A History of Sea Power Part 31

With no German "fleet in being" great numbers of workers in English industry and vast quant.i.ties of supplies might have been transferred to the support of the army. The threat of invasion would have been removed, and the large army that was kept in England right up to the crisis of March, 1918,[1] would have been free to reenforce the army at the front. Finally, without the personnel of the German fleet there could have been no ruthless submarine campaign the year after, such as actually came so near to winning the war. Thus, while the German claim to a triumph that drove the British from the seas is ridiculous, it is equally so to argue, as the First Lord of the Admiralty did, that there was no need of a British victory at Jutland, that all the fruits of victory were gained as it was. The subsequent history of the war tells a different tale.

[Footnote 1: A quarter of a million men were sent from England at this time.]

REFERENCES

THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916, Admiral Viscount Lord Jellicoe of Scapa, 1919.

THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral von Scheer, 1920.

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, Commander Carlyon Bellairs, M. P., 1920.

THE NAVAL ANNUAL, 1919, Earl Bra.s.sey.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, Lieut. Commander H.

H. Frost, U. S. N., in U. S. NAVAL INSt.i.tUTE PROCEEDINGS, vol.

45, pp. 1829 ff, 2019 ff; vol. 46, pp. 61 ff.

THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, A. H. Pollen, 1919.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: COMMERCE WARFARE

Interdiction of enemy trade has always been the great weapon of sea power; and hence, though mines, submarines, and the menace of the High Seas Fleet itself made a close blockade of the German coast impossible, Great Britain in the World War steadily extended her efforts to cut off Germany's intercourse with the overseas world. Germany, on the other hand, while unwilling or unable to take the risks of a contest for surface control of the sea, waged cruiser warfare on British and Allied commerce, first by surface vessels, and, when these were destroyed, by submarines. In the policies adopted by each belligerent there is an evident a.n.a.logy to the British blockade and the French commerce destroying campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars. And just as in the earlier conflict British sea power impelled Napoleon to a ruinous struggle for the domination of Europe, so in the World War, though in a somewhat different fas.h.i.+on, the blockade worked disaster for Germany.

"The consequences of the blockade," writes the German General von Freytag-Loringhoven, "showed themselves at once. Although we succeeded in establis.h.i.+ng our war economics by our internal strength, yet the unfavorable state of the world economic situation was felt by us throughout the war. That alone explains why our enemies found ever fresh possibilities of resistance, because the sea stood open to them, and why victories which would otherwise have been absolutely decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, did not bring us nearer peace."

For each group of belligerents, indeed, the enemy's commerce warfare a.s.sumed a vital significance. "No German success on land," declares the conservative British Annual Register for 1919, "could have ruined or even very gravely injured the English-speaking powers.

The success of the submarine campaign, on the other hand, would have left the United States isolated and have placed the Berlin Government in a position to dominate most of the rest of the world."

"The war is won for us," declared General von Hindenburg on July 2, 1917, "if we can withstand the enemy attacks until the submarine has done its work."

Commerce warfare at once involves a third party, the neutral; and it therefore appears desirable, before tracing the progress of this warfare, to outline briefly the principles of international law which, by a slow and tortuous process, have grown up defining the respective rights of neutrals and belligerents in naval war.

_Blockade_ is among the most fundamental of these rights accorded to the belligerent, upon the conditions that the blockade shall be limited to enemy ports or coasts, confined within specified limits, and made so effective as to create evident danger to traffic. It a.s.sumes control of the sea by the blockading navy, and, before the days of mines and submarines, it was enforced by a cordon of s.h.i.+ps off the enemy coast. A blockade stops direct trade or intercourse of any kind.

Whether or not a blockade is established, a belligerent has the right to attempt the prevention of _trade in contraband_. A neutral nation is under no obligation whatever to restrain its citizens from engaging in this trade. In preventing it, however, a belligerent wars.h.i.+p may stop, visit, and search any merchant vessel on the high seas. If examination of the s.h.i.+p's papers and search show fraud, contraband cargo, offense in respect to blockade, enemy owners.h.i.+p or service, the vessel may be taken as a prize, subject to adjudication in the belligerent's prize courts. The right of merchant vessels to carry defensive armament is well established; but resistance justifies destruction. Under certain circ.u.mstances prizes may be destroyed at sea, after removal of the s.h.i.+p's papers and full provision for the safety of pa.s.sengers and crew.

The Declaration of London,[1] drawn up in 1909, was an attempt to restate and secure general acceptance of these principles, with notable modifications. Lists were drawn up of _absolute_ contraband (munitions, etc., adapted obviously if not exclusively for use in war), _conditional_ contraband (including foodstuffs, clothing, rolling stock, etc., susceptible of use in war but having non-warlike uses as well), and free goods (including raw cotton and wool, hides, and ores). The most significant provision of the Declaration was that the doctrine of _continuous voyage_ should apply only to absolute contraband. This doctrine, established by Great Britain in the French wars and expanded by the United States in the American Civil War, holds that the ultimate enemy destination of a cargo determines its character, regardless of transs.h.i.+pment in a neutral port and subsequent carriage by sea or land. The Declaration of London was never ratified by Great Britain, and was observed for only a brief period in the first months of the war. Had it been ratified and observed, Germany would have been free to import all necessary supplies, other than munitions, through neutral states on her frontiers.

[Footnote 1: Printed in full in INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS of the U. S. Naval War College, 1910, p. 169 ff.]

_The Blockade of Germany_

Unable to establish a close blockade, and not venturing at once to advance the idea of a "long range" blockade, England was nevertheless able to impose severe restrictions upon Germany by extending the lists of contraband, applying the doctrine of continuous voyage to both absolute and conditional contraband, and throwing upon the owners of cargoes the burden of proof as to destination. Cotton still for a time entered Germany, and some exports were permitted.

But on March 1, 1915, in retaliation for Germany's declaration of a "war area" around the British Isles, Great Britain a.s.serted her purpose to establish what amounted to a complete embargo on German trade, holding herself free, in the words of Premier Asquith, "to detain and take into port s.h.i.+ps carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, owners.h.i.+p, or origin." In a note of protest on March 30, the United States virtually recognized the legitimacy of a long-range blockade--an innovation of seemingly wide possibilities--and confined its objections to British interference with lawful trade between neutrals, amounting in effect to a blockade of neutral ports.

As a matter of fact, in spite of British efforts, there had been an immense increase of indirect trade with Germany through neutrals.

While American exports to Germany in 1915 were $154,000,000 less than in 1913, and in fact practically ceased altogether, American exports to Holland and the Scandinavian states increased by $158,000,000. This trade continued up to the time when the United States entered the war, after which all the restrictions which England had employed were given a sharper application. By a simple process of subst.i.tution, European neutrals had been able to import commodities for home use, and export their own products to Germany.

Now, in order to secure supplies at all, they were forced to sign agreements which put them on rations and gave the Western Powers complete control of their exports to Germany.

The effect of the Allied blockade upon Germany is suggested by the accompanying chart. In the later stages of the war it created a dearth of important raw materials, crippled war industries, brought the country to the verge of starvation, and caused a marked lowering of national efficiency and morale.

Germany protested vigorously to the United States for allowing her foodstuffs to be shut out of Germany while at the same time s.h.i.+pping to England vast quant.i.ties of munitions. Throughout the controversy, however, Great Britain profited by the fact that while her methods caused only financial injury to neutrals, those employed by Germany destroyed or imperiled human lives.

_The Submarine Campaign_

[Ill.u.s.tration: From _The Blockade of Germany_, Alonzo E. Taylor, WORLD'S WORK, Oct. 1919.

EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE OF GERMANY

Decreased supply of commodities in successive years of the war.]

The German submarine campaign may be dated from February 18, 1915, when Germany, citing as a precedent Great Britain's establishment of a military area in the North Sea, proclaimed a _war zone_ "in the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole English Channel," within which enemy merchant vessels would be sunk without a.s.surance of safety to pa.s.sengers or crew. Furthermore, as a means of keeping neutrals out of British waters, Germany declared she would a.s.sume no responsibility for destruction of neutral s.h.i.+ps within this zone. What this meant was to all intents and purposes a "paper" submarine blockade of the British Isles. Its illegitimacy arose from the fact that it was conducted surrept.i.tiously over a vast area, and was only in the slightest degree effective, causing a destruction each month of less than one percent of the traffic.

Had it been restricted to narrow limits, it would have been still less effective, owing to the facility of countermeasures in a small area.

Determined, however, upon a spectacular demonstration of its possibilities, Germany first published danger notices in American newspapers, and then, on May 7, 1915, sank the unarmed Cunard liner _Lusitania_ off the Irish coast, with a loss of 1198 lives, including 102 Americans. In spite of divided American sentiment and a strong desire for peace, this act came little short of bringing the United States into the war. Having already declared its intention to hold Germany to "strict accountability," the United States Government now stated that a second offense would be regarded as "deliberately unfriendly," and after a lengthy interchange of notes secured the pledge that "liners will not be sunk without warning and without safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." Violations of this pledge, further controversies, and increased friction with neutrals marked the next year or more, during which, however, sinkings did not greatly exceed the level of about 150,000 tons a month already attained.

During this period Allied countermeasures were chiefly of a defensive character, including patrol of coastal areas, diversion of traffic from customary routes, and arming of merchantmen. This last measure, making surface approach and preliminary warning a highly dangerous procedure for the submarine, led Germany to the announcement that, after March 1, 1916, all armed merchant vessels would be torpedoed without warning. But how were U-boat commanders to distinguish between enemy and neutral vessels? Between vessels with or without guns? The difficulty brings out clearly the fact that while the submarines made good pirates, they were hampered in warfare on legitimate lines.

Germany redoubled U-boat activities to lend strength to her peace proposals at the close of 1916, and when these failed she decided to disregard altogether the cobwebs of legalism that had hitherto hindered her submarine war. On February 1, 1917, she declared unrestricted warfare in an immense barred zone within limits extending from the Dutch coast through the middle of the North Sea to the Faroe Islands and thence west and south to Cape Finisterre, and including also the entire Mediterranean east of Spain. An American s.h.i.+p was to be allowed to enter and leave Falmauth once a week, and there was a crooked lane leading to Greece.

[Ill.u.s.tration: GERMAN BARRED ZONES

British mined area and North Sea mine barrage.]

In thus announcing her intention to sink all s.h.i.+ps on sight in European waters, Germany burned her bridges behind her. She staked everything on this move. Fully antic.i.p.ating the hostility of the United States, she hoped to win the war before that country could complete its preparations and give effective support to the Allies.

General von Hindenburg's statement has already been quoted. It meant that the army was to a.s.sume the defensive, while the navy carried out its attack on Allied communications. Admiral von Capelle, head of the German Admiralty, declared that America's aid would be "absolutely negligible." "My personal view," he added, "is that the U-boat will bring peace within six months."

As it turned out, Germany's disregard of neutral rights in 1917, like the violation of Belgium in 1914, reacted upon her and proved the salvation of the Western Powers. After the defection of Russia, France was in imperative need of men. Great Britain needed s.h.i.+ps.

Neither of these needs could have been supplied save by America's throwing her utmost energies into active partic.i.p.ation in the war.

This was precisely the result of the proclamation of Feb. 1, 1917.

The United States at once broke off diplomatic relations, armed her merchant vessels in March, and on April 6 declared a state of war.

Having traced the development of submarine warfare to this critical period, we may now turn to the methods and weapons employed by both sides at a time when victory or defeat hinged on the outcome of the war at sea.

Germany's submarine construction and losses appear in the following table from official German sources, the columns showing first the total number built up to the date given, next the total losses to date, and finally the remainder with which Germany started out at the beginning of each year.

After 1916 Germany devoted the facilities of her s.h.i.+pyards entirely to submarine construction, and demoralized the surface fleet to secure personnel. Of the entire number built, not more than a score were over 850 tons. The U C boats were small mine-layers about 160 feet in length, with not more than two weeks' cruising period.

The U B'g were of various sizes, mostly small, and some of them were built in sections for transportation by rail. The U boats proper, which const.i.tuted the largest and most important cla.s.s, had a speed of about 16 knots on the surface and 9 knots submerged, and could remain at sea for a period of 5 or 6 weeks, the duration of the cruise depending chiefly upon the supply of torpedoes. In addition there were a half dozen large submarine merchantmen of the type of the _Deutschland_, which made two voyages to America in 1916; and a similar number of big cruisers of 2000 tons or more were completed in 1918, mounting two 6-inch guns and capable of remaining at sea for several months. The 372 boats built totaled 209,000 tons and had a personnel of over 11,000 officers and men.

There were seldom more than 20 or 30 submarines in active operation at one time. One third of the total number were always in port, and the remainder in training.

----------------------------------------------------------- | Boats | | Remainder | built | Losses |(On Jan. 1 of year following) ------------|-------|--------|----------------------------- End of 1914 | 31 | 5 | 26 1915 | 93 | 25 | 68 1916 | 188 | 50 | 138 1917 | 291 | 122 | 169 1918 | 372 | 202 | 170 -----------------------------------------------------------

It is evident from her limited supply of submarines at the outbreak of war that Germany did not contemplate their use as commerce destroyers. To the Allied navies also, in spite of warnings from a few more far-sighted officers, their use for this purpose came as a complete surprise. New methods had to be devised, new weapons invented, new types of s.h.i.+p built and old ones put to uses for which they were not intended--in short, a whole new system of warfare inaugurated amidst the preoccupations of war. As usual in such circ.u.mstances, the navy taking the aggressive with a new weapon gained a temporary ascendancy, until effective counter-measures could be contrived. It is easy to say that all this should have been foreseen and provided for, but it is a question to what extent preparations could profitably have been made before Germany began her campaign. It has already been pointed out in the chapter preceding that, had the German fleet been destroyed at Jutland, subsequent operations on the German coast might have made the submarine campaign impossible, and preparations unnecessary.

[Ill.u.s.tration: U 71-80 OCEAN-GOING MINE-LAYERS

U B 48-149

U C 80 CLa.s.s OF MINE-LAYERS

OCEAN-GOING TYPES U 30 TO U 39