A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels Volume Xi Part 13

These considerations have occasioned the compiling the ensuing work; which, in gratifying the inquisitive disposition of mankind, and contributing to the safety and success of future navigators, and to the extension of our commerce, may doubtless vie with any narration of this kind hitherto made public; since, as to the first of these heads, it may well be supposed that the general curiosity hath been strongly excited, by the circ.u.mstances of this undertaking already known to the world; for, whether we consider the force of the squadron sent on this service, or the diversified distresses that each single s.h.i.+p was separately involved in, or the uncommon instances of varying fortune which attended the whole enterprize; each of these articles must, I conceive, from its well-known rude outlines, appear worthy of a completer and more finished delineation: And, if this be allowed with respect to the narrative part of the work, there can be no doubt about the more useful and instructive parts, which are almost every where interwoven with it; for I can venture to affirm, without fear of being contradicted, on a comparison, that no voyage, hitherto published, furnishes such a number of views of land, soundings, draughts of ports, charts, and other materials, for the improvement of geography and navigation, as are contained in the ensuing volume; which are the more valuable too, as the greatest part of them relate to such islands or coasts as have been hitherto not at all, or erroneously described; and where the want of sufficient and authentic information might occasion future enterprizes to prove abortive, perhaps with the destruction of the s.h.i.+ps and men employed therein.

Besides the number and choice of these marine drawings and descriptions, there is another very essential circ.u.mstance belonging to them, which much enhances their worth; and that is the great accuracy with which they were executed. I shall express my opinion of them, in this particular, very imperfectly, when I say that they are not exceeded, and perhaps not equalled, by any thing of this nature that hath, as yet, been communicated to the world: For they were not copied from the works of others, or composed at home from imperfect accounts given by incurious and unskilful observers, a practice too frequent in these matters; but the greatest part of them were delineated on the spot, with the utmost exactness, by the direction and under the eye of Mr Anson himself; and where, as is the case in three or four of them, they have been done by less skilful hands, or were found in possession of the enemy, and consequently their justness could be less relied on, I have always taken care to apprize the reader of it, and to put him on his guard against giving entire credit to them; although I doubt not but these less authentic draughts, thus cautiously inserted, are to the full as correct as those which are usually published upon these occasions. For, as actual surveys of roads and harbours, and nice and critical delineations of views of land, take up much time and attention, and require a good degree of skill, both in planning and drawing, those who are defective in industry and ability supply these wants by bold conjectures and fict.i.tious descriptions; and, as they can be no otherwise confuted than by going on the spot, and running the risk of suffering by their misinformation, they have no apprehension of being detected; and therefore, when they intrude their supposit.i.tious productions on the public, they make no conscience of boasting, at the same time, with how much skill and care they have been executed. But let not those who are unacquainted with naval affairs imagine, that the impositions of this kind are of an innocent nature; for, as exact views of land are the surest guides to a seaman, on a coast where he has never been before, all fictions, in so interesting a matter, must be attended with numerous dangers, and sometimes with the destruction of those who are thus unhappily deceived.[7]

[Footnote 7: It must be quite obvious to all who are in the least degree acquainted with the nature of these draughts and views of land, in the nature of a coasting pilot, that it is utterly impossible to reduce them within the compa.s.s of an octavo size, and at the same time to render them of the smallest degree of usefulness; while large plates must have been necessary, and speedily destroyed by opening and refolding.--E.]

Besides these draughts of such places as Mr Anson, or the s.h.i.+ps which he commanded, have touched at in the course of this expedition, and the descriptions and directions relating thereto, there is inserted, in the ensuing work, an ample account, with a chart annexed to it, of a particular navigation, of which hitherto little more than the name has been known, except to those immediately employed in it: I mean the tract described by the Manilla s.h.i.+p, in her pa.s.sage to Acapulco, through the northern part of the Pacific-ocean. This material article is collected from the draughts and journals met with on board the Manilla galleon, founded on the experience of more than an hundred and fifty years practice, and corroborated in its princ.i.p.al circ.u.mstances by the concurrent evidence of all the Spanish prisoners taken in that vessel. And as many of their journals; which I have examined, appear to have been not ill kept, I presume the chart of that northern ocean, and the particulars of their routes through it, may be very safely relied on by future navigators. The advantages which may be drawn from an exact knowledge of this navigation, and the beneficial projects which may be formed thereon, both in war and peace, are by no means proper to be discussed in this place; but they will easily offer themselves to the skilful in maritime affairs. However, as the Manilla s.h.i.+ps are the only ones which have ever traversed this vast ocean, except a French straggler or two, which have been afterwards seized on the coast of Mexico; and as, during near two ages, in which this trade has been carried on, the Spaniards have secreted with the utmost care all accounts of their voyages from the rest of the world; these reasons would alone authorize the insertion of those papers, and would recommend them to the inquisitive, as a very great improvement in geography, and worthy of attention, from the singularity of many circ.u.mstances therein recited.

I must add what, in my opinion, is far from being the least recommendation of these materials, that the observations of the variations of the compa.s.s, which are laid down in the chart from these Spanish journals, tend greatly to complete the general system of the magnetic variation, of infinite importance to the commercial and sea-faring part of mankind. These observations were, though in vain, often publicly called for by our learned countryman, the late Dr Halley, and to his immortal reputation they confirm, as far as they extend, the wonderful hypothesis he had entertained on this head, and very nearly correspond, in their quant.i.ty, to the predictions he published about fifty years since, long before he was acquainted with any one observation made in those seas. The ascertaining the variation in that part of the world is just now of more than ordinary consequence, as the editors of a new variation chart, lately published, for want of proper information, have been misled by an erroneous a.n.a.logy, and have even mistaken the very species of variation in that of the northern ocean; for they make it westerly where it is easterly, and have laid it down 12 or 13 different from its real quant.i.ty.

This much it has been thought necessary to premise, with regard to the hydrographical and geographical part of the ensuing work; which, it is hoped, the reader will find, on perusal, much ampler and more important than this slight sketch can well explain. But, as there are hereafter interspersed, occasionally, some accounts of Spanish transactions, and many observations relative to the dispositions of the American Spaniards, and to the condition of the countries bordering on the South Seas; and as herein I may appear to differ greatly from the opinions generally established; I think it behoves me particularly to recite the authorities I have been guided by in these matters, that I may not be censured as having given way, either to a thoughtless credulity on the one hand, or, what would be a much more criminal imputation, to a wilful and deliberate misrepresentation on the other.

Mr Anson, before he set sail upon this expedition, besides the printed journals to these parts, took care to furnish himself with the best ma.n.u.script accounts he could procure of all the Spanish settlements upon the coasts of Chili, Peru, and Mexico. These he carefully compared with the examinations of his prisoners, and the informations of several intelligent persons who fell into his hands in the South Seas. He had likewise the good fortune, in some of his captures, to possess himself of a great number of letters and papers of a public nature, many of them written by the viceroy of Peru to the viceroy of Santa Fee, to the presidents of Panama and Chili, to Don Bla.s.s de Lezo, admiral of the galleons, and to divers other persons in considerable employments; and in these letters there was usually inserted a recital of those they were intended to answer, so that they contained no small part of the correspondence between these officers, for some time previous to our arrival on the coast. We took, besides, many letters, sent from persons entrusted by the Spanish government, to their friends and correspondents, which were frequently filled with narrations of public business, and sometimes contained undisguised animadversions on the views and conduct of their superiors. From these materials those accounts of the Spanish affairs ore drawn, which may appear, at first sight, the most exceptionable. In particular, the history of the various casualties which befel Pizarro's squadron is, for the most part, composed from intercepted letters; though, indeed, the relation of the insurrection of Orellana and his followers is founded on rather a less disputable authority; for it was taken from the mouths of an English gentleman then on board Pizarro, who often conversed with Pizarro; and it was, upon enquiry, confirmed in its princ.i.p.al circ.u.mstances by others who were in the s.h.i.+p at the same time: so that the fact, however extraordinary, is, I conceive, not to be contested.

And, on this occasion, I cannot but mention, that, though I have endeavoured with my utmost care to adhere strictly to truth, in every article of the ensuing narration, yet I am apprehensive that, in so complicated a work, some oversights must have been committed, by the inattention to which, at all times, all mankind are liable. However, I am conscious, as yet, of none but literal and insignificant mistakes; and if there are others more considerable, which have escaped me, I flatter myself they are not of moment enough to affect any material transaction; and therefore I hope they may justly claim the reader's indulgence.

After this general account of the ensuing work, it might be expected perhaps, that I should proceed to the work itself; but I cannot finish this introduction without adding a few reflections on a matter very nearly connected with the present subject, and, as I conceive, neither dest.i.tute of utility nor unworthy the attention of the public: I mean the animating my countrymen, both in their public and private stations, to the encouragement of all kinds of geographical and nautical observations, and of every species of mechanical and commercial information. It is by a settled attachment to these seemingly minute particulars, that our ambitious neighbours have established some part of that power with which we are now struggling: and as we have the means in our hands of pursuing these subjects more effectually than they can, it would be a dishonour to us longer to neglect so easy and beneficial a practice. For, as we have a navy much more numerous than theirs, great part of which is always employed in very distant stations, either in the protection of our colonies and commerce, or in a.s.sisting our allies against the common enemy, this gives us frequent opportunities of furnis.h.i.+ng ourselves with such kind of materials as are here recommended, and such as might turn greatly to our advantage either in war or peace; since, not to mention what might be expected from the officers of the navy, if their application to these subjects was properly encouraged, it would create no new expence to the government to establish a particular regulation for this purpose; as all that would be requisite would be constantly to embark, in some of our men of war which are sent on those distant cruizes, a person who, with the character of an engineer, and the skill and talents necessary to that profession, should be employed in drawing such coasts, and planning such harbours, as the s.h.i.+p should touch at, and in making such other observations, of all kinds, as might either prove of advantage to future navigators, or might any ways tend to promote the public service. Persons habituated to these operations, which could not fail at the same time of improving them in their proper business, would be extremely useful in many other lights besides those already mentioned, and might tend to secure our fleets from those disgraces with which their attempts against places on sh.o.r.e have been often attended. And, in a nation like ours, where all sciences are more eagerly and universally pursued, and better understood, than in any other part of the world, proper subjects for these employments cannot long be wanting, if due encouragement were given to them.

This method, here recommended, is known to have been frequently practised by the French, particularly in the instance of Mons.

Frezier, an engineer, who has published a celebrated voyage to the South Seas: for this person was purposely sent by the French king, in the year 1711, into that country, on board a merchant s.h.i.+p, that he might examine and describe the coast, and take plans of all the fortified places; the better to enable the French to prosecute their illicit trade, or, on a rupture between them and the court of Spain, to form their enterprizes in those seas with more readiness and certainty. Should we pursue this method, we might hope that the emulation amongst those who were commissioned for these undertakings, and the experience which, even in the most peaceable intervals, they would thereby acquire, might at length procure us a proper number of able engineers, and might efface the national scandal which our deficiency in that species of men has sometimes exposed us to: and surely every step to encourage and improve them is of greater moment to the public, as no persons, when they are properly instructed, make better returns in war for the distinctions and emoluments bestowed on them in times of peace: of which, the advantages the French have reaped from their dexterity, too numerous and recent to be soon forgot, are an ample confirmation.

Having mentioned engineers, or such as are skilled in drawing and the other usual practices of that profession, as the properest persons to be employed in these foreign enquiries, I cannot but lament, as it offers itself so very naturally to the subject in hand, how very imperfect many of our accounts of distant countries are rendered by the relators being unskilled in drawing, and in the general principles of surveying, even where other abilities have not been wanting. Had more of our travellers been initiated in these acquirements, and had there been added thereto some little skill in the common astronomical observations, all which a person of ordinary talents might attain with a very moderate share of application, we should, by this time, have seen the geography of the globe much correcter than we now find it; the dangers of navigation would have been considerably lessened, and the manners, arts, and produce of foreign countries would have been better known to us than they are. Indeed, when I consider the strong incitements that all travellers have to pursue some part at least of these qualifications, especially drawing; when I consider how much it would facilitate their observations, a.s.sist and strengthen their memories, and of how tedious, and often unintelligible, a load of description it would rid them; I cannot but wonder that any person who intends to visit distant countries, with a view of informing either himself or others, should be wanting in so necessary a piece of skill.

And, to enforce this argument still farther, I must add, that, besides the uses of drawing already mentioned, there is one which, though not so obvious, is yet perhaps of more consequence than all that has been hitherto urged; I mean the strength and distinguis.h.i.+ng power it adds to some of our faculties. This appears from hence, that those who are used to draw objects observe them with more accuracy than others who are not habituated to that practice. For we may easily find, by a little experience, that when we view any object, however simple, our attention or memory is scarcely at any time so strong as to enable us, when we have turned our eyes away from it, to recollect exactly every part it consisted of, and to recall all the circular stances of its appearance; since, on examination, it will be discovered, that in some we were mistaken, and others we had totally overlooked. But he who is accustomed to draw what he sees, is, at the same time, accustomed to rectify this inattention; for, by confronting his ideas, copied on the paper, with the object he intends to represent, he finds out what circ.u.mstance has deceived him in its appearance; and hence he at length acquires the habit of observing much more at one view than he could ever have done without his practice and proficiency in drawing.

If what has been said merits the attention of travellers of all sorts, it is, I think, more particularly applicable to the gentlemen of the navy, since, without drawing and planning, neither charts nor views of land can be taken; and without these it is sufficiently evident that navigation is at a full stand. It is doubtless from a persuasion of the utility of these qualifications, that his majesty has established a drawing-master at Portsmouth, for the instruction of those who are presumed to be hereafter entrusted with the command of his royal navy; and though some have been so far misled as to suppose that the perfection of sea officers consisted in a turn of mind and temper resembling the boisterous element they have to deal with, and have condemned all literature and science, as effeminate and derogatory to that ferocity, which, they would falsely persuade us, was the most unerring characteristic of courage, yet it is to be hoped that such absurdities have not at any time been authorized by the public opinion, and that the belief daily diminishes. If those who adhere to these mischievous positions were capable of being influenced by reason, or swayed by example, I should think it sufficient for their conviction to observe, that the most valuable drawings inserted in the following work, though done with such skill that even professed artists can with difficulty imitate them, were taken by Mr Piercy Bret, one of Mr Anson's lieutenants, and since captain of the Lion man-of-war, who, in his memorable engagement with the Elizabeth, [for the importance of the service, or the resolution with which it was conducted, inferior to none this age has seen,] has given ample proof that a proficiency in the arts I have been recommending, is extremely consistent with the most exemplary bravery, and the most distinguished skill in every function belonging to a sea officer.

Indeed, when the many branches of science are considered, of which even the common practice of navigation is composed, and the many improvements which men of skill have added to this practice within these few years, it would induce one to believe that the advantages of reflection and speculative knowledge were in no profession more eminent than in that of a naval officer; for, not to mention some expertness in geography, geometry, and astronomy, which it would be dishonourable for him to be without, as his journal and his estimate of the daily position of the s.h.i.+p are founded on particular branches of these sciences, it may well be supposed, that the management and working of a s.h.i.+p, the discovery of her most eligible position in the water, usually called her trim, and the disposition of her sails in the most advantageous manner, are articles in which the knowledge of mechanics cannot but be greatly a.s.sistant. And, perhaps, the application of this kind of knowledge to naval subjects may produce as great improvements in sailing and working a s.h.i.+p, as it has already done in many other matters conducive to the ease and convenience of human life; since, when the fabric of a s.h.i.+p and the variety of her sails are considered, together with the artificial contrivances for adapting them to her different motions, as it cannot be doubted but these things have been brought about by more than ordinary sagacity and invention; so neither can it be doubted but that, in some conjunctures, a speculative and scientific turn of mind may find out the means of directing and disposing this complicated mechanism much more advantageously than can be done by mere habit, or by a servile copying of what others may have, perhaps erroneously, practised in similar emergencies. But it is time to finish this digression, and to leave the reader to the perusal of the ensuing work, which, with how little art soever it may be executed, will yet, from the importance of the subject, and the utility and excellence of the materials, merit some share of the public attention.

SECTION I.

_Of the Equipment of the Squadron, and the Incidents relating to it, from its first Appointment to its setting Sail from St Helens._

The squadron under the command of Mr Anson, of which I here propose to recite the most material proceedings, having undergone many changes in its destination, its force, and its equipment, during the ten months between its original appointment and its final sailing from St Helens, I conceive the history of these alterations is a detail necessary to be made public, both for the honour of those who first planned and promoted this enterprize, and for the justification of those who have been entrusted with its execution; since it will from hence appear, that the accidents the expedition was afterwards exposed to, and which prevented it from producing all the national advantages the strength of the squadron and the expectation of the public seemed to presage, were princ.i.p.ally owing to a series of interruptions, which delayed the commander in the course of his preparations, and which it exceeded his utmost industry either to avoid or get removed.

When, in the latter end of the summer 1739, it was foreseen that a war with Spain was inevitable, it was the opinion of some considerable persons, then trusted with the administration of affairs, that the most prudent step the nation could take, on the breaking out of the war, was attacking that crown in her distant settlements; for by this means, as at that time there was the greatest probability of success, it was supposed that we should cut off the princ.i.p.al resources of the enemy, and should reduce them to the necessity of sincerely desiring a peace, as they would be deprived of the returns of that treasure by which alone they could be enabled to carry on a war.

In pursuance of these sentiments, several projects were examined, and several resolutions were taken by the council. And, in all these deliberations, it was from the first determined, that George Anson, Esq. then captain of the Centurion, should be employed as commander-in-chief of an expedition of this kind: and, he at that time being absent on a cruize, a vessel was dispatched to his station so early as the beginning of September, to order him to return with his s.h.i.+p to Portsmouth. And soon after he came there, that is, on the 10th November following, he received a letter from Sir Charles Wager, directing him to repair to London, and to attend the board of Admiralty; where, when he arrived, he was informed by Sir Charles, that two squadrons would be immediately fitted out for two secret expeditions, which, however, would have some connection with each other; and that he, Mr Anson, was intended to command one of them; and that Mr Cornwall, who hath since lost his life gloriously in defence of his country's honour, was to command the other; that the squadron under Mr Anson was to take on board three independent companies of an hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot; that Colonel Bland was likewise to embark with his regiment, and to command the land-forces; and that, as soon as this squadron could be fitted for sea, they were to sail, with express orders to touch at no place till they came to Java-Head in the East-Indies; that they were there only to stop to take in water, and thence to proceed directly to the city of Manilla in Luconia, one of the Philippine islands; that the other squadron, of equal force with this commanded by Mr Anson, was intended to pa.s.s round Cape Horn into the South Seas, to range along that coast; and, after cruizing upon the enemy in those parts, and attempting their settlements, this squadron, in its return, was to rendezvous at Manilla, there to join the squadron under Mr Anson, where they were to refresh their men, and to refit their s.h.i.+ps, and perhaps receive orders for other considerable enterprizes.

This scheme was doubtless extremely well projected, and could not but have greatly advanced the public service, and the reputation and fortune of those concerned in its execution; for, had Mr Anson proceeded to Manilla at the time and in the manner proposed by Sir Charles Wager, he would in all probability have arrived there before they had received any advice of the war between us and Spain, and consequently before they had been in the least prepared for the reception of an enemy, or had any apprehensions of their danger. The city of Manilla might well be supposed to have been at that time in the same defenceless condition with all the other Spanish settlements, just at the breaking out of the war; that is, their fortifications neglected, and in many places decayed; their cannon dismounted, or rendered useless by the mouldering of their carriages; their magazines both of military stores and provisions, all empty; their garrisons unpaid, and consequently thin, ill affected, and dispirited; and the royal chests of Peru, whence alone all these disorders could receive redress, drained to the very bottom. This, from the intercepted letters of their viceroys and governors, is well known to have been the defenceless state of Panama, and the other places on the coast of the South Sea, for near a twelvemonth after our declaration of war.

And it cannot be supposed that the city of Manilla, removed still farther by almost half the circ.u.mference of the globe, should have experienced from the Spanish government a greater share of attention for its security than Panama, and the other important ports in Peru and Chili, on which their possession of that immense empire depends.

Indeed, it is now well known that Manilla was at that time incapable of making any considerable defence, and, in all probability, would have surrendered only on the appearance of our squadron before it. The consequence of this city, and the island it stands on, may, in some measure, be estimated from the known healthiness of its air, the excellence of its port and bay, the number and wealth of its inhabitants, and the very extensive and beneficial commerce it carries on to the princ.i.p.al ports in the East-Indies and China, and its exclusive trade to Acapulco; the returns for which alone, being made in silver, are, upon the lowest calculation, not less than three millions of dollars yearly.

On this scheme Sir Charles Wager was so intent, that, on the 18th December, a few days only before this first conference, Mr Anson received an order to take under his command the Argyle, Severn, Pearl, Wager, and Tryal sloop; and other orders were issued to him, in the same month and in December, relating to the victualling of this squadron. But, on attending the Admiralty in the beginning of January, 1740, Mr Anson was informed by Sir Charles Wager, that, for reasons with which he was not acquainted, the expedition to Manilla was laid aside. It may well be conceived that Mr Anson was extremely chagrined at losing the command of so infallible, so honourable, and in every respect so desirable an enterprize; especially as he had already, at a very great expence, made the necessary provision for his own accommodation in this voyage, which he had reason to expect would prove very long. However, to render this appointment more tolerable, Sir Charles Wager informed him that the expedition to the South Sea was still intended; and that he, Mr Anson, and his squadron, as their first destination was now countermanded, should be employed in that service. And, on the 10th January, 1740, he received his commission, appointing him Commander-in-chief of the before-mentioned squadron, the Argyle being in the course of preparation exchanged for the Gloucester, with which he sailed above eight months afterwards from St Helens. On this change of destination, the equipment of the squadron was still prosecuted with as much vigour as ever; and the victualling, and whatever depended on the commodore, was soon so far advanced, that he conceived the s.h.i.+ps might be capable of putting to sea the instant he should receive his final orders, of which he was in daily expectation.

At length, on the 28th June, 1740, the Duke of Newcastle, princ.i.p.al secretary of state, delivered to him his majesty's instructions, dated on the 31st of January preceding, with an additional instruction from the lords justices, dated 19th June. On the receipt of these, Mr Anson immediately repaired to Spithead, with a resolution to sail with the first fair wind, flattering himself that all his difficulties were now at an end: for though he knew by the muster that his squadron wanted three hundred men of their complement, a deficiency he had not, with all his a.s.siduity, been able to get supplied, yet as Sir Charles Wager had informed him that an order from the board of Admiralty was sent to Sir John Norris to spare him the numbers which he wanted; he doubted not of its being complied with. But, on his arrival at Portsmouth, he found himself greatly mistaken and disappointed in this persuasion: for, on application, Sir John Norris told him he could spare him none, as he wanted men for his own fleet. This occasioned an inevitable and very considerable delay, and it was the end of July before this deficiency was by any means supplied, and all that was then done was extremely short of his necessities and expectation; for Admiral Balchen, who succeeded to the command at Spithead, after Sir John Norris had sailed to the westward, instead of three hundred sailors which Mr Anson wanted of his complement, ordered on board the squadron an hundred and seventy men only, of which thirty-two were from the hospital and sick-quarters, thirty-seven men from the Salisbury, with three officers and ninety-eight marines of Colonel Lowther's regiment; and these were all that were ever granted to make up the forementioned deficiency.

But the commodore's mortification did not end here. It has been already observed, that it was at first intended that Colonel Bland's regiment, and three independent companies of an hundred men each, should embark as land-forces on board the squadron. But this disposition was now changed; and all the land-forces that were to be allowed were five hundred invalids, to be collected from the out-pensioners of Chelsea College. As these consisted of soldiers, who, from their age, wounds, and other circ.u.mstances, were incapable of serving in marching regiments, Mr Anson was much chagrined at having such a decrepid detachment allotted to him; for he was fully persuaded that the greatest part of them would perish long before they could arrive at the scene of action, since the delays he had already experienced necessarily confined his pa.s.sage round Cape Horn to the most rigorous season of the year. Sir Charles Wager joined in opinion with the commodore, that invalids were by no means proper for this service, and strenuously solicited to have them, exchanged. But he was told, that persons who were considered better judges of soldiers than he or Mr Anson, thought them the properest men that could be employed on this occasion; and, upon this determination, they were ordered on board the squadron on the 5th of August. But, instead of five hundred, there came no more on board than two hundred and fifty-nine; for all those who had limbs and strength to walk out of Portsmouth deserted, leaving only those behind who were literally invalids, most of them being sixty years of age, and some upwards of seventy. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive a more moving scene than the embarkation of these unhappy veterans: they were themselves extremely averse from the service in which they were engaged, and fully apprized of all the disasters they were afterwards exposed to, the apprehensions of which were strongly marked by the concern which appeared in their countenances, which was mixed with no small degree of indignation to be thus hurried from their repose into a fatiguing employ, to which neither the strength of their bodies, nor the vigour of their minds, were any way proportioned; and in which, without seeing the face of an enemy, or in the least promoting the success of the enterprize, they would in all probability uselessly perish by lingering and painful diseases; and this, too, after they had spent the activity and strength of their youth in the service of their country.

I cannot but observe, on this melancholy incident, how extremely unfortunate it was, both to this aged and diseased detachment, and to the expedition in which they were engaged, that, amongst all the out-pensioners of Chelsea College, which were supposed to amount to two thousand men, the most crazy and infirm only should be called out for so laborious and perilous an undertaking; for it was well known, however unfit invalids in general might be for this service, yet, by a prudent choice, there might have been found amongst them five hundred men who had some remains of vigour; and Mr Anson fully expected that the best of them would have been allotted to him; whereas the whole detachment sent seemed to be made up of the most decrepid and miserable objects that could be collected out of the whole body; and by the desertion already mentioned, even these were cleared of the little strength and health which were to be found among them, and he had to take up with such as were much fitter for an infirmary than for any military duty.

It is here also necessary to mention another material particular in the equipment of this squadron. After it was determined that Mr Anson should be sent to the South Sea, it was proposed to Mr Anson to take with him two persons under the denomination of agent-victuallers.

Those mentioned for this employment had been formerly in the Spanish American colonies, in the service of the South-Sea Company, and it was supposed, that, by their knowledge and intelligence on that coast, they might often procure provisions for the squadron by compact with the inhabitants, when they were not to be got by force of arms. These agent-victuallers were, for this purpose, to be allowed to carry to the value of fifteen thousand pounds in merchandize on board the squadron, as they represented that it would be much easier to procure provisions in exchange for goods, than for the value of the same goods in money. Whatever colours were given to this scheme, it was difficult to persuade the generality of mankind that it was not princ.i.p.ally intended for the enrichment of the agents, by the beneficial commerce they proposed to carry on upon that coast. From the beginning, Mr Anson objected both to the appointment of agent-victuallers and to allowing them to carry a cargo on board the squadron; for he conceived that in those few amicable ports where the squadron might touch, he needed not their a.s.sistance to contract for any provisions these places afforded; and, when on the enemy's coast, he did not imagine they could ever procure him the necessaries he should want, unless the military operations of his squadron were to be regulated by the ridiculous views of their trading projects, with which he was resolved not to comply. All that he thought the government ought to have done, of this kind, was to put on board, to the value of two or three thousand pounds, of such goods only as were suitable for the Indians, or the Spanish planters on the less cultivated parts of the coast, as it was in such places only that he considered it might be worth while to truck with the enemy for provisions, and it was sufficiently evident that a very small cargo would suffice for such places.

Although the commodore objected both to the appointment of these officers and to their project, of the ill success of which he had no question, yet, as they had insinuated that their scheme, besides victualling the squadron, might contribute to the settling a trade on that coast which might afterwards be carried on without difficulty, and might become of very considerable national advantage, they were much listened to by several considerable persons; and, of the fifteen thousand pounds, which was to be the amount of their cargo, the government agreed to advance them ten thousand pounds upon imprest, and the remaining five thousand they raised on bottomry bonds, and the goods purchased with this latter sum were all that were put on board the squadron, how much soever their amount might be afterwards magnified by common report. This cargo was s.h.i.+pped at first in the Wager store-s.h.i.+p, and one of the victuallers, no part of it being admitted on board the men-of-war; but, when the commodore was at St Catharine's, he considered, in case the squadron might be separated, that it might be pretended that some of the s.h.i.+ps were disappointed of provisions for want of a cargo to truck with, wherefore he distributed some of the least bulky commodities on board the men-of-war, leaving the remainder princ.i.p.ally on board the Wager, in which it was lost, and more of the goods peris.h.i.+ng, by various accidents to be recited afterwards, and as no part of them being disposed of on the coast, the few that came home to England, when sold, did not produce above a fourth part of the original cost. So true was the commodore's judgment of the event of this project, which had been considered by many as infallibly productive of immense gain.

We return to the transactions at Portsmouth. To supply the place of the two hundred and forty invalids who had deserted, there were ordered on board two hundred and ten marines, drafted from different regiments. These were raw and undisciplined men, just raised, and had scarcely any thing more of the soldier than their regimentals, none of them having been so far trained as to be permitted to fire. The last of these detachments came on board on the 8th August, and on the 10th the squadron dropped down from Spithead to St Helen's, there to wait for a wind to proceed on the expedition. The delays we had already suffered had not yet spent all their influence; for we were now advanced to that season of the year when the westerly winds are usually very prevalent and violent; and it was thought proper that we should put to sea in company with the fleet commanded by Admiral Balchen, and the expedition under Lord Cathcart. As we now made up in all twenty-one sail of men-of-war, and one hundred and twenty-four sail of merchant s.h.i.+ps and transports, we had no hopes of getting out of the channel with so large a fleet, without the continuance of a fair wind for a considerable time, and this was what we had every day less and less reason to expect, as the time of the equinox drew near; wherefore our golden dreams and ideal possession of the Peruvian treasures grew every day more faint, and the difficulties and dangers of the pa.s.sage round Cape Horn, in the winter season, filled our imaginations in their room. It was forty days from our arrival at St Helens to our final departure from that place; and even then, having orders to proceed without Lord Cathcart, we tided down the channel with a contrary wind. But this interval of forty days was not free from the displeasing fatigue of often setting sail, and being as often obliged to return, nor exempt from dangers greater than have been sometimes undergone in surrounding the globe. For the wind coming fair for the first time on the 23d August, we got under sail, and Admiral Balchen shewed himself truly solicitous to have proceeded to sea; but the wind soon returned to its old quarter, and obliged us to put back to St Helens, not without considerable hazard, and some damage received by two of the transports, which ran foul of each other when tacking. We made two or three other attempts to sail, but without any better success; and, on the 6th September, being returned to anchor at St Helens, after one of those fruitless attempts, the wind blew so fresh that the whole fleet had to strike yards and topmasts to prevent drifting: Yet, notwithstanding this precaution, the Centurion drove next evening, and brought both cables a-head, when we were in no small danger of getting foul of the Prince Frederick, a seventy-gun s.h.i.+p, which was moored only a small distance under our stern, but we happily escaped, in consequence of her drifting at the same time, by which she preserved her distance, yet we did not think ourselves safe till we at last let go our sheet anchor, which fortunately brought us up.

We were in some measure relieved from this lingering and vexatious situation on the 9th September, by an order then received by Commodore Anson, from the lords justices, to put to sea on the first opportunity, with his own squadron only, if Lord Cathcart should not be ready. Being thus freed from the troublesome company of so large a fleet, our commodore resolved to weigh and tide it down channel, as soon as the weather should become sufficiently moderate, and this might easily have been done by our squadron full two months sooner, had the orders of the Admiralty for supplying us with seamen been punctually complied with, and had we met with none of those other delays mentioned in this narration. Even now, our hopes of a speedy departure were somewhat damped, by a subsequent order which Mr Anson received on the 12th September, by which he was required to take under his convoy the St Albans and the Turkey fleet, and to join the Dragon and the Winchester, with the Straits and American trade, at Torbay or Plymouth, and to proceed with them to sea as far as their way and ours lay together. This enc.u.mbrance of convoy gave us some uneasiness, fearing it might lengthen our pa.s.sage to Madeira: However, having now the command to himself, Mr Anson resolved to tide down channel with the first moderate weather; and, that the junction of the convoy might occasion as little loss of time as possible, he immediately sent directions to Torbay that the fleet he was there to take charge of should be in readiness to join him instantly on his approach. And at last, on the 18th September, he weighed from St Helens, and, though the wind was at first contrary, had the good fortune to get clear of the channel in four days, as will be more particularly related in the ensuing section.

Having thus gone through the respective steps taken in the equipment of this squadron, it must be sufficiently obvious how different an aspect the expedition bore at its first appointment in the beginning of January, from what it did in the latter end of September, when it left the channel, and how much its numbers, its strength, and the probability of its success were diminished by the various incidents which took place in that interval. For, instead of having all our old and ordinary seamen exchanged for such as were young and able, which the commodore was at first promised, and having our complement complete to its full number, we were obliged to retain our first crews, which were very indifferent; and a deficiency of three hundred men in our numbers was no otherwise made up than by sending on board an hundred and seventy men, the greatest part of whom were discharged from hospitals, or new-raised marines who had never been at sea before. In the land-forces allotted to us, the change was still more disadvantageous; as, instead of Bland's regiment of foot, which was an old one, and three independent companies of an hundred men each, we had only four hundred and seventy invalids and marines, one part of whom were incapable of action, by their age and infirmities, and the other part useless, by ignorance of their duty. But the diminution of the strength of the squadron was not the greatest inconveniency which attended these alterations; for the contests, representations, and difficulties which they continually produced, as we have seen above that the authority of the Admiralty in these cases was not always submitted to, occasioned a delay and waste of time, which, in its consequences, was the source of all the disasters to which the enterprize was afterwards exposed. For, owing to these circ.u.mstances, we were forced to make our pa.s.sage round Cape Horn at the most tempestuous season of the year, whence proceeded the separation of our squadron, the loss of numbers of our men, and the imminent hazard of oar total destruction. By this delay also, the enemy had been so well informed of our designs, that a person who had been employed in the service of the South-Sea Company, and arrived from Panama three or four days before we left Portsmouth, was able to relate to Mr Anson most of the particulars of the destination and strength of our squadron, from what he had learnt from the Spaniards before he left them. This was afterwards confirmed by a more extraordinary circ.u.mstance; for we shall find, that when the Spaniards, fully satisfied of our expedition being intended for the South Seas, had fitted out a squadron before us, which had so far got the start as to arrive before us at the island of Madeira, the commander of this squadron was so well instructed in the form and make of Mr Anson's broad pendant, and had imitated it so exactly, that he thereby decoyed the Pearl, one of our squadron, within gun-shot of him, before the captain of the Pearl was able to discover the deception.

SECTION II.

_The Pa.s.sage from St Helens to the Island of Madeira, with a short Account of that Island, and of our Stay there._

As observed in the preceding section, the squadron weighed from St Helens with a contrary wind on the 18th of September, 1740, our commodore proposing to tide down the channel, as he less dreaded the inconveniences we might have thereby to struggle with, than the risk he should run of ruining the enterprize by an uncertain, and, in all probability, a tedious attendance for a fair wind. The squadron allotted for this expedition consisted of five men-of-war, a sloop of war, and two victuallers. These were, the Centurion of 60 guns, and 400 men, George Anson, Esq. commander; the Gloucester, of 50 guns, and 300 men, Richard Norris, commander; the Severn, of 50 guns, and 300 men, the Honourable Edward Legg, commander; the Pearl, of 40 guns, and 250 men, Matthew Mitch.e.l.l, commander; the Wager, of 28 guns, and 160 men, Dandy Kidd, commander; the Tryal sloop, of 8 guns, and 100 men, the Honourable John Murray, commander. The two victuallers were pinks, the largest of about four hundred tons burden; and these were to attend us till the provisions we had on board were so far consumed as to make room for the additional quant.i.ty they carried, which was then to be taken into our s.h.i.+ps, and they were to be discharged. Besides the before-mentioned complements of men borne by the s.h.i.+ps as their crews, there were embarked in our squadron about 470 invalids and marines, as particularly mentioned in last section, under the denomination of land-forces, which were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cracherode.

With this squadron, together with the St Albans and Lark, and the Turkey trade under their convoy, we tided down channel for the first forty-eight hours. In the morning of the 20th, we discovered the Dragon, Winchester, South-Sea Castle, and Rye, with a number of merchantmen under their convoy, waiting for us off the Ram-head. We joined there the same day about noon, the commodore having orders to see them, together with the convoy of the St Albans and Lark, as far as their course and ours lay together. When we came in sight of this last-mentioned s.h.i.+p, Mr Anson first hoisted his broad pendant, and was saluted by all the men-of-war in company. After joining this last convoy, we made up eleven men-of-war, and about 150 sail of merchant s.h.i.+ps, consisting of the Turkey, the Straits, and the American trades.

The same day Mr Anson made a signal for all captains of men-of-war to come on board, when he delivered them their fighting and sailing instructions, and then we all stood to the S.W. with a fair wind; so that next day at noon, being the 21st, we had run forty leagues beyond the Ram-head. Being now clear of the land, our commodore, to render our view more extensive, ordered Captain Mitch.e.l.l, in the Pearl, to make sail two leagues a-head of the fleet every morning, and to repair to his station every evening. Thus we proceeded till the 25th, when the Winchester, with the American convoy, made the concerted signal for leave to separate, and this being answered by the commodore, they left us, which, was done by the St Albans and the Dragon on the 24th, with the Turkey and Straits convoys.

There now remained only our own squadron and the two victuallers, with which we stood on our course for the island of Madeira. But the winds were so contrary, that we had the mortification to be forty days on our pa.s.sage to that island from St Helens, though it is often known to be done in ten or twelve. This delay was most unpleasant, and was productive of much discontent and ill humour among our people, of which these only can have an adequate idea who have experienced a similar situation: For, besides the peevishness and despondency, which foul and contrary winds, and a lingering voyage, never fail to produce on all occasions, we in particular had substantial reasons for being greatly alarmed at this unexpected impediment; since, as we departed from England much later than we ought to have done, we had placed almost all our hope of success on the chance of retrieving in some measure at sea, the time we had so unhappily wasted at Spithead and St Helens. At last, on Monday the 25th October, at five in the morning, we made the land to our great joy, and came to anchor in the afternoon in Madeira road, in forty fathoms, the Brazen Head bearing from us E.

by S. the Loo N.N.W. and the Great Church N.N.E. We had hardly let go our anchor when an English privateer sloop ran under our stern, and saluted the commodore with nine guns, which we returned with five.

Next day the English consul visited the commodore, and was saluted with nine guns on coming on board.

The island of Madeira, where we now arrived, is famous through all our American settlements for its excellent wines, which seem designed by Providence for the refreshment of the inhabitants of the torrid zone.

It is situated in a fine climate, in lat. 32 27' N. and long. from London 18 30' to 19 30' W. by our different reckonings, though laid down in the charts in 47.[1] The whole island is composed of one continued hill of considerable height, extending from east to west; the declivity of which, on the south side, is cultivated and interspersed with vineyards. In the middle of this slope the merchants have their country seats, which contribute to form a very agreeable prospect. There is but one considerable town, named Fonchiale, on the south part of the island, situated at the bottom of a large bay. Towards the sea it is defended by a high wall with a battery of cannon, besides a castle on the Loo, which is a rock standing in the water at a small distance from the sh.o.r.e. Tonchiale is the only place of trade, and indeed the only place where it is possible for a boat to land; and even there the beach is so covered with great stones, and so violent a surf beats continually upon it, that the commodore did not care to venture the long-boats of our s.h.i.+ps in fetching off water, and therefore ordered the captains to employ Portuguese boats on that service.

[Footnote 1: The charts are however the most accurate, as that is the long. of the centre of Madeira, in our best modern maps.--E.]

We continued about a week at this island, watering our s.h.i.+ps, and providing the squadron with wine and other refreshments. While here, on the 3d November, Captain Richard Norris signified to the commodore, by letter, his desire to quit the command of the Gloucester, in order to return to England for the recovery of his health. The commodore complied with this request, and was pleased to appoint Captain Matthew Mitch.e.l.l to command the Gloucester in his room, to remove Captain Kidd from the Wager to the Pearl, and Captain Murray from the Tryal sloop to the Wager, giving the command of the Tryal to Lieutenant Cheap. These promotions being settled, with other changes in the lieutenancies, the commodore, on the 4th November, gave to the captains their orders, appointing St Jago, one of the Cape Verd islands, to be the first place of rendezvous in case of separation; and, if they did not meet the Centurion there, directing them to make the best of their way to the island of St Catharine on the coast of Brazil. The water for the squadron being that day completed, and each s.h.i.+p supplied with as much wine and other refreshments as they could take in, we weighed anchor in the afternoon, and took leave of Madeira. But, before continuing the narrative of our transactions, I think it necessary to give some account of the proceedings of the enemy, and of the measures they had taken to render all our designs abortive.

On visiting the governor of Madeira, Mr Anson was informed by him, that for three or four days in the latter end of October, there had appeared to the westward of the island seven or eight s.h.i.+ps of the line and a _patache_, which last was sent close in with the land every day. The governor a.s.sured our commodore, upon his honour, that no person on the island had either given them intelligence, or had any sort of communication with them. He believed them to be either French or Spanish, but was rather inclined to suppose the latter. On this intelligence, Mr Anson sent an officer in a clean sloop eight leagues to the westwards, to reconnoitre them, and, if possible, to discover what they were: But the officer returned without having seen them, so that we still remained in uncertainty; yet we could not but conjecture that this fleet was intended to put a stop, if possible, to our expedition; and, had they cruized to the eastward of the island, instead of the westward, they could not have failed in doing so: for, as in that case they must infallibly have fallen in with us, we should have been under the necessity of throwing overboard vast quant.i.ties of provisions, to clear our s.h.i.+ps for action; and this alone, independent of the event of the action, would have effectually prevented our progress. This was so obvious a measure, that we could not help imagining reasons which might have prevented them from pursuing it.

We supposed, therefore, that this French or Spanish squadron, having advice that we were to sail in company with Admiral Balchen and Lord Cathcart's expedition, might not think it adviseable to meet with us till we had parted company, from apprehension of being over-matched, and supposed we might not separate before our arrival at this island.

These were our speculations at the time, from which we had reason to suppose we might still fall in with them, in our way to the Cape de Verd islands. We were afterwards persuaded, in the course of our expedition, that this was the Spanish squadron commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro, sent out purposely to traverse the views and enterprizes of our squadron, to which they were greatly superior in strength. As this Spanish armament was so nearly connected with our expedition, and as the catastrophe, if underwent, though not effected by our force, was yet a considerable advantage to this nation produced in consequence of our equipment; I have, in the following section, given a summary account of their proceedings, from their first setting out from Spain in 1740, till the Asia, the only s.h.i.+p of the whole squadron that returned to Europe, got back to Corunna in the beginning of the year 1746.

SECTION III.

_History of the Spanish Squadron commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro._

The squadron fitted out by the court of Spain, to attend our motions, and traverse our projects, we supposed to have been the s.h.i.+ps seen off Madeira. As this force was sent out particularly against our expedition, I cannot but imagine that the following history of its casualties, so far as has come to my knowledge, by intercepted letters and other information, is an essential part of the present work. For it will from hence appear, that we were the occasion of a considerable part of the Spanish naval power being diverted from prosecuting the ambitious views of that court in Europe; and whatever men and s.h.i.+ps were lost by the enemy in this undertaking, were lost in consequence of the precautions they took to secure themselves against our expedition.

This squadron, besides two s.h.i.+ps bound for the West Indies, which did not part company till after they left Madeira, was composed of the following men-of-war, commanded by Don Joseph Pizarro. The Asia of 66 guns and 700 men, the admiral's s.h.i.+p; the Guipuscoa of 74 guns and 700 men; the Hermiona of 54 guns and 500 men; the Esperanza of 50 guns and 450 men; the St Estevan of 40 guns and 350 men; and a patache of 20 guns.