The Origins Of Political Order Part 19

1.Quoted in Lewis, Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, pp. 9798. The Muqadimmah Muqadimmah is technically only the prolegomenon to a larger work that today is much less read. is technically only the prolegomenon to a larger work that today is much less read.

2.Ayalon, Outsiders in the Lands of Islam Outsiders in the Lands of Islam, p. 328.

3.Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War: 12601281 Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War: 12601281 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 21516. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 21516.

4.Ibid., p. 228.

5.See Linda S. Northrup, "The Bahri Mamluk Sultanate, 12501390," in Carl F. Petry, ed., The Cambridge History of Egypt The Cambridge History of Egypt, Vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, 6401517 Islamic Egypt, 6401517 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

6.R. Stephen Humphreys, "The Emergence of the Mamluk Army," Studia Islamica Studia Islamica 45 (1977): 6799. 45 (1977): 6799.

7.Peter M. Holt, "The Position and Power of the Mamluk Sultan," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 38, no. 2 (1975): 23749; Northrup, "Bahri Mamluk Sultanate," p. 263. 38, no. 2 (1975): 23749; Northrup, "Bahri Mamluk Sultanate," p. 263.

8.Ayalon, Outsiders in the Land of Islam Outsiders in the Land of Islam, p. 328.

9.Ibid., p. 69.

10.Ibid., p. 72.

11.Ibid., p. 328; Northrup, "Bahri Mamluk Sultanate," pp. 25657, says that the one-generation principle was never explicitly stated anywhere.

12.Amalia Levanoni, "The Mamluk Conception of the Sultanate," International Journal of Middle East Studies International Journal of Middle East Studies 26, no. 3 (1994): 37392. 26, no. 3 (1994): 37392.

13.See f.u.kuyama, State-Building State-Building, chap. 2.

14.Jean-Claude Garcin, "The Regime of the Circa.s.sian Mamluks," in Petry, Cambridge History of Egypt Cambridge History of Egypt, p. 292.

15.In a contemporary version of this problem, the World Bank advises developing countries to separate the policy maker from the service provider. The latter becomes a pure agent and can be disciplined by the former for nonperformance. See World Bank, World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), pp. 4661. (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), pp. 4661.

16.Northrup, "Bahri Mamluk Sultanate," p. 257.

17.Ibid., pp. 25859.

18.Ibid., pp. 26162.

19.Garcin, "The Regime of the Circa.s.sian Mamluks," p. 290.

20.Carl F. Petry, "The Military Inst.i.tution and Innovation in the Late Mamluk Period," in Petry, Cambridge History of Egypt Cambridge History of Egypt, p. 468.

21.Ibid., pp. 47073.

22.Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Evans et al., eds.

23.Peter B. Evans, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative a.n.a.lysis of the Third World State," Sociological Forum Sociological Forum 4, no. 4 (1989): 56182. 4, no. 4 (1989): 56182.

24.See Petry, "The Military Inst.i.tution and Innovation," p. 478.

25.David Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Mediaeval Society Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom: A Challenge to a Mediaeval Society (London: Vallentine Mitch.e.l.l, 1956), p. 98. (London: Vallentine Mitch.e.l.l, 1956), p. 98.

26.Petry, "The Military Inst.i.tution and Innovation," pp. 47980; Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms Gunpowder and Firearms, pp. 101105.

15: THE FUNCTIONING AND DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN STATE.

1.Niccol Machiavelli, The Prince The Prince, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 1718.

2.On early Ottoman history, see Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, pp. 58.

3.Ibid., p. 107; I. Metin Kunt, The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 15501650 The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 15501650 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 913. A parallel inst.i.tution was the Russian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 913. A parallel inst.i.tution was the Russian kormlenie kormlenie, or feeding.

4.Kunt, Sultan's Servants Sultan's Servants, pp. 1415.

5.Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 36. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 36.

6.Kunt, Sultan's Servants Sultan's Servants, p. 24.

7.Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats, p. 36.

8.Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, p. 109.

9.Ibid., pp. 11415.

10.McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier Europe's Steppe Frontier, pp. 3840.

11.Lybyer, The Government of the Ottoman Empire The Government of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 6670.

12.Kunt, Sultan's Servants Sultan's Servants, pp. 3132.

13.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition, pp. 5859.

14.Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, p. 65.

15.Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats, p. 28.

16.For example, the Kutadgu Bilig, written for the Turkish ruler of the Karakhanids in 1069, which said, "To control the state requires a large army. To support the troops requires great wealth. To obtain this wealth the people must be prosperous. For the people to be prosperous the laws must be just. If any one of these is neglected the state will collapse." Quoted in Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, p. 66.

17.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, p. 88.

18.The historian William McNeill suggests another reason why Ottoman peasants were relatively lightly taxed in the empire's early days. The ruling elite were themselves recruited, through the devs.h.i.+rme system, from impoverished rural communities in the Balkans and elsewhere; the soldier-administrators understood the rigors of peasant life and had sympathy for the reaya. He points out, however, that the relatively light burden on the peasantry in the core areas of the empire could be sustained only through continuing predation on the empire's frontiers. The sipahi cavalrymen who const.i.tuted the bulk of the army were self-sustaining through their timars; there was a very limited tax base to support any expansion of the army, so larger forces required the conquest of new territories to create new timars. As we will see, the system began to break down when the empire reached the limits of its foreign expansion and was forced to increase tax rates in its core territories. See McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier Europe's Steppe Frontier, p. 32.

19.Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, p. 59.

20.Ibid., p. 60.

21.Max Weber characterized the Ottoman system as patrimonial; indeed, contemporary political scientists use Weber's term "sultanism" to describe a poorly inst.i.tutionalized system. The reason for this was that the Ottoman system at the highest levels was indeed only weakly rule bound and therefore still patrimonial. The succession system, which invited a free-for-all among the system's partic.i.p.ants, was only one example. As in Persia, Rome, China, and other empires, members of the ruler's family and courtiers in the palace were often far more vulnerable to arbitrary rule, since they were potential partic.i.p.ants in a zero-sum struggle for power. Sultans could and did appoint their sons and other kin to high posts as governors or military commanders. The rise of particular individuals to position of vizier or grand vizier was a matter of patronage networks and personal influence. Political power and private fortunes were dependent on one's personal ties to the court and to the sultan. See Weber, Economy and Society Economy and Society, Vol. 2, pp. 102526; also Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats, pp. 3032.

22.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, p. 59.

23.McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier Europe's Steppe Frontier, p. 42.

24.Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 35562; Barkey, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 35562; Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats, pp. 5152. See also Omer Lutfi Barkan and Justin McCarthy, "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Middle East," International Journal of Middle East Studies International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 1 (1975): 328. 6, no. 1 (1975): 328.

25.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, pp. 8990; Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion Revolution and Rebellion, pp. 36364.

26.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, pp. 9293.

27.Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion Revolution and Rebellion, pp. 36566.

28.McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier Europe's Steppe Frontier, pp. 6061; Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, p. 91.

29.There were many symptoms of the breakdown of the Ottoman system. At the turn of the seventeenth century, the countryside experienced a series of revolts by bandit armies, many of them composed of demobilized sekban forces, former peasants who had been taught military skills but who could find no employment when they returned to their villages. Some of the bandit armies grew to be as large as twenty thousand men, and the central government lost control of its own territory in central Anatolia in the first decade of the seventeenth century. This phenomenon is the subject of Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats Bandits and Bureaucrats. See also Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, pp. 9293.

30.Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire, pp. 9192.

31.McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier Europe's Steppe Frontier, pp. 13334.

16: CHRISTIANITY UNDERMINES THE FAMILY.

1.John Hajnal, "European Marriage Patterns in Perspective," in David V. Gla.s.s and D.E.C. Eversley, eds., Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography Population in History: Essays in Historical Demography (Chicago: Aldine, 1965). (Chicago: Aldine, 1965).

2.Henry Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Inst.i.tutions Lectures on the Early History of Inst.i.tutions (London: John Murray, 1875); and (London: John Murray, 1875); and Early Law and Custom Early Law and Custom.

3.Frederick Pollock and Frederic W. Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923).

4.For an overview of this literature, see the introduction by Lawrence Krader to Krader and Paul Vinogradoff, Anthropology and Early Law: Selected from the Writings of Paul Vinogradoff Anthropology and Early Law: Selected from the Writings of Paul Vinogradoff (New York: Basic Books, 1966). (New York: Basic Books, 1966).

5.Maine, Ancient Law Ancient Law, chap. 5.

6.See, for example, Peter Laslett, ed., Household and Family in Past Time Household and Family in Past Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); and Richard Wall, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); and Richard Wall, ed., Family Forms in Historic Europe Family Forms in Historic Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

7.Alan MacFarlane, The Origins of English Individualism The Origins of English Individualism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), p. 83. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), p. 83.

8.Ibid., p. 95.

9.Ibid., p. 125.

10.Ibid., pp. 13133.

11.Ibid., p. 142.

12.Ibid.

13.Bloch, Feudal Society Feudal Society, pp. 12527, 13132.

14.Ibid., pp. 13839.

15.On the effects of the ending of trade, see Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 325. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 325.

16.Bloch, Feudal Society Feudal Society, p. 142.

17.Ibid., p. 148.

18.MacFarlane does not purport to explain why individualism developed so early in England. Bloch suggests that the decline of kins.h.i.+p was related to the increases in trade that began in the eleventh century. It is not clear why the latter should be the case, since rising and falling levels of trade were not clearly correlated to the stability of lineages in other parts of the world like China or the Middle East.

19.Jack Goody, The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). See also Goody, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). See also Goody, The European Family: An Historico-Anthropological Essay The European Family: An Historico-Anthropological Essay (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000). (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000).

20.Goody, The Development of the Family The Development of the Family, p. 39.

21.Ibid., p. 95.

22.Ibid., p. 43.

23.Ibid., p. 105.

24.Jeno Szucs, "Three Historical Regions of Europe: An Outline," in John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (New York: Verso, 1988), p. 302. I am grateful to Gordon Bajnai for this reference. (New York: Verso, 1988), p. 302. I am grateful to Gordon Bajnai for this reference.

17: THE ORIGINS OF THE RULE OF LAW.

1.For a discussion of meanings of the rule of law, see Judith N. Shklar, "Political Theory and the Rule of Law," in Stanley Hoffmann, ed., Political Thought and Political Thinkers Political Thought and Political Thinkers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

2.William Blackstone argues that there is a single law of nature, discoverable through reason, which "is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this." He goes on to argue that religious laws are simply a different version of the universal law of nature, and that "the revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that moral system, which is framed by ethical writers, and denominated the natural law." See Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England Commentaries on the Laws of England (Philadelphia: Birch and Small, 1803), pp. 4142. (Philadelphia: Birch and Small, 1803), pp. 4142.

3.See, for example, Krishna k.u.mar, ed., Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International a.s.sistance Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International a.s.sistance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998). (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

4.For an overview of this literature, see Stephan Haggard, Andrew MacIntyre, and Lydia Tiede, "The Rule of Law and Economic Development," Annual Review of Political Science Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 20534. See also Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Inst.i.tutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Measures," 11 (2008): 20534. See also Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, "Inst.i.tutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Measures," Economics and Politics Economics and Politics 7 (1995): 20727; Philip Keefer, 7 (1995): 20727; Philip Keefer, A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: From Property Rights to Voice A Review of the Political Economy of Governance: From Property Rights to Voice (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: World Bank Inst.i.tute Working Paper 3315, 2004); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Ma.s.simo Mastruzzi, (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: World Bank Inst.i.tute Working Paper 3315, 2004); Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Ma.s.simo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 19962004 Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 19962004 (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: World Bank Inst.i.tute, 2005). (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: World Bank Inst.i.tute, 2005).

5.Barzel, Economic a.n.a.lysis of Property Rights Economic a.n.a.lysis of Property Rights.

6.Barry Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Inst.i.tutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 11 (1995): 131. 11 (1995): 131.

7."Good enough" property rights is suggested by Merilee S. Grindle, "Good Enough Governance: Poverty Reduction and Reform in Developing Countries," Governance Governance 17, no. 4 (2004): 52548. 17, no. 4 (2004): 52548.

8.Schurmann, "Traditional Property Concepts in China."

9.Dougla.s.s North argues that technological innovation will not happen without property rights that permit private returns from innovation that are close to the social returns. See, for example, North, Structure and Change in Economic History Structure and Change in Economic History, pp. 15960. While this may be true of technology that embeds scientific knowledge in specific products, a great deal of scientific research that produces technological advance has a public goods character that needs to be supported by public inst.i.tutions. It may also be that property rights in land and chattels may have rather different effects from intellectual property rights (patents, copyright, etc.).

10.Quoted in Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), Vol. II, part 3, chap. 1, p. 537.

11.For a review of current programs to promote the rule of law, see Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2006). (Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2006).

12.Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Law, Legislation and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 1:72. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 1:72.

13.This argument was the basis for the attack made by Hayek and the economist Ludwig von Mises on socialist central planning in the 1930s and '40s. See Friedrich A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945): 51930. See also 35, no. 4 (1945): 51930. See also Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

14.Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Law, Legislation and Liberty, pp. 7274.

15.Ibid., p. 85.

16.See, for example, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Political Economy Journal of Political Economy 52 (1997): 113150; and "Law and Finance," 52 (1997): 113150; and "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy Journal of Political Economy 106 (1998): 111355. This literature has sparked a large debate. It is not clear that common law systems provide clear advantages over civil law ones with regard to economic growth. Hayek himself, though preferring common law, noted that the Justinian Code on which civil law systems were based was itself the product of incremental acc.u.mulation of decisions by Roman jurists. It is easy in the end to overstate the differences between these systems. See Hayek (1976), p. 83. 106 (1998): 111355. This literature has sparked a large debate. It is not clear that common law systems provide clear advantages over civil law ones with regard to economic growth. Hayek himself, though preferring common law, noted that the Justinian Code on which civil law systems were based was itself the product of incremental acc.u.mulation of decisions by Roman jurists. It is easy in the end to overstate the differences between these systems. See Hayek (1976), p. 83.