Boer Politics Part 17

The authors were not branded as traitors by Mr. Chamberlain, he only wanted to place the letters before the public and their electors, who most likely will find these three gentlemen guilty of another offence than that of supporting Mr. Chamberlain's policy with President Kruger while they made him believe that, as they were fighting against that policy in England, there was no necessity for him to heed their advice.

Their att.i.tude in Europe was bound to nullify the effect of the warnings they were sending to Africa. It is astounding to see sedate men contradict themselves in that way. I cannot help wondering at Dr. Clark boasting on the 27th of September that owing to his endeavours Mr.

Stead's pamphlet was widely circulated, though, according to his words, "Mr. Stead had to the last moment been our enemy." The fact is that Mr.

Stead had met Dr. Leyds (he went on meeting him during the war), and had been persuaded to drop Cecil Rhodes and Jameson in spite of his former praise of them. The publicity given to these letters does evidently not give weight to the opinion of the writers or Mr. Stead either; the interest of the Blue Book on "Correspondence relating to the recent Political Situation in South Africa" does not lie that way, but it lies in the opinion and advice of an Afrikander--to be found in Sir H. de Villiers' letters--he being the Speaker of the House in Cape Colony, Chief Justice, and one of the leaders of the Afrikander party. Sir Henry de Villiers has been often taken to task for being a partisan of the Boers, he cannot, therefore, be suspected of bia.s.sed ideas in favour of Great Britain. Some extracts of the letters he wrote to President Steyn on the 21st of May to Mr. Fischer and to his brother Mr. Melius de Villiers on the 31st of July, then on the 28th September, twelve days before the ultimatum was sent by Mr. Kruger, show to what extent he appreciated the latter's policy. His opinion carries all the more weight as he was one of the delegates to negotiate the 1881 Convention.

On the 21st of May, he says:

"I am quite certain that if in 1881 it had been known to my fellow Commissioners that the President would adopt his retrogressive policy, neither President Brand nor I would ever have induced them to consent to sign the Convention. They would have advised the Secretary of State to let matters revert to the condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other words, to recommence the war."

Here are his views on the actual situation:

"On my recent visit to Pretoria I did not visit the President as I considered it hopeless to think of making any impression on him, but I saw Reitz, s.m.u.ts and Schalk Burger, who, I thought, would be amenable to argument, but I fear that either my advice had no effect on them, or else their opinion had no weight with the President.

"I urged upon them to advise the President to open the Volksraad with promises of a liberal franchise and drastic reforms.

"It would have been so much better if these had come voluntarily from the Government instead of being gradually forced from them. In the former case they would rally the greater number of the malcontents around them, in the latter case no grat.i.tude will be felt to the Republic for any concessions made by it. Besides, there can be no doubt that as the alien population increases, as it undoubtedly will, their demands will increase with their discontent, and ultimately a great deal more will have to be conceded than will now satisfy them. The franchise proposals made by the President seems to be simply ridiculous.

"I have always been a well-wisher to the Republic, and if I had any influence with the President I would advise him no longer to sit on the boiler to prevent it from bursting. Some safety-valves are required for the activities of the new population. In their irritation they abuse the Government, often unjustly, in the press, and send pet.i.tions to the Queen, but that was only to be expected.

Let the Transvaal Legislature give them a liberal franchise and allow them local self-government for their towns and some portion of the discontent will be allayed."

This, I beg to observe, is exactly what I said at the time when people in Europe who called themselves friends of the Boers yet are only Dr.

Leyds' friends or rather dupes urged upon Mr. Kruger the expediency of going on with his mistaken and retrograde policy, and continental diplomatists a.s.sured him that he might with impunity disregard the claims of the Uitlanders and England's warnings.

Those who have never condescended to read the Blue Book or the short chapter in this pamphlet, in which an a.n.a.lysis of this Blue Book is given are never tired of referring to concessions and franchise schemes proffered by Mr. Kruger.

What does Sir Henry de Villiers say about it!

"The franchise proposal made by the President seems to be simply ridiculous."

To Mr. Kruger he sent the English Enactment of 1870 on Naturalisation, and urged him to have it adopted. Is not this an answer to those who contended that England "would not be satisfied with what she offered the Transvaal?"

At the same time his lack of confidence in the Volksraad's promises is shown here:

"I fear there would always still be a danger of the Volksraad revoking the gift before it has come into operation."

His second letter is dated 31st of July, more than six weeks after the Bloemfontein Conference. He writes to Mr. Fischer who acted as go-between the Cape Afrikanders and President Kruger. Mr. Chamberlain had requested that a mixed Commission be appointed to enquire into the merits of the franchise law, pa.s.sed in accordance with Mr. Kruger's proposals. Here is Sir Henry de Villiers' judgment upon Mr. Kruger's and Mr. Chamberlain's proceedings.

"I am convinced Mr. Kruger's friends must now regret they did not recommend to President Kruger three months ago, as I strongly urged, to offer voluntarily a liberal franchise bill with such safeguards as would prevent the old burghers from being swamped.

"Mr. Chamberlain's speech was more moderate than I expected it would be, and as he holds out an olive branch in the form of a joint enquiry into the franchise proposals, would it not be well to meet him in this matter? I know that it might be regarded as a _partial_ surrender."

The last sentence runs as follows:

"I don't think that President Kruger and his friends realise the gravity of the situation. Even now the State Secretary is doing things which would be almost farcical if the times were not so serious."

According to Sir Henry telegrams were suppressed by Dr. Reitz on the plea that "the Government should not disseminate lies by its own wires."

Mr. de Villiers added:

"The Transvaal will soon not have a single friend left among the cultivated cla.s.ses."

Events have proved he had a better opinion of them than they deserved.

He goes on with the following:

"The time really has come when the friends of the Transvaal must induce President Kruger to become perfectly frank and take the new comers into his confidence."

And ends with saying again:

"As one who signed the Convention in 1881 I can a.s.sure you that my fellow Commissioners would not have signed it if they had not been led to believe that President Kruger's policy towards the Uitlanders would have been very different from what it has been."

In a letter written the same day to his brother Melius, one can see in what fool's paradise Dr. Reitz and his colleagues were living:

"When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are Ministers of the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible a.s.sistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions a responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown; at least, if they did not do so, they would be liable to dismissal."

Here is his opinion on the proceedings in the House of Commons:

"The debate which took place in the House of Commons since I last wrote to you satisfies me that the British nation is now determined to settle the Transvaal business in a manner satisfactory to themselves.

"I accordingly begged of Kruger's friends to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is war with England--on the other side there are concessions which will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now decide at once how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English five years' franchise--offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders--make them your friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will have a majority of the Uitlanders with you when they become Burghers. The answer I got was: 'We have done too much already and cannot do more.'"

One is aware of the fact that Mr. Kruger contended that the _non_-English Uitlanders would side with him. Sir Henry Villiers writes:

"I have never been able to understand why Kruger never attempted to take the Uitlanders into his confidence. He has always kept them at arm's length with the result that he has entirely alienated them.

It is said that there are 21,000 Uitlanders in Johannesburg who support him, and yet no meeting has been held at Johannesburg to compare with the meetings held by his opponents.

"Why should he not appoint as one of his nominees an Uitlander of position, whose integrity and judgment he has confidence in? If none such exists, it would only be a proof of his want of tact and statesmans.h.i.+p in not rallying such people to his side."

Mr. Melius de Villiers who was in Bloemfontein, while paying due attention to his brother's warnings, wanted only to persuade Kruger to yield for the time being. Forwarding his brother's letter he wrote to Mr. Fischer:

"Please impress upon Oom Paul what I think is an important fact, namely, that the present Ministry in England will not always last.

"By giving way now, we do not do so in perpetuity; but I feel a.s.sured a Liberal Ministry will be willing to reconsider the relations of the South African Republic to England, and even to revoke the Convention of London."

"Africa for the Afrikander, from the Zambezi to Simon's Bay" remained the motto, only Mr. de Villiers looked to the future for its realization. Yet Mr. Kruger sticks to his policy of deceit taking back what had been already granted.

Mr. de Villiers is down upon the summary and arrogant way with which reasonable offers have been rejected, and alluded to the despatch of the 21st of August in which proposals made in the despatch of the 19th are declared to be subordinate to the abandonment of suzeranity rights and acceptance of the principle of arbitration for pending questions.

On the 28th of September Mr. de Villiers appeals to Mr. Fischer for the last time:--

"Supposing a war does take place, is there any chance of the Transvaal obtaining better terms when the war is over? The war will not cease until the Transvaal is entirely subjugated. What will the position of the Republics then be?

"The very best friends of the Transvaal feel that the Bill providing for the seven years' franchise is not a fair or workable measure.

"I am a.s.suming, of course, that the proposals are such as can be accepted without dishonour.

"I confess I look with horror on a war to be fought by Afrikanders to bolster up President Kruger's regime. I could understand a war in defence of the South African Republic after it has made reasonable concessions to the demands of the new-comers, and after it has displayed the same desire to secure good government as is seen in the Orange Free State; but of such a desire I have not seen the faintest trace."

He alludes again to the doings of Dr. Reitz and s.m.u.ts:--

"I have carefully read the latest correspondence, and I am by no means satisfied that the British Resident was guilty of a breach of faith. The utmost I would say is that there was a misunderstanding.