The Medallic History of the United States of America 1776-1876 Part 88

Finding that Grand Gulf had been evacuated, and that the advance of my forces was already fifteen miles out from there, and on the road, too, they would have to take to reach either Vicksburg, Jackson, or any intermediate point on the railroad between the two places, I determined not to march them back, but taking a small escort of cavalry, some fifteen or twenty men, I went to the gulf myself, and made the necessary arrangements for changing my base of supplies from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf.

In moving from Milliken's Bend, the fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman commanding, was left to be the last to start. To prevent heavy re-enforcements going from Vicksburg to the a.s.sistance of the Grand Gulf forces, I directed Sherman to make a demonstration on Haines's Bluff, and to make all the _show_ possible. From the information since received from prisoners captured this ruse succeeded admirably.

It had been my intention, up to the time of crossing the Mississippi river, to collect all my forces at Grand Gulf, and get on hand a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores before moving, and in the meantime to detach an army corps to co-operate with General Banks on Port Hudson and effect a junction of our forces.

About this time I received a letter from General Banks giving his position west of the Mississippi river, and stating that he could return to Baton Rouge by the 10th of May; that by the reduction of Port Hudson he could join me with 12,000 men.

I learned about the same time that troops were expected at Jackson from the southern cities with General Beauregard in command. To delay until the 10th of May, and for the reduction of Port Hudson after that, the accession of 12,000 men would not leave me relatively so strong as to move promptly with what I had. Information received from day to day of the movements of the enemy also impelled me to the course pursued. Whilst lying at Hawkinson's Ferry waiting for wagons, supplies, and Sherman's corps, which had come forward in the mean time, demonstrations were made, successfully, I believe, to induce the enemy to think that route and the one by Hall's Ferry above were objects of much solicitude to me. Reconnoissances were made to the west side of the Big Black to within six miles of Warrenton. On the 7th of May an advance was ordered, McPherson's corps keeping the road nearest Black river to Rocky Springs, McClernand's corps keeping the Ridge road, with his corps divided on the two roads. All the ferries were closely guarded until our troops were well advanced.

It was my intention here to hug the Black river as closely as possible, with McClernand's and Sherman's corps, and get them to the railroad, at some place between Edward's Station and Bolton.

McPherson was to move by way of Utica to Raymond, and from there into Jackson, destroying the railroad, telegraph, and public stores, etc., and push west to rejoin the main force. Orders were given to McPherson accordingly. Sherman was moved forward on the Edward's Station road, crossing Fourteen Mile creek at Dillon's Plantation; McClernand was moved across the same creek, further west, sending one division of his corps by the Baldwin's Ferry road as far as the river. At the crossing of Fourteen Mile (p. 382) creek both McClernand and Sherman had considerable skirmis.h.i.+ng with the enemy to get possession of the crossing.

McPherson met the enemy near Raymond, two brigades strong under Gregg and Walker, on the same day engaged him, and after several hours hard fighting, drove him with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Many threw down their arms and deserted.

My position at this time was with Sherman's corps, some seven miles west of Raymond, and about the centre of the army.

On the night of the 12th of May, after orders had been given for the corps of McClernand and Sherman to march toward the railroads by parallel roads, the former in the direction of Edward's Station and the latter to a point on the railroad between Edward's Station and Bolton, the order was changed and both were directed to move toward Raymond.

This was in consequence of the enemy having retreated toward Jackson after his defeat at Raymond, and of information that re-enforcements were daily arriving at Jackson, and that General Joe Johnston was hourly expected there to take command in person.

I therefore determined to make sure of that place and leave no enemy in my rear.

McPherson moved on the 13th to Clinton, destroyed the railroad and telegraph, and captured some important despatches from General Pemberton to General Gregg, who had commanded the day before in the battle of Raymond. Sherman moved to a parallel position on the Mississippi Springs and Jackson road; McClernand moved to a point near Raymond.

The next day Sherman and McPherson moved their entire forces toward Jackson. The rain fell in torrents all the night before, and continued until about noon of that day making the roads at first slippery and then miry, notwithstanding, the troops marched in excellent order without straggling and in the best of spirits about fourteen miles, and engaged the enemy about 12 o'clock, M., near Jackson. McClernand occupied Clinton with one division, Mississippi Springs with another, Raymond with a third, and had his fourth division and Blair's division of Sherman's corps with a wagon train still in the rear near New Auburn, while McArthur with one brigade of his division of McPherson's corps was moving toward Raymond on the Utica road. It was not the intention to move these forces any nearer Jackson, but to have them in a position where they would be in supporting distance if the resistance at Jackson should prove more obstinate than there seemed reason to expect.

The enemy marched out the bulk of his force on the Clinton road and engaged McPherson's corps about two and a half miles from the city. A small force of artillery and infantry took a strong position in front of Sherman, about the same distance out. By a determined advance of our skirmishers these latter were soon driven within their rifle-pits just outside the city. It was impossible to ascertain the strength of the enemy at this part of the line in time to justify an immediate a.s.sault; consequently McPherson's two divisions engaged the main bulk of the rebel garrison at Jackson, without further aid than the moral support given them by the knowledge the enemy had a force to the south side of the city and the few infantry and artillery of the enemy posted there to impede Sherman's progress. Sherman soon discovered the weakness of the enemy by sending a (p. 383) reconnoitering party to his right, which also had the effect of causing the enemy to retreat from this part of his line. A few of the artillerists, however, remained in their places, firing upon Sherman's troops, until the last moment, evidently instructed to do so, with the expectation of being captured in the end. On entering the city it was found that the main body of the enemy had retreated north, after a heavy engagement of more than two hours with McPherson's corps, in which he was badly beaten. He was pursued until near night, but without further damage to him.

During that evening I learned that General Johnston, as soon as he satisfied himself that Jackson was to be attacked, had ordered Pemberton peremptorily to march out from the direction of Vicksburg and attack our rear. Availing myself of this information, I immediately issued orders to McClernand and Blair, of Sherman's corps, to face their troops towards Bolton, with a view of reaching Edward's Station, marching on different roads converging near Bolton. These troops were admirably located for such a move. McPherson was ordered to retrace his steps early in the morning of the 15th on the Clinton road. Sherman was left in Jackson to destroy the railroads, bridges, factories, workshops, a.r.s.enals, and everything valuable for the support of the enemy.

This was accomplished in the most effectual manner.

On the afternoon of the 15th I proceeded as far west as Clinton, through which place McPherson's corps pa.s.sed to within supporting distance of Hovey's division of McClernand's corps, which had moved that day on the same road to within one and a half mile of Bolton. On reaching Clinton, at 4.45 P.M., I ordered McClernand to move his command early the next morning toward Edward's Station, marching so as to feel the enemy, if he encountered him, but not to bring on a general engagement unless he was confident he was able to defeat him; and also to order Blair to move with him.

About five o'clock on the morning of the 16th, two men, employees on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, who had pa.s.sed through Pemberton's army the night before, were brought to my headquarters. They stated Pemberton's force to consist of about eighty regiments, with ten batteries of artillery, and that the whole force was estimated by the enemy at about twenty-five thousand men. From them I also learned the positions being taken up by the enemy, and his intention of attacking our rear. I had determined to leave one division of Sherman's corps one day longer in Jackson, but this information determined me to bring his entire command up at once, and I accordingly dispatched him at 5.30 A.M. to move with all possible speed until he came up with the main force near Bolton. My despatch reached him at 7.10 A.M., and his advance division was in motion in one hour from that time. A despatch was sent to Blair at the same time, to push forward his division in the direction of Edward's Station with all possible dispatch. McClernand was directed to establish communication between Blair and Osterhaus, of his corps, and keep it up, moving the former to the support of the latter. McPherson was ordered forward at 5.45 A.M. to join McClernand, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, was sent forward to communicate the information received, and with verbal instructions to McClernand as to the disposition of his forces.

At an early hour I left for the advance, and on arriving at the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad with the road (p. 384) from Raymond to Bolton, I found McPherson's advance and his pioneer corps engaged in rebuilding a bridge on the former road that had been destroyed by the cavalry of Osterhaus's division that had gone into Bolton the night before. The train of Hovey's division was at a halt, and blocked up the road from further advance on the Vicksburg road. I ordered all quartermasters and wagonmasters to draw their teams to one side and make room for the pa.s.sage of troops. McPherson was brought up by this road.

Pa.s.sing to the front, I found Hovey's division of the thirteenth army corps at a halt, with our skirmishers and the enemy's pickets near each other. Hovey was bringing his troops into line, ready for battle, and could have brought on an engagement at any moment. The enemy had taken up a very strong position on a narrow ridge, his left resting on a height where the road makes a sharp turn to the left approaching Vicksburg. The top of the ridge and the precipitous hill-side to the left of the road are covered by a dense forest and undergrowth. To the right of the road the timber extends a short distance down the hill, and then opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope and into a valley extending for a considerable distance. On the road and into the wooded ravine and hill-side Hovey's division was disposed for the attack. McPherson's two divisions, all of his corps with him on the march from Milliken's Bend (until Ransom's brigade arrived that day after the battle), were thrown to the right of the road properly speaking, the enemy's rear. But I would not permit an attack to be commenced by our troops until I could hear from McClernand, who was advancing with four divisions, two of them on a road intersecting the Jackson road about one mile from where the troops above described were placed, and about the centre of the enemy's line; the other two divisions on a road still north and nearly the same distance off.

I soon heard from McClernand, through members of his staff and my own, whom I had sent to him early in the morning, and found that by the nearest practicable route of communication he was two and a half miles distant. I sent several successive messages to him to push forward with all rapidity. There had been continuous firing between Hovey's skirmishers and the rebel advance, which by 11 o'clock grew into a battle. For some time this division bore the brunt of the conflict, but finding the enemy too strong for them, at the instance of Hovey I directed first one and then a second brigade from Crocker's division to re-enforce him. All this time Logan's division was working upon the enemy's left and rear and weakened his front attack most wonderfully. The troops here opposing us evidently far outnumbered ours. Expecting McClernand momentarily with four divisions, including Blair's, I never felt a doubt at the result. He did not arrive, however, until the enemy had been driven from the field, after a terrible contest of hours, with a heavy loss of killed, wounded and prisoners, and a number of pieces of artillery. It was found afterward that the Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about one mile and to where it intersected one of the Raymond roads, turns almost to the west, down the hill and across the valley in which Logan was operating on the rear of the enemy. One brigade of Logan's division had, unconscious of this important fact, penetrated nearly to this road and compelled the enemy to retreat to prevent capture. As it was, much of his artillery and Loring's division of his army was cut off, besides the prisoners captured. On the call of Hovey for more re-enforcements, just before the rout of the enemy (p. 385) commenced, I ordered McPherson to move what troops he could by a left flank around to the enemy's front. Logan rode up at this time and told me that if Hovey could make another dash at the enemy he could come up from where he then was and capture the greater part of their force. I immediately rode forward and found the troops that had been so gallantly engaged for so many hours withdrawn from their advanced position and were filling their cartridge boxes. I directed them to use all dispatch and push forward as soon as possible, explaining to them the position of Logan's division. Proceeding still further forward, expecting every moment to see the enemy, and reaching what had been his line, I found he was retreating. Arriving at the Raymond road, I saw to my left and on the next ridge a column of troops which proved to be Can's division and McClernand with it in person; and to the left of Carr, Osterhaus's division soon afterward appeared with his skirmishers well in advance. I sent word to Osterhaus that the enemy was in full retreat, and to push up with all haste. The situation was soon explained, after which I ordered Carr to pursue with all speed to Black river, and across it if he could, and to Osterhaus to follow. Some of McPherson's troops had already got into the road in advance, but having marched and engaged the enemy all day they were fatigued, and gave the road to Carr who continued the pursuit until after dark, capturing a train of cars loaded with commissary and ordnance stores and other property.

The delay in the advance of the troops immediately with McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front of artillery and infantry where it was impossible, from the nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover his numbers. As it was, the battle of Champion's Hill or Baker's Creek was fought mainly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps and Logan's and Quinby's divisions (the latter commanded by Brigadier-General M. M. Crocker) of McPherson's corps.

Ransom's brigade, of McPherson's corps, came on to the field where the main battle had been fought immediately after the enemy had begun his retreat.

Word was sent to Sherman, at Bolton, of the result of the day's engagement, with directions to turn his corps toward Bridgeport, and to Blair to join him at this latter place.

At daylight, on the 17th, the pursuit was renewed with McClernand's corps in the advance. The enemy was found strongly posted on both sides of the Black river. At this point, on Black river, the bluffs extended to the water's edge on the west bank.

On the east side is an open, cultivated bottom of near one mile in width, surrounded by a bayou of stagnant water, from two to three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty feet in width, from the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the inside line of this bayou the enemy had constructed rifle-pits, with the bayou to serve as a ditch on the outside and immediately in front of them. Carr's division occupied the right in investing this place, and Lawless brigade the right of his division. After a few hours skirmis.h.i.+ng Lawler discovered that by moving a portion of his brigade under cover of the river bank he could get a position from which that place could be successfully a.s.saulted, and ordered a charge accordingly. Notwithstanding the level ground over which a portion of his troops had to pa.s.s without cover, and the great obstacle of the ditch in front of the enemy's works, the charge was gallantly and successfully (p. 386) made, and in a few minutes the entire garrison with seventeen pieces of artillery were the trophies of this brilliant and daring movement. The enemy on the west bank of the river immediately set fire to the railroad bridge and retreated, thus cutting off all chance of escape for any portion of his forces remaining on the east bank.

Sherman, by this time, had reached Bridgeport, on the Black river above. The only pontoon train with the expedition was with him.

By the morning of the 18th he had crossed the river, and was ready to march on Walnut Hills. McClernand and McPherson built floating bridges during the night, and had them ready for crossing their commands by 8 A.M. of the 18th.

The march was commenced by Sherman at an early hour by the Bridgeport and Vicksburg road, turning to the right when within three and a half miles of Vicksburg to get possession of Walnut Hills and the Yazoo river. This was successfully accomplished before the night of the 18th. McPherson crossed Black river above the Jackson road, and came into the same road with Sherman, but to his rear. He arrived after nightfall with his advance to where Sherman turned to the right. McClernand moved by the Jackson and Vicksburg road to Mount Albans, and there turned to the left to get into Baldwin's Ferry road. By this disposition the three army corps covered all the ground their strength would admit of, and by the morning of the 19th the investment of Vicksburg was made as complete as could be by the forces at my command.

During the day there was continuous skirmis.h.i.+ng, and I was not without hope of carrying the enemy's works. Relying upon the demoralization of the enemy in consequence of repeated defeats outside of Vicksburg, I ordered a general a.s.sault at 2 P.M. on this day.

The fifteenth army corps, from having arrived in front of the enemy's works in time on the 18th to get a good position, were enabled to make a vigorous a.s.sault. The thirteenth and seventeenth corps succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions, covered from the fire of the enemy. The 20th and 21st were spent in perfecting communications with our supplies. Most of the troops had been marching and fighting battles for twenty days, on an average of about five days' rations, drawn from the commissary department. Though they had not suffered from short rations up to this time, the want of bread to accompany the other rations was beginning to be much felt. On the 21st my arrangements for drawing supplies of every description being complete, I determined to make another effort to carry Vicksburg by a.s.sault. There were many reasons to determine me to adopt this course. I believed an a.s.sault from the position gained by this time could be made successfully. It was known that Johnston was at Canton with the force taken by him from Jackson, re-enforced by other troops from the east, and that more were daily reaching him. With the force I had, a short time must have enabled him to attack me in the rear, and possibly succeeded in raising the siege. Possession of Vicksburg at that time would have enabled me to have turned upon Johnston and driven him from the State, and possess myself of all the railroads and practical military highways, thus effectually securing to ourselves all territory west of the Tombigbee, and this before the season was too far advanced for campaigning in this lat.i.tude. I would have saved (p. 387) government sending large re-enforcements much needed elsewhere; and finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, and would not have worked in the trenches with the same zeal, believing it unnecessary, that they did after the failure to carry the enemy's works. Accordingly on the 21st orders were issued for a general a.s.sault on the whole line, to commence at 11 A.M. on the 22d. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, that there should be no difference between them in movement of a.s.sault. Promptly at the hour designated, the three army corps then in front of the enemy's works commenced the a.s.sault. I had taken a commanding position near McPherson's front, and from which I could see all the advancing columns from his corps, and a part of each of Sherman's and McClernand's. A portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting their flags on the outer slopes of the enemy's bastions and maintained them there until night. Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used in the a.s.sault, over such ground as intervened between them and the enemy. More men could only avail in case of breaking through the enemy's line or in repelling a sortie. The a.s.sault was gallant in the extreme on the part of all the troops, but the enemy's position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way. At every point a.s.saulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works could cover. The a.s.sault failed, I regret to say, with much loss on our side in killed and wounded, but without weakening the confidence of the troops in their ability to ultimately succeed.

No troops succeeded in entering any of the enemy's works with the exception of Sergeant Griffith, of the 21st regiment Iowa volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment. Of these none returned except the sergeant and possibly one man. The work entered by him, from its position, could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time.

About 12 M., I received a despatch from McClernand that he was hard pressed at several points, in reply to which I directed him to re-enforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had that were not engaged. I then rode round to Sherman, and had just reached there, when I received a second despatch from McClernand stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of and still held two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag was then waved over them, and asking me to have Sherman and McPherson make a diversion in his favor. This despatch I showed to Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the a.s.sault on his front. I also sent a messenger to McClernand, directing him to order up McArthur to his a.s.sistance, and started immediately to the position I had just left on McPherson's line to convey to him the information from McClernand by this last despatch, that he might make the diversion requested. Before reaching McPherson I met a messenger with a third despatch from McClernand, of which the following is a copy:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps, To In the Field near Vicksburg, Mississippi, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. May 22d, 1863.

General: We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur to re-enforce me if he can. Would it not be best to (p. 388) concentrate the whole or part of his command on this point?

John A. MCCLERNAND, _Major-General commanding_.

P.S. I have received your despatch, my troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to re-enforce others.

MCCLERNAND.

The position occupied by me during most of the time of the a.s.sault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of the thirteenth army corps than I believed it possible for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for re-enforcements, as represented in his despatches, up to the time I left it, which was between 12 M.

and 1 P.M., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which doubts the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby's division, which was all of McPherson's corps then present, but four brigades, to report to McClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was promptly and vigorously made and resulted in the increase of our mortality list full fifty per cent., without advancing our position or giving us other advantages.

About 3.50 P.M., I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as follows:

To Headquarters 13th Army Corps, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, May 22, 1863.

Department of the Tennessee.

General: I have received your despatch in regard to General Quinby's division and General McArthur's division. As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by rifle pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard pressed.

John A. MCCLERNAND, _Major-General commanding_.

The a.s.sault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization.

After the failure of the 22d, I determined upon a regular siege.

The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satisfactorily until the 3d of July, when all was about ready for a final a.s.sault.

There was a great scarcity of Engineer officers in the beginning, but under the skillful superintendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, (p. 389) and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined this command during the siege, such practical experience was gained as would enable any division of this army hereafter to conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular Engineer officers.

On the afternoon of the 3d of July a letter was received from Lieutenant-General Pemberton, commanding the Confederate forces at Vicksburg, proposing an armistice and the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place.

The correspondence, copies of which are herewith transmitted, resulted in the surrender of the city and garrison of Vicksburg at 10 o'clock A.M., July 4, 1863, on the following terms: The entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled, not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the proper authorities; officers and men each to be furnished with a parole, signed by himself; officers to be allowed then side arms and private baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property; rations from their own stores sufficient to last them beyond our lines; the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food; and thirty wagons to transport such articles as could not well be carried. These terms I regarded more favorable to the government than an unconditional surrender. It saved us the transportation of them north, which at that time would have been very difficult, owing to the limited amount of river transportation on hand, and the expenses of subsisting them. It left our army free to operate against Johnston, who was threatening us from the direction of Jackson, and our river transportation to be used for the movement of troops to any point the exigency of the service might require.

I deem it proper to state here, in order that the correspondence may be fully understood, that after my answer to General Pemberton's letter of the morning of the 3d, we had a personal interview on the subject of the capitulation.

The particulars and incidents of the siege will be contained in the reports of division and corps commanders, which will be forwarded as soon as received.

I brought forward during the siege, in addition to Lauman's division and four regiments previously ordered from Memphis, Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the sixteenth army corps, and a.s.signed Major-General C. C. Washburne to command of same. On the 11th of June, Major-General F. J. Herron's division from the Department of the Missouri arrived; and on the 14th two divisions of the ninth army corps, Major-General J. G. Parke commanding, arrived. This increase in my force enabled me to make the investment most complete, and at the same time left me a large reserve to watch the movements of Johnston. Herron's division was put into position on the extreme south of the city, and Lauman's division was placed between Herron and McClernand. Smith's and Kimball's divisions and Parke's corps were sent to Haines's Bluff. This place I had fortified to the land side and every preparation made to resist a heavy force. Johnston crossed Big Black river with a portion of his force, and everything indicated that he would make an attack about the 25th of June. Our position in front of Vicksburg having been made as strong against a sortie from the enemy as his works were against an a.s.sault, I placed Major-General Sherman in command of all the troops designated to look after Johnston. The force intended to operate against Johnston, in addition to that at Haines's Bluff, was one division from each of the thirteenth, fifteenth, and (p. 390) seventeenth army corps and Lauman's division. Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an a.s.sault on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th, and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move upon receipt of orders if the a.s.sault should prove a success. His preparations were immediately made, and when the place surrendered on the 4th two days earlier than I fixed for the attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force increased by the remainder of both the thirteenth and fifteenth army corps, and is at present investing Jackson where Johnston has made a stand.

In the march from Bruinsburg to Vicksburg, covering a period of twenty days, before supplies could be obtained from government stores, only five days' rations were issued, and three days' of these were taken in haversacks at the start, and were soon exhausted. All other subsistence was obtained from the country through which we pa.s.sed. The march was commenced without wagons, except such as could be picked up through the country. The country was abundantly supplied with corn, bacon, beef and mutton. The troops enjoyed excellent health, and no army ever appeared in better spirits or felt more confident of success.