The Greater Republic Part 39

McCLELLAN'S TARDINESS.

The corps commanders believed that if McClellan would press matters Richmond could be captured, but the Union leader devoted several weeks to building bridges. It rained incessantly and the health of the men suffered. Many more died from disease than from bullets and wounds, and McClellan's tardiness gave the enemy the time they needed in which to make their combinations as strong as possible. Stonewall Jackson, although placed in a perilous position in the Shenandoah Valley, skillfully extricated himself and united his corps with the troops that were defending Richmond.

GENERAL STUART'S RAID.

While McClellan was engaged in constructing bridges over the Chickahominy, and no important movement was made by either army, General J.E.B. Stuart, the famous cavalry leader, left Richmond, June 13th, with a strong mounted force, and, by rapid riding and his knowledge of the country, pa.s.sed entirely around the Federal army, cutting telegraph wires, burning bridges, capturing wagons and supplies, frightening McClellan, and returning to Richmond, after two days' absence, with the loss of only a single man.

The Union commander was discouraged by the withdrawal of McDowell to the defense of Was.h.i.+ngton, by the uncertainty regarding the disposition of the enemy's corps, and by the belief that they were much more numerous than was the fact. He decided to change the base of his operations from the Pamunkey to the James. Both he and Lee fixed upon the same day--June 26th--for an offensive movement; but Lee was the first to act. On the afternoon of that day a vehement attack was made upon the Union right.

The a.s.sault was repulsed, after a furious struggle, and it marked the beginning of that fearful series of battles known as the Seven Days'

Fight.

THE SEVEN DAYS' FIGHT.

Feeling insecure, McClellan fell back, and the terrific fighting, beginning June 26th, at Mechanicsville, continued with scarcely any intermission until July 1st. Both armies were well handled and fought bravely, but McClellan kept steadily falling back. Lee was not satisfied with simply defeating the Union army; he strained every nerve to destroy it, but he was defeated in his purpose, and, as the hot afternoon of June 30th was drawing to a close, the last wagon train of the Union army reached Malvern Hill, and preparations were hurriedly made to resist the a.s.sault that every one knew would soon come.

Malvern Hill was a strong position. In addition the Federals had the aid of the gunboats. Indeed, the place was so well-nigh impregnable that the warmest admirers of General Lee must condemn his furious and repeated a.s.saults upon it. He suffered a disastrous repulse, and in the end withdrew to the defenses of Richmond, while McClellan took position at Harrison's Landing. All the Union troops had arrived by the night of July 3d, and their commander began to study out a new plan for another advance against the Confederate capital. Before anything could be done, he was peremptorily ordered to withdraw his army from the peninsula. The movement was begun with the purpose of uniting the troops with those of General Pope, who was to the southeast of Was.h.i.+ngton, and placing them all under his command.

Pope had 40,000 troops between Fredericksburg and Was.h.i.+ngton. Learning the situation, Lee kept enough men to hold Richmond, and sent the rest, under Stonewall Jackson, against Pope in the north. Jackson executed the task intrusted to him in his usual meteoric fas.h.i.+on. Despite the risk involved, he threw himself between Pope and Was.h.i.+ngton and struck here, there, and everywhere so rapidly that the Union general became bewildered, his a.s.sociate officers disgusted, and everything was involved in inextricable confusion.

SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

The second battle of Bull Run, or Mana.s.sas, opened early on August 29th and lasted until dusk. The fighting was desperate, Jackson standing mainly on the defensive and waiting for Longstreet, who was hurrying forward through Thoroughfare Gap. At night Jackson withdrew so as to connect with Longstreet. Believing the movement meant a retreat, Pope telegraphed to that effect to Was.h.i.+ngton. But he was grievously mistaken, for the Confederates were rapidly reinforced, as was discovered the next day, when the battle was renewed and pressed resistlessly against the Federals. In the afternoon Lee arrived on the ground, and, taking command, ordered an advance. Pope retreated, and that night crossed Bull Run and took position behind the field works at Centreville. Other corps joined him, and on the 1st of September Lee made a demonstration against the Union right flank. Pope now became terrified, as he saw that Was.h.i.+ngton was threatened, and he began a tumultuous retreat toward the capital, pursued and hara.s.sed by the Confederates, until at last the whole disorganized army found rest and safety behind the fortifications at Was.h.i.+ngton. Pope had been disastrously defeated, and the second campaign against Richmond was one of the worst failures conceivable.

McCLELLAN RECALLED TO COMMAND.

Pope had done the best he knew how, but the task was beyond his ability, and he was glad enough to be relieved of his command, which was a.s.sumed once more by McClellan, who still retained a great deal of his popularity with the rank and file. Pope's division had been styled the Army of Virginia, but the name was now dropped, and the consolidated forces adopted the t.i.tle of the Army of the Potomac, by which it was known to the close of the war.

The success of the Confederates had been so decisive that the Richmond authorities now decided to a.s.sume the aggressive and invade the North.

It was a bold plan thus to send their princ.i.p.al army so far from its base, and General Lee did not favor it, but the opportunity was too tempting for his superiors to disregard. One great incentive was the well-founded belief that if the Confederacy gained a marked advantage, England and France would intervene and thus secure the independence of the South.

The neighboring State of Maryland was viewed with longing and hopeful eyes by Lee and his army. It was a slave State, had furnished a good many men to the Confederate armies, and, had it been left to itself, probably would have seceded. What more likely, therefore, than that its people would hasten to link their fortunes with the Confederacy on the very hour that its most powerful army crossed her border?

THE CONFEDERATE ADVANCE INTO MARYLAND.

The Confederate army began fording the Potomac at a point nearly opposite the Monocacy, and by the 5th of September all of it was on Maryland soil. The bands struck up the popular air, "Maryland, my Maryland," the exultant thousands joining in the tremendous chorus, as they swung off, all in high spirits at the belief that they were entering a land "flowing with milk and honey," where they would find abundant food and be received with outspread arms.

Frederick City was reached on the 6th, and two days later Lee issued an address to the people of Maryland, inviting them to unite with the South, but insisting that they should follow their free-will in every respect. The doc.u.ment was a temperate one, and the discipline of the troops was so excellent that nothing in the nature of plundering occurred.

But it did not take Lee long to discover he had made a grievous mistake by invading Maryland. If the people were sympathetic, they did not show it by anything more than words and looks. They refused to enlist in the rebel army, gave Lee the "cold shoulder," and left no doubt that their greatest pleasure would be to see the last of the ragged horde.

While at Frederick, Lee learned that the Union Colonel Miles was at Harper's Ferry with 12,000 troops, held there by the direct order of General Halleck, who was the acting commander-in-chief of the United States forces. Lee determined to capture the whole body, and, detaching Stonewall Jackson with three divisions, ordered him to do so and return to him with the least possible delay.

Military critics have condemned this act of Lee as one of the gravest blunders of his career. His advance thus far had been resistless, and it was in his power to capture Baltimore, and probably Philadelphia and Was.h.i.+ngton; but the delay involved in awaiting the return of Jackson gave McClellan, who was a skillful organizer, time to prepare to meet the Confederate invasion.

Jackson lost not an hour in capturing Harper's Ferry, the defense of which was so disgraceful that had not Colonel Miles been killed just as the white flag was run up he would have been court-martialed and probably shot. Many suspected him of treason, but the real reason was his cowardice and the fact that he was intoxicated most of the time. Be that as it may, Harper's Ferry surrendered with its garrison of 11,500 men, who were immediately paroled. The Confederates obtained seventy-two cannon, 13,000 small arms, and an immense amount of military stores.

Scarcely had the surrender taken place, when Jackson, who had hardly slept for several days and nights, received orders from Lee to join him at once. He started without delay, but he and his men were almost worn out. It is likely that by this time Lee was aware of the mistake he had made when he stopped for several days while his leading a.s.sistant went off to capture a post that was of no importance to either side.

McCLELLAN'S PURSUIT OF LEE.

Leaving a strong garrison to defend Was.h.i.+ngton, McClellan, at the head of 100,000 troops, set out to follow Lee, who had about 70,000 under his immediate command. The Union leader reached Frederick on the 12th of September, and there a curious piece of good fortune befell him.

In the house which had been used as the headquarters of General D.H.

Hill was found a copy of an order issued by General Lee, which detailed his projected movements, and contained his instructions to his various leaders. It was priceless information to General McClellan, who made good use of it.

Lee manoeuvred to draw McClellan away from Was.h.i.+ngton and Baltimore, that he might attack them before the Union commander could return to their defense. Lee left Frederick on September 10th, after Jackson had started for Harper's Ferry, and, marching by South Mountain, aimed for Boonsboro'. Stuart and his cavalry remained east of the mountains to watch McClellan, who was advancing with every possible precaution. Lee expected Harper's Ferry would fall on the 13th, but the surrender did not take place until two days later. The Confederate army being divided, McClellan tried to take advantage of the fact, hoping to save Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry. It did not take Lee long to perceive from the actions of the Union commander that in some way he had learned of his plans.

It would not be interesting to give the details of the many manoeuvres by each commander, but before long Lee saw he could not hold his position at South Mountain, and he retreated toward Sharpsburg, near the stream of water known as Antietam Creek. He was thus on the flank of any Federal force that might attempt to save Harper's Ferry. Naturally he held the fords of the Potomac, so that in case of defeat the way to Virginia was open.

[Ill.u.s.tration: GENERAL LEE'S INVASION OF THE NORTH.

The Confederate army under General Lee twice invaded the north. The first invasion was brought to a disastrous end by the Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862. The second invasion ended with greater disaster at Gettysburg, July 1-3, 1863. Gettysburg was the greatest and Antietam the bloodiest battles of the war.]

Still Lee and Jackson were separated by a wide stretch of mountain, river, and plain, and McClellan was aware of the fact. He had the opportunity to cut off each division in detail, but lacked the nerve and dash to do it. There were subordinates in the Army of the Potomac who yearned for just such a chance, but McClellan's timidity and excessive caution deprived him of another golden opportunity, as it had done before and was soon to do again.

The position of Lee was among a range of hills, which, following the form of a crescent, extended from the lower point of Antietam Creek to a bend in the Potomac. Jackson was straining every nerve to join Lee, but his men were taxed beyond endurance, and many of them fell by the roadside from utter exhaustion, only a portion reaching Sharpsburg on the 16th. The full Confederate army did not exceed 40,000, while McClellan, who arrived on the opposite side of Antietam Creek, that afternoon, had 70,000. Instead of attacking at once, he waited two days, and thus gave Lee time to gather many thousand stragglers.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ANTIETAM BRIDGE.]

BATTLE OF ANTIETAM OR SHARPSBURG.

Finally, when McClellan had no excuse for further delay, and the enemy was in fine form, he opened the attack on the morning of the 17th. To reach Lee the Union commander had to cross the creek, which was spanned by three bridges, each defended by Confederate batteries.

The first attack was by Hooker on the enemy's left, where he drove Jackson back, after he had been reinforced by Hood, cleared the woods, and took possession of the Dunker Church, which stood slightly north of Sharpsburg. A little way beyond the Confederates made a stand, and, being reinforced, recovered most of the ground they had lost. General Mansfield was killed and Hooker received a painful wound in the foot.

When their two corps were retreating in confusion, Sumner arrived, rallied them, and made a successful stand. Seeing the critical situation, Lee hurried every available man to that point. This left only 2,500 troops in front of the bridge, where Burnside had 14,000.

McClellan sent repeated orders for him to advance, but he paid no attention until one o'clock, when he crossed without trouble, and then remained idle for three more hours. The heights were soon captured, and a position secured from which the rebel lines could be enfiladed. A.P.

Hill arrived at this juncture from Harper's Ferry with 4,000 men, and drove Burnside in a panic to the creek. Fighting soon ceased, both sides too much exhausted to keep up the terrific struggle, the position of the two armies being much the same as at first.

This fierce battle had wrenched and disorganized both armies, but McClellan, who had much the larger body, could have destroyed or captured those in front of him, had he followed the urgent advice of his officers, and given the enemy no rest. But he decided to await reinforcements, which arrived to the number of 14,000 that night. Then he resumed his preparations, and on the morning of the 19th advanced against the enemy, only to find there was none in front of him.

LEE'S RETREAT.

The retreat of Lee was deliberate. Having accurately gauged the commander in front of him, he spent all of the 18th in completing his preparations, and made no move until the next morning. Then, protected by batteries on the opposite bank, he crossed the Potomac, and on the 20th drove back a Union reconnaissance. The government, impatient with McClellan's tardiness, urged and almost ordered him to follow up Lee, but the commander preferred to guard against being followed up himself by the Army of Northern Virginia. Thus again a golden opportunity slipped away unimproved.

Naturally each side claimed a victory at Antietam or Sharpsburg, as it is called in the South, but such a claim in either case is hardly justifiable. It may be said, on the one hand, that Lee's invasion of the North was brought to a disastrous end by his check at Antietam, but the claim of Lee was that his failure to secure the expected recruits from Maryland, and his distance from the base of supplies, necessitated such a withdrawal on his part, for it is established that he was opposed to the northward advance from the first.

On the other hand, he had received a serious check, but his army remained intact and was as well prepared as ever to contest the campaign against Richmond, a campaign which had to be pushed to a successful conclusion before the war could end. The one grand opportunity of General McClellan's life was presented to him at the close of the battle of Antietam, and, failing to seize it, it never came again, and his military career ended with failure.

Antietam was, in comparison to numbers engaged, the bloodiest battle of the Civil War. The Union loss was 2,108 killed; 9,549 wounded; 753 missing; total, 12,410. The Confederate loss was 1,886 killed; 9,348 wounded; 1,367 captured and missing; total, 12,601.