The Victory At Sea Part 19

1. Forwarded.

[s] A. P. NIBLACK.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WAs.h.i.+NGTON

June 26, 1919.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL:

I am sending you in the regular official course my approval of your plan to print and publish a book relative to the operations of the naval forces under your command during the great war. I am happy that you are going to undertake this, because I am sure it will be of great value to the Navy and of interest to the world.

With sentiments of esteem and high regard,

Sincerely yours, [s] JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

P.S.

Of course any facilities or a.s.sistance that the Navy Department can render you will be at your disposal.

Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims, U.S.N., President Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

_Extract from Navy Regulations, 1913, Article 1534_

"(2) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy Department shall publish or cause or permit to be published, directly or indirectly, or communicate by interviews, private letters, or otherwise, except as required by his official duties, any information in regard to the foreign policy of the United States, or concerning the acts or measures of any department of the Government or of any officer acting thereunder, or any comments or criticisms thereon; or the text of any official instructions, reports, or letters upon any subject whatever, or furnish copies thereof to any person, without the express permission of the Navy Department.

"(4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting officers from forwarding to the department, through official channels, well-considered comment and suggestions with a view to promoting the efficiency of the service and the public interests; on the contrary, such suggestions are invited, but they should be in regard to things or methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be accompanied by a well-digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions, if approved by the department, will be entered on the officer's record and he will be duly notified to that effect."

APPENDIX II

FIRST CABLE MESSAGE TO WAs.h.i.+NGTON

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Sent April 14, 1917.

Through: State Department.

File No. 25-9-2.

The situation is as follows:

The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people realize in America. The recent success of operations and the rapidity of construction const.i.tute the real crisis of the war. The _moral_ of the enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four are known to have been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded.

The reports of our press are greatly in error. Recent reports circulated concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy _moral_ and results are [not] very satisfactory.

Supplies and communications of forces all fronts, including the Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled.

German submarines are constantly extending their operations into the Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five admirals, captains, and commanders murdered, and in some armies there is insubordination.

The amount of British, neutral and Allied s.h.i.+pping lost in February was 536,000 tons, in March, 517,000 tons, and in the first ten days of April 205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these losses are increasing.

The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape of some raiders during the long nights, but the chances are better now.

The Allies were notified that hospital s.h.i.+ps will continue to be sunk, this in order to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines to convoy hospital s.h.i.+ps; in this way causing a large demand for large convoy forces in all areas not before necessary, and also partially immobilizing the main fleet.

On account of the immense theatre and the length and number of lines of communication, and the material deterioration resulting from three years' continuous operation in distant fields with inadequate base facilities, the strength of the naval forces is dangerously strained.

This applies to all of the sea forces outside of the Grand Fleet. The enemy has six large and sixty-four small submarine mine-layers; the latter carry eighteen mines and the former thirty-four, also torpedoes and guns. All cla.s.ses submarines for actual commission completed at a rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure defeat of the submarine campaign immediate active co-operation absolutely necessary.

The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of communications in the Eastern Atlantic, therefore I very urgently recommend the following immediate naval co-operation.

Maximum number of destroyers to be sent, accompanied by small anti-submarine craft; the former to patrol designated high seas area westward to Ireland, based on Queenstown, with an advance base at Bantry Bay, latter to be an insh.o.r.e patrol for destroyers: small craft should be of light draft with as high speed as possible but low speed also useful. Also repair s.h.i.+ps and staff for base. Oil and docks are available but I advise sending continuous supply of fuel. German main fleet must be contained, demanding maximum conservation of the British main fleet. South of Scotland no base is so far available for this force.

At present our battles.h.i.+ps can serve no useful purpose in this area, except that two divisions of dreadnoughts might be based on Brest for moral effect against antic.i.p.ated raids by heavy enemy s.h.i.+ps in the channel out of reach of the British main fleet.

The chief other and urgent practical co-operation is merchant tonnage and a continuous augmentation of anti-submarine craft to reinforce our advanced forces. There is a serious shortage of the latter craft. For towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous areas sea-going tugs would be of great use.

The co-operation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost despatch in order to break the enemy submarine _moral_ and accelerate the accomplishment of the chief American objective.

It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep our forces from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through effect upon public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the focussing of s.h.i.+pping on this side will restrict such operations to minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed, princ.i.p.ally by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine mines have been anch.o.r.ed as deep as ninety fathoms but majority at not more than fifty fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth until from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after they have been laid.

So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight of landmarks or lights on account of danger to themselves if location is not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and anti-submarine work where most effective const.i.tute the paramount immediate necessity.

Mr. Hoover informs that there is only sufficient grain supply in this country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail stores. In a few days Mr. Hoover will sail for the United States.

SIMS.

APPENDIX III

FIRST DETAILED REPORT ON THE ALLIED NAVAL SITUATION

LONDON, ENGLAND.

April 19, 1917.

From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams concerning War situation and recommendations for U.S. Naval co-operation.

1. _Reception_: