be able to close this discussion with reflections profound and wise as those contained in the following extract from the essay heretofore alluded to.

"The reciprocal relations of s.p.a.ce, Time, and G.o.d, are veiled in impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to s.p.a.ce and Time, lest it should conflict with the infinity of G.o.d. Such timidity has but a slender t.i.tle to respect. If the Laws of Thought necessitate any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion that s.p.a.ce and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile this result with the infinity of G.o.d, there is no alternative but to accept of scepticism with as good a grace as possible. No man is worthy to join in the search for truth, who trembles at the sight of it when found. But a profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by antic.i.p.ation, and prophesies the solutions of reason. s.p.a.ce is infinite, Time is infinite, G.o.d is infinite; three infinites coexist. Limitation is possible only between existences of the same kind. There could not be two infinite s.p.a.ces, two infinite Times, or two infinite G.o.ds; but while infinites of the same kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds may. When an hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite s.p.a.ce; when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, infinite s.p.a.ce and Time will limit the infinite G.o.d. _But not before._ Time exists ubiquitously, s.p.a.ce exists eternally, G.o.d exists ubiquitously and eternally. The nature of the relations between the three infinites, so long as s.p.a.ce and Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and absolutely incomprehensible; but to a.s.sume contradiction, exclusion, or mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous as it is irreverent."

PART III.

AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT Pa.s.sAGES IN THE WRITINGS OF THE LIMITISTS.

ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.

It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, or even to notice it particularly. From the first, it was only proposed to attempt the refutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated essay, "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof; and which he supplemented, but never superseded. If the arguments adduced, and ill.u.s.trations presented, in the first part, in behalf of the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, and the a.n.a.lysis and attempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes, an excluded middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as sufficient, as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, and the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far at least as Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if any, further remark will be expected. A few subordinate pa.s.sages in the essay above referred to may, however, it is believed, be touched with profit by the hand of criticism and explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention is now called.

In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: "Now, it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the proposition, _that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is immediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality, and relation_." It is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism, that the terms infinite, absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when used to express abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite--what? The fact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may be thus stated:--The infinite Person, or the necessary principle as inhering in that Person, is _immediately_ known in consciousness, and this, not by difference, plurality, and relation, but by a direct intuition of the Pure Reason. In this act the object seen--the idea--is held right in the Reason's eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not known by difference, because there is no other object but the one before that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it known by plurality, because it is seen by itself, and there is no other object contemplated, with which to join it. Nor is it known by relation, because it is seen to be what it is _in itself_, and as out of all relation. A little below, in the same paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin, thus:--"The recognition of the absolute as a const.i.tutive principle of intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of philosophy." The true idea, accurately stated, is as follows. The fact that, by a const.i.tuting law of intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately intuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of _a priori_ first principles, and of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the condition, and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy.

These two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated "statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought." The four "opinions," to which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are too well known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only to afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, as it is believed, the true opinion, which is as follows.

The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable as a fact, is known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known to be such and such; all this, by an immediate intuition of the Pure Reason, of which the spiritual person is definitely conscious; and that Person is so seen to be primarily unconditioned, _i. e._ out of all relation, difference, and plurality.

"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word has no force except with regard to things in nature.

Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain than that an _exhaustive_ knowledge of the Deity is impossible to any creature. But equally certain is it, that, except as we have some true, positive, _reliable_ knowledge of him _as he is_, we cannot be moral beings under his moral government. Take, for instance, the moral law as the expression of G.o.d's nature. 1. Either "G.o.d is love," or he is not love--hate; or he is indifferent, _i. e._ love has no relation to him.

If the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy to the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it is unquestionably true that he is utterly inscrutable. Then are we in just the condition which the Limitists a.s.sert. But observe the results respecting ourselves. Our whole moral nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We feel that we ought to love the perfect Being. At times we go starving for love to him and beg that bread. He has no love to give. He never felt a pulsation of affection. He sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow; and, covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. He gives us a stone. Does such a picture instantly shock, yea, horrify, all our finer sensibilities? Does the soul cry out in agony, her rejection of such a conclusion? In that cry we hear the truth in G.o.d's voice; for he made the soul. Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It is impossible, then, to think of G.o.d except as _love_. We know what love is. We know what G.o.d is. There is a somewhat common to the Deity and his spiritual creatures. This enables us to attain a final law, as follows.

_In so far as G.o.d's creatures have faculties and capacities in common with him, in so far do they know him positively; but in all matters to which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, they only know him negatively;_ i. e. _they know that he is the opposite of themselves._

That pa.s.sage which was quoted in a former page, simply to prove that Sir William Hamilton denied the reality of the Reason as distinct from the Understanding, requires and will now receive a particular examination.

He says: "In the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function; both seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'" In this sentence, and the remarks which follow it, the logician shows that he neither comprehends the a.s.signed function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any accurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he pa.s.ses judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than his. For "both faculties" do _not_ "perform the same function." Only the Understanding seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks _the many in the one_. The functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are exactly opposite. The Understanding runs about through the universe, and gathers up what facts it may, and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason sees the truth _first_, as necessary _a priori_ law, and holding it up as standard, measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this a.s.sertion, is guilty of a most glaring _pet.i.tio principii_. For, the very question at issue is, whether "both faculties" do "perform the same function"; whether "both" do "seek the one in the many." In order not to leave the hither side of the question built upon a bare a.s.sertion, it will be proper to revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The Reason sees the truth first. Take now the a.s.sertion, Malice is criminal. Is this primarily learned by experience; or is it an intuitive conviction, which conditions experience. Or, in more general terms, does a child need to be taught what guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its letters before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within it spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter be the true experience, then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an idea of right and wrong, as an _a priori_ law, is organic in man; and, by our definition, the presentation of this law to the attention in consciousness is the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one principle was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but the many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one standard, which was seen _first_, and as necessarily true. Take another ill.u.s.tration. All religions, in accounting for the universe, have one common point of agreement, which is, that some being or beings, superior to it and men, produced it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a crude form, is a.s.sociated with the other. These notions must be accounted for. How shall it be done? Are they the result of experience? Then, the first human beings had no such notions. But another and more palpable objection arises. Are they the result of individual experience? Then there would be as many religions as individuals. But, very ignorant people have the experience,--persons who never learned anything but the rudest forms of work, from the acc.u.mulated experience of others; nor by their own experience, to make the smallest improvement in a simple agricultural instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience one of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last resort, it may be said they were taught it by philosophers. But this is negatived by the fact, that philosophers do not, to any considerable extent, teach the people, either immediately or mediately; but that generally those who have the least philosophy have the largest influence. And what is most in point, none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the gist of the idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the same. Be it a Fetish, or Brahm, or G.o.d, in the kernel final cause will be found. It would seem that any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men, were this possible, could secure such universal exact.i.tude. But turn now and examine any individual in the same direction, as we did just above, respecting the question of right and wrong, and a plain answer will come directly. The notion of first cause, however crude and rudimentary its form, is organic. It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual takes it--"the one,"--and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of nature--"the many,"--and is satisfied. And this is an experience not peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared equally by the illiterate,--those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions.

These ill.u.s.trations might be carried to an almost indefinite length, showing that commonly, in the every-day experiences of life, men are accustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure phenomena by an original and fixed standard, as, "This man is malicious, and therefore wicked." Between the two modes of procedure, the following distinction may always be observed. Conclusions are always doubtful, only probable. Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what may be, decisions what must be. The former result from concepts and experience, the latter from intuitions and logical processes. Thus is made plain the fact that, to give it the most favorable aspect, Sir William Hamilton, in his eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely mistaken one cla.s.s of human experiences, and so was led to deny the actuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind.

In view of the foregoing results, one need not hesitate to say that, whether he ever attempted it or not, Kant never "has clearly shown that the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality," for it is impossible to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective reality is G.o.d; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important "knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover, unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," and not "a fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of G.o.d, who comprehends all positives. A little after, Hamilton says: "And while he [Kant]

appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of _Ideas_," &c. Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the Reason such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are they hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish an affirmative answer to the first question, a negative to the others follows directly, and the logician's system is a failure. Again, the discrimination of thought into _positive_ and _negative_ is simply absurd. All thought is _positive_. The phrase, negative thought, is only a convenient expression for the refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not thoughts at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. Ideas are a part of such objects. All objects in the mind are positive. The phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. But, without any deduction, we see immediately that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of the human race affirms this.

The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. "For those who, with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who consequently employ the terms _Absolute_, _Infinite_, _Unconditioned_, as only various expressions for the same ident.i.ty, are imperatively bound to prove that their idea of _the One corresponds, either with that Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with that Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or that it includes both, or that it excludes both_. This they have not done, and, we suspect, have never attempted to do." The italics are Hamilton's. The above statement is invalid, for the following reasons. The Absolute, therein named, has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand, and an absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," as applied to s.p.a.ce and Time, is a violation of the laws of thought. Since we seek the truth, that Absolute must be rejected. Again, the definitions of the terms absolute and infinite, which have been found consistent, and pertinent to s.p.a.ce and Time, have been further found irrelevant and meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is the Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation to s.p.a.ce and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and known as he is. The terms infinite and absolute will, of necessity, then, when applied to him, have entirely different significations from what they will when applied to s.p.a.ce and Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in this latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former.

The questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits, as must those in this. What is really required, then, is, that the One, the Person, be shown to be both absolute and infinite, and that these, as qualities, consistently inhere in that _unity_. As this has already been done in the first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here.

Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. Cousin, Hamilton quotes from him as follows: "The condition of intelligence _is difference_; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of terms." In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues from this, thus: "But, on the other hand, it is a.s.serted, that the condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference; consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable, it must be identified either, first, with the subject knowing; or, second, with the object known; or, third, with the indifference of both." Rejecting the first two, Hamilton says: "The _third_ hypothesis, on the other hand, is _contradictory of the plurality of intelligence_; for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is therefore necessary: Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of plurality and difference."

In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far as the author is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers. The logician presents an alternative which is unquestionably valid. Yet with almost, if not entire unanimity, writers have been accustomed to a.s.sign plurality, relation, difference, and--to adopt a valuable suggestion of Mr. Spencer--likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and among them those who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute. The error by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely psychological; and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed out, from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, the Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and concludes about, things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by which he sees and knows, with an _absolutely certain_ knowledge, principles and laws; and to subject this faculty to those conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if the logician's premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If "an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of terms," then is it impossible that we should know G.o.d, _or that he should know himself_. The logic is impregnable. But the conclusion is revolting. What must be done, then? Erect some makes.h.i.+ft subterfuge of mental impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It will not satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she casts it out utterly, as a most gross insult. Unquestionably, but one course is left; and that is so plain, that one cannot see how even a Limitist could have overlooked it. Correct the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the principle that _every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth_; and hold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is true. And what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic will give us a satisfactory, a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A plurality of terms is _not_ the necessary condition of intelligence; but objects which are pure, simple, una.n.a.lyzable, may be directly known by an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, relation, difference, and likeness, are necessary conditions of intelligence through the Sense and Understanding; but they do not in the least degree lie upon the Reason, which sees its objects as pure, simple ideas which are _self-evident_, and, consequently, are not subject to those conditions.

Whatever knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly gain under the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, and likeness; for "mammals" are things in nature. But absoluteness is a pure, simple, una.n.a.lyzable idea in the Reason, and as such is seen and known by a direct insight as out of all plurality, relation, difference, and likeness: for this is a _quality_ of the self-existent Person, and so belongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural.

Let us ill.u.s.trate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The knowledge given by the Sense and Understanding. This is of material objects. Take, for example, an apple. The Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that many characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color, skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, also, that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows, and, as well, that its several qualities have relations among themselves. One color belongs to the skin, another to the pulp. The skin, as cover, relates to the pulp as covered, and the like. The apple, moreover, is distinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of likeness. It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, and possesses those marks just named, which, though differing among themselves, according to the fruit in which they inhere, have a commonality of kind, as compared with other objects. This distinguis.h.i.+ng, a.n.a.lyzing, and cla.s.sifying of characteristics, and connecting them into a unity, as an apple, is the work of the Sense and Understanding.

2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is of _a priori_ laws, of these laws combined in pure archetypal forms, and of G.o.d as the Supreme Being who comprehends all laws and forms. A fundamental difference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's attention. In the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and _a.n.a.lysis_. In the latter it is by comprehension and _synthesis_. Take the idea of moral obligation to ill.u.s.trate this topic. No one but a Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the position of Dr Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or _oughtness_ is a simple idea."

This being once acceded, carries with it the whole theory which the author seeks to maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot be distinguished or a.n.a.lyzed. Being simple, it is _sui generis_. Hence, it cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference or likeness. If known at all, it must be known _as it is in itself_, by a spontaneous insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of the activity of the Pure Reason, and such are the objects of that activity. In maintaining, then, the doctrine of "intellectual intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in subjecting all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and difference."

Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. Hamilton states certain problems, which he is "confident" Cousin cannot solve. There is nothing very difficult about them; and it is a wonder that he should have so presented them. Following the pa.s.sage--which is here quoted--will be found what appear simple and easy solutions.

"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)--(1) how liberty can be conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a knowledge of that plurality;--(2) how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final causes;--(3) how intelligence can influence a blind power, without operating as an efficient cause;--(4) or how, in fine, morality can be founded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;--these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve."

1. Liberty cannot be _conceived_. It must be intuited. There is "a plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge of that plurality." 2. "A faculty" cannot resolve to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot determine itself _at all_. Only a _spiritual person_ can _resolve_, can have a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence.

Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual person can be influenced, and he by object through the intelligence as medium, and only he can be an efficient cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a liberty, which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;"

and, what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it as possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought of the Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: viz., the employment both in thinking and expressions of faculties, capacities, and qualities, as if they possessed all the powers of persons. This habit is thoroughly erroneous, and destructive of truth. The truth desired to answer this whole pa.s.sage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The infinite and absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible, and indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality of personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion or restraint in the choice of one of two possible ends. This Person intuits a mult.i.tude of modes of activity. He possesses also perfect wisdom, which enables him, having chosen the right end, to determine with unerring accuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination to put in force the best means for securing that end. Hence this Person decides that the best mode shall _be_. He also possesses all-power. This is _his_ endowment, not that of his intelligence. The intelligence is not person, but _faculty_ in the person. So is it with the _power_. So then this Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; and is efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity nor chance. He is not under necessity, because there is no constraint which compels him to choose the right end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under chance, because he is _certain_ which is the best mode of action to gain the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and modes of activity, which has been so clearly set forth by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in the motions of spiritual persons in each sphere, lie the ground for answering _all_ difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or chance. With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of his followers.

REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT."

This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid and reflective reader a feeling of profound respect. The writer is manifestly a deeply religious man. The book bears the marks of piety, and an earnest search after the truth respecting that august Being whom its author reverentially wors.h.i.+ps. However far wrong we may believe him to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit must ever inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and condemn the intellectual principles upon which his work is based, we cannot but desire to be like him, in rendering solemn homage to the Being he deems inscrutable.