A History of Sea Power Part 19

Villeneuve put to sea in a rising gale on January 17, 1805, but was soon back in port with damaged s.h.i.+ps, the only effect being to send Nelson clear to Egypt in search of him. A successful start was made on March 30. Refusing to wait for 5 Spanish vessels at Carthagena, Villeneuve with 11 sail reached Cadiz on April 9, picked up one French vessel and two Spanish under Admiral Gravina, and leaving 4 more to follow was off safely on the same night for the West Indies.

From Gibraltar to the Admiralty in London, Villeneuve's appearance in the Atlantic created a profound stir. His departure from Cadiz was known, but not whither he had gone. The five s.h.i.+ps on the Cadiz blockade fell back at once to the Channel. A fast frigate from Gibraltar carried the warning to Calder off Ferrol and to the Brest blockade, whence it reached London on April 25. A convoy for Malta and Sicily with 6000 troops under Gen. Craig--a pledge which Russia called for before sending her own forces to southern Italy--was already a week on its way and might fall an easy victim. In consequence of an upheaval at the Admiralty, Lord Barham, a former naval officer now nearly 80 years of age, had just begun his memorable 9 months'

administration as First Lord of the Admiralty and director of the naval war. Immediately a whole series of orders went out to the fleets to insure the safety of the troop s.h.i.+ps, the maintenance of the Ferrol blockade, an eventual strengthening of forces outside the Channel, and the safety of the Antilles in case Villeneuve had gone there.

Where was Nelson? His scout frigates by bad judgment had lost Villeneuve on the night of March 31 east of Minorca, with no clue to his future course. Nelson took station between Sardinia and the African coast, resolved not to move till he "knew something positive." In the absence of information, the safety of Naples, Sicily, and Egypt was perhaps not merely an obsession on his part, but a proper professional concern; but it is strange that no inkling should have reached him from the Admiralty or elsewhere that a western movement from Toulon was the only one Napoleon now had in mind.

It was April 18 before he received further news of the enemy, and not until May 5 was he able to get up to and through the Straits against steady head winds; even then he could not, as he said, "run to the West Indies without something beyond mere surmise."

Definite reports from Cadiz that the enemy had gone thither reached him through an Admiral Campbell in the Portuguese service, and were confirmed by the fact that they had been seen nowhere to northward.

On the 12th, leaving the _Royal Sovereign_ (100) to strengthen the escort of Craig's convoy, which had now appeared, he set out westward with 10 s.h.i.+ps in pursuit of the enemy's 18.

He reached Barbados on June 4, only 21 days after Villeneuve's arrival at Martinique. The latter had found that the Rochefort squadron--as a result of faulty transmission of Napoleon's innumerable orders--was already back in Europe, and that the Brest squadron had not come. In fact, held tight in the grip of Cornwallis, it was destined never to leave port. But a reenforcement of 2 s.h.i.+ps had reached Villeneuve with orders to wait 35 days longer and in the meantime to harry the British colonies. Disgruntled and despondent, he had scarcely got troops aboard and started north on this mission when he learned that Nelson was hot on his trail. The troops were hastily thrown into frigates to protect the French colonies. Without other provision for their safety, and in disregard of orders, Villeneuve at once turned back for Europe, hoping the Emperor's schemes would still be set forward by his joining the s.h.i.+ps at Ferrol.

Nelson followed four days later, on June 13, steering for his old post in the Mediterranean, but at the same time despatching the fast brig _Curieux_ to England with news of the French fleet's return. This vessel by great good fortune sighted Villeneuve in mid-ocean, inferred from his northerly position that he was bound for Ferrol, and reached Portsmouth on July 8. Barham at the Admiralty got the news the next morning, angry that he had not been routed out of bed on the arrival of the captain the night before. By 9 o'clock the same morning, orders were off to Calder on the Ferrol station in time so that on the 22d of July he encountered the enemy, still plowing slowly eastward, some 300 miles west of Cape Finisterre.

As a result of admirable communication work and swift administrative action the critic of Nelson at Cape St. Vincent now had a chance to rob the latter of his last victory and end the campaign then and there. His forces were adequate. Though he had only 14 s.h.i.+ps to 20, his four three-deckers, according to the estimates of the time, were each worth two of the enemy 74's, and on the other hand, the 6 Spanish s.h.i.+ps with Villeneuve could hardly be counted for more than three. In the ensuing action, fought in foggy weather, two of the Spanish were captured and one of Calder's three-deckers was so injured that it had to be detached. The two fleets remained in contact for three days following, but neither took the aggressive.

In a subsequent court martial Calder was reprimanded for "not having done his utmost to renew the said engagement and destroy every s.h.i.+p of the enemy."

[Ill.u.s.tration: NELSON'S PURSUIT OF VILLENEUVE, MARCH-SEPTEMBER, 1805]

On July 27 the Allied fleet staggered into Vigo, and a week later, after dropping three s.h.i.+ps and 1200 sick men, it moved around to Corunna and Ferrol. Instead of being shaken down and strengthened by the long cruise, it was, according to the commander's plaintive letters, in worse plight than when it left Toulon. Nevertheless, ten days later he was ready to leave port, with 29 units, 14 of them raw vessels from Ferrol, and 11 of them Spanish. If, as Napoleon said, France was not going to give up having a navy, something might still be done. His orders to Villeneuve were to proceed to Brest and thence to Boulogne. "I count," he ended, "on your zeal in my service, your love of your country, and your hatred of that nation which has oppressed us for 40 generations, and which a little preseverance on your part will now cause to reenter forever the ranks of petty powers."[1]

[Footnote 1: Orders of 26 July, Desbriere, PROJETS, Vol. V, p. 672.]

Such were Villeneuve's instructions, the wisdom or sincerity of which it was scarcely his privilege to question (though it may be ours). In pa.s.sing judgment on his failure to execute them it should be remembered that two months later, to avoid the personal disgrace of being superseded, he took his fleet out to more certain disaster than that which it now faced in striking northward from Corunna. "_Un poltron du tete et non de la c?ur_"[2] the French Admiral was handicapped throughout by a paralyzing sense of the things he could not do.

[Footnote 2: Graviere II, 136.]

If he had sailer northward he would have found the British fleet divided. Nelson, it is true, after returning to Cadiz had fallen back from Gibraltar to the Channel, where he left his eleven s.h.i.+ps with the Brest squadron in remarkable condition after more than two years at sea. Calder had also joined, bringing Cornwallis' total strength to 39. These stood between the 21 French at Brest and the 29 at Ferrol. But on August 16 Cornwallis divided his forces, keeping 18 (including 10 three-deckers) and sending Calder back to the Spanish coast with the rest. Napoleon called this a disgraceful blunder (_insigne betise_), and Mahan adds, "This censure was just."

Sir Julian Corbeh says it was a "master stroke... in all the campaign there is no movement--not even Nelson's chase of Villeneuve--that breathes more deeply the true spirit of war." According to Napoleon, Villeneuve might have "played prisoners' base with Calder's squadron and fallen upon Cornwallis, or with his 30 of the line have beaten Calder's 20 and obtained a decisive superiority."

So perhaps a Napoleonic admiral. Villeneuve left Ferrol on August 13 and sailed northwest on a heavy northeast wind till the 15th.

Then, his fixed purpose merely strengthened by false news from a Danish merchantman of 25 British in the vicinity, he turned before the wind for Cadiz. As soon as he was safely inside, the British blockaders again closed around the port.

_The Battle of Trafalgar_

After twenty-five days in England, Nelson took command off Cadiz on September 28, eager for a final blow that would free England for aggressive war. There was talk of using bomb vessels, Congreve's rockets, and Francis's (Robert Fulton's) torpedoes to destroy the enemy in harbor, but it soon became known that Villeneuve would be forced to put to sea. On October 9, Nelson issued the famous Memorandum, or battle plan, embodying what he called "the Nelson touch," and received by his captains with an enthusiasm which the inspiration of the famous leader no doubt partly explains. This plan, which had been formulating itself in Nelson's mind as far back as the pursuit of the French fleet to the West Indies, may be regarded as the product of his ripest experience and genius; the praise is perhaps not extravagant that "it seems to gather up and coordinate every tactical principle that has ever proved effective."[1]

[Footnote 1: Corbett. THE CAMPAIGN OF TRAFALGAR, p. 349.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: NELSON'S VICTORY

Built in 1765. 2162 tons.]

Though the full text of the Memorandum will repay careful study, its leading principles may be sufficiently indicated by summary.

a.s.suming 40 British s.h.i.+ps to 46 of the enemy (the proportions though not the numbers of the actual engagement), it provides first that "the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the fleet in two lines of 16 s.h.i.+ps each, with an advanced squadron of 8 of the fastest sailing two-decked s.h.i.+ps." This made for speed and ease in maneuvering, and was based on the expressed belief that so many units could not be formed and controlled in the old-fas.h.i.+oned single line without fatal loss of time. The s.h.i.+ps would now come into action practically in cruising formation, which was commonly in two columns. The only noteworthy change contemplated was that the flags.h.i.+ps of the first and second in command should s.h.i.+ft from first to third place in their respective columns, and even this change was not carried out. Perhaps because the total force was smaller than antic.i.p.ated, the advance squadron was merged with the two main divisions on the night before the battle, and need not be further regarded. Collingwood, the second in command, was given freedom of initiative by the provision that "after my intentions are made known to him he will have entire direction of his line."

The plan next provides, first for attack from to leeward, and second for attack from to windward. In either case, Collingwood's division was to bring a superior force to bear on 12 s.h.i.+ps of the enemy rear, while Nelson would "cut two, three or four s.h.i.+ps ahead of their center so far as to ensure getting at their commander in chief."

"Something must be left to chance... but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy can succor their rear."

And further, "no captain can do very wrong if he places his s.h.i.+p alongside that of an enemy."

Of the attack from the windward a very rough diagram is given, thus:

[Ill.u.s.tration]

But aside from this diagram, the lines of which are not precisely straight or parallel in the original, and which can hardly be reconciled with the instructions in the text, there is no clear indication that the attack from the windward (as in the actual battle) was to be delivered in line abreast. What the text says is: "The divisions of the British fleet will be brought nearly within gunshot of the enemy's center. The signal will most probably then be given for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails, in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line and to cut through." Thus, if we a.s.sume a convergent approach in column, there was to be no slow deployment of the rear or leeward division into line abreast to make the attack of all its s.h.i.+ps simultaneous; rather, in the words of a captain describing what really happened, they were simply to "scramble into action" at best speed. Nor is there any suggestion of a preliminary s.h.i.+ft from line ahead in the case of Nelson's division. Though endless controversy has raged over the point, the prescribed approach seems to have been followed fairly closely in the battle.

The concentration upon the rear was not new; in fact, it had become almost conventional, and was fully antic.i.p.ated by the enemy. More originality lay in the manner of "containing" the center and van.

For this purpose, in the first place, the approach was to be at utmost speed, not under "battle canvas" but with all sail spread.

In the second place, the advance of Nelson's division in column, led by the flags.h.i.+p, left its precise objective not fully disclosed to the enemy until the last moment, and open to change as advantage offered. It could and did threaten the van, and was finally directed upon the center when Villeneuve's presence there was revealed.

Finally, the very serious danger of enemy concentration upon the head of the column was mitigated not only by the speed of the approach, but by the concentration there of three heavy three-deckers. The plan in general had in view a particular enemy, superior in numbers but weak in gunnery, slow in maneuver, and likely to avoid decisive action. It aimed primarily at rapidity of movement, but combined also the merits of concentration, simplicity, flexibility, and surprise.

In this discussion of the scheme of the battle, around which interest chiefly centers, the actual events of the engagement have been in some measure antic.i.p.ated, and may now be told more briefly.

Driven to desperation by the goadings of Napoleon and the news that Admiral Rosily was approaching to supersede him, Villeneuve at last resolved to put to sea. "The intention of His Majesty,"

so the Minister of Marine had written, "is to seek in the ranks, wherever they may be found, officers best suited for superior command, requiring above all a n.o.ble ambition, love of glory, decision of character, and unbounded courage. His Majesty wishes to destroy that circ.u.mspection which is the reproach of the navy; that defensive system which paralyzes our fleet and doubles the enemy's. He counts the loss of vessels nothing if lost with honor; he does not wish his fleet blockaded by an enemy inferior in strength; and if that is the situation at Cadiz he advises and orders you to attack."

The Allied fleet worked out of Cadiz on the 19th of October and on the 20th tacked southward under squally westerly winds. On the 21st, the day of the battle, the wind was still from the west, light and flawy, with a heavy swell and signs of approaching storm. At dawn the two fleets were visible to each other, Villeneuve about 9 miles northeast and to leeward of the British and standing southward from Cape Trafalgar. The French Admiral had formed his main battle line of 21 s.h.i.+ps, French and Spanish intermingled, with the _Santisima Trinidad_ (128) in the center and his flags.h.i.+p _Bucentaure_ next; the remaining 12 under the Spanish Admiral Gravina const.i.tuted a separate squadron stationed to windward to counter an enemy concentration, which was especially expected upon the rear.

As the British advance already appeared to threaten this end of their line, the Allied fleet wore together about 9 o'clock, thus reversing their order, s.h.i.+fting their course northward, and opening Cadiz as a refuge. The maneuver, not completed until an hour later, left their line bowed in at the center, with a number of s.h.i.+ps slightly to leeward, while Gravina's squadron mingled with and prolonged the rear in the new order.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCT. 21, 1805

Position of s.h.i.+ps about noon, when _Royal Sovereign_ opened fire.

(From plan by Capt. T. H. Tizard, R.N., British Admiralty Report, 1913.)]

The change, though it aroused Nelson's fear lest his quarry should escape, facilitated his attack as planned, by exposing the enemy rear to Collingwood's division. As rapidly as the light airs permitted, the two British columns bore down, Nelson in the _Victory_ (100) leading the windward division of 12 s.h.i.+ps, closely followed by the heavy _Neptune_ and _Temeraire_, while Collingwood in the freshly coppered and refitted _Royal Sovereign_ set a sharp pace for the 15 sail to leeward. Of the forty s.h.i.+ps Nelson had once counted on, some had not come from England, and a half dozen others were inside the straits for water. While the enemy were changing course, Collingwood had signaled his division to s.h.i.+ft into a line of bearing, an order which, though rendered almost ineffective by his failure to slow down, served to throw the column off slightly and bring it more nearly parallel to the enemy rear. (See plan.) Both commanders clung to the lead and pushed ahead as if racing into the fray, thus effectually preventing deployment and leaving trailers far behind. Nelson went so far as to try to jockey his old friend out of first place by ordering the _Mars_ to pa.s.s him, but Collingwood set his studding sails and kept his lead. Possibly it was then he made the remark that he wished Nelson would make no more signals, as they all knew what they had to do, rather than after Nelson's famous final message: "England expects that every man will do his duty."

Nelson, uncertain of Villeneuve's place in the line and anxious to prevent escape northward, steered for a gap ahead of the _Santisima Trinidad_, as if to threaten the van. But at 12:00 noon, as the first shots were fired at the _Royal Sovereign_, flags were broken from all s.h.i.+ps, and Villeneuve's location revealed. Swinging to southward under heavy fire, the _Victory_ pa.s.sed under the stern of the _Bucentaure_ and then crashed into the _Redoutable_, which had pushed close up to the flags.h.i.+p. The relative effectiveness of the gunnery in the two fleets is suggested by the fact that the _Victory_ while coming in under the enemy's concentrated fire had only 50 killed and wounded, whereas the raking broadside she finally poured into the _Bucentaure's_ stern is said to have swept down 400 men. Almost simultaneously with the leader, the _Temeraire_ and _Neptune_ plunged into the line, the former closing with the _Bucentaure_ and the latter with the _Santisima Trinidad_ ahead.

Other s.h.i.+ps soon thrust into the terrific artillery combat which centered around the leaders in a confused mingling of friend and foe.

At about 12:10, nearly half an hour before the _Victory_ penetrated the Allied line, the _Royal Sovereign_ brought up on the leeward side of the _Santa Ana_, flags.h.i.+p of the Spanish Admiral Alava, after raking both her and the _Fougueux_ astern. The _Santa Ana_ was thirteenth in the actual line, but, as Collingwood knew, there were 16, counting those to leeward, among the s.h.i.+ps he had thus cut off for his division to subdue. As a combined effect of the light breeze and the manner of attack, it was an hour or more before the action was made general by the advent of British s.h.i.+ps in the rear. All these suffered as they closed, but far less than those near the head of the line. Of the total British casualties fully a third fell upon the four leading s.h.i.+ps--_Victory, Temeraire, Royal Sovereign_ and _Belleisle_.

Not until about three o'clock were the shattered but victorious British in the center threatened by the return of the ten s.h.i.+ps in the Allied van. Culpably slow, however hindered by lack of wind, several of these joined stragglers from Gravina's division to leeward; the _Intrepide_, under her brave skipper Infernet, set an example all might well have followed by steering straight for the _Bucentaure_, and surrendered only to overwhelming odds; five others under Rear Admiral Dumanoir skirted to windward and escaped with the loss of one of their number, cut off by two British late-comers, _Spartiate_ and _Minotaur_.

"Partial firing continued until 4:30, when a victory having been reported to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Nelson, he died of his wound." So reads the _Victory's_ log. The flags.h.i.+p had been in deadly grapple with the _Redoutable_, whose complement, like that of many another French and Spanish s.h.i.+p in the action, showed that the decadence of their navies was not due to lack of fighting spirit in the rank and file. Nelson was mortally wounded by a musket shot from the mizzen-top soon after the s.h.i.+ps closed. In his hour of supreme achievement death came not ungraciously, giving final a.s.surance of the glory which no man ever faced death more eagerly to win.

Of the Allied fleet, four fled with Dumanoir, but were later engaged and captured by a British squadron near Corunna. Eleven badly battered survivors escaped into Cadiz. Of the 18 captured, 11 were wrecked or destroyed in the gales that swept the coast for several days after the battle; three were recaptured or turned back to their crews by the prize-masters, and only four eventually reached Gibraltar.

[Ill.u.s.tration: TRAFALGAR, ABOUT 12:30

From plan attached to report of Capt. Prigny, Villeneuve's Chief of Staff (Deshriere, _Trafalgar_, App. p. 128.)]

The Trafalgar victory did not indeed reduce France to terms, and it thus ill.u.s.trates the limitations of naval power against an enemy not primarily dependent upon the sea. But it freed England from further threat of invasion, clinched her naval predominance, and opened to her the prospect of taking a more aggressive part in the land war. Even this prospect was soon temporarily thrust into the background. On the very day of Trafalgar Napoleon's bulletins announced the surrender of 60,000 Austrians at Ulm, and the Battle of Austerlitz a month later crushed the Third Coalition. The small British contingents in Germany and southern Italy hastened back to their transports. It was only later, when France was approaching exhaustion, that British forces in the Spanish peninsula and elsewhere took a conspicuous part in the Continental war.

_The Continental System_

England's real offensive strength lay not in her armies but in her grip on Europe's intercourse with the rest of the world. And on the other hand, the only blow that Napoleon could still strike at his chief enemy was to shut her from the markets of Europe--to "defeat the sea by the land." This was the aim of his Continental System. It meant a test of endurance--whether he could force France and the rest of Europe to undergo the tremendous strain of commercial isolation for a sufficient period to reduce England to ruin.

The Continental System came into being with Napoleon's famous Berlin Decree of November, 1806, which, declaring a "paper" blockade of the British Isles, put all trade with England under the ban. Under this decree and later supplementary measures, goods of British origin, whatever their subsequent owners.h.i.+p, were confiscated or destroyed wherever French agents could lay hands on them; and neutral vessels were seized and condemned for entering British ports, accepting British convoy, or even submitting to British search.