The History of Rome Volume III Part 3

31. Laelius returned victorious into Carteia; and hearing there what had occurred at Gades, that the plot had been discovered, the conspirators sent to Carthage, and that the hopes which had brought them there had been completely frustrated, he sent a message to Lucius Marcius, to the effect that, unless they wished to waste time uselessly in lying before Gades, they should return to the general; and Marcius consenting to the proposal, they both returned to Carthage a few days after. In consequence of their departure, Mago not only obtained a temporary relief from the dangers which beset him on all sides, both by sea and land, but also on hearing of the rebellion of the Ilergetians, conceived hopes of recovering Spain, and sent messengers to Carthage to the senate, who, at the same time that they represented to them in exaggerated terms both the intestine dissension in the Roman camp and the defection of their allies, might exhort them to send succours by which the empire of Spain, which had been handed down to them by their ancestors, might be regained. Mandonius and Indibilis, retiring within their borders, remained quiet for a little time, not knowing what course to take, till they knew what was determined upon respecting the mutiny; but not distrusting that if Scipio pardoned the error of his own countrymen, they also might obtain the same. But when the severe punishment inflicted came to be generally known, concluding that their offence also would be considered as demanding a similar expiation, they again summoned their countrymen to arms; and a.s.sembling the auxiliaries which had joined them before, they crossed over into the Sedetanian territory, where they had had a fixed camp at the beginning of the revolt, with twenty thousand foot and two thousand five hundred horse.

32. Scipio having without difficulty regained the affection of his soldiers, both by his punctuality in discharging the arrears of pay to all, as well the guilty as the innocent, and particularly by the looks and language of reconciliation towards all, before he quitted Carthage summoned an a.s.sembly; and after inveighing at large against the perfidy of the petty princes who were in rebellion, declared "that the feelings with which he set out to take revenge for their villany were widely different from those with which he lately corrected the error committed by his countrymen. That on the latter occasion, he had with groans and tears, as though he were cutting his own vitals, expiated either the imprudence or the guilt of eight thousand men with the heads of thirty; but now he was going to the destruction of the Ilergetians with joyful and animated feelings: for they were neither natives of the same soil, nor united with him by any bond of society.

The only connexion which did subsist between them, that of honour and friends.h.i.+p, they had themselves severed by their wicked conduct." When he looked at the troops which composed his army, besides that he saw that they were all either of his own country, or allies and of the Latin confederacy; he was also strongly affected by the circ.u.mstance, that there was scarcely a soldier in it who was not brought out of Italy into that country either by his uncle, Cneius Scipio, who was the first of the Roman name who had come into that province, or by his father when consul, or by himself. That they were all accustomed to the name and auspices of the Scipios; that it was his wish to take them home to their country to receive a well-earned triumph; and that he hoped that they would support him when he put up for the consuls.h.i.+p, as if the honour sought were to be shared in common by them all. With regard to the expedition which they were just going to undertake, that the man who considered it as a war must be forgetful of his own achievements. That, by Hercules, Mago, who had fled for safety with a few s.h.i.+ps beyond the limits of the world into an island surrounded by the ocean, was a source of greater concern to him than the Ilergetians; for in it there was both a Carthaginian general and a Carthaginian army, whatever might be its numbers; while here were only robbers and leaders of robbers, who, though they possessed sufficient energy for ravaging the lands of their neighbours, burning their houses, and carrying off their cattle, yet would have none at all in a regular and pitched battle; and who would come to the encounter relying more on the swiftness with which they can fly than on their arms. "Accordingly," he said, "that he had thought it right to quell the Ilergetians before he quitted the province, not because he saw that any danger could arise from them, or that a war of greater importance could grow out of these proceedings; but in the first place, that a revolt of so heinous a character might not go unpunished, and in the next place, that not a single enemy might be said to be left in a province which had been subdued with such valour and success. He bid them, therefore, follow him, with the a.s.sistance of the G.o.ds, not so much to make war upon, for the contest was not with an enemy who was upon an equality with them, but to take vengeance on the basest of men."

33. After this harangue he dismissed them, with orders to get themselves in readiness in every respect for marching the next day; when, setting out, he arrived at the river Iberus in ten days. Then crossing the river, he, on the fourth day, pitched his camp within sight of the enemy. Before him was a plain enclosed on all sides by mountains. Into the valley thus formed Scipio ordered some cattle, taken chiefly from the lands of the enemy, to be driven, in order to excite the rapacity of the barbarians, and then sent some light-armed troops as a protection for them, directing Laelius to charge the enemy from a place of concealment when they were engaged in skirmis.h.i.+ng. A mountain which projected conveniently concealed the ambuscade of the cavalry, and the battle began without delay. The Spaniards, as soon as they saw the cattle at a distance, rushed upon them, and the light-armed troops attacked the Spaniards while occupied with their booty. At first they annoyed each other with missiles; but afterwards, having discharged their light weapons, which were calculated to provoke rather than to decide the contest, they drew their swords, and began to engage foot to foot. The fight between the infantry would have been doubtful, but that the cavalry then came up, and not only, charging them in front, trod down all before them, but some also, riding round by the foot of the hill, presented themselves on their rear, so that they might intercept the greater part of them; and consequently the carnage was greater than usually takes place in light and skirmis.h.i.+ng engagements. The resentment of the barbarians was rather inflamed by this adverse battle, than their spirits depressed.

Accordingly, that they might not appear cast down, they marched out into the field the following day as soon as it was light. The valley, which was confined, as has been before stated, would not contain all their forces. About two-thirds of their foot and all their cavalry came down to the engagement. The remainder of their infantry they stationed on the declivity of the hill. Scipio, conceiving that the confined nature of the ground would be in his favour, both because the Roman troops were better adapted for fighting in a contracted s.p.a.ce than the Spanish, and also because the enemy had come down and formed their line on ground which would not contain all their forces, applied his mind to a new expedient. For he considered that he could not himself cover his flanks with his cavalry, and that those of the enemy which they had led out, together with their infantry, would be unable to act. Accordingly he ordered Laelius to lead the cavalry round by the hills as secretly as possible, and separate, as far as he could, the fight between the cavalry from that between the infantry. He himself drew up the whole body of his infantry against the enemy, placing four cohorts in front, because he could not extend his line further. He commenced the battle without delay, in order that the contest itself might divert the attention of the enemy, and prevent their observing the cavalry which were pa.s.sing along the hills. Nor were they aware that they had come round before they beard the noise occasioned by the engagement of the cavalry in their rear. Thus there were two battles; two lines of infantry and two bodies of horse being engaged within the s.p.a.ce occupied by the plain lengthwise; and that because it was too narrow to admit of both descriptions of force being engaged in the same lines. When the Spanish infantry could not a.s.sist their cavalry, nor their cavalry the infantry, and the infantry, which had rashly engaged in the plain, relying on the a.s.sistance of the cavalry, were being cut to pieces, the cavalry themselves also, being surrounded and unable to stand the shock of the enemy's infantry in front, (for by this time their own infantry were completely overthrown,) nor of the cavalry in their rear, after having formed themselves into a circle and defended themselves for a long time, their horses standing still, were all slain to a man. Nor did one person, horse or foot, survive of those who were engaged in the valley. The third part, which stood upon the hill rather to view the contest in security than to take any part of it upon themselves, had both time and s.p.a.ce to fly; among whom the princes themselves also fled, having escaped during the confusion, before the army was entirely surrounded.

34. The same day, besides other booty, the camp of the Spaniards was taken, together with about three thousand men. Of the Romans and their allies as many as one thousand two hundred fell in that battle; more than three thousand were wounded. The victory would have been less b.l.o.o.d.y had the battle taken place in a plain more extended, and affording facilities for flight. Indibilis, renouncing his purpose of carrying on war, and considering that his safest reliance in his present distress was on the tried honour and clemency of Scipio, sent his brother Mandonius to him; who, falling prostrate before his knees, ascribed his conduct to the fatal frenzy of those times, when, as it were from the effects of some pestilential contagion, not only the Ilergetians and Lacetanians, but even the Roman camp had been infected with madness. He said that his own condition, and that of his brother and the rest of his countrymen, was such, that either, if it seemed good, they would give back their lives to him from whom they had received them, or if preserved a second time, they would in return for that favour devote their lives for ever to the service of him to whom alone they were indebted for them. They before placed their reliance on their cause, when they had not yet had experience of his clemency, but now, on the contrary, placing no reliance on their cause, all their hopes were centred in the mercy of the conqueror. It was a custom with the Romans, observed from ancient times, not to exercise any authority over others, as subject to them, in cases where they did not enter into friends.h.i.+p with them by a league and on equal terms, until they had surrendered all they possessed, sacred and profane; until they had received hostages, taken their arms from them, and placed garrisons in their cities. In the present instance, however, Scipio, after inveighing at great length against Mandonius, who stood before him, and Indibilis, who was absent, said "that they had justly forfeited their lives by their wicked conduct, but that they should be preserved by the kindness of himself and the Roman people. Further, that he would neither take their arms from them, (which only served as pledges to those who feared rebellion,) but would leave them the free use of them, and their minds free from fear; nor would he take vengeance on their unoffending hostages, but upon themselves, should they revolt, not inflicting punishment upon a defenceless but an armed enemy. That he gave them the liberty of choosing whether they would have the Romans favourable to them or incensed against them, for they had experienced them under both circ.u.mstances." Thus Mandonius was allowed to depart, having only a pecuniary fine imposed upon him to furnish the means of paying the troops. Scipio himself, having sent Marcius in advance into the Farther Spain, and sent Sila.n.u.s back to Tarraco, waited a few days until the Ilergetians had paid the fine imposed upon them; and then, setting out with some troops lightly equipped, overtook Marcius when he was now drawing near to the ocean.

35. The negotiation which had some time before commenced respecting Masinissa, was delayed from one cause after another; for the Numidian was desirous by all means of conferring with Scipio in person, and of touching his right hand in confirmation of their compact. This was the cause of Scipio's undertaking at this time a journey of such a length, and into so remote a quarter. Masinissa, when at Gades, received information from Marcius of the approach of Scipio, and by pretending that his horses were injured by being pent up in the island, and that they not only caused a scarcity of every thing to the rest, but also felt it themselves; moreover that his cavalry were beginning to lose their energy for want of employment; he prevailed upon Mago to allow him to cross over to the continent, to plunder the adjacent country of Spain. Having pa.s.sed over, he sent forward three chiefs of the Numidians, to fix a time and place for the conference desiring that two might be detained by Scipio as hostages. The third being sent back to conduct Masinissa to the place to which he was directed to bring him, they came to the conference with a few attendants. The Numidian had long before been possessed with admiration of Scipio from the fame of his exploits; and his imagination had pictured to him the idea of a grand and magnificent person; but his veneration for him was still greater when he appeared before him. For besides that his person, naturally majestic in the highest degree, was rendered still more so by his flowing hair, by his dress, which was not in a precise and ornamental style, but truly masculine and soldier-like, and also by his age, for he was then in full vigour of body, to which the bloom of youth, renewed as it were after his late illness, had given additional fulness and sleekness. The Numidian, who was in a manner thunderstruck by the mere effect of the meeting, thanked him for having sent home his brother's son. He affirmed, that from that time he had sought for this opportunity, which being at length presented to him, by favour of the immortal G.o.ds, he had not allowed to pa.s.s without seizing it. That he desired to serve him and the Roman people in such a manner, as that no one foreigner should have aided the Roman interest with greater zeal than himself. Although he had long since wished it, he had not been so able to effect it in Spain, a foreign and strange country; but that it would be easy for him to do so in that country in which he had been born and educated, under the hope of succeeding to his father's throne. If, indeed, the Romans should send the same commander, Scipio, into Africa, he entertained a well-grounded hope that Carthage would continue to exist but a short time. Scipio saw and heard him with the highest delight, both because he knew that he was the first man in all the cavalry of the enemy, and because the youth himself exhibited in his manner the strongest proof of a n.o.ble spirit. After mutual pledges of faith, he set out on his return to Tarraco. Masinissa, having laid waste the adjacent lands, with the permission of the Romans, that he might not appear to have pa.s.sed over into the continent to no purpose, returned to Gades.

36. Mago, who despaired of success in Spain, of which he had entertained hopes, from the confidence inspired first by the mutiny of the soldiers, and afterwards by the defection of Indibilis, received a message from Carthage, while preparing to cross over into Africa, that the senate ordered him to carry over into Italy the fleet he had at Gades; and hiring there as many as he could of the Gallic and Ligurian youth, to form a junction with Hannibal, and not to suffer the war to flag which had been begun with so much vigour and still more success.

For this object Mago not only received a supply of money from Carthage, but himself also exacted as much as he could from the inhabitants of Gades, plundering not only their treasury, but their temples, and compelling them individually to bring contributions of gold and silver, for the public service. As he sailed along the coast of Spain, he landed his troops not far from New Carthage, and after wasting the neighbouring lands, brought his fleet thence to the city.

Here, keeping his troops in the s.h.i.+ps by day, he landed them by night, and marched them to that part of the wall at which Carthage had been captured by the Romans; for he had supposed both that the garrison by which the city was occupied was not sufficiently strong for its protection, and that some of the townsmen would act on the hope of effecting a change. But messengers who came with the utmost haste and alarm from the country, brought intelligence at once of the devastation of the lands, the flight of the rustics, and the approach of the enemy. Besides, the fleet had been observed during the day, and it was evident that there was some object in choosing a station before the city. Accordingly, the troops were kept drawn up and armed within the gate which looks towards the lake and the sea. When the enemy, rus.h.i.+ng forward in a disorderly manner, with a crowd of seamen mingled with soldiers, came up to the walls with more noise than strength; the gate being suddenly thrown open, the Romans sallied forth with a shout, and pursued the enemy, routed and put to flight at the first onset and discharge of their weapons, all the way to the sh.o.r.e, killing a great number of them; nor would one of them have survived the battle and the flight, had not the s.h.i.+ps, which had been brought to the sh.o.r.e, afforded them a refuge in their dismay. Great alarm and confusion also prevailed in the s.h.i.+ps, occasioned by their drawing up the ladders, lest the enemy should force their way in together with their own men, and by cutting away their halsers and anchors that they might not lose time in weighing them. Many, too, met with a miserable death while endeavouring to swim to the s.h.i.+ps, not knowing, in consequence of the darkness, which way to direct their course, or what to avoid. On the following day, after the fleet had fled back to the ocean whence it had come, as many as eight hundred were slain between the wall and the sh.o.r.e, and two thousand stand of arms were found.

37. Mago, on his return to Gades, not being allowed to enter the place, brought his fleet to sh.o.r.e at Cimbis, a place not far distant from Gades; whence he sent amba.s.sadors with complaints of their having closed their gates upon a friend and ally. While they endeavoured to excuse themselves on the ground that it was done by a disorderly a.s.sembly of their people, who were exasperated against them on account of some acts of plunder which had been committed by the soldiers when they were embarking, he enticed their suffetes, which is the name of the chief magistracy among the Carthaginians, together with their quaestor, to come to a conference; when he ordered them to be lacerated with stripes and crucified. He then pa.s.sed over with his fleet to the island Pityusa, distant about a hundred miles from the continent, and inhabited at that time by Carthaginians; on which account the fleet was received in a friendly manner; and not only were provisions liberally furnished, but also young men and arms were given them to reinforce their fleet. Rendered confident by these supplies, the Carthaginians crossed over to the Balearian islands, fifty miles distant. The Balearian islands are two in number; one larger than the other, and more powerful in men and arms; having also a harbour in which, as it was now the latter end of autumn, he believed he might winter conveniently. But here his fleet was opposed with as much hostility as he would have met with had the Romans inhabited that island. The only weapons they used at that time, and which they now princ.i.p.ally employ, were slings; nor is there an individual of any other nation who possesses such a degree of excellence in the skilful use of this weapon, as the Balearians universally possess over the rest of the world. Such a quant.i.ty of stones, therefore, was poured like the thickest hail on the fleet, when approaching the sh.o.r.e, that, not daring to enter the harbour, they made off for the main. They then pa.s.sed over to the lesser Balearian island, which is of a fertile soil, but not equally powerful in men and arms. Here, therefore, they landed, and pitched a camp in a strong position above the harbour; and having made themselves masters of the city and country without a contest, they enlisted two thousand auxiliaries, which they sent to Carthage, and then hauled their s.h.i.+ps on sh.o.r.e for the winter. After Mago had left the coast of the ocean, the people of Gades surrendered to the Romans.

38. Such were the transactions in Spain under the conduct and auspices of Publius Scipio. Scipio himself, having put Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Acidinus in charge of the province, returned to Rome with ten s.h.i.+ps. Having obtained an audience of the senate without the city, in the temple of Bellona, he gave an account of the services he had performed in Spain; how often he had fought pitched battles, how many towns he had taken by force from the enemy, and what nations he had brought under the dominion of the Roman people. He stated that he had gone into Spain against four generals, and four victorious armies, but that he had not left a Carthaginian in that country. On account of these services he rather tried his prospect of a triumph, than pressed it pertinaciously; for it was quite clear, that no one had triumphed up to that time for services performed, when not invested with a magistracy. When the senate was dismissed he entered the city, and carried before him into the treasury fourteen thousand three hundred and forty-two pounds of silver, and a great quant.i.ty of coined silver.

Lucius Veturius Philo then held the a.s.sembly for the election of consuls, when all the centuries, with the strongest marks of attachment, named Publius Scipio as consul. Publius Licinius Cra.s.sus, chief pontiff, was joined with him as his colleague. It is recorded, that this election was attended by a greater number of persons than any other during the war. People had come together from all quarters, not only to give their votes, but also for the purpose of seeing Publius Scipio. They ran in crowds, not only to his house, but also to the Capitol; where he was engaged in offering a sacrifice of a hundred oxen to Jupiter, which he had vowed in Spain, impressed with a presentiment, that as Caius Lutatius had terminated the former Punic war, so Publius Scipio would terminate the present; and that as he had driven the Carthaginians out of every part of Spain, so he would drive them out of Italy; and dooming Africa to him as his province, as though the war in Italy were at an end. The a.s.sembly was then held for the election of praetors. Two were elected who were then plebeian aediles, namely, Spurius Lucretius and Cneius Octavius; and of private persons, Cneius Servilius Caepio and Lucius Aemilius Papus.

In the fourteenth year of the Punic war, Publius Cornelius Scipio and Publius Licinius Cra.s.sus entered on the consuls.h.i.+p, when the provinces a.s.signed to the consuls were, to Scipio, Sicily, without drawing lots, his colleague not opposing it, because the care of the sacred affairs required the presence of the chief pontiff in Italy; to Cra.s.sus, Bruttium. The provinces of the praetors were then put to the determination of lots, when the city jurisdiction fell to Servilius; Ariminum, for so they called Gaul, to Spurius Lucretius; Sicily to Lucius Aemilius; Sardinia to Cneius Octavius. A senate was held in the Capitol, when, on the motion of Publius Scipio, a decree was made, that he should exhibit the games which he had vowed in Spain during the mutiny of the soldiers, out of the money which he had himself brought into the treasury.

39. He then introduced into the senate the Saguntine amba.s.sadors, the eldest of whom thus spoke: "Although there remains no degree of suffering, conscript fathers, beyond what we have endured, in order that we might keep our faith towards you to the last; yet such are the benefits which we have received both from yourselves and your generals, that we do not repent of the calamities to which we have ourselves been exposed. On our account you undertook the war, and having undertaken it, you have continued to carry it on for now the fourteenth year with such inflexible perseverance, that frequently you have both yourselves been reduced, and have brought the Carthaginians to the last extremity. At a time when you had a war of such a desperate character in Italy, and Hannibal as your antagonist, you sent your consul with an army into Spain, to collect, as it were, the remains of our wreck. Publius and Cneius Cornelius, from the time they entered the province, never ceased from adopting such measures as were favourable to us and detrimental to our enemies. First of all, they restored to us our town; and, sending persons to collect our countrymen, who were sold and dispersed throughout all Spain, restored them from a state of slavery to freedom. When our circ.u.mstances, from being wretched in the extreme, had nearly a.s.sumed a desirable state, your generals Publius and Cneius Cornelius fell more to be lamented by ourselves even than by you. Then truly we seemed to have been dragged back from distant places to our ancient abode, to perish again, and witness the second destruction of our country. Nor did it appear that there was any need forsooth of a Carthaginian army or general to effect our destruction; but that we might be annihilated by the t.u.r.dulans, our most inveterate enemies, who had also been the cause of our former overthrow. When suddenly, to our great surprise, you sent us this Publius Scipio, in seeing whom declared consul, and in having it in our power to carry word back to our countrymen that we have seen it, for on him our hopes and safety entirely rest, we consider ourselves the most fortunate of all the Saguntines. He, when he had taken a great number of the cities of your enemies in Spain, on all occasions separated the Saguntines out of the ma.s.s of captives, and sent them back to their country; and lastly, by his arms he reduced to so low a state t.u.r.detania, which harboured such animosity against us, that if that nation continued to flourish it was impossible that Saguntum could stand, that it not only was not an object of fear to us, but, and may I say it without incurring odium, not even to our posterity. We see the city of those persons demolished, to gratify whom Hannibal destroyed Saguntum. We receive tribute from their lands, which is not more acceptable to us from the advantage we derive from it than from revenge. In consideration of these benefits, than which we could not hope or wish for greater from the immortal G.o.ds, the senate and people of Saguntum have sent us ten amba.s.sadors to you to return their thanks; and at the same time to offer you their congratulations on your having carried on your operations in Spain and Italy so successfully of late years, that you have subdued by your arms, and have gotten possession of Spain, not only as far as the river Iberus, but also to where the ocean forms the limit of the remotest regions of the world; while in Italy you have left nothing to the Carthaginian except so much s.p.a.ce as the rampart of his camp encloses. We have been desired, not only to return thanks for these blessings to Jove most good and great, the guardian deity of the capitoline citadel, but also, if you should permit us, to carry into the Capitol this present of a golden crown in token of victory. We request that you would permit us so to do; and, if you think proper, that you would, by your authority, perpetuate and ratify the advantages which your generals have conferred upon us." The senate replied to the Saguntines, "that the destruction and restoration of Saguntum would form a monument to all the nations of the world of social faith preserved on both sides. That, in restoring Saguntum, and rescuing its citizens from slavery, their generals had acted properly, regularly, and according to the wishes of the senate; and that, whatever other acts of kindness they had done to them, were in conformity with the wishes of the senate. That they gave them permission to deposit their present in the Capitol." Orders were then given to furnish the amba.s.sadors with apartments and entertainment, and that not less than ten thousand _a.s.ses_ should be given to each as a present. After this, the rest of the emba.s.sies were introduced and heard. On the request of the Saguntines that they might go and take a view of Italy as far as they could with safety, they were furnished with guides, and letters were sent to the several towns, requiring them to entertain the Spaniards kindly. The senate then took into consideration the state of public affairs, the levying troops, and the provinces.

40. It being generally reported that Africa, as a new province, was destined for Publius Scipio without casting lots; and he himself, not content with any moderate share of glory, a.s.serting that he had been declared consul, not only for prosecuting, but for finis.h.i.+ng the war; that that object could not be accomplished by any other means than by his transporting an army into Africa; and himself openly declaring that he would do it through the people if the senate opposed him; the design by no means pleased the princ.i.p.al senators; and when the rest, either through fear or a wish to ingratiate themselves with him, only murmured, Quintus Fabius Maximus, being asked his opinion, thus spoke: "I know, conscript fathers, that by many of you the question which is this day agitated is considered as already determined; and that the man who shall deliver his sentiments on the subject of making Africa a province, as a new proposal, will speak to little purpose. But, in the first place, I cannot see how it can be considered as determined, that Africa shall be the province of the consul, that brave and active officer, when neither the senate have voted nor the people ordered that it should be const.i.tuted a province this year. In the next place, if it is determined, I think the consul is to blame, who, by pretending to consult the senate on a question already decided, insults that body, and not the senator only who delivers his sentiments in his place on the subject of deliberation. Now I am well aware, that by disapproving of this excessive eagerness to pa.s.s over into Africa, I subject myself to two imputations: one grounded on the caution inherent in my disposition, which young men may if they please call cowardice and sloth, so long as we have the consolation to reflect, that though hitherto the measures of others have always appeared on the first view of them the more plausible, mine on experience have proved the sounder. The other imputation is that of jealousy and envy towards the daily increasing glory of this most valiant consul. But if neither my past life and character, nor a dictators.h.i.+p, together with five consuls.h.i.+ps, and so much glory acquired, both in peace and war, that I am more likely to loathe it than desire more, exempt me from such a suspicion, let my age at least acquit me. For what rivalry can there exist between myself and a man who is not equal in years even to my son? When I was dictator, when as yet in the possession of full vigour, and engaged in a series of affairs of the utmost magnitude, no one heard me, either in the senate or in the popular a.s.sembly, express any reluctance to have the command equally shared between myself and the master of the horse, at the time when he was maligning me; a proposition which no one ever heard mention of before. I chose to bring it about by actions rather than by words, that he who was placed on the same footing with me in the judgment of others, should soon by his own confession declare me his superior. Much less, after having pa.s.sed through these honours, would I propose to myself to enter the lists of compet.i.tion and rivalry with a man in the very bloom of youth. And that, forsooth, in order that Africa, if it shall have been denied to him, may be a.s.signed as a province to me, who am now weary of life, and not merely of active employments. I must live and die with that share of glory which I have already acquired. I prevented Hannibal from conquering, in order that he might even be conquered by you, whose powers are now in full vigour.

41. "It is but fair, Publius Cornelius, that you should pardon me, if I, who in my own case never preferred the honour of men to the interest of the state, do not place even your fame before the public good. Although, if there were either no war in Italy, or an enemy of such a description that no glory could be acquired from conquering him, the man who would retain you in Italy, though actuated by a desire to promote the public good, might appear to wish to deprive you of an opportunity of acquiring renown when he objected to your removing the war. But since Hannibal is our antagonist, who is besieging Italy for now the fourteenth year, with an army unimpaired, will you have reason to be dissatisfied, Publius Cornelius, with the glory you will acquire, if you in your consulate shall drive out of Italy an enemy who has been the cause of so many deaths and so many disasters to us, and if you should enjoy the distinction of having terminated this, as Caius Lutatius did the former Punic war? Unless either Hamilcar is a general more worthy of consideration than Hannibal, or a war in Africa of more importance, or a victory there greater and more glorious, (should it be our lot to be victorious while you are consul,) than one here. Would you rather have drawn away Hamilcar from Drepanum and Eryx than have expelled the Carthaginians and Hannibal from Italy? Although you naturally prize more highly the renown which you have acquired than that which you hope for, yet surely you would not boast more of having freed Spain from war than of having freed Italy. Hannibal is not as yet in such a state as that the man who prefers another war would not appear to have feared rather than to have despised him. Why then do you not apply yourself to this, and carry the war in a straightforward manner to the place where Hannibal is, rather than pursue that circuitous course, according to which you expect that when you shall have crossed over into Africa Hannibal will follow you thither? Do you seek to obtain the distinguished honour of having finished the Punic war? After you have defended your own possessions, for this is naturally the first object, then proceed to attack those of others. Let there be peace in Italy before war in Africa; and let us be free from fear ourselves before we bring it upon others. If it is possible that both objects may be accomplished under your conduct and auspices, having first conquered Hannibal here, then go and lay siege to Carthage; but if one or other of these conquests must be left for the succeeding consuls, the former is both the greater and more glorious, and also the cause of the second. For now indeed, besides that the treasury is not able to maintain two different armies, one in Italy and one in Africa; besides that we nave nothing left from which we may equip fleets or be able to furnish provisions, who knows not how great danger would be incurred?

Publius Licinius will wage war in Italy, Publius Scipio in Africa.

What if, (an omen which may all the G.o.ds avert, and which my mind shrinks back with alarm from mentioning,--but what has happened may happen again,--) what I say, if Hannibal, having gained a victory, should advance to the city? Shall we then at length send for you, our consul, out of Africa, as we formerly sent for Quintus Fulvius from Capua? What shall we say when we consider that in Africa also both parties will be liable to the chances of war? Let your own house, your father and your uncle, slain together with their armies within the s.p.a.ce of thirty days, after that, having spent several years in the performance of the most important services, both by sea and land, they had inspired foreign nations with the highest reverence for the name of the Roman people and your family, be a warning to you. The day would fail me were I disposed to enumerate the kings and generals who have brought the most signal calamities upon themselves and their armies by rashly pa.s.sing into the territories of their enemies. The Athenians, a state distinguished for prudence, leaving a war at home, sent a great fleet into Sicily at the instance of a youth equally enterprising and ill.u.s.trious; but by one naval battle they reduced their flouris.h.i.+ng republic to a state of humiliation from which she could never recover.

42. "But I am adducing foreign and too remote examples. That same Africa, and Marcus Atilius, who was a signal example of both extremes of fortune, may form a warning to us. Without doubt, Publius Cornelius, when you shall have a view of Africa from the sea, the reduction of your province of Spain will appear to you to have been a mere matter of sport and pastime. For what similarity is there between them? After sailing along the coast of Italy and Gaul to Emporiae without any enemy to oppose you, you brought your fleet to land at a city of our allies. There landing your soldiers, you marched them through countries entirely secure from danger to Tarraco, to join the allies and friends of the Roman people. After that, from Tarraco you marched through places garrisoned by Roman troops. On the banks of the Iberus were the armies of your father and your uncle, rendered still more furious after the loss of their generals, even by the very calamity they had suffered. The general, indeed, Lucius Marcius, had been irregularly const.i.tuted and chosen for the time by the suffrages of the soldiers; but had he been adorned with n.o.ble birth and the regular gradation of preferment, he would have been equal to the most distinguished generals, from his skill in every art of war. You then laid siege to Carthage, quite at your leisure, not one of the three Punic armies coming to the defence of their allies. The rest of your achievements, nor do I wish to disparage them, are by no means to be compared with what you will have to do in a war in Africa, where there is not a single harbour open to receive our fleet, no part of the country at peace with us, no state in alliance, no king in friends.h.i.+p with us, no room in any part either to take up a position or to advance. Whichever way you turn your eyes, all is hostility and danger. Do you trust in the Numidians and Syphax? Let it suffice to have trusted in them once. Temerity is not always successful, and the fraudulent usually pave the way to confidence in small matters, that when an advantageous opportunity occurs, they may deceive with great gain. Your father and uncle were not cut off by the arms of their enemies till they were duped by the treachery of their Celtiberian allies; nor were you yourself exposed to so much danger from Mago and Hasdrubal, the generals of your enemies, as from Indibilis and Mandonius, whom you had received into friends.h.i.+p. Can you place any confidence in Numidians after having experienced a defection in your own soldiers? Syphax and Masinissa would rather that they themselves should have the rule in Africa than the Carthaginians, but that the Carthaginians should rather than any other state. At present emulation and the various causes of dispute existing between them incite them against each other, because the fear of any foreign enemy is remote.

But show them the Roman arms and a body of troops, natives of another country, and they will run together as if to extinguish a common conflagration. These same Carthaginians defended Spain in a different manner from that in which they will defend the walls of their capital, the temples of their G.o.ds, their altars, and their hearths; when their terrified wives will attend them on the way to the battle, and their little children will run to them. What, moreover, if the Carthaginians, feeling sufficiently secure in the harmony subsisting in Africa, in the attachment of the sovereigns in alliance with them, and their own fortifications, should, when they see Italy deprived of the support of yourself and your army, themselves a.s.suming an offensive att.i.tude, either send a fresh army out of Africa into Italy, or order Mago, who, it is certain, having pa.s.sed over from the Baleares, is now sailing along the coast of Liguria and the Alps, to form a junction with Hannibal. Without doubt, we should be thrown into the same state of alarm as we were lately, when Hasdrubal pa.s.sed over into Italy; that Hasdrubal, whom you, who are about to blockade, not Carthage only, but all Africa with your army, allowed to slip out of your hands into Italy. You will say that he was conquered by you.

For that very reason I should be less willing, not on account of the commonwealth only, but of yourself, that, after having been defeated, he should be allowed to march into Italy. Suffer us to ascribe to your prudence all the successful events which have happened to you and the empire of the Roman people, and to impute all those of an adverse nature to the uncertain chances of war and to fortune. The more meritorious and brave you are, so much the more do your country and all Italy desire to retain you as their protector. You cannot even yourself pretend to deny, that where Hannibal is, there is the head and princ.i.p.al stress of the war, for you profess, that your motive in crossing over into Africa is to draw Hannibal thither. Whether, therefore, here or there, it is with Hannibal that you will have to contend. Will you then, I pray, have more power in Africa and alone, or here, with your own and your colleague's army united? Is not the great difference which this makes proved to you even by the recent precedent of Claudius and Livius, the consuls? What! will Hannibal, who has now for a long time been unavailingly soliciting succours from home, be rendered more powerful in men and arms when occupying the remotest corner of the Bruttian territory, or when near to Carthage and supported by all Africa? What sort of policy is that of yours, to prefer fighting where your own forces will be diminished by one half, and the enemy's greatly augmented, to encountering the enemy when you will have two armies against one, and that wearied with so many battles, and so protracted and laborious a service? Consider how far this policy of yours corresponds with that of your parent. He, setting out in his consuls.h.i.+p for Spain, returned from his province into Italy, that he might meet Hannibal on his descent from the Alps; while you are going to leave Italy when Hannibal is there, not because you consider such a course beneficial to the state, but because you think it will redound to your own honour and glory; acting in the same manner as you did when leaving your province and your army without the sanction of a law, without a decree of the senate, you, a general of the Roman people, intrusted to two s.h.i.+ps the fortune of the commonwealth and the majesty of the empire, which were then hazarded in your person. In my estimation, conscript fathers, Publius Cornelius was elected consul for the service of the state and of us, and not to forward his own individual interest; and the armies were enlisted for the protection of the city and of Italy, and not for the consuls, like kings, to carry into whatever part of the world they please from motives of vanity."

43. Fabius having made a strong impression on a large portion of the senate, and especially those advanced in years, by this speech, which was adapted to the occasion, and also by his authority and his long-established reputation for prudence; and those who approved of the counsel of this old man being more numerous than those who commended the hot spirit of the young one; Scipio is reported thus to have spoken: "Even Quintus Fabius himself has observed, conscript fathers, in the commencement of his speech, that in the opinion he gave a feeling of jealousy might be suspected. And though I dare not myself charge so great a man with harbouring that feeling, yet, whether it is owing to a defect in his language, or to the fact, that suspicion has certainly not been removed. For he has so magnified his own honours and the fame of his exploits, in order to do away with the imputation of envy, that it would appear I am in danger of being rivalled by every obscure person, but not by himself, because, as he enjoys an eminence above every body else, an eminence to which I do not dissemble that I also aspire, he is unwilling that I should be placed upon a level with him. He has represented himself as an old man, and as one who has gone through every gradation of honour, and me as below the age even of his son; as if he supposed that the desire of glory did not exceed the limits of human life, and as if its chief part had not respect to memory and future ages. I am confident, that it is usual with all the most exalted minds, to compare themselves, not only with the ill.u.s.trious men of the present, but of every age.

For my own part, I do not dissemble that I am desirous, not only to attain to the share of glory which you possess, Quintus Fabius, but, (and in saying it I mean no offence,) if I can, even to exceed it. Let not such a feeling exist in your mind towards me, nor in mine towards those who are my juniors, as that we should be unwilling that any of our countrymen should attain to the same celebrity with ourselves; for that would be a detriment, not to those only who may be the objects of our envy, but to the state, and almost to the whole human race. He mentioned what a great degree of danger I should incur, should I cross over into Africa, so that he appeared solicitous on my account, and not only for the state and the army. But whence has this concern for me so suddenly sprung? When my father and uncle were slain; when their two armies were cut up almost to a man; when Spain was lost; when four armies of the Carthaginians and four generals kept possession of every thing by terror and by arms; when a general was sought for to take the command of that war, and no one came forward besides myself, no one had the courage to declare himself a candidate; when the Roman people had conferred the command upon me, though only twenty-four years of age; why was it that no one at that time made any mention of my age, of the strength of the enemy, of the difficulty of the war, and of the recent destruction of my father and uncle? Has some greater disaster been suffered in Africa now than had at that time befallen us in Spain? Are there now larger armies in Africa, more and better generals, than were then in Spain? Was my age then more mature for conducting a war than now? Can a war with a Carthaginian enemy be carried on with greater convenience in Spain than in Africa? After having routed and put to flight four Carthaginian armies; after having captured by force, or reduced to submission by fear, so many cities; after having entirely subdued every thing as far as the ocean, so many petty princes, so many savage nations; after having regained possession of the whole of Spain, so that no trace of war remains, it is an easy matter to make light of my services; just as easy as it would be, should I return victorious from Africa, to make light of those very circ.u.mstances which are now magnified in order that they may appear formidable, for the purpose of detaining me here. He says that there is no possibility of entering Africa; that there are no ports open. He mentions that Marcus Atilius was taken prisoner in Africa, as if Marcus Atilius had miscarried on his first access to Africa. Nor does he recollect that the ports of Africa were open to that very commander, unfortunate as he was; that he performed some brilliant services during the first year, and continued undefeated to the last, so far as related to the Carthaginian generals. You will not, therefore, in the least deter me by that example of yours. If that disaster had been sustained in the present, and not in the former war, if lately, and not forty years ago, yet why would it be less advisable for me to cross over into Africa after Regulus had been made prisoner there, than into Spain after the Scipios had been slain there? I should be reluctant to admit that the birth of Xanthippus the Lacedaemonian was more fortunate for Carthage than mine for my country. My confidence would be increased by the very circ.u.mstance, that such important consequences depended upon the valour of one man. But further, we must take warning by the Athenians, who inconsiderately crossed over into Sicily, leaving a war in their own country. Why, therefore, since you have leisure to relate Grecian tales, do you not rather set before us the instance of Agathocles, king of Syracuse, who, when Sicily was for a long time wasted by a Punic war, by pa.s.sing over into this same Africa, removed the war to the country from whence it came.

44. "But what need is there of ancient and foreign examples to remind us what sort of thing it is boldly to carry terror against an enemy, and, removing the danger from oneself, to bring another into peril?

Can there be a stronger instance than Hannibal himself, or one more to the point? It makes a great difference whether you devastate the territories of another, or see your own destroyed by fire and sword.

He who brings danger upon another has more spirit than he who repels it. Add to this, that the terror excited by unknown circ.u.mstances is increased on that account. When you have entered the territory of an enemy, you may have a near view of his advantages and disadvantages.

Hannibal did not expect that it would come to pa.s.s that so many of the states in Italy would come over to him as did so after the defeat at Cannae. How much less would any firmness or constancy be experienced in Africa by the Carthaginians, who are themselves faithless allies, oppressive and haughty masters! Besides, we, even when deserted by our allies, stood firm in our own strength, the Roman soldiery. The Carthaginians possess no native strength. The soldiers they have are obtained by hire;--Africans and Numidians--people remarkable above all others for the inconstancy of their attachments. Provided no impediment arises here, you will hear at once that I have landed, and that Africa is blazing with war; that Hannibal is preparing for his departure from this country, and that Carthage is besieged. Expect more frequent and more joyful despatches from Africa than you received from Spain. The considerations on which I ground my antic.i.p.ations are the good fortune of the Roman people, the G.o.ds, the witnesses of the treaty violated by the enemy, the kings Syphax and Masinissa; on whose fidelity I will rely in such a manner as that I may be secure from danger should they prove perfidious. Many things which are not now apparent, at this distance, the war will develope; and it is the part of a man, and a general, not to be wanting when fortune presents itself, and to bend its events to his designs. I shall, Quintus Fabius, have the opponent you a.s.sign me, Hannibal; but I shall rather draw him after me than be kept here by him. I will compel him to fight in his own country, and Carthage shall be the prize of victory rather than the half-ruined forts of the Bruttians. With regard to providing that the state sustain no injury in the mean time, while I am crossing over, while I am landing my troops in Africa, while I am advancing my camp to the walls of Carthage; be not too sure that it is not an insult to Publius Licinius, the consul, a man of consummate valour, who did not draw lots for so distant a province merely that, as he was chief pontiff, he might not be absent from religious affairs, to say that he is unable to do that, now that the power of Hannibal is shaken, and in a manner shattered, which you Quintus Fabius, were able to effect when he was flying victorious throughout all Italy.

By Hercules, even if the war would not be more speedily terminated by adopting the plan I propose, yet it were consistent with the dignity of the Roman people, and the high character they enjoy with foreign kings and nations, to appear to have had spirit not only to defend Italy, but also to carry hostilities into Africa; and that it should not be supposed and spread abroad that no Roman general dared what Hannibal had dared; that in the former Punic war, when the contest was about Sicily, Africa should have been so often attacked by our fleets and armies, and that now, when the contest is about Italy, Africa should be left undisturbed. Let Italy, which has so long been hara.s.sed, at length enjoy some repose; let Africa, in her turn, be fired and devastated. Let the Roman camp overhang the gates of Carthage rather than that we should again behold the rampart of the enemy from our walls. Let Africa be the seat of the remainder of the war. Let terror and flight, the devastation of lands, the defection of allies, and all the other calamities of war which have fallen upon us, through a period of fourteen years, be turned upon her. It is sufficient for me to have spoken on those matters which relate to the state, the war before us, and the provinces which form the subject of deliberation. My discourse would be tedious and uninteresting to you if, as Fabius has depreciated my services in Spain, I should also in like manner endeavour, on the other hand, to turn his glory into ridicule, and make the most of my own. I will do neither, conscript fathers; and if in nothing else, though a young man, I shall certainly have shown my superiority over this old man, in modesty and the government of my tongue. Such has been my life, and such the services I have performed, that I can gladly rest contented in silence with that opinion which you have spontaneously conceived of me."

45. Scipio was heard less favourably, because, a report had been spread that, if he did not prevail with the senate to have Africa decreed to him as his province, he would immediately lay the matter before the people. Therefore, Quintus Fulvius, who had been consul four times, and censor, requested of the consul that he would openly declare in the senate whether "he submitted to the fathers to decide respecting the provinces; and whether he intended to abide by their determination, or to put it to the people." Scipio having replied that he would act as he thought for the interest of the state, Fulvius then rejoined: "When I asked you the question I was not ignorant of what answer you would give, or how you would act; for you plainly show that you are rather sounding than consulting the senate; and, unless we immediately decree to you the province you wish, have a bill ready (to lay before the people). Therefore," said he, "I require of you, tribunes of the people, to support me in refusing to give my opinion, because, though my recommendation should be adopted, the consul is not disposed to abide by it." An altercation then arose, the consul a.s.serting that it was unfair for the tribunes to interpose so as to prevent any senator from living his opinion in his place on being asked it. The tribunes came to the determination, "that if the consul submit to the senate the question relating to the provinces, whatever the senate decree we shall consider as final, nor will we allow a bill to be proposed to the people on the subject. If he does not submit it to them, we will support any one who shall refuse to deliver his sentiments upon the matter." The consul requested the delay of a day to confer with his colleague. The next day the decision was submitted to the senate. The provinces were a.s.signed in this manner: to one of the consuls Sicily and thirty s.h.i.+ps of war, which Caius Servilius had commanded the former year; he was also permitted to cross over into Africa if he conceived it to be for the advantage of the state. To the other consul Bruttium and the war with Hannibal were a.s.signed; with either that army which Lucius Veturius or that which Quintus Caecilius commanded. The two latter were to draw lots, and settle between themselves which should act in Bruttium with the two legions which the consul gave up; and he to whose lot that province fell, was to be continued in command for a year. The other persons also, besides the consuls and praetors, who were to take the command of armies and provinces, were continued in command. It fell to the lot of Quintus Caecilius to carry on the war against Hannibal in Bruttium, together with the consul. The games of Scipio were then celebrated in the presence of a great number of persons, and with the approbation of the spectators. The deputies, Marcus Pomponius Matho and Quintus Catius, sent to Delphi to convey a present out of the spoils taken from Hasdrubal, carried with them a golden crown of two hundred pounds'

weight, and representations of the spoils made out of a thousand pounds' weight of silver. Scipio, though he could not obtain leave to levy troops, a point which he did not urge with great eagerness, obtained leave to take with him such as volunteered their services; and also, as he declared that the fleet would not be the occasion of expense to the state, to receive what was furnished by the allies for building fresh s.h.i.+ps. First, the states of Etruria engaged to a.s.sist the consuls to the utmost of their respective abilities. The people of Caere furnished corn, and provisions of every description, for the crews; the people of Populoni furnished iron; of Tarquinii, cloth for sails; those of Volaterrae, planks for s.h.i.+ps, and corn; those of Arretium, thirty thousand s.h.i.+elds, as many helmets; and of javelins, Gallic darts, and long spears, they undertook to make up to the amount of fifty thousand, an equal number of each description, together with as many axes, mattocks, bills, buckets, and mills, as should be sufficient for fifty men of war, with a hundred and twenty thousand pecks of wheat; and to contribute to the support of the decurios and rowers on the voyage. The people of Perusia, Clusium, and Rusella furnished firs for building s.h.i.+ps, and a great quant.i.ty of corn.

Scipio had firs out of the public woods. The states of Umbria, and, besides them, the people of Nursia, Reate, and Amiternum, and all those of the Sabine territory, promised soldiers. Many of the Marsians, Pelignians, and Marrucinians volunteered to serve in the fleet. The Cameritans, as they were joined with the Romans in league on equal terms, sent an armed cohort of six hundred men. Having laid the keels of thirty s.h.i.+ps, twenty of which were quinqueremes, and ten quadriremes, he prosecuted the work with such diligence, that, on the forty-fifth day after the materials were taken from the woods, the s.h.i.+ps, being fully equipped and armed, were launched.

46. He set out into Sicily with thirty s.h.i.+ps of war, with about seven thousand volunteers on board. Publius Licinius came into Bruttium to the two consular armies, of which he selected for himself that which Lucius Veturius, the consul, had commanded. He allowed Metellus to continue in the command of those legions which were before under him, concluding that he could act more easily with the troops accustomed to his command. The praetors also went to their different provinces. As there was a scarcity of money to carry on the war, the quaestors were ordered to sell a district of the Campanian territory extending from the Grecian trench to the sea, with permission to receive information as to what land belonged to a native Campanian, in order that it might be put into the possession of the Roman people. The reward fixed upon for the informer was a tenth part of the value of the lands so discovered. Cneius Servilius, the city praetor, was also charged with seeing that the Campanians dwelt where they were allowed, according to the decree of the senate, and to punish such as dwelt anywhere else.

The same summer, Mago, son of Amilcar, setting out from the lesser of the Balearian islands, where he had wintered, having put on board his fleet a chosen body of young men, conveyed over into Italy twelve thousand foot, and about two thousand horse, with about thirty s.h.i.+ps of war, and a great number of transports. By the suddenness of his arrival he took Genoa, as there were no troops employed in protecting the sea-coast. Thence he brought his fleet to sh.o.r.e, on the coast of the Alpine Ligurians, to see if he could create any commotion there.

The Ingaunians, a tribe of the Ligurians, were at that juncture engaged in war with the Epanterians, a people inhabiting the mountains. The Carthaginian, therefore, having deposited his plunder at Savo, an Alpine town, left ten s.h.i.+ps of war for its protection. He sent the rest to Carthage to guard the sea-coast, as it was reported that Scipio intended to pa.s.s over thither; formed an alliance with the Ingaunians, whose friends.h.i.+p he preferred; and commenced an attack upon the mountaineers. His army increased daily, the Gauls flocking to his standard from all sides, from the splendour of his fame. When the senate received information of these things, by a letter from Spurius Lucretius, they were filled with the most intense anxiety, lest the joy they had experienced on the destruction of Hasdrubal and his army, two years before, should be rendered vain by another war's springing up in the same quarter, equal in magnitude, but under a new leader.

They therefore ordered Marcus Livius, proconsul, to march his army of volunteer slaves out of Etruria to Ariminum, and gave in charge to Cneius Servilius to issue orders, if he thought it necessary for the safety of the state, that the city legions should be marched out under the command of any person he thought proper. Marcus Valerius Laevinus led those legions to Arretium. About the same time, as many as eighty transports of the Carthaginians were captured, near Sardinia, by Cneius Octavius, who had the government of that province. Caelius states that they were laden with corn and provisions, sent for Hannibal; Valerius, that they were conveying the plunder of Etruria, and the Ligurian mountaineers who had been captured, to Carthage.

In Bruttium scarcely any thing was done this year worth recording.

A pestilence had attacked both Romans and Carthaginians with equal violence; but the Carthaginian army, in addition to sickness, was distressed by famine. Hannibal pa.s.sed the summer near the temple of Juno Lacinia, where he erected and dedicated an altar with an inscription engraved in Punic and Greek characters, setting forth, in pompous terms, the achievements he had performed.

BOOK XXIX.

_In Spain, Mandonius and Indibilis, reviving hostilities, are finally subdued. Scipio goes over from Syracuse to Locri; dislodges the Carthaginian general; repulses Hannibal, and recovers that city. Peace made with Philip. The Idaean Mother brought to Rome from Phrygia; received by Publius Scipio Nasica, judged by the senate the best man in the state. Scipio pa.s.ses over into Africa. Syphax, having married a daughter of Hasdrubal, renounces his alliance with Scipio. Masinissa, who had been expelled his kingdom by Syphax, joins Scipio with two hundred hors.e.m.e.n; they defeat a large army commanded by Hanno.

Hasdrubal and Syphax approach with a most numerous force.

Scipio raises the siege of Utica, and fortifies a post for the winter. The consul Semp.r.o.nius gets the better of Hannibal in a battle near Croton. Dispute between Marcus Livius and Claudius Nero, censors._

1. Scipio, after his arrival in Sicily, formed his volunteers into cohorts and centuries. Of these he kept about his person three hundred young men, in the bloom of their age and the prime of their strength, unarmed, and not knowing for what purpose they were reserved, as they were not included in the centuries, nor furnished with arms. He then selected out of the number of the youth of all Sicily three hundred hors.e.m.e.n, of the highest birth and fortune, who were to cross over with him into Africa, appointing a day on which they were to present themselves equipped and furnished with horses and arms. This severe service, far from their native land, appeared to them likely to