A History of the Third French Republic Part 1

A History of the Third French Republic.

by C. H. C. Wright.

CHAPTER I

THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR

Two men were largely responsible, each in his own way, for the third French Republic, Napoleon III and Bismarck. The one, endeavoring partly at his wife's instigation to renew the prestige of a weakening Empire, and the other, furthering the ambitions of the Prussian Kingdom, set in motion the forces which culminated in the Fourth of September.

The causes of the downfall of the Empire can be traced back several years. Napoleon III was, at heart, a man of peace and had, in all sincerity, soon after his accession, uttered the famous saying: "L'empire, c'est la paix." But the military glamour of the Napoleonic name led the nephew, like the uncle, into repeated wars. These had, in most cases, been successful, exceptions, such as the unfortunate Mexican expedition, seeming negligible. They had sometimes even resulted in territorial aggrandizement. Napoleon III was, therefore, desirous of establis.h.i.+ng once for all the so-called "natural" frontiers of France along the Rhine by the annexation of those Rhenish provinces which, during the First Empire and before, had for a score of years been part of the French nation.

On the other hand, though France was still considered the leading continental power, and though its military superiority seemed una.s.sailable, the imperial regime was unquestionably growing "stale."

The Emperor himself, always a mystical fatalist rather than the hewer of his own fortune, felt the growing inertia of his final malady. A lavishly luxurious court had been imitated by a pleasure-loving capital.

This had brought in its train relaxed standards of governmental morals and had seriously weakened the fibre of many military commanders.

Outwardly the Empire seemed as glorious as ever, and in 1867 France invited the world to a gorgeous exposition in the "Ville-lumiere." But Paris was more emotional year by year, and the Tuileries and Saint-Cloud were dominated by a narrow-minded and spoiled Empress. Court intrigues were rife and drawing-room generals were to be found in real life, as well as in Offenbach's "Grande d.u.c.h.esse." But n.o.body, except perhaps Napoleon himself, realized how the Empire had declined. The Empress merely felt that it was time to do something stirring, and, without necessarily waging war, to a.s.sert again the pre-eminence in Europe of France, weakened in 1866 by the unexpected outcome of the rivalry between Austria and Prussia for preponderance among the German States.

Beyond the eastern frontier of France a nation was growing in ambition and power. Prussia still remembered the warlike achievements of Frederick the Great, although since those days its military efficiency had at times undergone a decline. But now, under the reign of King William, guided by a vigorous minister, Bismarck, an example, whatever his admirers may say, of the brutal and unscrupulous _Junker_, the Prussian Government had for some time tried to impose its leaders.h.i.+p on the other German States. Some of these were far from anxious to accept it. In the furtherance of Prussian schemes, Bismarck had been able to inflict a diplomatic rebuff on Napoleon, as well as a severe military defeat on Austria.

In 1866, Prussia won from Austria the important victory of Koniggratz or Sadowa, and thereby a.s.serted its leaders.h.i.+p. The outcome was a check to Napoleon, who had expected a different result. Moreover, by it Bismarck was encouraged to pursue his plans for the consolidation of Germany under a still more openly acknowledged Prussian supremacy. A crafty and utterly unscrupulous diplomat, he was able to mislead Napoleon and his unskilful ministers.

Soon after Sadowa the Emperor tried to obtain territorial compensation from Prussia. He wished, in return for recognition of Prussia's new position and of the projected union of North and South Germany minus Austria, to obtain the cession of territories on the left bank of the Rhine, or an alliance for the conquest and annexation of Belgium to France. Such schemes having failed, Napoleon tried next to satisfy French jingoism by the acquisition of the Duchy of Luxembourg. This move resulted only in securing the evacuation by its Prussian garrison of the Luxembourg fortress and the neutralization of the duchy. From that time on, tension increased between France and Prussia. Bismarck was, indeed, more anxious for war than Napoleon. He suspected the weakness of the French Empire, he despised its leaders, he realized the advance in military efficiency of his own country, and his aim was unswerving to establish a Prussianized German Empire at the cost, if possible, of the downfall of France. As a matter of fact, France, as now, was far from being permeated with militarism and, a few months before the war in 1870, the military budget was actually reduced.

The occasion for a dispute arrived with the suggested candidacy of Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a German prince related to the King of Prussia, to the crown of Spain. As early as 1868, intrigues had begun to put a Prussian on the Spanish throne, but Napoleon had not as yet been disturbed. It was not until 1870 that he took the matter seriously.

In July, Prince Leopold accepted the crown, egged on by Bismarck, and with the fiction of the approval of King William as head of the Hohenzollerns, as distinguished from his position as King of Prussia.

At that time the French Emperor was in precarious health and scarcely in full control of his powers. The French people at large were pacifically inclined and would have asked for nothing better than to remain at home instead of fighting about a foreigner's candidacy to an alien throne.

But, unfortunately, the Empress Eugenie was for war. The Government, too, was in the hands of second-rate and hesitating diplomats. Emile Ollivier, the chief of the Cabinet, was an orator more than a statesman, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the duc de Gramont, was a conceited mediocrity more and more involved in his own mistakes. In consequence, the att.i.tude of the Government was not so much deliberate desire for war as provocative bl.u.s.ter, of which Bismarck was quick to take advantage.

The Cabinet was egged on by Eugenie's adherents, the militants, who had been looking for an insult since Sadowa, and by obstreperous journalists and noisy boulevard mobs, whose manifestations were unfortunately taken, even by the Corps legislatif, for the voice of France.

In consequence, blunder after blunder was made. The ministers worked at cross-purposes, without due consultation and without consideration of the effect of their actions on an inflamed public opinion or on prospective European alliances. Stated in terms of diplomatic procedure, the aim of the French Cabinet was to humiliate Prussia by forcing its Government to acknowledge a retreat. King William was not seeking war and was probably willing to make honorable concessions. Bismarck, on the contrary, desired war, if it could be under favorable diplomatic auspices, and the Hohenzollern candidacy was a direct provocation. He wanted France to seem the aggressor, in view of the effect both on neutral Europe, and particularly on the South German States, which he wished to draw into alliance under the menace of French attack.

The French Amba.s.sador to the King of Prussia, Benedetti, was instructed to demand the withdrawal of Prince Leopold's candidacy. This demand followed a very arrogant statement to the Corps legislatif, on July 6, by the duc de Gramont. The a.s.sumption was that Prince Leopold's presence on the Spanish throne would be dangerous to the honor and interests of France, by exposing the country on two sides to Prussian influence.

King William was, on the whole, willing to make a concession to avoid international complications, but he obviously wished not to appear to act under pressure. M. Benedetti went to Ems and, on July 9, he laid the French demands before the King. After long-drawn-out discussion the French Government asked for a categorical reply by July 12. On that day the father of Prince Leopold, Prince Antony of Hohenzollern, in a telegram to Spain, formally withdrew his son's name. The King had planned to give his consent to this apparently _spontaneous_ action on the part of the candidate's family, when officially informed. Thus France would obtain its ends and the King himself would not be involved.

Unfortunately the thoughtlessness of the head of the French Ministry spoiled everything. Instead of waiting a day for the King's ratification, Emile Ollivier, desirous also of peace, hastened to make public the telegram from the Prince of Hohenzollern. Thereupon the leaders of the war party in the Corps legislatif at once pointed out that the telegram was not accompanied by the signature of the Prussian monarch, declared that the Cabinet had been outwitted, and clamored for definite guarantees. Stung by the charge of inefficiency, the would-be statesman Gramont immediately accentuated his stipulations and demanded that the King of Prussia guarantee not to support in future the candidacy of a Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne.

Matters were rapidly reaching an _impa.s.se_, and Bismarck was correspondingly elated, because France was appearing to Europe a trouble-maker. The duc de Gramont and Emile Ollivier committed the error of dictating a letter to the Prussian Amba.s.sador for him to transmit to the King, to be in turn sent back as his reply. King William was offended by this high-handed procedure. He had already told comte Benedetti at Ems that a satisfactory letter was on its way from Prince Antony and had promised him another interview upon its arrival. After receiving the dispatch from his amba.s.sador at Paris communicating Gramont's formulas, he sent word to Benedetti that Prince Leopold was no longer a candidate and that the incident was closed. Nor was the King willing to grant Benedetti's urgent requests for an interview (July 13).

The King and the French Amba.s.sador had remained perfectly courteous, and the next day, at the railway station, they took leave of each other with marks of respect. Things were not yet hopeless, until Bismarck, by a trick of which he afterwards bragged, caused a dispatch to be published implying that Benedetti had been so persistent in pus.h.i.+ng his demands that King William had been obliged to snub him. The French were led to believe that their representative had been insulted, and neutrals sided with Prussia as the aggrieved party. After deliberation the French Ministry decided on war and the decision was blindly ratified by the Corps legislatif on July 15. At this meeting Emile Ollivier made his famous remark that the Ministry accepted responsibility for the war with a "clear conscience." His actual words, "le coeur leger," seemed, however, to imply "with a light heart", and thereafter weighed heavily against him in the minds of Frenchmen.

CHAPTER II

THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR--THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

September, 1870, to February, 1871

On July 19 the French Emba.s.sy at Berlin declared a state of war. Paris was wild with enthusiasm and eager for an advance on Berlin. The provinces were for the most part cool, but accepted the war calmly because they were a.s.sured of an easy victory. The leaders of the two nations had for each other equal contempt. "Ce n'est pas un homme serieux," Napoleon had once said of Bismarck, and Bismarck thought Napoleon "stupid and sentimental." Meanwhile each nation had eyes on the territory of the other: France was ready to claim the Rhine frontier; Prussia wanted all it could get, and certainly Alsace and Lorraine. The idea, so often repeated by the Germans since the war, that these provinces were annexed because they had once been German, was not in Bismarck's mind,--"that is a Professor's reason," he said.[1] He wanted Stra.s.sburg because its commanding position and the wedge of Wissembourg could cut off northern from southern Germany. The frontier of the Vosges was as desirable to the Germans as the Rhine to the French.

From the beginning all went wrong in France. The Government found itself left in the lurch by the European states whose alliance it had expected.

Moreover, mobilization proceeded slowly and in utter confusion. In spite of Marshal Le Boeuf's famous exclamation ("Il ne manquera pas un bouton de guetre"), never did a nation enter on a war less prepared than the French. On the other hand, all Germany, well trained and ready, sprang to the side of Prussia. The whole military force was grouped in three armies--under Steinmetz, Prince Frederick Charles, and the Crown Prince. But, meanwhile, it seemed necessary to the French to give a semblance of military achievement. The Emperor had started from Paris on July 28 leaving the Empress as regent. On August 2, a vain military display with largely superior forces was made across the frontier at Saarbrucken, a practically unprotected place was taken, and the Emperor was able to send home word that the Prince Imperial had received his "baptism of fire" and that the soldiers wept at seeing him calmly pick up a bullet. The same day King William took command of the German forces at Mainz, and on August 4 the army of the Crown Prince entered Alsace and defeated at Wissembourg the division of about twelve thousand men of General Abel Douay, who was killed. On the 6th Mac-Mahon, with a larger force, met the still more numerous Germans somewhat farther back at Worth, Froschwiller, and Reichsoffen, and was utterly routed with a loss of over ten thousand in killed, wounded, and taken. Alsace was thus completely exposed to the enemy, and the road was open to Luneville and Nancy. On the same day, German armies under Steinmetz and Prince Frederick Charles crossed into Lorraine at Saarbrucken and engaged the troops of the French general Frossard at Forbach and Spicheren, inflicting on them a severe repulse. Meanwhile Frossard's superior, Bazaine, though not far away, did not move a finger to help him. "If Frossard wanted the baton of marshal of France he could win it alone."

The news of these disasters was a terrible shock to Paris. The "liberal"

Ollivier Cabinet was overthrown and replaced by a reactionary one led by General Cousin-Montauban, comte de Palikao. The Emperor withdrew from military leaders.h.i.+p and Marshal Bazaine received supreme command.

Bazaine was a brave soldier, but a poor general-in-chief, and withal a self-seeking man, incompetent to deal with the difficulties in which France found itself. He was perhaps not a conscious traitor in the great disaster which soon came to pa.s.s, but he thought more of himself than of his country. At the time we are concerned with he was considered the coming man. Meanwhile Mac-Mahon, cut off from Bazaine's main army, fell back, between August 6 and August 17, to Chalons. Bazaine was apparently without intelligent strategic plans. He professed to be desirous of concentrating at Verdun, but was afraid to get out of reach of Metz. He won first an indecisive battle at Borny (August 14), which was unproductive of any concrete advantage. On August 16, he let himself be turned back, by an enemy only half as numerous, at Rezonville (Vionville, Mars-la-Tour). On the 18th, he encountered, on the contrary, a much larger force at Saint-Privat (Gravelotte) and let himself be cooped up in Metz. Critics of Bazaine say that he could have turned both Rezonville and Gravelotte to the advantage of the French.

The familiar military uncertainties now began to show themselves in the movements of Mac-Mahon and his troops. The armies of Steinmetz and of Frederick Charles were united under command of the latter to beleaguer Metz, and a smaller force under Prince Albert of Saxony was thrown off to cooperate with the army of the Crown Prince in its advance on Paris.

Mac-Mahon had collected about one hundred and twenty thousand men, and Napoleon, without real authority except as a meddler, was with him. The plan was originally to fall back for the protection of Paris, but the Empress-Regent was afraid to have a defeated Emperor return to the capital lest revolution ensue, and Palikao urged a swift advance to rescue Metz, crus.h.i.+ng Prince Albert of Saxony on the way, taking Frederick Charles between the two fires of rescuers and besieged, with the Crown Prince still too far away to be dangerous. Meanwhile Mac-Mahon moved to Reims, which was neither on the direct road to Paris nor to Metz, and at last started to the rescue of Bazaine by the roundabout route of Montmedy, continually hesitating and retracing his steps. On receiving news of his progress, the armies of the Crown Prince and of Prince Albert converged northward. Mac-Mahon's right wing, under General de Failly, was surprised at Beaumont, and finally the French army in disorder drew up in most unfavorable positions between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier, to face a foe twice as numerous and already nearly completely surrounding it. The battle of Sedan broke out on September 1. Mac-Mahon was wounded early in the fight and gave over the command to Ducrot, in turn superseded by Wimpffen, already designated by the Ministry to replace Mac-Mahon in case of accident. After a fierce battle it fell to General de Wimpffen to capitulate on September 2. By the disaster of Sedan the Germans captured the Emperor, a marshal of France, and the whole of one of its two armies.

The news of the overwhelming defeat of Sedan struck Paris like a thunderbolt. Jules Favre proposed to the Corps legislatif the overthrow of Napoleon and of his dynasty; Thiers, who favored the restoration of the Orleans family, wished the convocation of a Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly; the comte de Palikao asked for a provisional governing commission of which he should be the lieutenant-general. But, before anything was done, the Paris mob invaded the legislative chamber. Gambetta, with the majority of the Paris Deputies, went to the Hotel de Ville, and to prevent a more radical set from seizing the Government, proclaimed the Republic (September 4). A Government of National Defence was const.i.tuted of which General Trochu became President, Jules Favre Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Gambetta Minister of the Interior. Thiers was not a member, but gave his support. Eugenie escaped from the Tuileries to the home of her American dentist, Dr. Evans, and then fled to England.

Jules Favre was innocent enough to think that the Germans would be satisfied with the overthrow of Napoleon, and he was rash enough to declare that France would not yield "an inch of its territory or a stone of its fortresses." But, in an interview with Bismarck at Ferrieres, on September 19, he realized the oppressiveness of the German demands. The rhetorical and emotional, even tearful, Jules Favre was faced by a harsh and unrelenting conqueror, and the meeting ended without an agreement. Meanwhile Paris was invested by the German forces of the Crown Prince and the Prince of Saxony after a defeat of some French troops at Chatillon. William, Bismarck, and Moltke took up their station at Versailles. Europe, made suspicious by the numerous changes of government in France in the nineteenth century, and moved also by selfish reasons, refused its aid and looked on with indifference. Thiers made a fruitless quest through Europe for practical aid, bringing home only meaningless expressions of sympathy.

Unfortunately even a number of people in the provinces, relaxed by the fact.i.tious prosperity of the imperial regime, were too willing to yield to the invaders. Where resistance was brave it appeared fruitless: Stra.s.sburg capitulated on September 28, after the Germans had burned its library and bombarded the cathedral. A scratch army on the Loire, under La Motterouge, was beaten at Artenay (October 10) and had to evacuate Orleans. On October 18, the Germans captured Chateaudun after heroic resistance by National Guards and sharpshooters.

Though one of the two great French armies was in captivity and the other besieged in Metz, the idea of submission never for a moment entered Gambetta's head. Paris was under the command of Trochu, patriotic and brave, but military critic rather than leader, discouraged from the beginning, and unable to take advantage of opportunities. A delegation of the Government of National Defence had established itself at Tours to avoid the German besiegers, but two of its members, Cremieux and Glais-Bizoin, were elderly and weak. Admiral Fourichon was the most competent. Gambetta escaped from Paris by balloon on October 7, and, reaching Tours in safety, made himself by his energy and patriotic inspiration, practically dictator and organizer of resistance to the invaders.

Leon Gambetta, a young lawyer politician of thirty-two, of inexhaustible energy and impa.s.sioned eloquence, was the son of an Italian grocer settled at Cahors. With the help of his a.s.sistant Charles de Freycinet, he levied and armed in four months six hundred thousand men, an average of five thousand a day. Everything was done in haste and unsatisfactorily,--the army of General Chanzy was equipped with guns of fifteen different patterns. But Gambetta did the task of a giant, in spite of another crus.h.i.+ng blow to France, the surrender of Metz.

Bazaine had let himself be cooped up in Metz. Instead of being moved by patriotism, he thought only of his own interests and ambitions. In the midst of the cataclysm which had fallen on France he aspired to hold the position of power. The Emperor gone and the Republic destined, Bazaine thought, to fall, he would be left at the head of the only army. His would be the task of treating for peace with Germany, and then he would perhaps become in France regent instead of the Empress, or Marshal-Lieutenant of the Empire, like the Spanish marshals. So he neglected favorable military opportunities, and dallied over plans of peace, while Bismarck misled him with fruitless propositions or false emissaries like the adventurer Regnier. Finally, on October 27, Bazaine had to surrender Metz, with three marshals (himself, Canrobert, and Le Boeuf), sixty generals, six thousand officers, and one hundred and seventy-three thousand men. France was deprived of her last trained forces, and the besieging army of Frederick Charles was set free to help in the conquest of France. After the war Bazaine was condemned to death, by court-martial, for treason. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, but he afterwards escaped from the fortress in which he was confined and died in obscurity and disgrace at Madrid.

No sooner did the news of the capitulation of Metz reach Paris than a regrettable affair took place. There was much dissatisfaction with the indecision of the Provisional Government, and, on October 31, a mob invaded the Hotel de Ville and arrested the chief members of the commission. Fortunately they were released later the same day and a plebiscite of November 3 confirmed the powers of the Government of National Defence. Fortunately, too, within a few days came news of the first real success of the French during the war, the battle of Coulmiers (November 9).

Gambetta had succeeded during October in organizing the Army of the Loire which, under General d'Aurelle de Paladines, defeated the Bavarian forces of von der Thann at Coulmiers and recaptured Orleans. The plan was to push on to Paris and the objections of d'Aurelle were overcome by Gambetta. But the fall of Metz had released German reinforcements. After an unsuccessful contest by the right wing at Beaune-la-Rolande (November 28), and a partial victory at Villepion, the French were defeated in turn on December 2 at Loigny or Patay (left wing), on December 3 at Artenay. The Germans reoccupied Orleans and the first Army of the Loire was dispersed. The Government moved from Tours to Bordeaux.

After Coulmiers General Trochu had planned a sortie from Paris to meet the Army of the Loire. This advance was under command of General Ducrot, but was delayed by trouble with pontoon bridges. The various battles of the Marne (November 30-December 2) culminated in the terrible fight and repulse of Villiers and Champigny. In the north, a small army hastily brought together under temporary command of General Favre was defeated at Villers-Bretonneux and Amiens (November 27).

The last phase of the Franco-Prussian War begins with the crus.h.i.+ng of the Army of the Loire and the check of the advance to Champigny. With unwearied tenacity Gambetta tried to reorganize the Army of the Loire. A portion became the second Army of the Loire or of the West, under Chanzy. The rest, under Bourbaki, became the Army of the East. Faidherbe tried to revive the Army of the North.

To Chanzy, on the whole the most capable French general of the war, was a.s.signed the task of trying, with a smaller force, what d'Aurelle had already failed in accomplis.h.i.+ng, a drive on Paris. In this task Bourbaki and Faidherbe were expected by Gambetta to cooperate. Instead of succeeding, Chanzy, bravely fighting, was driven back, first down the Loire, in the long-contested battle of Josnes (Villorceau or Beaugency) (December 7-10), then up the valley of the tributary Loir to Vendome and Le Mans. There the army, reduced almost to a mob, made a new stand.

In a battle between January 10 and 12, this army was again routed and what was left thrown back to Laval.

Faidherbe, taking the offensive in the north, fought an indecisive contest at Pont-Noyelles (December 23) and took Bapaume (January 3). But his endeavor to proceed to the a.s.sistance of Paris was frustrated, he was unable to relieve Peronne, which fell on January 9, and was defeated at Saint-Quentin on January 19.

Bourbaki, in spite of his reputation, showed himself inferior to Chanzy and Faidherbe. He let his army lose morale by his hesitation, and then accepted with satisfaction Freycinet's plan to move east upon Germany instead of to the rescue of Paris. On the eastern frontier Colonel Denfert-Rochereau was tenaciously holding Belfort, which was never captured by the Germans during the whole war.[2] Bourbaki's dishearteningly slow progress received no effective a.s.sistance from Garibaldi. This Italian soldier of fortune, now somewhat in his decline, had offered his services to France and was in command of a small body of guerillas and sharpshooters, the Army of the Vosges. With alternate periods of inactivity, failure, and success, Garibaldi perhaps did more harm than good to France. He monopolized the services of several thousand men, and yet, through his prestige as a distinguished foreign volunteer, he could not be brought under control. Bourbaki won the battle of Villers.e.xel on January 9. Pus.h.i.+ng on to Belfort he was defeated only a few miles from the town in the battle of Hericourt, or Montbeliard, along the river Lisaine. The army, now transformed into panic-stricken fugitives, made its way painfully through bitter cold and snow, and Bourbaki tried to commit suicide. He was succeeded by General Clinchant. When Paris capitulated, on January 28, and an armistice was signed, this Army of the East was omitted. Jules Favre at Paris failed to notify Gambetta in the provinces of this exception, and the army, hearing of the armistice, ceased its flight, only to be relentlessly followed by the Germans. Finally, on February 1, the remnants of the army fled across the Swiss frontier and found safety on neutral soil.

Meanwhile, in Paris the tightening of the Prussian lines had made the food problem more and more difficult, and the population were reduced to small rations and unpalatable diet. After Champigny the German general von Moltke communicated with the besieged, informing them of the defeat of Orleans, and the means seemed opened for negotiations. But the opportunity was rejected, and the Government even refused to be represented at an international conference, then opening in London, because of its unwillingness to apply to Bismarck for a safe-conduct for its representative. A chance to bring the condition of France before the Powers was neglected. Between December 21 and 26, a sally to Le Bourget was driven back, and, on the next day, the bombardment of the forts began. On January 5, the Prussian batteries opened fire on the city itself. On January 18, the Germans took a spectacular revenge for the conquests of Louis XIV by the coronation of King William of Prussia as Emperor of the united German people. The ceremony took place in the great Galerie des Glaces of Louis's magnificent palace of Versailles.

The very next day the triumph of the Germans received its consecration, not only by the battle of Saint-Quentin (already mentioned), but by the repulse of the last offensive movement from Paris. To placate the Paris population an advance was made on Versailles with battalions largely composed of National Guards. At Montretout and Buzenval they were routed and driven back in a panic to Paris. General Trochu was forced to resign the military governors.h.i.+p of Paris, though by a strange contradiction he kept the presidency of the Government of National Defence, and was replaced by General Vinoy. On January 22, a riot broke out in the capital in which blood was shed in civil strife. Finally, on January 28, Jules Favre had to submit to the conqueror's terms. Paris capitulated and the garrison was disarmed, with the exception of a few thousand regulars to preserve order, and the National Guard; a war tribute was imposed on the city and an armistice of twenty-one days was signed to permit the election and gathering of a National a.s.sembly to pa.s.s on terms of peace. With inexcusable carelessness Jules Favre neglected to warn Gambetta in the provinces that this armistice began for the rest of France only on the thirty-first and that, as already stated, the Army of the East was excepted from its provisions.

Gambetta was furious at the surrender and at the presumption of Paris to decide for the provinces. He preached a continuation of the war, and the intervention of Bismarck was necessary to prevent him from excluding from the National a.s.sembly all who had had any connection with the imperial regime. Jules Simon was sent from Paris to counteract Gambetta's efforts. The latter yielded before the prospect of civil war, withdrew from power, and, on February 8, elections were held for the National a.s.sembly.

The downfall of what had been considered the chief military nation of Europe was due to many involved causes. The Empire was responsible for the _debacle_ and the Government of National Defence was unable to create everything out of nothing. Many people were ready to be discouraged after a first defeat, and few realized what Germany's demands were going to be. The imperial army was insufficiently equipped and the majority of its generals were inefficient and lacking in initiative: there was no preparation, no system, little discipline.

During the period of National Defence the members of the Government themselves were usually wanting in experience and in diplomacy, and the badly trained armies made up of raw recruits were liable to panics or unable to follow up an advantage. There was jealousy, mistrust, and frequent unwillingness to subordinate politics to patriotism, or, at any rate, to make allowances for other forms of patriotism than one's own.