A History of Sea Power Part 28

Aside from the Dardanelles failure, the naval situation at the end of 1915 was such as to give a.s.surance to the Western Powers. They had converted potential control of the sea into actual control, save in limited areas on the enemies' sea frontiers. Germany had lost her cruisers and her colonies, and her s.h.i.+pping had been destroyed or driven from the seas. Though losses from submarines averaged 150,000 tons a month in 1915, they had not yet caused genuine alarm.

The German fleet was still a menace, but, in spite of attrition warfare, the Grand Fleet was decidedly stronger than in 1914.

REFERENCES

BRITISH OFFICIAL NAVAL HISTORY, Sir Julian Corbett, London, 1920.

THE GRAND FLEET, Admiral Jellicoe, London, 1918.

THE BRITISH NAVY IN BATTLE, Arthur H. Pollen, London, 1919.

MY MEMOIRS, Admiral van Tirpitz, 1919.

THE GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET IN THE WORLD WAR, Vice Admiral van Scheer, 1920.

U. S. NAVAL INSt.i.tUTE PROCEEDINGS, WAR NOTES, 1914-1918.

LES ENSEIGNEMENTS MARITIMES DE LA GUERRE ANTI-GERMANIQUE, Admiral Daveluy, Paris, 1919.

IL POTERE MARITTIMO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA, Captain Romeo Bernotti, Leghorn, 1920.

NAVAL POWER IN THE WAR, Commander C. C. Gill, New York, 1918.

CHAPTER XVII

THE WORLD WAR [_Continued_]: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

There was only one action between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet in the World War, the battle of Jutland.

This was indecisive, but even in a history with the limits of this book it deserves a chapter of its own. In the magnitude of the forces engaged, a magnitude less in numbers of s.h.i.+ps--great as that was--than in the enormous destructive power concentrated in those s.h.i.+ps, it was by far the greatest naval battle in history.

Moreover, this was the one fleet battle fought with the weapons of to-day. Any discussion of modern tactics, therefore, must be based for some time to come on an a.n.a.lysis of Jutland. Finally, the indecisiveness of the action has resulted in a controversy among naval critics that is likely to continue indefinitely. Meanwhile the debatable points are rich in interest and suggestion.

In earlier wars the nation with a more powerful fleet blockaded the ports of the enemy. In this war the sea mine, the submarine, the aircraft and the long-range gun of coast defenses made the old-fas.h.i.+oned close blockade impossible. Such blockade as could be maintained under modern conditions had to be "distant." The British made a base in the Orkneys, Scapa Flow, which had central position with relation to a possible sortie of the German fleet toward either the North Atlantic or the Channel. The intervening s.p.a.ce of North Sea was patrolled by a scouting force of light vessels of various sorts and periodical sweeps by the Grand Fleet. On May 30, 1916, the Grand Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, set out from its base at Scapa Flow for one of these patrolling cruises. On the same day Vice Admiral Beatty left his base at Rosyth (in the Firth of Forth) with his advance force of battle cruisers and battles.h.i.+ps, under orders to join Jellicoe at sea. On the following day the High Seas Fleet took the sea and the two great forces came together in battle.

It is not certain why the German fleet should have been cruising at this time. Having declined to offer battle in the summer of 1914, on account of the British superiority of force, the High Command could hardly have contemplated attacking in 1916 when the odds were much heavier. From statements published by German officers since the war, the objects seem to have been, first, to prevent a suspected attempt to force an entrance into the Baltic; secondly, to fall upon Beatty's Battle Cruiser Squadron, during its frequent patrolling cruises, when it was detached from the main force; and, thirdly, to destroy the British trading fleets which were conducting an important volume of commerce from the ports of Norway with England and Russia. It is not easy to see, however, why the High Seas Fleet should be sent out on a mere commerce destroying raid. The Germans had been out twice before, since April 1st of that year, and probably it was considered good policy to send the fleet to sea every now and then for the moral effect. The people could not relish the idea of their navy being condemned to inaction in their own harbors, and there was bad feeling over the fact that the government had just yielded to President Wilson's protest on ruthless submarine warfare. A victory over Beatty's battle cruisers, or some other detached unit of the British fleet, would have been very opportune in bracing German morale. At the same time Admiral von Scheer had probably reckoned on being able to avoid battle with the Grand Fleet by means of a swift retreat under cover of smoke screens and torpedo attacks. Certainly the odds were too heavy to permit of any other policy on his part.

_The First Phase_

[Ill.u.s.tration: CRUISING FORMATION OF THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET

(After diagram by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, U.S.N., _U. S. Naval Inst.i.tute Proceedings, Nov., 1919._)

Forces: 24 Dreadnought Battles.h.i.+ps 3 Battle Cruisers 12 Light Cruisers 8 Armored Cruisers 51 Destroyers Note: One destroyer accompanied each armored cruiser.]

At 2 p. m. of the 31st of May, 1916, the British main fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, was in Lat.i.tude 57 57' N., Longitude 3 45'

E. (off the coast of Norway), holding a south-easterly course.

It consisted of 24 battles.h.i.+ps formed in a line of six divisions screened by destroyers and light cruisers, as indicated in the accompanying diagram. Sixteen miles ahead of the battle fleet was the First Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Arbuthnot and the Second Cruiser Squadron under Rear Admiral Heath; these consisted of four armored cruisers each. They were spread out at intervals of six miles, with the _Hamps.h.i.+re_ six miles astern of the _Minotaur_ to serve as link s.h.i.+p for signals to and from the main fleet. Four miles ahead was the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron of three s.h.i.+ps under Rear Admiral Hood. These were steaming in column, screened by four destroyers and two light cruisers (_Chester_ and _Canterbury_).

The diagram on p. 388 shows the complete formation of the Battle Fleet and Cruiser Squadrons, under Admiral Jellicoe's personal command. It is interesting as an example of the extreme complexity of fleet formation under modern conditions, especially when it is realized that the whole fleet was proceeding on its base course by zigzagging.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BEATTY'S CRUISING FORMATION, 2 P. M.

(After diagrams by Lieut.-Comdr. H. H. Frost, U.S.N., _U. S. Naval Inst.i.tute Proceedings, Nov., 1919._)]

Seventy-seven miles to the southward Vice Admiral Beatty, commanding the scouting force, was heading on a northeasterly course. His force was spread out in scouting formation. The First Battle Cruiser Squadron of four s.h.i.+ps, headed by the flags.h.i.+p _Lion_, was flanked three miles to the eastward by the Second Battle Cruiser Squadron of two s.h.i.+ps, and five miles to the north by the Fifth Battle Squadron, consisting of four of the finest battles.h.i.+ps in the fleet, 25-knot _Queen Elizabeths_, under Rear Admiral Evan-Thomas. Each of these squadrons had its screen of destroyers and light cruisers. Eight miles to the south the First, Second, and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons were spread out in line at five-mile intervals. The formation is made clear by the accompanying diagram.

At the same hour, 2 p. m., Vice Admiral Hipper, with the German scouting force, was heading north about 15 to 20 miles to the southeast of Beatty. Hipper commanded the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the _Lutzow_ (flag), _Derflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke_, and _Van der Tann_, accompanied by a screening force of four or five light cruisers and about 15 destroyers. Fifty miles south of this advance force was the main body of the High Seas Fleet under Vice Admiral von Scheer. It consisted of three battle squadrons arranged apparently in one long column of 22 s.h.i.+ps escorted by a screen of 62 destroyers, eight or ten light cruisers, and the one remaining armored cruiser in the German navy, the _Roon_.

Thus the stage was set and the characters disposed for the great naval drama of that day.

[Ill.u.s.tration: TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLE CRUISER: THE DERFFLINGER

From Jane, _Fighting s.h.i.+ps, 1918_

Normal displacement, 26,600 to 28,000 tons.

Length (waterline), 689 to 700 feet. Beam, 95 to 96 feet. Mean draught, 27-1/2 feet.

Guns: Some (4.7 inch?) anti-aircraft 8--1.2 inch, 50 cal. (A5) 2 machine 14--5.9 inch, 50 cal. in M. & H. Torpedo tubes (21.7 inch): but only 2 or 4 submerged (broadside) 12--5.9 inch, 50 cal. in D. 1 submerged (bow) (1.2 or less--3.4 inch, 22 pdr. ?)]

At 2.20 the light cruiser _Galatea_ (v. diagram), which lay farthest to the east of Beatty's force, reported two German light cruisers engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. Beatty thereupon changed course toward Horn Reef Lights.h.i.+p in order to cut them off from their base, his light cruisers of the first and third divisions spreading out as a screen to the eastward. It would be interesting to know why, at this point, he did not draw in his battles.h.i.+ps and thus concentrate his force, for when he did establish contact with the Germans, Evan-Thomas's squadron was too far away for effective support. Ten minutes later Hipper got word of British light cruisers and destroyers sighted to the westward and, changing course to northwest, he headed for them at high speed. At 2.45 Beatty sent out a seaplane from the _Engadine_ to ascertain the enemy's position.

This is the first instance in naval history of a fleet scouting by means of aircraft. The airplane came close enough to the enemy to draw the fire of four light cruisers, and returning reported their position. Meanwhile the _Galatea_ had reported heavy smoke "as from a fleet."

At the first report from the _Galatea_, which had been intercepted on the flags.h.i.+p, _Iron Duke_, Jellicoe ordered full speed, and despatched ahead the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Hood, to cut off the escape of the Germans to the Skagerrak, as Beatty was then heading to cut them off from their bases to the south.

Admiral Scheer, also, on getting report of the English cruisers, quickened the speed of his main fleet.

At 3.30 Beatty and Hipper discovered each other's battle cruiser forces. Hipper turned about and headed on a southerly course to lead the British toward the advancing main fleet. Beatty also turned, forming his battle cruisers on a line of bearing to clear the smoke, and the two forces approached each other on converging courses as indicated in the diagram.

At this point it is worth while to compare the two battle cruiser forces:[1]

BRITISH GERMAN Displace- Displace- Name Armor ment Guns Name Armor ment Guns Queen Mary 9" 26,350 8 13.5" Lutzow 13" 26,180 8 12"

Lion 9" 26,350 8 13.5" Derfflinger 13" 26,180 8 12"

Tiger 9" 28,500 8 13.5" Seydlitz 11" 24,610 10 11"

Princess Royal 9" 28,350 8 13.5" Moltke 11" 22,640 10 11"

Indefatigable 8" 18,800 8 12" VonderTann 10" 19,100 11"

New Zealand 8" 18,800 8 12"

------- ------- 145,150 118,710

[Footnote 1: Table from Lieut. Comdr. H. H. Frost, U. S. N., _U.

S. Naval Inst.i.tute Proceedings_, Nov., 1919, p. 850.]

A glance shows the superiority of the British in guns and the German superiority in armor. The British had six s.h.i.+ps to the German five, and if the four new battles.h.i.+ps of Evan-Thomas's division could be effectively brought into action, the British superiority in force would be reckoned as considerably more than two to one. These battles.h.i.+ps had 13" armor, eight 15" guns each, and a speed of 25 knots. They were the most powerful s.h.i.+ps afloat.

[Ill.u.s.tration: TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER: THE LION

From Jane, _Fighting s.h.i.+ps_, 1918

Normal displacement, 26,350 tons. Full load, 29,700.

Length (w. l.). 675 feet. Beam, 88-1/2, feet.

Mean draught, 27-2/3 feet. Max. draught, 31-2/3 feet.

Length over all, 700 feet. Length, p. p., 660 feet.

Guns: (P. R. 2--2 pdr. pom-pom) 8--13.5 inch (M. V.). Dir. Con. 5 M. G. (1 landing) 16--4 inch, 50 cal, Dir. Con. Torpedo tubes (21 inch): 2--3 inch (anti-aircraft) 2 submerged (broadside) 4--3 pdr.]

In speed, Beatty had a marked advantage. He could make 29 knots with all six of his cruisers and 32 knots with his four best,--_Queen Mary, Tiger, Lion_, and _Princess Royal_. Hipper's squadron could make but 28 knots, though the _Lutzow_ and _Derfflinger_ were probably capable of 30.