A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels Volume V Part 3

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was very anxious to devise some stratagem for inveigling the viceroy into his hands, as he considered his usurpation unsafe so long as that officer remained alive and at the head of a military force. With this view, that the viceroy might return into Peru where he might have it in his power to bring him to action, Gonzalo gave out that he intended to proceed to Las Charcas at the southern extremity of Peru, to repress the disorders occasioned by Centeno, leaving Captain Pedro de Puelles at Quito with three hundred men to oppose the viceroy. He proceeded even ostensibly to take such measures as were proper for executing this design; selecting such troops as were to accompany himself to the south, and those who were to remain at Quito; even distributing money to both divisions, and set off on his march for the south after a general muster and review of his army.

Gonzalo contrived that intelligence of these proceedings should be conveyed to the viceroy, by means of a spy in the employment of that officer, who had betrayed his trust, and had even communicated to Gonzalo the cypher which he used in corresponding with his employer.

Gonzalo made this person send intelligence to the viceroy of these pretended motions; and Puelles wrote likewise to some friends in Popayan, as if privately to inform them that he was left in the command at Quito with three hundred men, with which he believed himself able to resist all the force the viceroy might be able to bring against him; and these letters were sent purposely in such a manner that they might fall into the hands of the viceroy. Gonzalo likewise took care to spread these reports among the Indians who were present at the review, and who, having seen Gonzalo set off on his march to the south, were perfectly acquainted with the number of troops which accompanied him on the march, and of those which remained under Puelles at Quito. To give the greater appearance of truth to these reports, Gonzalo actually set out on his march; but halted at two or three days journey from Quito, under pretence of falling sick.

On receiving intelligence of these circ.u.mstances, which he implicitly believed, the viceroy determined to march from Popayan to Quito, satisfied that he should be easily able to overpower the small force left there under Puelles, who had no means of being reinforced. He accordingly began his march, during which he was unable to procure any intelligence whatever respecting Gonzalo and his troops, so carefully were all the pa.s.ses guarded to prevent either Christians or Indians from conveying advices on the road towards Popayan. While, on the contrary, Gonzalo procured regular notice of every step taken by the viceroy, by means of the Indians called _Cagnares_, a cunning and intelligent race.

Accordingly, when the viceroy was arrived within a few days march of Quito, Gonzalo returned thither with his troops to join Puelles, and they marched together to meet the viceroy, who was then at Oravalo about twelve leagues from Quito. Although the viceroy was at the head of eight hundred men, and his force increased daily on his approach to Quito, Gonzalo confided in the valour and experience of his troops, among which were many of the princ.i.p.al persons in Peru, his soldiers being inured to war, accustomed to hards.h.i.+ps and fatigue, and full of confidence in themselves from the many victories they had gained.

Gonzalo did every thing in his power to satisfy his troops of the justice of the cause in which he and they were engaged; representing to them that Peru had been conquered by him and his brothers; recalling to their remembrance the cruelties which had been exercised by the viceroy, particularly in putting to death the commissary Yllan Suarez and several of his own captains. In the next place, he gave an exaggerated picture of the tyrannical conduct of the viceroy during the whole period of his government, owing to which he had been deposed by the royal audience, and sent out of the country to give an account to the king of his conduct: Instead of which, he now endeavoured to disturb the colony by sowing dissensions and encouraging insurrections, and had even levied an army in other provinces, with which he intended to reduce the country under his tyrannous rule, and to ruin all its inhabitants. After a long speech, by which he endeavoured to animate his troops with resentment against the viceroy, they all declared their readiness to march against him and bring him to battle. Some were actuated by interested motives, to prevent the enforcement of the obnoxious regulations; others by a desire of avenging private injuries; and others again by the fear of punishment for having taken up arms. But it is not to be concealed, that the majority acted from dread of the severity of Gonzalo and his officers, who had already put several persons to death, merely for having shewn some degree of coldness or disinclination towards the cause of the insurgents.

On reviewing and mustering his force, Gonzalo found himself at the head of 130 well mounted cavalry, 200 musqueteers, and 350 armed with pikes, or near 700 in all, with abundance of excellent gun-powder[19]. Learning that the viceroy had encamped on the banks of the river about two leagues from Quito, Gonzalo advanced to meet him. Juan de Acosta and Juan Velez de Guevara were his captains of musqueteers, Hernando Bachicao commanded the pikemen, and the horse were led by Pedro de Puelles and Gomez de Alvarado. On this occasion there was no person appointed to the office of major-general, the duties of which Gonzalo chose to execute in person. He detached seventy of his cavalry to occupy a ford of the river, by which he meant to cross over towards the camp of the viceroy, over whom he expected to gain an easy victory. It was now Sat.u.r.day the 15th of January 1546, and the two armies remained all night so near each other that the advanced posts were able to converse, each calling the other rebels and traitors, those on each side pretending that they only were loyal subjects to the king.

[Footnote 19: According to Garcila.s.so, the army of Gonzalo on this occasion amounted to 700 men, 200 of whom were armed with firelocks, 350 with pikes, and 150 were cavalry. In the History of America, II. 375, the force under the viceroy is only stated at 400; but both in Zarate and Garcila.s.so the royalists are mentioned as 800 strong.--E.]

At this time, Gonzalo Pizarro was accompanied by the licentiate Benedict Suarez de Carvajal brother to the commissary Yllan Suarez de Carvajal who had formerly been put to death at Lima in presence of the viceroy.

At that former period Benedict was on his journey from Cuzco to Lima, intending to have joined the viceroy against Gonzalo, and had arrived within twenty leagues of Lima when he learnt the murder of his brother, after which he dared not to trust himself in that city until the viceroy had been deposed and sent on board s.h.i.+p. He was afterwards made prisoner by Gonzalo, who was even on the point of putting him to death; but on setting out for Quito, Gonzalo took him into favour. Carvajal now followed him with good will against the viceroy, upon whom he was eager to take signal vengeance for the unmerited death of his brother; and was even followed on this occasion by about thirty of his friends and relations, who formed a separate company under his immediate command.

The viceroy had arrived at a village called Tuza, about twenty leagues from Quito, when he learnt that Gonzalo Pizarro was returned to that city, and was now at the head of about seven hundred men. Believing himself however in sufficient force to attempt the recovery of his authority in Peru, the viceroy communicated this intelligence to his princ.i.p.al officers, whom he commanded to have every thing in readiness for battle. On his arrival at the river within two leagues of Quito, and in presence of the enemy who occupied the slope of a hill on the other side, he determined to endeavour to get into their rear, for which purpose he advanced with his troops by a road in a different direction from that on which the insurgents were posted, expecting to derive great advantages from this measure, as the whole infantry of Gonzalo, which formed his princ.i.p.al force, were posted on the slope of the hill directly in front, and his rear-guard of cavalry could have no suspicion of being liable to attack. The viceroy accordingly began his march on the night of the 15th January, leaving his camp standing with all his Indians and dogs, and with fires burning in many places, to deceive the enemy into a belief that he still remained in the camp.

Marching therefore in perfect silence by the road which had been pointed out to him for gaining the rear of the insurgents, he expected to have attained his object before day: But as the road, had not been frequented for a long time, he encountered so many obstructions and difficulties, in consequence of the road being broken up in many places, that when day broke he was still a league from the enemy, by which all hope or opportunity of surprizing them was entirely lost. In this dilemma, he came to the resolution of marching straight upon Quito, in which there were very few to oppose him, and which was in no situation to give any resistance. He was in hopes of finding several loyal subjects in that place, who might have contrived to elude following the usurper to the field, and might now join his army, and he expected to find some arms and military stores left there by Gonzalo. On arriving at Quito, the soldiers of the viceroy learnt that Gonzalo was present with all his troops, which circ.u.mstance had hitherto been carefully concealed from their knowledge.

In the morning of the 16th, the scouts of Gonzalo were surprised to hear so little noise in the camp of the viceroy; and having cautiously advanced, they learnt from the Indian followers of the royalist army in what manner the viceroy had pa.s.sed the insurgents during the night. The scouts therefore made haste to apprize Gonzalo of this event, who learnt soon afterwards by messengers from Quito that the viceroy had taken possession of that city. Gonzalo therefore immediately marched for Quito, determined to give battle to the viceroy without delay; and although the viceroy was perfectly aware of the advantages possessed by Pizarro in the superior discipline and equipment of his troops, he courageously resolved to run the risk of battle, and even to expose himself personally to all its dangers. In this determination, he boldly marched from the city of Quito directly towards the enemy, as if a.s.sured of gaining a victory. To Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, who commanded his first company with the royal standard, he a.s.signed the office of lieutenant-general, commanding every one to obey him in that capacity.

Cepeda and Bazan led the cavalry, and Ahumada carried the great standard. Sancho Sanchez de Avila, Hernandez Giron, Pedro Heredia, and Rodrigo Nunnez de Bonilla were captains of infantry, over which Juan de Cabrera commanded as major-general. The viceroy was earnestly requested by all his officers not to engage in the front of battle as he intended, but to take post in the rear with fifteen hors.e.m.e.n, whence he might send succours to wherever they might be required; yet, when the engagement was about to commence, the viceroy rode up to the vanguard, and took his place beside the lieutenant-general, Don Alfonzo, in front of the royal standard. On this occasion the viceroy was mounted on a grey horse, dressed in an upper garment of white muslin, with large slashes, shewing an under vest of crimson satin fringed with gold. Just before beginning the engagement, he addressed his troops to the following effect: "I do not pretend, my loyal friends, to encourage you by my words and example, as I rather look for an example of bravery from your courageous efforts, and am fully convinced you will do your duty as brave and faithful subjects of our gracious sovereign. Knowing therefore your inviolable fidelity to the king our common master, I have only to say that we are engaged in the cause of G.o.d." These last words he repeated several times, exclaiming, "It is the cause of G.o.d! It is the cause of G.o.d!"

After this short exhortation, the viceroy with Don Alfonzo and Bazan advanced to the charge, being opposed on the other side by the licentiate Carvajal. Gonzalo Pizarro had likewise intended to have taken post in the front of battle, but his officers insisted upon his remaining in the rear with eight or ten hors.e.m.e.n. In the first charge the cavalry s.h.i.+vered their lances, after which they continued to fight obstinately with swords, battle-axes and war-clubs or maces. In this part of the battle the cavalry of the viceroy were much galled by a line of musqueteers of the adverse army which plied them in flank. While fighting bravely, the viceroy beat down one of the insurgents named Montalva; but immediately afterwards received so severe a blow on the head with a battle-axe from Ferdinand de Torres, that he fell stunned from his horse. Indeed, both he and his horse had been so excessively fatigued by the difficult march of the preceding night, in which they had neither been able to take food or rest, that they were both easily overthrown. While this was pa.s.sing with the cavalry of the van, the infantry on both sides advanced to engage, setting up such loud shouts, that one would have believed them much more numerous than they were in reality. Juan de Cabrera was slain at the very commencement of this part of the battle. Sancho de Avilla, advanced boldly at the head of his company to attack the enemy, brandis.h.i.+ng a two-handed sword, which he employed with so much strength and address that he soon broke through and defeated half of the company by which he was opposed. But as the soldiers of Pizarro were more numerous in this part of the field than those who followed Avilla, he was surrounded on all sides, and he and most of his men slain. Until the death of the viceroy was known, the battle was very bravely contested by his infantry; but as soon as the knowledge of that unfortunate event had spread through their ranks, they lost heart and relaxed in their efforts, and were soon entirely defeated with considerable slaughter. At this time, the licentiate Carvajal observed Pedro de Puelles about to end the life of the unfortunate viceroy, already insensible and almost dead in consequence of the blow he had received from De Torres and a wound from a musquet ball: Carvajal immediately dismounted and cut off his head, saying, "That his only object in joining the party of Gonzalo was to take vengeance for the death of his brother."

When the victory was completely decided, Gonzalo Pizarro ordered a retreat to be sounded to recal his troops who were engaged in pursuit of the enemy. In this battle, the royalists lost about two hundred men, while only seven were slain on the side of the victors. Pizarro ordered the slain to be buried on the field of battle, and caused the bodies of the viceroy and Sancho de Avilla to be carried to Quito, where they were buried with much solemn pomp, attending himself at the funeral and in mourning[20]. He soon afterwards ordered ten or twelve of the princ.i.p.al royalists to be hanged, who had taken shelter in the churches of Quito, or had concealed themselves in other places. The oydor Alvarez, Benalcazar governor of Popayan, and Don Alfonzo de Montemayor, were wounded and made prisoners in the battle. Gonzalo intended to have ordered Don Alfonzo to be beheaded; but as he had many friends among the insurgents who interceded for his life, and who a.s.sured Gonzalo that he could not possibly recover from his wounds, he was spared. Some time afterwards, Gomez de Alvarado sent notice to Benalcazar that it was intended to administer poison to these three prisoners in the dressings applied to their wounds or in their food; and accordingly he and Don Alfonzo took great precautions to avoid this treachery. As the oydor Alvarez was lodged in the same house with his brother judge Cepeda, he had not in his power to use similar precautions, and died soon after; and every one believed that he was poisoned in some almond soup.

[Footnote 20: This authentic circ.u.mstance by no means agrees with the a.s.sertion in the History of America, II. 376, that the head of the viceroy was affixed on the public gibbet in Quito. From the text of Zarate, this battle appears to have been fought on the 16th January 1546. In the History of America, it is dated on the 18th; but the difference is quite immaterial.--E.]

Finding that he could not get secretly rid of Don Alfonzo as he wished, and having no hope of gaining him over to his party, Pizarro resolved to banish him into Chili, above a thousand leagues from Quito, and to send to the same place Rodrigo de Bonilla the treasurer of Quito, and seven or eight other persons of importance, who had always faithfully accompanied the viceroy under every change of fortune. Gonzalo did not put these men to death, as several of his own partizans interceded for their lives; and he did not deem it prudent to keep them near his person, or to permit them to remain in Peru. These exiles were accordingly sent off for Chili, under the charge of Antonio de Ulloa with a party of soldiers. After a march of more than four hundred leagues, mostly on foot, although their wounds were not entirely healed, these prisoners determined to make an effort to recover their liberty, or to lose their lives in the attempt. They accordingly rose against Ulloa and his men with so much courage and resolution that they succeeded in making him and most of his men prisoners. Being near a sea-port, they contrived by great address to gain possession of a vessel, in which were several soldiers and others of the insurgent party whom they overpowered; and leaving all their prisoners, they embarked without either sailors or pilot, and though none of them were in the least acquainted with navigation, they had the good fortune to reach New Spain.

Not satisfied with wreaking his vengeance on those of his enemies who had fallen into his hands in consequence of the victory of Quito, Gonzalo sent Guevara to the city of Parto to apprehend some of his enemies who resided in that place, one of whom only was put to death, and all the rest sent into exile. He pardoned Benalcazar, who promised faithfully to become attached to his party, and sent him back to his government of Popayan, with part of the troops he had brought from thence in the service of the viceroy. He likewise a.s.sembled all the fugitive troops of the viceroy, to whom he in the first place urged the many causes of displeasure which he had for their past conduct, yet pardoned them as he knew they had either been misled or forced to act against him, and promised, if they served him faithfully in the sequel, that he would treat them as well as those who had been on his side from the beginning, and would reward them equally when the country was restored to peace. He sent off messengers in every direction, to announce the victory he had obtained, and to encourage his partizans, so that his usurpation seemed established in greater security than ever.

Captain Alarcon was sent to Panama, to communicate the intelligence to Hinojosa, with orders to bring back along with him Vela Nunnez and the others who had been made prisoners in that quarter.

SECTION V.

_Continuation of the Usurpation of Gonzalo Pizarro, to the arrival of Gasca in Peru with full powers to restore the Colony to order._

At this period, some of Gonzalo's adherents advised him to send his fleet to scour the coasts of Nicaragua and New Spain, on purpose to take or burn all the vessels which might be found in these parts, by which he would effectually secure himself from any attack by sea. By this means, they alleged, when the dispatches and orders from his majesty should arrive in the Tierra Firma, finding no means of sending these into Peru, the ministers of the crown would be under the necessity of granting him favourable terms of accommodation almost equal to his wishes. Pizarro however had great confidence in the fidelity and attachment of Hinojosa and those who were with him, believing that he might trust implicitly to their vigilance, and refused to follow the measures proposed, as tending to evince too much weakness and want of confidence in the goodness of the cause in which he was engaged. He was besides so puffed up by the victory which he had gained over the viceroy, that he believed himself able to resist any power which could now be brought against him.

Alarcon went accordingly to Panama, whence he brought back to Peru the prisoners who had been taken at that place by Hinojosa, and was accompanied on his return by the son of Gonzalo. When near Puerto Viejo on his voyage back, Alarcon ordered Saavedra and Lerma, two of his chief prisoners, to be hanged on account of some words they were said to have spoken against the insurgents. He was disposed to have put Rodrigo Mexia, another of these prisoners, to death at the same time; but the son of Gonzalo pleaded strongly to save his life, by representing how kindly he had been used by Mexia while in his custody. Vela Nunnez was conducted to Quito, where he was pardoned by Gonzalo, yet admonished to behave very carefully for the future, as the slightest suspicion would be fatal. Cepeda, one of the oydors of the royal audience, always continued to accompany Gonzalo, so that Ortiz de Zarate, the only judge who remained in Lima was unable to act in the absence of all the other judges. Indeed he was now less feared, ever since Gonzalo Pizarro had almost by force procured a marriage between one of the daughters of that judge and his brother Blas Soto[21]. Still however this judge retained every proper sentiment of loyalty to the king, although constrained by the exigency of the times to conceal his principles, and to seem in some measure reconciled to the usurper.

[Footnote 21: Of this brother of the Pizarro family, no other notice occurs in Zarate.--E.]

While these transactions were going on in the north of Peru, the lieutenant-general Carvajal continued his operations in the south against Centeno. As formerly related, he departed from Cuzeo with three hundred men, well provided with horses, musquets and other arms, marching by way of the Collao for the province of Paria, in which Centeno then was with about two hundred and fifty men, determined to await the arrival of the enemy and to run the chance of battle. When Carvajal was come within about two leagues of that place, Centeno retired a short s.p.a.ce to the other side of the city, taking post on the side of a river in what appeared to him strong ground, and Carvajal took possession of the _tambo_ of Paria, about a league from the camp of Centeno. Next day, Centeno sent fifteen well mounted musqueteers to bid defiance to Carvajal, and to challenge him to battle. On arriving within a stones throw of the tambo, they required a conference with Carvajal, to whom they delivered the following message: "That Centeno was ready to give battle in the cause of his majesty; but if Carvajal, who had grown old in the royal service, would return to his duty and abandon the service of the usurper, Centeno and all his followers would be happy to serve under his command." To this message Carvajal only returned abusive language, and the two parties mutually reproached each other as rebels and traitors. After some time spent in this manner, the fifteen royalists discharged their musquets and returned to Centeno, to whom they gave an account of the number and disposition of the enemy. This occurrence took place on Holy Friday in the year 1546.

Immediately after this defiance, Carvajal put his troops in motion to attack the royalists, but Centeno thought proper to retire to a more advantageous post, not deeming it prudent to run the risk of a pitched battle, and meaning rather to hara.s.s the enemy by means of skirmishes and night attacks. He was likewise in hopes that a good many of those who followed Carvajal might come over to his side as opportunity offered, as he understood many of them were much discontented with the harsh and brutal behaviour of the lieutenant-general, whom they served from fear and constraint, not from attachment. Besides, Centeno was unwilling to run the risk of battle, as Carvajal though inferior in cavalry to the royalist party was greatly superior in point of fire arms. In fact this resolution of retreating was much against the inclination of Centeno, who wished to have given battle to Carvajal; but as all the inhabitants of La Plata on his side opposed that measure, he was obliged to conform to their wishes, yet always determined to give battle on the first favourable opportunity. Centeno accordingly retreated fifteen leagues that day, and was followed by Carvajal with great diligence, insomuch that the hostile parties encamped at night very near each other, on which occasion Carvajal confided the guard of his camp to such of his followers as he could most surely depend upon.

Towards midnight, Centeno detached eighty hors.e.m.e.n to a.s.sault the camp of the insurgents, which they did accordingly with much spirit, making several discharges of their fire arms, but without any favourable impression; as Carvajal drew up his troops in order of battle, and kept them all night in their ranks, strictly forbidding any one to quit their post on any pretence, lest some might desert over to the enemy. At break of day, Centeno decamped and resumed his march, and was followed by Carvajal with equal diligence always very near. In this second day of the retreat the two parties marched ten leagues, or near forty miles; and towards evening Camijal came up with one of the soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had lagged behind owing to extreme fatigue. Carvajal ordered him immediately to be hanged, swearing that he would treat every one of the enemy who fell into his hands in the same manner.

Centeno continued always to retreat, and Carvajal to pursue close in his rear, both parties using the utmost possible diligence, insomuch that they every day marched twelve or fifteen long leagues, almost always within sight of each other. After some days, Centeno made a countermarch upon Paria by taking a different road, and even directed his march, towards the Collao, always followed by Carvajal. At Hayohayo[22]

Carvajal came up with twelve soldiers belonging to Centeno, who had fallen behind, all of whom he ordered to be hanged. In consequence of these continued rapid marches, several of the soldiers of both sides used daily to lag behind from excessive fatigue, all of whom endeavoured to hide themselves as well as they could to avoid being made prisoners.

Finding his force daily diminis.h.i.+ng, Centeno complained loudly of his officers and followers for having prevented him from fighting; and as he found the whole country through which he now marched attached to the enemy, he determined to direct his march towards the coast intending to escape if possible by sea. For this purpose he took the direction of Arequipa, and sent off one of his officers named Ribadeneyra to endeavour to procure a s.h.i.+p somewhere on the coast, which he was to bring to Arequipa, that it might be in readiness to embark the whole remnant of the retreating party immediately on their arrival[23].

Ribadeneyra fell in with a s.h.i.+p on the coast which was ready to sail for Chili, of which he easily took possession, and found it well adapted for his purpose.

[Footnote 22: The Callao is a district at the north end of the great lake of t.i.ticaca. Paria and Hayohayo are two towns on the east side of the Rio Desaguadero, which flows from the south into the lake of t.i.ticaca.--E.]

[Footnote 23: Arequipa is not less than twenty-five miles from the nearest coast, at which place there is a bay or port named La Guata.--E.]

"In the course of this pursuit, it happened, one day that Centeno had to pa.s.s a deep dell or narrow valley between two mountains, as often happens in that country, the descent to which was about a league from the top to a stream of water in the bottom, yet the hills were so precipitous and close together that their tops hardly exceeded a musquet shot. As Carvajal was well acquainted with this pa.s.s, he was confident of catching his enemy at this place as in a trap; believing that while Centeno was descending to the bottom, he should be able to gain the top of the hill, whence he might greatly annoy Centeno and his men while clambering up the opposite hill. Centeno was however fully aware of his danger, and was accordingly very careful to provide against the mischief which he foresaw might occur. He therefore placed six of his best mounted cavalry in ambush near the top of the first mountain, with directions to a.s.sail the rear of Carvajal's troops after the van and main body were past, so as to make a diversion and oblige Carvajal to return to succour his people, by which he and his men would be enabled, to get beyond the pa.s.s in safety. The ambush accordingly remained concealed until Carvajal and the best part of his troops were gone past; after which they sallied forth, and fell with great resolution on the rear which was marching on in disorder, consisting of a mixed mult.i.tude of Indians, Negroes, and straggling Spaniards, with horses mules and other beasts of burden, all in confusion and disorder, among whom they did great execution. Although he heard the noise occasioned by this unexpected a.s.sault, Carvajal continued his march for some time, believing it only a false alarm. The six hors.e.m.e.n therefore continued their a.s.sault almost unopposed, carrying all before them, and doing incredible mischief. Among the rest they overthrew a loaded mule which carried several quintals of gun-powder, which they blew up with so violent a noise that Carvajal was convinced of the serious nature of the a.s.sault, and found it necessary to desist from the pursuit of Centeno, and to return for the protection of his rear. When the six hors.e.m.e.n belonging to Centeno observed the approach of the troops of Carvajal, they immediately fled by cross ways and bye paths, under the guidance of some friendly Indians, and rejoined Centeno six or seven days afterwards. By this successful stratagem Centeno was enabled to escape across the dangerous pa.s.s, and even gained considerably in the retreat, as Carvajal was obliged to remain on the top of the first mountain all the rest of that day and the following night. Carvajal was much displeased at being thus foiled by one so much less experienced than he in the art of war, and observed to his officers, that during forty years service in the wars of Italy, where he had seen many fine retreats, accomplished by the king of France, by Antonio de Leyva, Count Pedro de Navarro, Mark Antony Colona, and other famous captains, he had never seen one so excellently contrived as this by Centeno[24]."

[Footnote 24: This paragraph, marked by inverted commas, is inserted from Garcila.s.so de la Vega in the text, as too long for a note.--E.]

Centeno arrived soon afterwards at Arequipa, and in less than two days Carvajal arrived there in pursuit. As the vessel procured by Ribadeneyra was not come to that part of the coast, and Centeno had not even received notice of its capture, he determined to dismiss his followers, now reduced to eighty men, that they might endeavour to escape separately, being utterly unable to make head against the enemy who was fast approaching. Centeno, accompanied only by two friends, withdrew, into the mountains, where he remained concealed in a cave till the arrival of the licentiate Gasca, being all the time supplied with provisions by a friendly cacique. On arriving at the coast of Arequipa, Carvajal was informed that Centeno and his people were dispersed; and hearing that Lope de Mendoza was at no great distance with eight or ten of the royalists, he detached one of his officers with twenty mounted musqueteers in pursuit. Mendoza however fled with so much diligence, that although followed for more than eighty leagues, his pursuers were unable to overtake him, and were at last obliged to return. Mendoza continued his retreat beyond the ridge of the Andes, into the eastern plain of the Rio Plata, where we must leave him for the present to continue the narrative of events in Peru.

Soon after the arrival of Carvajal in Arequipa, the s.h.i.+p which, had been seized by Ribadeneyra appeared on the coast, and Carvajal was informed by some of the soldiers of Centeno who remained at Arequipa of the intention of this vessel, and of the signal which had been agreed, upon between Centeno and Ribadeneyra. Wis.h.i.+ng to gain possession of the vessel, Carvajal concealed twenty musqueteers near the coast, and made the appointed signal. Ribadeneyra at first believed that the signal was made by order of Centeno and sent the boat on sh.o.r.e; but having some suspicions of the actual state of affairs, he directed the people in the boat to be extremely cautious against surprize before venturing on sh.o.r.e. They accordingly, refused to land, unless Centeno himself made his appearance; and as this of course could not be complied with, they returned to the s.h.i.+p, with which Ribadeneyra immediately set sail for Nicaragua. As no part of the late force under Centeno remained in the field, Carvajal resolved to take up his residence for some time in the city of La Plata, as he was informed that Centeno and his friends had concealed a large quant.i.ty of treasure at that place, and that he might both endeavour to discover that deposit, and might draw as large a sum as possible from the rich mines in that neighbourhood. Carvajal was willing to communicate to Gonzalo a portion of the wealth he expected to acquire in that district, for defraying the expences of the war; but he proposed especially to enrich himself on this occasion, being exceedingly covetous, as has been already remarked. He accordingly went to La Plata, which submitted without resistance, and remained there for a considerable time ama.s.sing wealth, till obliged to take the field against Mendoza.

Lope de Mendoza, as already mentioned, made his escape from Arequipa with a small number of followers, and was pursued for a long way. He for some time followed the line of the coast, and after he had eluded the pursuit of the party sent after him by Carvajal, he and his companions resolved so endeavour to penetrate into the government of Diego de Roias on the Rio Plata, as all the country of Peru had universally submitted to the domination of Gonzalo. For this purpose Mendoza followed the same route which Centeno had formerly taken when retreating from Alfonso de Toro; both because he thought his enemies would not pursue him by that road and because the Indians belonging to Centeno and himself dwelt in that part of the country, and he expected to procure provisions and other a.s.sistance from them. While travelling across these deserts, Mendoza met with Gabriel Bermudez, who had accompanied Diego de Roias on his expedition into the country on the Rio Plata. From this person Mendoza was informed of the events which had occurred to the expedition under De Roias, of which the following is an abstract:

Diego de Roias, Philip Gutierrez and Pedro de Heredia, who went upon this expedition, had to fight their way among hostile Indians, in the course of which De Roias was slain. After his death, violent disputes arose between Francisco de Mendoza who succeeded in the command and the other officers engaged in the expedition, in the course of which Gutierrez was cas.h.i.+ered and banished. They continued after this to prosecute their discoveries all the way to the Rio Plata, receiving information that great riches were to be found in some districts in the neighbourhood, in which there were certain Spaniards who had penetrated into the country by ascending the Rio Plata from the Atlantic, and had formed establishments in the interior. In prosecuting the exploration, of that great river, they had fallen in with some forts which were built by Sebastian Gabota; and reported many other surprizing and wonderful things which they had seen in that country. In the course of their proceedings, Francisco de Mendoza was a.s.sa.s.sinated by Pedro Heredia, owing to which violent disputes had taken place among them, by which and the smallness of their force they had been rendered unable to proceed in conquering the country, so that at length they had come to the resolution of returning into Peru, that his majesty or the viceroy of that kingdom might nominate a new commander. They were likewise persuaded, when the riches of the country in which they had been came to be known, that they would be able to procure a considerable accession of new adventurers, so as to enable them to atchieve the conquest.

In the course of their expedition they a.s.serted that they had penetrated six hundred leagues to the eastwards of La Plata, through a champaign country of very easy access, and tolerably abounding in provisions and water. Bermudez added, that within a very few days they had learnt, from some Indians who occasionally traded into the province of Las Charcas, of the revolt which had taken place in Peru, but had been unable to procure information respecting the causes of this insurrection or as to who were chiefly engaged in it; for which reason he had been sent on before to inquire into these circ.u.mstances, and had received orders from the captains and other princ.i.p.al persons in the expedition, to offer their services to the party that acted for the royal interests, in which cause they might be of material importance, as they had a considerable number of excellent horses and plenty of arms. After the conclusion of this narrative, Mendoza gave Bermudez an account of all the late events in Peru; on which, in, virtue of the commission with which he had been entrusted, Bermudez promised in the name of all his companions to march against the lieutenant-general.

Lope Mendoza and Bermudez went after this to meet the troops which were returning from the Rio Plata, which were at no great distance. When they were informed of the situation of affairs in Peru, they received Lope with every demonstration of respect, and confirmed the offers of a.s.sistance which Bermudez had already made in their name, declaring their resolution to devote themselves heartily to the service of the king. Lope de Mendoza gave them hearty commendations for their loyalty, and represented to them how honourable and praiseworthy it was to exert their utmost endeavours in the cause of their lawful sovereign; a.s.suring them that they might all depend upon being amply provided for, when the country was restored to obedience. Lope de Mendoza was unanimously received as their chief, and conducted them to the village of Pocona, about forty leagues to the north-east of La Plata; whence he sent some confidential persons to certain secret places where he and Centeno had hidden above a thousand marks of silver under ground. On recovering this treasure, he proposed to divide it among those persons who had so n.o.bly offered to follow his orders; but most of them refused his preferred bounty, either because they were already sufficiently rich, or because hitherto the soldiers who had been engaged in the wars of Peru had been unused to any regular pay, and only accepted money to answer their immediate wants, and to provide themselves with horses and arms. Even the lowest soldier, in those days expected, when the enterprizes of their leaders succeeded, to be rewarded for his services in repart.i.tions or advantageous establishments in the country, by which they flattered themselves to acquire riches, so great was the reputation of the richness of Peru. By means of these men from the Rio Plata, Lope Mendoza found himself unexpectedly at the head of an hundred and fifty well mounted cavalry; all excellently armed and equipped for service. It was a great misfortune to the royal cause, that Centeno was now concealed, instead of having retreated into the interior along with Mendoza as he had done formerly; as if he had now been at the head of the royalists, with this important reinforcement, affairs might have taken a better turn than they actually did.

While Carvajal was on his way from Arequipa for the city of La Plata, he received intelligence of the success of Gonzalo Pizarro at Quito, and that all Peru was entirely reduced under his command. He resolved therefore to repair to La Plata, as formerly mentioned, intending to regulate the affairs of the province of Las Charcas, and to collect treasure. On his arrival however at Paria on his way to La Plata he received intelligence of the arrival of the troops from the Rio Plata and of their junction with Lope Mendoza. Being informed at the same time that these unexpected opponents were by no means united among themselves, and that they marched very carelessly in separate and unconnected detachments, most of which refused to acknowledge any one as their commander, he determined to set out against them with the utmost diligence, that he might fall upon them in their present divided state.

Being rejoined by the detachment which had pursued Lope Mendoza, and having put his men in order for a fresh expedition, Carvajal set out from La Plata and marched towards the enemy with the utmost possible speed, encouraging his troops by the a.s.surance of an easy and bloodless victory, even a.s.serting that he had received letters from the princ.i.p.al officers among the enemy in which they offered their services to him, so that they would only have the trouble of marching, without any danger of fighting.

During this march Carvajal was joined by thirty men in addition to his former force, so that he was now at the head of two hundred and fifty men. At length he came in sight of Pocona, which is eighty leagues from Paria, about four o'clock of an afternoon, and made his appearance in good order, on the top of a rising ground within view of Lope de Mendoza, who was then making a distribution of money among such of his new companions as were willing to accept his bounty: Mendoza had already got some intimation of the approach of Carvajal; and as his own force consisted entirely of cavalry, most of whom were persons of some consideration, remarkably well mounted and armed, he drew up his men in good order in a plain at some distance from the village, in which he left the baggage and his money; saying, that he trusted through their bravery to be soon able to recover both, and even to increase their store by that belonging to their enemies. Carvajal immediately descended from the hill he had first taken possession of, and took post in the place which Mendoza had just quitted, which was an inclosare of considerable extent surrounded with walls, in which there were openings in several places. Carvajal chose this as a convenient post for the night, in which the enemy would not be able to attack with their cavalry. On learning that Lope de Mendoza and his men had left their baggage in the town of Pocona, the troops of Carvajal immediately quitted their ranks to go in search of plunder, insomuch that Carvajal was left in his camp with hardly eight men. If Mendoza had availed himself of this opportunity to attack Carvajal, he might have gained an easy victory, and might have boasted of having left his baggage exposed to plunder as a stratagem of war, which on similar occasions had often been the cause of signal victories. On purpose to recall his troops to their duty, Carvajal ordered a false alarm to be sounded, which occasioned the return of the greater part of his men; but so strong was their avidity for spoil that most part of the night was spent before they all returned to the camp.

At this time there was a secret conspiracy entered into by many of Carvajal's followers, with the intention of putting him to death out of revenge for his harsh and tyrannical conduct towards them, and one Pedro de Avendano, his secretary, in whom he reposed entire confidence was the princ.i.p.al ringleader of the conspirators. To facilitate the execution of this enterprize, Avendano, sent a message by a clever fellow of an Indian to give Mendoza notice of the intentions of the conspirators, and to request he would make an attack upon Carvajal's camp in the course of the night, in the confusion attendant upon which he and the other conspirators might have an opportunity of executing their intended plot.

Mendoza had previously determined upon withdrawing about four or five leagues from Pocona, to a level plain in which his cavalry would be able to act with much advantage. But on receiving the message of Avendano, he ordered his men to hold themselves in readiness to attack the camp of Carvajal at the going down of the moon, preferring the obscurity of night in order to avoid the danger of the more numerous firearms of the enemy. At that time he advanced in good order towards the enemy, sending some scouts in advance, who made prisoner of one of Carvajal's soldiers.

After interrogating this man, they advanced to the openings of the wall which surrounded the camp, which they found guarded by some musqueteers and pikemen. Mendoza made a brisk attack, but was bravely resisted by the enemy, and so great was the confusion and noise that it was impossible to enter upon any parley, as no one could be heard by reason of the continual firing and the shouts of the combatants.

Immediately on the alarm, Carvajal used his utmost efforts to get his troops into order and to animate and encourage them to exert themselves against the enemy. At this period, Avendano pointed out Carvajal to a musqueteer who was one of the conspirators, and encouraged him to take a steady aim at the lieutenant-general; but owing to the darkness, the shot missed of its intended effect; and only wounded him in one of his thighs. Finding himself wounded, and being satisfied it had been done by one of his own people, Carvajal deemed it prudent to conceal the circ.u.mstance for the present; and retired along with Avendano, of whose fidelity he had no suspicion, on purpose to disguise himself in an old brown coat-and a shabby hat, that he might not be conspicuous, after which he returned to animate his men to defend the camp. Avendano again pointed him out to another conspirator, who fired a second time at Carvajal, but entirely missed his aim. In the meantime the a.s.sailants frequently called out to know if Carvajal were dead; but receiving no answer, and finding that all the avenues to the camp were bravely defended, Lope de Mendoza drew off his men. In this night engagement about fourteen were slain on both sides, and several wounded. Carvajal got his wound secretly dressed, so that none of his people knew that such a thing had happened.

After the cessation of the engagement, one Placentia deserted from Carvajal's camp, and informed Mendoza that all the baggage belonging to Carvajal and his troops had been left at a place which he described about five or six leagues from Pocona, among which was a large quant.i.ty of gold and silver, several horses, and some musquets and powder. On this information, Meodoza set off immediately with his troops for that place, guided by the deserter; and marching diligently all the remainder of the night, he arrived quite unexpectedly at the place where Carvajal had secured his baggage; but as the night was exceedingly dark, above seventy of his men lost their way and fell behind. Yet, with such of his people as had kept up with him, Mendoza took possession of the whole without any resistance. After this, being sensible that he was not in sufficient force to cope with Carvajal, Mendoza resolved to retreat by way of the desert in which Centeno had formerly taken shelter, which he did accordingly with about fifty men, all the rest of his troops having fallen behind during the night, as already mentioned. In the prosecution of this plan of retreat, Mendoza and his people reached a certain river about two leagues and a half from Pocona, where they halted to take some rest and refreshment after the excessive fatigues of the past night.

Carvajal was soon apprised of the capture of his baggage and the route which Mendoza had taken, and immediately set off in pursuit with about fifty of his best mounted troops; and, using every possible diligence, he came to the place where Mendoza had halted, about noon of the next day, and immediately attacked the royalists, some of whom were asleep, while others were taking food. Thus unexpectedly a.s.sailed, and believing that Carvajal was followed by his whole force, the royalists made a feeble resistance, and very soon took to flight, dispersing themselves in every direction. Lope de Mendoza and Pedro de Heredia, with a good many others, were made prisoners and Carvajal immediately ordered these two chiefs, and six or seven other princ.i.p.al persons among the royalists to be beheaded.

On this occasion Carvajal recovered the whole of his own baggage, and got possession of all that had belonged to the enemy, with all of which and the prisoners he had made, he returned to Pocona, engaging to do no injury to those who had escaped from the soldiers in the late attack, and even restored their horses arms and baggage to his prisoners, most of whom he sent off to join Gonzalo Pizarro. On leaving Pocona, he took Alfonso de Camargo and Luis Pardamo along with him, who had formerly fled along with Mendoza, and whose lives he now spared, as they gave him information respecting a considerable treasure which Centeno had concealed under ground near Paria, and where in fact he discovered above 50,000 crowns. After this, he went with his troops to the city of La Plata, where he proposed to reside for some time. At this place he appointed persons in whom he could confide to the offices of judges and magistrates, and dispatched intelligence of the success of his arms over the whole kingdom of Peru. He remained for some time at La Plata, where he collected treasure from all the surrounding country, under pretence of supplying Gonzalo Pizarro, but in reality he retained much the larger share for himself.

Having thus succeeded, in all his enterprizes and established his authority in the south of Peru on such firm foundations that no opposition remained in the whole country, fortune seemed to determine to exalt him to the summit of his desires by the discovery of the richest mines which had ever been known. Some Indians who belonged to Juan de Villareal, an inhabitant of La Plata, happening to pa.s.s over a very high isolated mountain in the middle of a plain, about eighteen leagues from that city, named Potosi, noticed by some indications that it contained mines of silver. They accordingly took away some specimens of the ore for trial, from which they found that the mineral was exceedingly rich in pure silver; insomuch that the poorest of the ore produced eighty marks of pure silver from the quintal of native mineral[25], being a more abundant production than any that ever had been heard of before.

When this discovery became known in the city of La Plata, the magistrates went to the mountain of Potosi, which they divided among the inhabitants of their city, setting up boundary marks to distinguish the allotments or each person in those places which appeared eligible for workings. So great was the resort to these new mines, that in a short time there were above seven thousand _Yanaconas_, or Indian labourers, established in the neighbourhood, who were employed by their Christian masters in the various operations of these mines. These men laboured with so much industry, that each Indian, by agreement, furnished two marks or sixteen ounces of silver weekly to their respective masters; and so rich was the mine, that they were able to do this and to retain an equal quant.i.ty to themselves[26]. Such is the nature of the ore extracted from the mineral veins of this mountain, that it cannot be reduced in the ordinary manner by means of bellows, as is customary in other places. It is here smelted in certain small furnaces, called _guairas_ by the Indians, which are supplied with a mixed fuel of charcoal and sheeps dung, and are blown up by the wind only, without the use of any mechanical contrivance.

[Footnote 25: This produce is most extraordinarily large, being equal to _four_ parts of pure silver from _ten_ of ore, or 640 ounces of silver from the quintal or 1600 ounces of ore. At the present time, the silver mines in Mexico, which are the most productive of any that have ever been known, are remarkable for the poverty of the mineral they contain.

A quintal or 1600 ounces of ore affording only at an average 3 or 4 ounces of pure silver. The profit therefore of these must depend upon the abundance of ore, and the facility with which it is procured and smelted.--E.]

[Footnote 26: The gross amount of this production of silver, on the data in the text, is 11,648,000 ounces yearly; worth, at 5s. 6d. per ounce, L. 3,203,200 sterling; and, estimating silver in those days, at six times its present efficacy, worth L. 19,219,200 of modern value. In the present day before the revolutionary troubles, Humboldt estimates the entire production of gold and silver from Spanish and Portuguese America at L. 9,787,500; only about three times the quant.i.ty said to have been at first extracted from Potosi alone, and only about half the effective value.--E.]

These rich mines are known by the name of Potosi, which is that of the district, or province in which the mountain is situated. Owing to the easy labour and great profit experienced by the Indians at these mines, when any of the Yanaconas was once established at this place it was found almost impossible to induce them to leave it or to work elsewhere; and indeed, they were here so entirely concealed from all dangers, and so much exempted from their usual severe drudgery and the unwholesome vapours they had been subjected to in other mines, that they preferred working at Potosi to any other situation. So great was the concourse of inhabitants to Potosi, and the consequent demand for provisions, _that the sack of maize was sold for twenty crowns, the sack of wheat for forty, and a small bag of _coca_ for thirty dollars; and these articles rose afterwards to a higher price. Owing to the astonis.h.i.+ng productiveness of these new mines, all the others in that part of Peru were speedily abandoned. Even those of Porco, whence Ferdinand Pizarro had formerly procured great riches, were left unwrought. All the Yanaconas who had been employed in searching for gold in the province of Carabaya, and in the auriferous rivers in different parts of southern Peru, flocked to Potosi, where they were able to make vastly more profit by their labour than in any other place. From various indications, those who are most experienced in mining believe that Potosi will always continue productive and cannot be easily exhausted[27].