The Evidence in the Case Part 20

This question was communicated by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian Government, with the addition that he (Sir Edward Grey) asked that "the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of her power her neutrality which I desire, and expect other Powers to uphold and observe."

Pursuant to these instructions, the English Amba.s.sador to Paris, on the night of July 31, 1914, called upon Viviani, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the same night received a reply which is reported by Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey, as follows:

French Government is resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to a.s.sure defense of her own security, to act otherwise. This a.s.surance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister to Brussels has spontaneously renewed the a.s.surance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.[87]

[Footnote 87: English _White Paper_, No. 125.]

Confirming this, the French Minister at Brussels, on August 1st, made to the Belgian Foreign Minister the following declaration:

I am authorized to declare that in the event of an international conflict, the government of the Republic will, as it has always declared, respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the event of this neutrality not being respected by another Power, the French Government, in order to insure its own defense, might be led to modify its att.i.tude.[88]

[Footnote 88: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 15.]

On July 31, 1914, the English Amba.s.sador at Berlin saw the German Secretary of State, and submitted Sir Edward Grey's pointed interrogation, and the only reply that was given was that "he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer," and the German Secretary of State very significantly added that for strategic reasons it was "very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all."

Goschen also submitted the matter to the German Chancellor, who also evaded the question by stating that "Germany would in any case desire to know the reply returned to you [the English Amba.s.sador] by the French Government."

That these were mere evasions the events on the following day demonstrated.

On August 1st, Sir Edward Grey saw the German Amba.s.sador in London, and the following significant conversation took place:

I told the German Amba.s.sador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same a.s.surance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant, while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our att.i.tude should be.

All I could say was that our att.i.tude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here.

I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.[89]

[Footnote 89: English _White Paper_, No. 123.]

On the following day, August 2d, the German Minister at Brussels handed to the Belgian Foreign Office the following "highly confidential" doc.u.ment. After stating that "the German Government has received _reliable information_, according to which the French forces intend to march on the Meuse, by way of Givet and Namur," and after suggesting a "fear that Belgium, in spite of its best will, will be in no position to repulse such a largely developed French march without aid," the doc.u.ment adds:

It is an imperative duty for the preservation of Germany to forestall this attack of the enemy. The German Government would feel keen regret if Belgium should regard as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of the enemies of Germany oblige her on her part to violate Belgian territory.[90]

[Footnote 90: Belgian _Gray Book_, No. 20.]

Some hours later, at 1.30 A.M. on August 3d, the German Minister aroused the Belgian Secretary General for the Minister of Foreign Affairs from his slumbers and,

asked to see Baron von der Elst. He told him that he was instructed by his Government to inform us that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a patrol of French cavalry, violating international law, seeing that war was not declared, had crossed the frontier.

The Secretary General asked Herr von Below where these events had taken place; _in Germany, he was answered_. Baron von der Elst observed that in that case he could not understand the object of his communication. Herr von Below said that these acts, contrary to international law, _were of a nature to make one expect that other acts contrary to international law would be perpetrated by France_.[91]

[Footnote 91: Belgian _Gray Paper_, No. 21.]

As to these last communications, it should be noted that the German Government, neither then nor at any subsequent time, ever disclosed to the world the "reliable information," which it claimed to have of the intentions of the French Government, and the event shows beyond a possibility of contradiction that at that time France was unprepared to make any invasion of Belgium or even to defend its own north-eastern frontier.

It should further be noted that the alleged aggressive acts of France, which were made the excuse for the invasion of Belgium, according to the statement of the German Amba.s.sador himself, _did not take place in Belgium but in Germany_.

On August 3d, at 7 o'clock in the morning, Belgium served upon the German Amba.s.sador at Brussels the following reply to the German ultimatum, which, after quoting the substance of the German demand, continued:

This note caused profound and painful surprise to the King's Government.

The intentions which it attributed to France are in contradiction with the express declarations which were made to us on the 1st August in the name of the Government of the Republic.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of Belgian neutrality were to be committed by France, Belgium would fulfill all her international duties, and her army would offer the most vigorous opposition to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, establish the independence and the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and particularly of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations; she has fulfilled her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality; she has neglected no effort to maintain her neutrality or to make it respected.

The attempt against her independence, with which the German Government threatens her, would const.i.tute a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies the violation of that law.

_The Belgian Government would, by accepting the propositions which are notified to her, sacrifice the honor of the nation while at the same time betraying her duties toward Europe._

Conscious of the part Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, she refuses to believe that her independence can be preserved only at the expense of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope were disappointed the Belgian Government has firmly resolved to repulse by every means in her power any attack upon her rights.

In the records of diplomacy there are few n.o.bler doc.u.ments than this.

Belgium then knew that she was facing possible annihilation. Every material interest suggested acquiescence in the peremptory demands of her powerful neighbor. In the belief that then so generally prevailed, but which recent events have somewhat modified, the success of Germany seemed probable, and if so, Belgium, by facilitating the triumph of Germany, would be in a position to partic.i.p.ate in the spoils of the victory.

If Belgium had regarded her honor as lightly as Germany and felt that the matter of self-preservation would excuse any moral dereliction, she would have imitated the example of Luxemburg, also invaded, and permitted free pa.s.sage to the German army without essential loss of her material prosperity, but with a fatal sacrifice to her national honor.

Even under these conditions Belgium evidently entertained a hope that Germany at the last moment would not, in view of its promises and the protest of Belgium, commit this foul outrage.

The military attache of the French Government, being apprised of Germany's virtual declaration of war, offered "the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government," and in reply Belgium, still jealously regardful of her obligation of neutrality, replied:

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circ.u.mstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. The Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they think it necessary to take.

As in Caesar's time, the Belgae, of all the tribes of Gaul, are in truth "the bravest."

Later in the evening, the King of Belgium met his Ministers, and the offer of France was communicated to them, and again the Belgian Government, still reposing some confidence in the Punic faith of Prussia, decided not to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers, or to avail itself of the offers of France.

On the following morning at 6 o'clock the German Minister handed this formal declaration of war to the Belgian Government:

I have been instructed, and have the honor to inform your Excellency, that in consequence of the Government of His Majesty the King having declined the well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out--if necessary by force of arms--the measures of security which have been set forth as indispensable in view of the French menaces.

Here again, no active violation of Belgium's neutrality by France is alleged, only "French menaces."

The conjecture is plausible that in the case of the Prussian General Staff, it was their "own hard dealings" which thus taught them to "suspect the thoughts of others."

On that day the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier and hostilities began.

On the same day, at the great session of the Reichstag, when the Imperial Chancellor attempted to justify to the world the hostile acts of Germany, and especially the invasion of Belgium, the pretended defense was thus bluntly stated by the German Premier:

We are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. _Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law._ It is true that the French Government has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for invasion. _France could wait, but we could not wait._ A French movement upon our flank upon the lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the _just protest_ of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments.

_The wrong--I speak openly--that we are committing_ we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened, as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought--how he is to hack his way through.