The Medallic History of the United States of America 1776-1876 Part 87

I am, Sir, your very obedient servant, S. B. BUCKNER, _General commanding C. S. A._

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_General Orders No. 2._ (p. 375)

Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, Fort Donelson, February 17th, 1862.

The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion gained by their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant.

For four successive nights, without shelter during the most inclement weather known in this lat.i.tude, they faced an enemy in large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all times to receive an attack, and with continuous skirmis.h.i.+ng by day, resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without conditions.

The victory achieved is not only great in breaking down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in one battle on this continent.

Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the maps of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people.

U. S. GRANT, _Major-General commanding_.

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_General Grant to the a.s.sistant Adjutant-General._

To Headquarters, Department of the Tennessee, COLONEL J. C. KELTON, Vicksburg, Mississippi, July 6, 1863 a.s.sistant Adjutant-General, Was.h.i.+ngton, D. C.

Colonel: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Army of the Tennessee, and co-operating forces, from the date of my a.s.suming the immediate command of the expedition against Vicksburg, Mississippi, to the reduction of that place.

From the moment of taking command in person I became satisfied that Vicksburg could only be turned from the south side, and, in accordance with this conviction, I prosecuted the work on the ca.n.a.l, which had been located by Brigadier-General Williams, across the peninsula, on the Louisiana side of the river, with all vigor, hoping to make a channel which would pa.s.s transports for moving the army and carrying supplies to the new base of operations thus provided. The task was much more herculean than it at first appeared, and was made much more so by the almost continuous rains that fell during the whole of the time this work was prosecuted. The river, too, continued to rise and make a large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the water out of our camps and the ca.n.a.l.

Finally, on the 8th of March, the rapid rise of the river (p. 376) and the consequent great pressure upon the dam across the ca.n.a.l, near the upper end, at the main Mississippi levee, caused it to give way and let through the low lands at the back of our camps a torrent of water that separated the north and south sh.o.r.es of the peninsula as effectually as if the Mississippi flowed between them. This occurred when the enterprise promised success within a short time. There was some delay in trying to repair damages. It was found, however, that with the then stage of water, some other plan would have to be adopted for getting below Vicksburg with transports.

Captain F. E. Prime, Chief Engineer, and Colonel G. G. Pride, who was acting on my staff, prospected a route through the bayous which run from near Milliken's Bend on the north and New Carthage on the south, through Roundaway Bayou into the Tensas river.

Their report of the practicability of this route determined me to commence work upon it. Having three dredge boats at the time, the work of opening this work was executed with great rapidity. One small steamer and a number of barges were taken through the channel thus opened, but the river commencing about the middle of April to fall rapidly, and the roads becoming pa.s.sable between Milliken's Bend and New Carthage, made it impracticable and unnecessary to open water communication between these points.

Soon after commencing the first ca.n.a.l spoken of, I caused a channel to be cut from the Mississippi river into Lake Providence; also one from the Mississippi river into Coldwater, by way of Yazoo Pa.s.s.

I had no great expectations of important results from the former of these, but having more troops than could be employed to advantage at Young's Point, and knowing that Lake Providence was connected by Bayou Baxter with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream through which transports might pa.s.s into the Mississippi below, through Tensas, Wachita, and Red rivers, I thought it possible that a route might be opened in that direction which would enable me to co-operate with General Banks at Port Hudson.

By the Yazoo Pa.s.s route I only expected at first to get into the Yazoo by way of Coldwater and Tallahatchie with some lighter gunboats and a few troops and destroy the enemy's transports in that stream and some gunboats which I knew he was building. The navigation, however, proved so much better than had been expected that I thought for a time of the possibility of making this the route for obtaining a foothold on high land above Haines Bluff, Mississippi, and small cla.s.s steamers were accordingly ordered for transporting an army that way. Major-General J. B. McPherson, commanding seventeenth army corps, was directed to have his corps in readiness to move by this route; and one division from each the thirteenth and fifteenth corps were collected near the entrance of the Pa.s.s to be added to his command. It soon became evident that a sufficient number of boats of the right cla.s.s could not be obtained for the movement of more than one division.

Whilst my forces were opening one end of the Pa.s.s the enemy was diligently closing the other end, and in this way succeeded in gaining time to strongly fortify Greenwood, below the junction of the Tallahatchie and Yallobusha. The advance of the expedition, consisting of one division of McClernand's corps from Helena, commanded by Brigadier-General L. F. Ross, and the 12th and 17th regiments of Missouri infantry, from Sherman's corps, as (p. 377) sharpshooters on the gunboats, succeeded in reaching Coldwater on the 2d day of March, after much difficulty, and the partial disabling of most of the boats. From the entrance into Coldwater to Fort Pemberton, at Greenwood, Mississippi, no great difficulty of navigation was experienced nor any interruption of magnitude from the enemy. Fort Pemberton extends from the Tallahatchie to the Yazoo at Greenwood. Here the two rivers come within a few hundred yards of each other. The land around the fort is low, and at the time of the attack was entirely overflowed. Owing to this fact, no movement could be made by the army to reduce it, but all depended upon the ability of the gunboats to silence the guns of the enemy and enable the transports to run down and land troops immediately on the fort itself. After an engagement of several hours the gunboats drew off, being unable to silence the batteries. Brigadier-General I. F. Quinby, commanding a division of McPherson's corps, met the expedition under Ross with his division on its return from Fort Pemberton, on the 21st of March, and being the senior, a.s.sumed command of the entire expedition, and returned to the position Ross had occupied.

On the 23d of March I sent orders for the withdrawal of all the forces operating in that direction, for the purpose of concentrating my army on Milliken's Bend.

On the 14th day of March, Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding Mississippi squadron, informed me that he had made a reconnoissance up Steele's Bayou, and partially through Black Bayou toward Deer Creek, and so far as explored these water courses were reported navigable for the smaller iron-clads.

Information given mostly, I believe, by the negroes of the country, was to the effect that Deer Creek could be navigated to Rolling Fork, and that from there through the Sunflower to the Yazoo river there was no question about the navigation. On the following morning I accompanied Admiral Porter in the ram Price, several iron-clads preceding us, up through Steele's Bayou to near Black Bayou.

At this time our forces were at a dead-lock at Greenwood, and I looked upon the success of this enterprise as of vast importance.

It would, if successful, leave Greenwood between two forces of ours, and would necessarily cause the immediate abandonment of that stronghold.

About thirty steamers of the enemy would have been destroyed or fallen into our hands. Seeing that the great obstacle to navigation, so far as I had gone, was from overhanging trees, I left Admiral Porter near Black Bayou and pushed back to Young's Point for the purpose of sending forward a Pioneer corps to remove these difficulties. Soon after my return to Young's Point Admiral Porter sent back to me for a co-operating force. Sherman was promptly sent with one division of his corps. The number of steamers suitable for the navigation of these bayous being limited, most of the force was sent up the Mississippi river to Eagle's Bend, a point where the river runs within one mile of Steele's Bayou, thus saving an important part of this difficult navigation. The expedition failed, probably more from want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pa.s.s. Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to move forces to effectually checkmate further (p. 378) progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo.

All this may have been providential in driving us ultimately to a line of operations which has proven eminently successful.

For further particulars of Steele's Bayou expedition see report of Major-General W. T. Sherman, forwarded on the 12th of April.

As soon as I decided to open water communication from a point on the Mississippi near Milliken's Bend to New Carthage I determined to occupy the latter place, it being the first point below Vicksburg that could be reached by land at the stage of water then existing, and the occupancy of which, while it secured to us a point on the Mississippi river, would also protect the main line of communication by water. Accordingly the thirteenth army corps, Major-General J. A. McClernand commanding, was directed to take up its line of march on the 29th day of March for New Carthage, the fifteenth and seventeenth corps to follow, moving no faster than supplies and ammunition could be transported to them.

The roads though level were intolerably bad, and the movement was therefore necessarily slow. Arriving at Smith's Plantation, two miles from New Carthage, it was found that the levee of Bayou Vidal was broken in several places, thus leaving New Carthage an island.

All the boats that could be were collected from the different bayous in the vicinity, and others were built, but the transportation of an army in this way was found exceedingly tedious. Another route had to be found. This was done by making a further march around Vidal to Perkins' Plantation, a distance of twelve miles more, making the whole distance to be marched from Milliken's Bend to reach water communication on the opposite side of the point thirty-five miles. Over this distance, with bad roads to contend against, supplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to be hauled by wagons with which to commence the campaign on the opposite side of the river.

At the same time that I ordered the occupation of New Carthage, preparations were made for running transports by the Vicksburg batteries with Admiral Porter's gunboat fleet.

On the night of the 16th of April Admiral Porter's fleet and the transports Silver Wave, Forest Queen, and Henry Clay ran the Vicksburg batteries. The boilers of the transports were protected as well as possible with hay and cotton. More or less commissary stores were put on each. All three of these boats were struck more or less frequently while pa.s.sing the enemy's batteries, and the Henry Clay, by the explosion of a sh.e.l.l or by other means, was set on fire and entirely consumed. The other two boats were somewhat injured, but not seriously disabled. No one on board of either was hurt.

As these boats succeeded in getting by so well, I ordered six more to be prepared in like manner for running the batteries.

These latter, viz.: Tigress, Anglo-Saxon, Cheeseman, Empire City, Horizonia, and Moderator, left Milliken's Bend on the night of the 22d April, and five of them got by, but in a somewhat damaged condition. The Tigress received a shot in her hull below the water line, and sunk on the Louisiana sh.o.r.e soon after pa.s.sing the last of the batteries. The crews of these steamers, with (p. 379) the exception of that of the Forest Queen, Captain D. Conway, and the Silver Wave, Captain McMillan, were composed of volunteers from the army. Upon the call for volunteers for this dangerous enterprise, officers and men presented themselves by hundreds, anxious to undertake the trip. The names of those whose services were accepted will be given in a separate report.

It is a striking feature, so far as my observation goes, of the present volunteer army of the United States, that there is nothing which men are called upon to do, mechanical or professional, that accomplished adepts cannot be found for the duty required in almost every regiment.

The transports injured in running the blockade were repaired by order of Admiral Porter, who was supplied with the material for such repairs as they required, and who was and is ever ready to afford all the a.s.sistance in his power for the furtherance of the success of our arms. In a very short time five of the transports were in running order, and the remainder were in a condition to be used as barges in the moving of troops. Twelve barges loaded with forage and rations were sent in tow of the last six boats that run the blockade; one half of them got through in a condition to be used.

Owing to the limited number of transports below Vicksburg it was found necessary to extend our line of travel to Hard Times, Louisiana, which, by the circuitous route it was necessary to take, increased the distance to about seventy miles from Milliken's Bend, our starting point.

The thirteenth army corps being all through to the Mississippi and the seventeenth army corps well on the way, so much of the thirteenth as could be got on board the transports and barges were put aboard and moved to the front of Grand Gulf on the 29th of April. The plan here was that the navy should silence the guns of the enemy, and the troops land under cover of the gunboats and carry the place by storm.

At 8 o'clock A.M. the navy made the attack, and kept it up for more than five hours in the most gallant manner. From a tug out in the stream I witnessed the whole engagement. Many times it seemed to me the gunboats were within pistol-shot of the enemy's batteries. It soon became evident that the guns of the enemy were too elevated and their fortifications too strong to be taken from the water side. The whole range of hills on that side were known to be lined with rifle-pits, besides the field artillery could be moved to any position where it could be made useful in case of an attempt at landing. This determined me to again run the enemy's batteries, turn his position by affecting a landing at Rodney, or at Bruinsburg, between Grand Gulf and Rodney. Accordingly orders were immediately given for the troops to debark at Hard Times, Louisiana, and march across to the point immediately below Grand Gulf. At dark the gunboats again engaged the batteries, and all the transports run by, receiving but two or three shots in the pa.s.sage, and these without injury. I had some time previously ordered a reconnoissance to a point opposite Bruinsburg, to ascertain if possible from persons in the neighborhood the character of the road leading to the highlands back of Bruinsburg. During the night I learned from a negro man that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, which determined me to land there.

The work of ferrying the troops to Bruinsburg was commenced (p. 380) at daylight in the morning, the gunboats as well as transports being used for the purpose.

As soon as the thirteenth army corps was landed, and could draw three days' rations to put in haversacks (no wagons were allowed to cross until the troops were all over) they were started on the road to Port Gibson. I deemed it a matter of vast importance that the highlands should be reached without resistance.

The seventeenth corps followed as rapidly as it could be put across the river.

About 2 o'clock on the 1st of May, the advance of the enemy was met eight miles from Bruinsburg, on the road to Port Gibson. He was forced to fall back, but as it was dark, he was not pursued far until daylight. Early on the morning of the 1st I went out, accompanied by members of my staff, and found McClernand with his corps engaging the enemy about four miles from Port Gibson. At this point the roads branched in exactly opposite directions, both, however, leading to Port Gibson. The enemy had taken position on both branches, thus dividing as he fell back the pursuing forces. The nature of the ground in that part of the country is such that a very small force could r.e.t.a.r.d the progress of a much larger one for many hours. The roads usually run on narrow, elevated ridges, with deep and impenetrable ravines on either side. On the right were the divisions of Hovey, Carr, and Smith, and on the left the division of Osterhaus, of McClernand's corps. The three former succeeded in driving the enemy from position to position back toward Port Gibson steadily all day.

Osterhaus did not, however, move the enemy from the position occupied by him on our left until Logan's division of McPherson's corps arrived.

McClernand, who was with the right in person, sent repeated messages to me before the arrival of Logan to send Logan's and Quinby's divisions of McPherson's corps to him.

I had been on that as well as all other parts of the field, and could see how they could be used there to advantage. However, as soon as the advance of McPherson's corps (Logan's division) arrived, I sent one brigade to McClernand on the right, and sent one brigade, Brigadier-General J. E. Smith commanding, to the left to the a.s.sistance of Osterhaus.

By the judicious disposition made of this brigade, under the immediate supervision of McPherson and Logan, a position was soon obtained giving us an advantage which soon drove the enemy from that part of the field, to make no further stand south of Bayou Pierre.

The enemy was here repulsed with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. The repulse of the enemy on our left took place late in the afternoon. He was pursued toward Port Gibson, but night closing in, and the enemy making the appearance of another stand, the troops slept upon their arms until daylight.

In the morning it was found that the enemy had retreated across Bayou Pierre, on the Grand Gulf road, and a brigade of Logan's division was sent to divert his attention whilst a floating bridge was being built across Bayou Pierre immediately at Port Gibson. This bridge was completed, eight miles marched by McPherson's corps to the north fork of Bayou Pierre, that stream bridged, and the advance of this corps commenced pa.s.sing over it at 5 o'clock the following morning.

On the 3d the enemy was pursued to Hawkinson's Ferry, with (p. 381) slight skirmis.h.i.+ng all day, during which we took quite a number of prisoners, mostly stragglers from the enemy.