The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume V Part 25

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 26th, 1780.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to write me on the 25th of this month.

The sincere respect I entertain for your Excellency's sentiments would have determined me, upon the least intimation, to have communicated my letter and your answer to Congress, and to suspend, until I should receive orders on their part, all measures towards the British Ministry, without your Excellency's requisition in the name of the King.

I shall transmit these papers to Congress, and I doubt not the reasons your Excellency has adduced will be sufficient to induce them to suspend any communication to the British Ministry, as it is undoubtedly their wisdom to conduct all such measures in concert with their allies.

There is a great body of people in America, as determined as any to support their independence, and their alliances, who notwithstanding wish that no measure may be left unattempted by Congress, or their servants, to manifest their readiness for peace, upon such terms as they think honorable and advantageous to all parties. Your Excellency's arguments, or indeed your authority, will probably be sufficient to satisfy these people, and to justify me, whereas without them I might have been liable to the censure of numbers. For it is most certain, that all due deference will be shown by the people of the United States and their servants, both in and out of Congress, to the sentiments of the Ministry of France.

This deference, however, by no means extends so far as to agree in all cases to those sentiments without examination. I cannot, therefore, agree in the sentiment, that proposing a treaty of peace and commerce, is discovering a great deal of weakness, or that the Americans have forgotten the British system of tyranny, cruelty, or perfidy, or to invite her to believe the Americans have an irresistible predilection for England, or to fortify her in the opinion that the American patriots will submit through weariness, or through fear of the preponderant influence of the tories.

And so far from thinking it would give credit to the opinion, if there be such a one in all Europe, that the United States incline towards a defection, and that they will not be faithful to their engagements, it seems to me on the contrary, it would discredit the opinion which prevails too much in Europe, that there is some secret treaty between France and the United States, by which the former is ent.i.tled to exclusive privileges in the American trade.

It is very true, that the independence of America must be acknowledged before a treaty of peace can be made. But a prospect of a free trade with America, upon principles of perfect equality and reciprocity, like that between France and the United States, might be a powerful inducement with the people of England, to acknowledge American independence. Indeed I do not see any other considerable motive, that England can ever have to make that acknowledgment. The Congress have given no positive instructions respecting the time or manner of making these powers known to one Court or another. All this is left at discretion, and to a construction of the Commissioners themselves. It is very certain, that all the belligerent powers are busily occupied every winter in their councils, and preparations for the ensuing campaign. And it is also certain, that the artifice of the British Ministry, in holding up to view every winter some semblance of a design of reconciliation formerly, and of peace latterly, has been a real engine of hostility against America, equal to a considerable part of the British army. Neither the people of America, nor Mr Adams, have the least dread upon their minds, of an insolent answer from one of the British Ministers, nor of the ridicule of those nations who have not yet acknowledged the independence of America. No man of any knowledge, justice, or humanity, in any of those nations, would laugh upon such an occasion, on the contrary, he would feel a just indignation against a Minister who should insult a message so obviously calculated for the good of England, and of all Europe, in the present circ.u.mstances of affairs.

I am very much mistaken, for I speak upon memory, if the Duke of Richmond did not make a motion two years ago in the House of Lords, and if Mr Hartley did not make another about a year ago, which was seconded by Lord North himself, in the House of Commons, tending to grant independence to America. And it is very certain, that a great part of the people of England think that peace can be had upon no other terms. It is most clear, that the present Ministry will not grant independence; the only chance of obtaining it is by change of that Ministry, The King is so attached to that Ministry, that he will not change them, until it appears that they have so far lost the confidence of the people, that their representatives in Parliament dare no longer to support them, and in the course of the last winter the weight and sentiment of the people were so considerable, as to bring many great questions nearly to a balance, and particularly to carry two votes, one against the increase of the influence of the Crown, and another against the Board of Trade and Plantations, a vote that seemed almost to decide the American question, and they came within a very few votes of deciding against the American Secretary.

Now where parties are approaching so near to a balance, even a small weight thrown into either scale may turn it.

In my letter of the 19th of February, I said, that my appointment was notorious in America, and that therefore it was probably known to the Court of London, although they had not regular evidence of it. The question then, was more particularly concerning a commission to a.s.sist in the pacification. This was published in the American newspapers, in a general way, but I have no reason to think they are particularly informed of these matters; if they were, no evil that I am aware of could result from giving them the information officially. Certainly they have no official information, and it is denied, that they know the nature of Mr Adams' commission.

Without any great effort of genius, I think it is easy to demonstrate to any thinking being, that by granting American independence, and making a treaty of commerce upon principles of perfect reciprocity, England would in the present circ.u.mstances of affairs make an honorable and an advantageous peace. It would have been more for their honor and advantage never to have made this war against America, it is true, but having made it, all the dishonor and disadvantage there is in it are indelible, and after thirteen colonies have been driven to throw off their government and annihilate it in every root and branch, becoming independent in fact, maintaining this independence against a force of forty thousand men and fifty s.h.i.+ps of war, that would have shaken most of the States of Europe to the foundation, after maintaining this independence four years, and having made an honorable treaty with the first power in Europe, after another power had fallen into the war in consequence of the same system, after the voice of mankind had so far declared against the justice of their cause, that they could get no ally, but on the contrary all the maritime powers are entering into a confederacy against them, upon a point which has been a princ.i.p.al source of their naval superiority in Europe; in these circ.u.mstances, the only honorable part they can act, is to conform to the opinion of mankind, and the dishonorable and ruinous part for them to act is to continue the war. For the principle, that the people have a right to a form of government according to their own judgments and inclinations, is, in this intelligent age so well agreed on in the world, that it would be thought dishonorable by mankind in general, for the English to govern three millions of people against their wills by military force, and this is all they can ever hope for, even supposing they could bribe and tempt deserters enough from our army and apostates from our cause to make it impossible for us to carry on the war. This, however, I know to be impossible, and that they never will get quiet possession again of the government of any one whole State in the thirteen; no, not for an hour. If England considers further, that America is now known all over Europe to be such a magazine of raw materials for manufactures, such a nursery of seamen, and such a source of commerce and naval power, that it would be dangerous to all the maritime powers to suffer any one of them to establish a domination and a monopoly again in America.

I know there exists in some European minds, a prejudice against America, and a jealousy that she will be hurtful to Europe, and England may place some dependence upon this prejudice and jealousy, but the motions of the maritime powers begin to convince her, that this jealousy and prejudice do not run so deep as they thought, and surely there never was a more groundless prejudice entertained among men, and it must be dissipated as soon as the subject is considered.

America is a nation of husbandmen, planted on a vast continent of wild uncultivated land, and there is, and will be for centuries, no way in which these people can get a living, and advance their interest so much as by agriculture. They can apply themselves to manufactures, only to fill up interstices of time, in which they cannot labor on their lands, and to commerce, only to carry the produce of their lands, the raw materials of manufactures, to the European market.

Europe is a country whose land is all cultivated nearly to perfection, where the people have no way to advance themselves but by manufactures and commerce; here are two worlds then, fitted by G.o.d and nature, to benefit each other, one by furnis.h.i.+ng raw materials, the other manufactures, and they can never interfere. The number of States in America, their position and extension over such a great continent, and their fundamental const.i.tution that nine States must concur to war, show that nine of these States never can agree in any foreign war, or any other, but for self defence, if they should ever become powerful.

But in this case, however disagreeable a prospect it may open to Americans, Europe has an everlasting warranty against their becoming dangerous to her in the nature of men, the nature of her governments, and their position towards one another.

All these circ.u.mstances serve to show, and the people of England begin to be sensible of it, that Europe will never suffer them to regain their domination and monopoly, even if the English were able to extort a forced submission. In this situation then, the only honorable and advantageous course for England is to make peace, and open commerce with America, in perfect consistency with her independence and her alliances. The people of England cannot be said to furnish subsidies without murmuring, for it is certain there never was so much murmuring and such radical discontent in that nation nor any other, but at the eve of a revolution.

I very cheerfully agree with your Excellency in opinion, that the Court of Spain has sagacity enough to penetrate and to defeat the deceitful designs of the English, and am not under other apprehensions from thence, than that the report of a negotiation with Spain will leave some impressions in America, where I believe the English Ministry chiefly intend it. I have already said, that from the present British Ministry I expect no peace. It is for the nation and for the change of Ministry, as a step towards peace, that I thought it might have some effect to make the communication, and to satisfy those people in America, who without the most distant thought of departing from their independence or their alliances, wish still to take every reasonable measure towards peace. Your Excellency's letter will convince them, that my apprehensions were wrong, and your advice will undoubtedly be followed, as it ought to be; for they cannot promise themselves any advantages from the communication equivalent to the inconveniency of taking a measure of this kind, which ought not to be done but in concert, against the opinion of the Ministry of France.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 27th, 1780.

Sir,

Since my letter of the 21st, and upon reading over again your Excellency's letter to me of the 20th, I observed one expression, which I think it my duty to consider more particularly. The expression I have in view, is this, "that the King without having been solicited by the Congress, had taken measures the most efficacious to sustain the American cause."

Upon this part of your letter, I must entreat your Excellency to recollect, that the Congress did as long, ago as the year 1776, before Dr Franklin was sent off for France, instruct him, Mr Deane, and Mr Lee, to solicit the King for six s.h.i.+ps of the line, and I have reason to believe, that the Congress have been from that moment to this, persuaded that this object has been constantly solicited by their Ministers at this Court.

In addition to this, I have every personal, as well as public motive to recall to your Excellency's recollection, a letter or memorial, which was presented to your Excellency in the latter end of the month of December, 1778, or the beginning of January, 1779, in which a great variety of arguments were adduced to show, that it was not only good policy, but absolutely necessary, to send a superiority of naval force to the coasts of the Continent of America.[7] This letter, together with your Excellency's answer, acknowledging the receipt of it, I transmitted to Congress myself, and their Journals show, that they received them near a year ago, so that Congress I am persuaded, rest in the most perfect security in the persuasion, that everything has been done by themselves and their servants at this Court, to obtain this measure, and that the necessary arrangements of the King's naval service have hitherto prevented it.

But if it was only suspected by Congress, that a direct application from them to the King was expected, I am a.s.sured they would not hesitate a moment to make it. I am so convinced by experience, of the absolute necessity of more consultations and communications between his Majesty's Ministers and the Ministers of Congress, that I am determined to omit no opportunity of communicating my sentiments to your Excellency, upon everything that appears to me of importance to the common cause, in which I can do it with propriety. And the communications shall be direct in person, or by letter to your Excellency, without the intervention of any third person. And I shall be very happy, and think myself highly honored, to give my poor opinion and advice to his Majesty's Ministers upon anything that relates to the United States, or the common cause, whenever they shall be asked.

I wish I may be mistaken, but it could answer no good purpose to deceive myself; and I certainly will not disguise my sentiments from your Excellency. I think that Admiral Graves, with the s.h.i.+ps before in America, will be able to impede the operations of M. de Ternay, of M.

de Rochambeau, and of General Was.h.i.+ngton, if their plan is to attack New York.

If there should be a naval battle between M. de Ternay and Admiral Graves, the event is uncertain. From the near equality of force, and the equality of bravery and of naval science which now prevails everywhere, I think we cannot depend upon anything decisive in such an engagement, unless it be from the particular character of Graves, whom I know personally to be neither a great man, nor a great officer. If there should be no decision in a naval battle, Graves and his fleet must lay at New York, and M. de Ternay and his, at Rhode Island. I readily agree, that this will be a great advantage to the common cause, for the reasons mentioned in my letter to your Excellency of the 13th of this month. But still I beg leave to suggest to your Excellency, whether it would not be for the good of the common cause to have still further resources in view, whether circ.u.mstances may not be such in the West Indies, as to enable M. de Guichen to despatch s.h.i.+ps to the reinforcement of M. de Ternay, or whether it may not consist with the King's service to despatch s.h.i.+ps from Europe for that purpose, and further, whether the Court of Spain cannot be convinced of the policy of keeping open the communication between the United States and the French and Spanish Islands in the West Indies, so as to co-operate with France and the United States in the system of keeping up a constant superiority of naval power, both upon the coasts of North America and in the West India Islands. This is the true plan which is finally to humble the English, and give the combined forces the advantage.

The English, in the course of the last war, derived all their triumphs, both upon the Continent of America and the Islands, from the succors they received from their Colonies. And I am sure that France and Spain, with attention to the subject, may receive a.s.sistance in this war, from the same source equally decisive.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

[7] See this memorial, or letter, in the Commissioners'

Correspondence, Vol. I. page 500.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

Versailles, July 29th, 1780.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which you did me the honor to write me on the 27th of this month. When I took upon myself to give you a mark of my confidence, by informing you of the destination of Messrs de Ternay and Rochambeau, I did not expect the animadversion, which you have thought it your duty to make on a pa.s.sage of my letter of the 20th of this month. To avoid any further discussions of that sort, I think it my duty to inform you, that Mr Franklin being the sole person who has letters of credence to the King from the United States, it is with him only that I ought and can treat of matters, which concern them, and particularly of that which is the subject of your observations.

Besides, Sir, I ought to observe to you, that the pa.s.sage in my letter, which you have thought it your duty to consider more particularly, relates only to sending the fleet commanded by the Chevalier de Ternay, and had nothing further in view, than to convince you, that the King did not stand in need of your solicitations to induce him to interest himself in the affairs of the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO B. FRANKLIN.

Translation.

Versailles, July 31st, 1780.

Sir,