The History Of The Last Trial By Jury For Atheism In England Part 6

'If G.o.d had never been affirmed, he could not have been denied. It is a rule of logic, and a very sensible rule, that the _onus probandi,_ that is the burthen or weight of proving, rests on those who affirm a proposition. Priests have affirmed the existence of a G.o.d, but who will maintain that they have complied with the rule of logic?'*

We can only, I think, arrive at a conviction of the existence of a G.o.d by the following modes:--

1. By the medium of _innate ideas_, which we are said by some divines to possess, and which intuitively lead us to entertain the idea of a G.o.d.

2. By the _senses_, the sole media by which all _knowledge_ is acquired.

3. By _conjecture_.--This is employed by those who suppose there must be a G.o.d from their inability otherwise to account for the existence of the universe, and are not willing to allow it to be inexplicable.

4. By _a.n.a.logy_.--Comparison is the basis of this argument. a.n.a.logy is the foundation of natural theology.

5. By _revelation_.--In this country the Bible is said to contain the revelation of a G.o.d.

Of these it may be remarked:--

1. _Innate ideas_.--With regard to these, very conclusive reasons have been advanced by eminent philosophers for disbelieving that we have any. And human experience confirms this conclusion. Some nations, as the people of the Arru Islands, have no idea of a G.o.d. So this source of knowledge concerning one is, to say the least, dubious.

2. _Senses_.--'No man hath seen G.o.d at any time,' is a sufficient reply to this--for the same may be affirmed of every other sense, which is here affirmed of sight.

3. _Conjecture_.--This defies us. We only prove our own inability and multiply difficulties. For when we suppose a G.o.d, we cannot suppose how he came, nor how he created something out of nothing, which is held by the learned to be plainly _impossible_.**

* Oracle of Reason, No. 31, p. 251.

** Since this time Mr. Francis William Newman has put this argument unanswerably in these words; 'A G.o.d uncaused and existing from eternity, is to the full as incomprehensible as a world uncaused and existing from eternity'--'The Soul,'

p. 36. Second edition.

4. _a.n.a.logy_ will not inform us. A small pivot or wheel cannot _infallibly_ indicate to us the mechanism to which it belongs, nor anything conclusive as to whether the whole had only one or more makers.

So of the universe, no part can shadow forth the whole of that, nor inform us conclusively whether it had a creator or creators. And here it is to be observed the difficulty is greater than with machines--for a pivot or wheel is a finite part of a finite whole, and _both comprehensible_; but with the universe, all we can take cognisance of is but a very finite part of an _infinite_ whole, and that whole to all men acknowledged _incomprehensible_. Moreover, _creation_ can have no a.n.a.logy--no one ever saw or can conceive of anything being created. So that this mode of learning the existence of a G.o.d fails. The Rev. Hugh M'Neile, M.A., minister of St. Jade's Church, Liverpool, in a lecture delivered to above four hundred of the Irish clergy, at the Rotunda in Dublin, said in reference to this part of the question, 'I am convinced, I say, that, from external creation, no right conclusion can be drawn concerning the _moral_ character of G.o.d. Creation is too deeply and disastrously blotted in consequence of man's sin, to admit of any satisfactory result from an _adequate_ contemplation of nature.

The authors of a mult.i.tude of books on this subject, have given an inadequate and partial induction of particulars. Already aware (though perhaps scarcely recognising how or whence) that "G.o.d is love," they have looked on nature for proofs of this conclusion, and taken what suited their purpose. But they have not taken nature _as a whole_, and collected a conclusion fairly from impartial premises. They expatiate on the blessings and enjoyments of life, in the countless tribes of earth, air, and sea. But if life be a blessing, death is a curse. Nature presents the universal triumph of death. Is this the doing of a G.o.d of love? or are there two G.o.ds--a kind one, giving life; and an unkind one taking it away; and the wicked one invariably the victor? In external creation, exclusively and adequately contemplated, there is no escape from Manichaeism. It is vain to say that the death of the inferior creatures is a blessing to man; for why, in the creation of a G.o.d of love, should any such necessity exist? And how would this account for the death of man himself?' So far the argument of a.n.a.logy.

5. _Revelation_.--We have _none_. If others ever had, we can only determine it by human reason, and for this purpose Leslie has furnished his well-known rules. Therefore, as revelation means something superadded to reason, we cannot be said to possess it, for reason has to determine what is, and what is not revelation, and therefore is superior to it. Also, it is contended by divines that, but for the Bible we should know nothing of a G.o.d, which shows the unsatisfactory nature of the four methods of learning his existence we have gone through. And Lord Brougham contends that but for natural theology, or the a.n.a.logy argument, which has been shown to be no argument at all, the Bible would have no other basis than mere tradition.

So you see, gentlemen, the philosophical difficulties besetting the path of a young inquirer into sacred things. These difficulties are to me insuperable, and hence I find myself incapable of employing language you are more fortunate in being able to adapt to your conscience.*

* The object of this pa.s.sage was to show the jury the intellectual difficulties belonging to this subject, and the pa.s.sage formed but an episode among the moral issues I raised. A friend of mine asking an eminent divine at one of Dr. Elliotson's seances, and who afterwards entered parliament, what he thought of my defence. 'Oh it turned upon that eternal conundrum the existence of G.o.d,' was the answer. But I hope the reader will see something more in my defence than the frivolity that employs itself on riddles.

But it has been stated I said I would put the Deity on half-pay. After first stating that I did not believe there was a Deity, is it likely I should say I would put him on half-pay? Would you put a servant on half-pay whom you never hired or had? All my expressions went to prove that I referred to the expenses of religion. I could not suppose that there is a being capable of governing the world, and consider him good and kind, and yet have any intention of bringing him into contempt. I had no personal reference to the Deity. I made use of that figure of speech because I thought they would understand it better, and they did understand it. I was saying we had many heavy burdens to pay to capitalists and others, and that I thought it hung like a millstone round us. Sir R. Peel said, when he introduced the income-tax, that the poor man could bear no more. I said there were twenty-four millions taken from us for the support of religion, and that they would do well to reduce that one-half. Suppose, gentlemen, that I did refer to the Deity, was my notion a dishonourable one? What man of you who had enough and to spare, and seeing the people around him in poverty, would not willingly relinquish part of his income to give them a bare subsistence?

Who will deny that in England there are honest, industrious, hard-working men, honourable women, and beautiful children, who have not the means of obtaining food? Did I do him a disgrace if I thought he, who is called our Father, the Most High, would have dispensed with one-half of the lip-service he receives in order to give his creatures necessaries!

[It being nearly four o'clock the Jury asked leave to retire, to which Mr. Holyoake consenting, they left the Court for a short time. Some ladies who represented themselves as wives of clergymen, came round the dock offering Mr. Holyoake confections and refreshment, and expressing their regret at the treatment he had received, and the position in which he was placed.]

Mr. Holyoake, on resuming, said--According to a calculation that has never been disputed, the

'Pay to their Clergy.

Catholics, numbering... 124,672,000... 6,106,000 Protestants ? ... 54,046,000... 11,906,000 Greek Church ? ... 41,000,000... 760,000

Total of Christians 219,718,000 18,762,000

'Of which England, for twenty-one millions of people, pays more than one-half.'* Thus the English pay five times more according to their numbers--I proposed a reduction of only one-half.

* 'Cheap Salvation.' By Henry Hetheringten.

Mr. W. J. Fox has told us--'If the government of the country disposed of the mismanaged funds of the clergy, they would have sufficient for their annual needful expenditure.'

Mr. Justice Erskine. If you can convince the jury that you only meaning was that the incomes of the clergy ought to be reduced, and that you did not intend to insult G.o.d, I should tell the jury you ought not to be convicted. You need not go into a laboured defence of that.

Mr. Holyoake. It was stated by one of the witnesses at Cheltenham that I said Christians are wors.h.i.+ppers of Mammon. I thought it necessary for me to refer to it.

Mr. Justice Erskine. There is no evidence of that.

Mr. Holyoake. Then turn to the question _What is blasphemy?_ In the case of Mr. Southwell, one of the witnesses for the prosecution stated his opinion that the crime was '_bringing a scandal on the religion of the magistrates_.' Perhaps this is as correct a definition as can be given.

It has been said to be 'an injury to G.o.d,' Men who could not string six sentences together grammatically, have told me they would defend G.o.d--men whom I should be ashamed to have defending me. But blasphemy is impossible in the sense of annoyance to G.o.d. Jonathan Edwards says--'The following things may be laid down as maxims of plain truth and indisputable evidence:--

'1. That G.o.d is a perfectly happy being, in the most absolute and highest sense possible.

'2. It will follow from hence, that G.o.d is free from everything that is _contrary to happiness_: and so that in strict propriety of speech there is no such thing as any pain, grief or trouble in G.o.d.

'3. Where any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed, and things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is less pleased, or has the less pleasure, his pleasure and happiness are diminished, and he suffers what is disagreeable to him, or is the subject of something that is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness, even pain and grief.

'From this last maxim it follows, that if no distinction is to be admitted between G.o.d's hatred of sin, and his will with respect to the event and existence of sin, as the all-wise determiner of all events, under the view of all consequences through the whole com pa.s.s and series of things; I say, then, it certainly follows, that the coming to pa.s.s of every individual act of sin is truly, all things considered, contrary to his will, and that his will is really crossed in it, and that in proportion as he hates it. And as G.o.d's hatred of sin is infinite, by reason of the infinite contrariety of his holy nature to sin; so his will is infinitely crossed in every act of sin that happens. Which is as much as to say:--he endures that which is infinitely disagreeable to him, by means of every act of sin he sees committed--and so he must be infinitely crossed and suffer infinite pain every day, in millions of millions of instances, which would be to make him infinitely the most miserable of all beings.'*

But _blasphemy_ is an antiquated accusation. In a work** by Col.

Feyronnet Thompson, it is remarked--'what a turmoil, what a splutter, was in this land, when men first announced that they would not eat fish, they would not bow down, they would not confess but when they liked, and this because the secret had got wind that these things were either not in the priests' own rule, or were against it! What threats of h.e.l.l flames, what splas.h.i.+ng about of fire and brimstone, what registration of judgments on men choked with a beef-steak on Friday! Look at one of those simple men in the present day, who shock themselves with the barouches, the cigars, the newspapers, and the elephants of a London Sunday, and occasionally digress to Paris, for the keener excitation of seeing Punch upon the Boulevards, and wondering where heaven reserves its thunder. And put the parallel case; that a good Austrian or Navarrese Catholic came here, and grieved his heart with our weekly doings on a Friday, to say nothing of our more wholesale offences for forty days together in Lent. "Such frying; such barbecuing; in no place did I see anybody having the smallest notion of a red herring! All are involved in one flood of sin and gravy! How fathomless the patience of heaven, that such an island is not swallowed up of the deep!" We have looked into the rule he professes to go by; and we declare it is not there, but the contrary. We know we must appear in the next world with all our mutton on our heads. But we have done our best to look at the rule with the light that G.o.d has given us; and in spite of Austria or Navarre, we will take the risk of His not being angry with us, for seeing no prohibition of mutton there.' Thus we see that _mutton-eating_ was at one period blasphemous.

* Quoted from 'A Commentary on the Public Discussion on the subjects of Necessity and Responsibility,' &c By Jonathan Jonathan, late of the United States.

** 'The Question of Sabbath Observance, tried by the Church's own rule,' &c. By Col. Peyronnet Thompson, F.R.S, of Queen's College, Cambridge.

Mr. Sergeant Talfourd told the jury, in the case of Hetherington v. Moxon, that if the government were consistent in carrying out prosecutions for blasphemy--Shakspere, Milton, Byron, Sh.e.l.ley, Southey--might be prohibited. This perhaps would be an agreeable result to a reverend gentleman well known in this court and county, who says all science should be destroyed; but I trust you entertain no such feelings, and that if I can show that my sentiments cannot be productive of harm, you will feel called upon to acquit me. I claim no inherent right of expressing my opinions, I only contend for liberty of expression because required for the public good. A doctrine was laid down by Lord John Russell upon the occasion of the presentation of the National Pet.i.tion, which I will quote as a view of the subject of human rights well expressed.

'I am aware,' he said, 'that it is a doctrine frequently urged, and I perceive dwelt upon in this pet.i.tion, that every male of a certain age has a right, absolute and inalienable, to elect a representative to take his place among the members in the Commons' House of Parliament. Now, sir, I never could understand that indefeasible right. It appears to me that that question, like every other in the practical application of politics, is to be settled by the inst.i.tutions and the laws of the country of which the person is a native. I see no more right that a person twenty-one years of age has to elect a member of parliament than he has to be a juryman. I conceive that you may just as well say that every adult male has a right to sit upon a jury to decide the most complicated and difficult questions of property, or that every man has a right to exercise the judicial functions, as the people did in some of the republics of antiquity. These things, as it appears to me, are not matters of right; but if it be for the good of the people at large, if it be conducive to the right government of the state, if it tend to the maintenance of the freedom and welfare of the people, that a certain number, defined and limited by a reference to a fixed standard of property, should have the right of electing members of parliament, and if it be disadvantageous to the community at large that the right of suffrage should be universal, then I say that on such a subject the consideration of the public good should prevail, that legislation must act upon it as on every other, and that no inalienable right can be quoted against that which the good of the whole demands.'

If Lord Russell did not, I do see a difference between the claim of an elector and the right of a juryman. The elector is chiefly concerned with his own interests, the juryman with other people's--one is simple, the other complex. But with the measure of right laid down by his lords.h.i.+p in the sentiments I have quoted, I perfectly accord, and if it could be shown that freedom of expression produced public harm, then I would give it up. But I believe such a right would produce good, and therefore I claim it at your hands upon the ground of public good.

In what I urge, it is not faith but reason, as far as I understand it, that I take for my guide--a rule of argument I trust you will accept.

'Reason contents me,' was inscribed as the motto on the seal of the letter from Sir James Graham, acknowledging the receipt of the Cheltenham memorial. If reason 'contents' the Secretary of State, and 'fountain of justice,' surely it ought to 'content' the channels through which such justice is diffused over society. Reason would always be preferred by us were we not differently instructed. 'Bewildered,' says Diderot, 'in an immense forest during the night, and having only one small torch for my guide, a stranger approaches and thus addresses me: "_Friend, blow out thy light if thou wouldst make sure of the right path_" The "forest" was the world--the "light" was my reason---the "stranger" was a priest.'

After several quotations showing the dubious and often pernicious influence of sacred authority, Mr. Holyoake observed---Religious sanctions are regarded only by the ignorant, whom they confirm in folly.

The good find their sanction in the satisfaction ef a virtuous act performed. In an address of the Rev. F. Close, delivered a short time since at the Church of England Tradesmen and Working Men's a.s.sociation of Cheltenham, he said, 'that the more a man is advanced in human knowledge, the more is he opposed to religion, and the more deadly enemy he is to the truth of G.o.d.' If this Christian minister is to be believed, then may you burn your books--forsake all mental refinement--and be equal in piety and ignorance. If Christianity is opposed to human improvement, then should all systems of ignorance be patronised by Christians. Sentiments like these would lead us to give up Boyle, Locke, and Newton, and regard them, with the Rev. Mr. Close, with detestation.

Mr. Justice Erskine. Let me see the discourse of Mr. Close from which you are quoting.

The book was handed to his lords.h.i.+p.

Mr. Holyoake. If the correctness of that report be doubted, I may state that the sentiments of Mr. Close were replied to by Mr. G. Berkeley.

Permit me now to draw your attention strongly to what has been said by men in authority of the impolicy of these prosecutions--that even if you were justified in inflicting punishment on me, it would not be wise to do so, Lord Brougham, three or four years ago, said, 'I may underrate the power of truth opposed to error, and I may overrate the good sense of my fellow country men in rejecting it, but one thing I do not overrate--the power of persecution to spread that which persecution only can spread.' When I walk through any of those ancient places, as I did yesterday through your beautiful cathedral, I feel the majesty they ever present, and think of the manner in which our Catholic ancestors acted on the minds of men. There were sublimity and pageantry and pomp to create awe. We have none now of that beauty of architecture in our meagre churches and more meagre chapels. They had a service more imposing than we ever had. Recollecting all these things, I have wondered how anything could be found sufficiently powerful to shake them off. I have wondered how Luther, with his rude vulgarity, could have effected so much. I can only account for it in this way--that when the Catholics dragged his followers to gaol, it was found that human feelings were stronger than human creeds.