A Hind Let Loose Part 8

The hired servant gets reward for his service, by compact; the subjects none, but rather gives the royal reward of tribute to the king for his service; the tyrant exacts it to maintain his tyranny. 2. The hired servant is maintained by his master; the subjects maintain the king; the tyrant robs it from them by force. 3. The hired servant bargains only for a time, and then may leave him; the subject cannot give up his covenanted allegiance, at that rate and for these reasons as the servant may his service; a tyrant will make nor keep no such bargain. 4. The hired servant must have his master's profit mainly before his eyes, and his own secondarily; but the magistrates power is primarily ordinated to the public good of the community and only consequentially to the good of himself. 5. The master hath a greater power over the hired servant, to make and give out laws to him, which if they be lawful he must obey; than the king hath over the nation, to which he is the sole lawgiver, as is shewed. 6. The hired servant's subjection is mercenary and servile; but the subject's subjection is civil, free, voluntary, liberal, and loving to a lawful king. Again for slaves, the difference between them and subjects is great. 1. Slavery, being against nature, rational people would never choose that life, if they could help it; but they gladly choose government and governors. 2. Slavery would make their condition worse than when they had no government, for liberty is always preferable; neither could people have acted rationally in setting up government, if to be free of oppression of others they had given themselves up to slavery, under a master who may do what he pleases with them. 3. All slaves are either taken in war, or bought with money, or born in the house where their parents were slaves, as Abraham and Solomon had of that sort; but subjects are neither captives, nor bought, nor born slaves.--4. Slavery is not natural, but a penal fruit of sin, and would never have been if sin had not been; but government is not so, but natural and necessary. 5. Slaves are not their master's brethren, subjects are the king's brethren, "over whom he must not lift up himself," Deut. xvii. 20. 6. Masters might purchase and sell their slaves, Abimelech took sheep and men servants and gave them unto Abraham, Gen. xx. 14. Jacob had maid-servants, and men-servants, and a.s.ses, Gen. x.x.x. 43. no otherwise than other goods, Solomon got to himself servants and maidens, and servants born in his house, Eccles.

ii. 7. a king cannot do so with his subjects. 7. Princes have not this power to make the people slaves, neither from G.o.d, nor from the people: from G.o.d they have none, but to feed and to lead them, 2 Sam. v. 2. to rule them so as to feed them, 1 Chron. xi. 2. Psal. lxxviii, 71, 72.

From the people they have no power to make slaves, they can give none such. 8. Slavery is a curse: it was Canaan's curse to be a servant of servants, Gen. ix. 25. but to have magistrates is a promised blessing, Jer. xvii. 25. 9. To be free of slavery is a blessing, as the redemption from Egypt's bondage is every where called, and the year of redemption was a jubilee of joy, so the freedom of release every seven years a great privilege, Jer. x.x.xiv. 9. but to be free of government is a judgment, Isa. iii. 4, 5. 'tis threatened, "Israel shall abide without a king and without a prince;" Hos. iii. 4. In the next place, they cannot be owned as masters or proprietors over the goods of the subjects; though in the case of necessity, the king may make use of all goods in common, for the good of the kingdom; for, 1. The introduction of kings cannot overturn nature's foundation; by the law of nature property was given to man, kings cannot rescind that. 2. A man had goods ere ever there was a king; a king was made only to preserve property, therefore he cannot take it away. 3. It cannot be supposed that rational people would choose a king at all, if he had power to turn a great robber to preserve them from lesser robberies and oppressions; would rational men give up themselves for a prey to one, that they might be safe from becoming a prey to others? 4. Then their case should be worse, by erecting of government, if the prince were proprietor of their goods, for they had the property themselves before. 5. Then government should not be a blessing, but a curse, and the magistrate could not be a minister for good. 6. Kingdoms then should be among the goods of fortune, which the king might sell and dispone as he pleased. 7. His place then should not be a function, but a possession. 8. People could not then, by their removes, or otherwise, change their sovereigns. 9.

Then no man might dispose of his own goods without the king's consent, by buying or selling, or giving alms; nay, nor pay tribute, for they cannot do these things except they have of their own. 10. This is the very character of a tyrant, as described, 1 Sam. viii. 11. "He will take your sons," Zeph. iii. 3. "Her princes are roaring lions, her judges are evening wolves." 11. All the threatnings and rebukes of oppression condemn this, Isa. iii. 14, 15, Ezek. xlv. 9. Mic. iii. 2, 3. Ahab condemned for taking Naboth's vineyard. 12. Pharaoh had not all the land of Egypt, till he bought it, Gen. xlii. 20. So the land became Pharaoh's not otherwise. Yet giving, and not granting that he were really a master in all these respects; notwithstanding if he turn to pursue me for my life, because of my fidelity to my master and his both, and will withdraw me from the service of the supreme universal master, I may lawfully withdraw myself from his, and disown him for one, when I cannot serve two masters. Sure he cannot be master of the conscience. Thirdly, they cannot come under the conjugal relation, though there may be some proportion between that and subjection to a lawful ruler, because of the mutual covenant transacted betwixt them; but the tyrant and usurper cannot pretend to this, who refuse all covenants.

Yet hence it cannot be inferred, that because the wife may not put away her husband, or renounce him, as he may do her in the case of adultery; therefore the people cannot disown the king in the case of the violation of the royal covenant. For the king's power is not at all properly a husband's power, 1. The wife, by nature, is the weaker vessel, but the kingdom is not weaker than the king. 2. The wife is given as an help to the man; but here the man is given as an help to the common-wealth. 3. The wife cannot limit the husband's power; as subjects may limit their sovereigns. 4. The wife cannot prescribe the time of her continuing under him; as subjects may do with their sovereigns. 5. The wife cannot change her husband; as a kingdom can do their government. 6.

The husband hath not power of life and death; but the sovereign hath it over malefactors. Yet giving, and not granting, his power were properly marital: if the case be put, that the man do habitually break the marriage-covenant, or take another wife, and turn also cruel and intolerable in compelling his own wife to wickedness; and put the case also, that she should not get a legal divorce procured, who can doubt but she can disown him, and leave him? For this case is excepted out of that command, 1 Cor. vii. 10. Let not the wife depart from her husband, meaning for mere difference in religion, or other lesser causes; but adultery doth annul the marriage relation. See Pool's Synopsis critic, in loc.u.m. So when a prince breaks the royal covenant and turns tyrant, or without any covenant commits a rape upon the common-wealth, that pretended relation may and must be disowned. Hence, we see, there is no relation can bring a king or ruler under the object of the duty of the fifth command, except it be that of a fiduciary patron, or trustee, and public servant: for we cannot own him properly either to be a father, or a master, or a husband. Therefore what can remain, but that he must be a fiduciary servant? Wherefore if he shall either treacherously break his trust, or presumptuously refuse to be entrusted, upon terms and conditions to secure and be accountable for, (before G.o.d and man) religion and liberty, we cannot own his usurped authority. That metaphor which the learned Buchanan uses, de jure regni, of a public and politic physician, is not a relation different from this of a fiduciary servant; when he elegantly represents him as entrusted with the preservation and restoration of the health of the politic body, and endowed with skill and experience of the laws of his craft. If then he be orderly called unto this charge, and qualified for it, and discharges his duty faithfully, he deserves, and we are obliged to give him the deference of an honoured physician; but if he abuse his calling, and not observe the rules thereof, and instead of curing, go about wilfully to kill the body he is entrusted with, he is no more to be owned for a physician: but for a murderer.

9. If we enquire further into the nature of this relation between a king, (whose authority is to be owned) and his subjects; we can own it only as it is reciprocal in respect of superiority and inferiority; that is, whereby in some respects the king is superior to the people, and in some respects the people is inferior to him. The king is superior and supreme as he is called, 1 Pet. ii. 13. In respect of formal sovereignty, and executive authority, and majestic royal dignity, resulting from the peoples devolving upon him that power, and const.i.tuting him in that relation over themselves, whereby he is higher in place and power than they, and in respect of his charge and conduct is worth ten thousands of the people, 2 Sam. xviii. 3. and there is no formally regal tribunal higher than his; and though he be lesser than the whole community, yet he is greater than any one, or all the people distributively taken; and though he be a royal va.s.sal of the kingdom, and princely servant of the people; yet he is not their deputy, because he is really their sovereign, to whom they have made over their power of governing and protecting themselves irrevocably, except in the case of tyranny; and in acts of justice, he is not accountable to any, and does not depend on the people as a deputy.

But, on the other hand, the people is superior to the king, in respect of their fountain power of sovereignty, that remains radically and virtually in them, in that they make him their royal servant, and him rather than another, and limit him to the laws for their own good and advantage, and though they give to him a politic power for their own safety; yet they keep a natural power which they cannot retract, the power of justice to govern righteously, yet it is not so irrevocably given away to him, but that when he abuseth his power to the destruction of his subjects, they may wrest a sword out of a mad man's hand, though it be his own sword, and he hath a just power to use it for good, but all fiduciary power abused may be repealed. They have not indeed sovereignty, or power of life and death formally; yet, in respect, they may const.i.tute a magistrate with laws, which if they violate they must be in hazard of their lives, they have this power eminently and virtually. Hence, in respect, that the king's power is, and can be only fiducial, by way of trust reposed upon him, he is not so superior to the people, but he may and ought to be accountable to them in case of tyranny; which is evident from what is said, and now I intend to make it further appear. But, first, I form the argument thus; we can own no king that is not accountable to the people: ergo, we cannot own this king. To clear the connexion of the antecedent and consequent, I add; either he is accountable to the people, or he is not: if he be accountable to all, then he is renouncible by a part, when the community is defective as to their part, it is the interest of a part, that would, but cannot, do their duty, to give no account to such as they can get no account from for his maleversations. This is all we crave: if he be not accountable, then we cannot own him, because all kings are accountable: for these reasons, 1. The inferior is accountable to the superior; the king is inferior, the people superior: ergo, the king is accountable to the people. The proposition is plain; if the king's superiority make the people accountable to him in case of transgressing the laws; then, why should not the peoples superiority make the king accountable to them, in case of transgressing the laws? Especially, seeing the king is inferior to the laws: because the law restrains him, and from the law he hath that whereby he is king; the law is inferior to the people, because they are as it were its parent, and may make or unmake it upon occasion: and seeing the law is more powerful than the king, and the people more powerful than the law, we may see before which we may call the king to answer in judgment, Buchan. jure regni apud Scot. That the king is inferior to the people is clear on many accounts: for these things which are inst.i.tute for others sake, are inferior to those for whose sake they are required or sought; a horse is inferior to them that use him for victory; a king is only a mean for the peoples good; a captain is less than the army, a king is put a captain over the Lord's inheritance, 1 Sam. x. 1. He is but the minister of G.o.d for their good, Rom. xiii. 4.

Those who are before the king, and may be a people without him: let the king be considered either materially as a mortal man, he is then but a part inferior to the whole; or formally under the reduplication as a king, he is no more but a royal servant, obliged to spend his life for the people, to save them out of the hand of their enemies, 2 Sam. xix.

9: A part is inferior to the whole, the king is but a part of the kingdom: a gift is inferior to them to whom it is given, a king is but a gift given of G.o.d for the peoples good: that which is mortal, and but accidental, is inferior to that which is eternal, and cannot perish politically; a king is but mortal, and it is accidental to government that there be a succession of kings; but the people is eternal, one generation pa.s.seth away, and another generation cometh, Eccl. i. 4.

especially the people of G.o.d, the portion of the Lord's inheritance, is superior to any king, and their ruin of greater moment than all the kings of the world; for, if the Lord for their sake smite great kings, and slay famous kings, as Sihon and Og, Psal. cx.x.xvi. 17,--20. if he give kings and famous kingdoms for their ransom, Isa. xliii. 3, 4. then his people must be so much superior than kings, by how much his justice is active to destroy the one, and his mercy to save the other. All this proves the people to be superior in dignity; and therefore, even in that respect, it is frivolous to say, the king cannot be accountable to them, because so much superior in glory and pomp; for they are superior every way in excellency; and though it were not so, yet judges may be inferior in rank considered as men, but they are superior in law over the greatest as they are judges, to whom far greater than they are accountable.

The low and mean condition of them to whom belongs the power of judgment, does not diminish its dignity; when the king then is judged by the people, the judgment is of as great dignity as if it were done by a superior king; for the judgment is the sentence of the law. 2. They are superior in power: because every const.i.tuent cause is superior to the effect, the people is the const.i.tuent cause, the king is the effect, and hath all its royalty from them, by the conveyance G.o.d hath appointed; so that they need not fetch it from heaven, G.o.d gives it by the people, by whom also his power is limited, and, if need be, diminished from what they gave his ancestors: hence, if the people const.i.tute and limit the power they give the king, then they may call him to an account, and judge him for the abuse of it; but the first is true, as is proven above: ergo.----The major is undeniable, for sure they may judge their own creature, and call him to an account for the power they gave him, when he abuses it, though there be no tribunal formally regal above him, yet, in the case of tyranny, and violating his trust, there is a tribunal virtual eminently above him, in them that made him, and reposed that trust upon him, as is said. 3. The fountain power is superior to the power derived: the people, though they const.i.tute a king above them, yet retain the fountain power, he only hath the derived power: certainly the people must retain more power eminently, than they could give to the king, for they gave it, and he receives it with limitations; if he turn mad or incapable, they may put curators or tutors over him; if he be taken captive, they may appoint another to exercise the power; if he die, then they may const.i.tute another, with more or less power; so then if they give away all their power, as a slave selleth his liberty, and retain no fountain power or radical right, they could not make use of it to produce any of these acts: they set a king above them only with an executive power for their good, but the radical power remains in the people, as in an immortal spring, which they communicate by succession to this or that mortal man, in the manner and measure they think expedient; for otherwise, if they gave all their power away, what shall they reserve to make a new king, if this man die? What if the royal line surcease, there be no prophets now sent to make kings; and if they have power in these cases, why not in the case of tyranny? 4. If the king be accountable by law, for any act of tyranny done against one man, then much more is he accountable for many against the whole state: but the former is true; a private man may go to law before the ordinary judges, for wronging his inheritance, and the king is made accountable for the wrong done by him. Now, shall the laws be like spiders webs, which hold flies, but let bigger beasts pa.s.s through? Shall sentence be past for petty wrongs against a man, and none for tyrannizing over religion, laws, and liberties of the kingdom? Shall none be past against parricide or fratricide, for killing his brother, murdering the n.o.bles, and burning cities? Shall petty thieves be hanged for stealing a sheep; and does the laws of G.o.d or man give impunity for robbing a whole country of the nearest and dearest interests they have, to crowned heads, for the fancied character of royalty, which thereby is forfeited?

5. If there be judges appointed of G.o.d independently, to give out and execute the judgment of the Lord on all offenders, without exception of the highest; then the king also must be subject to that judgment; but there are judges appointed of G.o.d independently, to give out and execute the judgment of the Lord on all offenders, without exception of the highest. Two things must be here proved; first, that in giving judgment they do not depend on the king, but are the immediate vicars of G.o.d.

Secondly, that the king is not excepted from, but subject to their judgment, in case he be criminal.

First, They cannot depend upon the king, because they are more necessary than the king; and it is not left to the king's pleasure whether there be judges or not. There may be judges without a king, but there can be no king without judges, nor no justice, but confusion; no man can bear the people's burden alone, Numb. xi. 14, 17. If they depended on the king, their power would die with the king; the streams must dry up the fountain; but that cannot be, for they are not the ministers of the king, but of the kingdom, whose honour and promotion, though by the king's external call, yet comes from G.o.d, as all honour and promotion does, Psal. lxxv. 7. The king cannot make judges whom he will, by his absolute power, he must be tied to that law, Deut. i. 13. To take wise men and understanding, and known: neither can he make them during pleasure; for if these qualifications remain, there is no allowance given for their removal. They are G.o.ds, and the children of the most high, appointed to defend the poor and fatherless, as well as he, Psal.

lx.x.xii. 3, 6. They are ordained of G.o.d for the punishment of evil doers, in which they must not be resisted, as well as he, Rom. xiii. 1, 2. By me (saith the Lord) rule--all the judges of the earth, Prov. viii. 16.

To them we must be subject for conscience sake, as being the ministers of G.o.d for good; they must be obeyed for the Lord's sake, as well as the king; though they are sent of him, yet they judge not for man, but for the Lord, 2 Chron. xix. 6. hence they sit in his room, and are to act as if he were on the bench; the king cannot say, the judgment is mine, because it is the Lord's; neither can he limit their sentence (as he might, if they were nothing but his deputies) because the judgment is not his: nor are their consciences subordinate to him, but to the Lord immediately; otherwise if they were his deputies, depending on him, then they could neither be admonished, nor condemned for unjust judgment, because their sentence should neither be righteous nor unrighteous, but as the king makes it; and all directions to them were capable of this exception, do not so or so, except the king command you; crush not the poor, oppress not the fatherless, except the king command you; yea, then they could not execute any judgment, but with the king's licence, and so could not be rebuked for their not executing judgment.

Now all this is contrary to scripture, which makes the sentence of the judges undeclinable, when just, Deut. xvii. 11. The Lord's indignation is kindled, when he "looks for judgment, and behold oppression, for righteousness, and behold a cry," Isa. v. 7. Neither will it excuse the judges to say, the king would have it so; for even they that are subservient to "write grievousness, to turn aside the needy from judgment," &c. are under the wo, as well as they that prescribe it, Isa.

x. 1, 2. The Lord is displeased when "judgment is turned away backward, and judgment stands afar off,"----and when there is no judgment, whatever be the cause of it, Isa. lix. 14, 15. The Lord threatens he will be "avenged on the nation," when a man is "not found to execute judgment," Jer. v. 1, 9. And promises, if they "will execute judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor," he will give them righteous magistrates, Jer. xxii. 3, 4.

but if they do not, he will send desolation, ibid. He rebukes those that "turn judgment to wormwood, and leave off righteousness in the earth,"

Amos v. 7. He resents it, when "the law is slacked, and judgment doth not go forth" freely, without overawing or over-ruling restraint, Hab.

i. 4.

Can these scriptures consist with the judges dependence on the king's pleasure, in the exercise and execution of their power? therefore, if they would avoid the Lord's displeasure, they are to give judgment, though the king should countermand it. Secondly, That the king is not excepted from their judgment, is also evident from the general commands, Gen. ix. 6. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed:" there is no exception of kings or dukes here: and we must not distinguish where the law distinguisheth not, Numb. x.x.xv. 30, 31. Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to death by the mouth of witnesses,--ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer which is guilty of death, but he shall be surely put to death. What should hinder then justice to be awarded upon a murdering king? Shall it be for want of witnesses? It will be easy to adduce thousands. Or, shall this be satisfaction for his life, that he is a crowned king? The law saith, there shall be no satisfaction taken. The Lord speaketh to under judges, Levit. xix. 5. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty. If kings be not among the mighty, how shall they be cla.s.sed?

Deut. i. 17. Ye shall not respect persons in judgment, but you shall hear the small as well as the great; you shall not be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment is G.o.d's. If then no man's face can outdare the law and judgment of G.o.d, then the king's majestic face must not do it; but as to the demerit of blood, he must be subject as well as another.

It is no argument to say, the Sanhedrim did not punish David for his murder and adultery; therefore it is not lawful to punish a king for the same; a reason from not doing is not relevant. David did not punish Joab for his murder, but authorized it, as also he did Bathsheba's adultery; will that prove, that murders connived at, or commanded by the king, shall not be punished? Or that wh.o.r.es of state are not to be called to an account? Neither will it prove, that a murdering king should not be punished; that David was not punished, because he got both the sin pardoned, and his life granted from the Lord, saying to him by the mouth of the prophet Nathan, Thou shalt not die. But as for the demerit of that fact, he himself p.r.o.nounced the sentence out of his own mouth, 2 Sam. xii. 15. "As the Lord liveth, the man that hath done this thing shall surely die." 'So every king condemned by the law, is condemned by his own mouth: for the law is the voice of the king. Why then do we so much weary ourselves concerning a judge, seeing we have the king's own confession, that is, the law?' Buchanan de jure regni.

And there needs be no other difficulty to find a tribunal for a murdering king, than to find one for a murderer; for a judgment must acknowledge but one name, viz. of the crime. If a king then be guilty of murder, he hath no more the name of a king, but of a murderer, when brought to judgment; for he is not judged for kings.h.i.+p, but for his murder; as when a gentleman is judged for robbery, he is not hanged, neither is he spared, because he is a gentleman, but because he is a robber. See Buchanan above. 6. If the people's representatives be superior to the king in judgment, and may execute judgment without him, and against his will, then they may also seek account of him; for if he hath no power but from them, and no power without them to act as king, (no more than the eye or hand hath power to act without the body) then his power must be inferior, fiduciary, and accountable to them; but the former is true, the peoples representatives are superior to the king in judgment, and may execute judgment without him, and against his will. In scripture we find the power of the elders and heads of the people was very great, and in many cases superior to the king; which the learned Dr. Owen demonstrates in his preliminary exercitations on the epistle to the Hebrews, and proves out of the Rabbins, that the kings of the Jews might have been called to an account, and punished for transgressing of the law. But in the scripture we find, (1.) They had a power of judgment with the supreme magistrate in matters of religion, justice and government. Hamor and Shechem would not make a covenant with Jacob's sons, without the consent of the men of the city, Gen. x.x.xiv. 20. David behoved to consult with the captains of thousands, and every leader, if it seemeth good to bring again the ark of G.o.d, 1 Chron. xiii. 1, 2, 3.

So also Solomon could not do it without them, 1 Kings viii. 1. Ahab could not make peace with Benhadad against the consent of the people, 1 Kings xx. 8. The men of Ephraim complain that Jephthah, the supreme magistrate, had gone to war against the children of Ammon without them, and threatned to burn his house with fire, which he only excuses by the law of necessity, Judges xii. 1, 2, 3. The seventy elders are appointed of G.o.d, not to be the advisers only and helpers of Moses, but to bear a part of the burden of ruling and governing the people, that Moses might be eased, Numb. xi. 14, 17. Moses upon his sole pleasure, had not power to restrain them in the exercise of judgment given of G.o.d.

They were not the magistrate's depending deputies, but in the act of judging, they were independent, and their consciences as immediately subjected to G.o.d as the superior magistrate, who was to add his approbative suffrage to their actings, but not his directive nor imperative suffrage of absolute pleasure, but only according to the law; he might command them to do their duty, but he could do nothing without them. (2.) They had power, not derived from the prince at all, even a power of life and death. The rebellious son was to be brought to the elders of the city, who had power to stone him, Deut. xxi. 18, 24. They had power to punish adultery with death, Deut. xxii. 21. They had power to cognosce whom to admit into, and whom to seclude from the cities of refuge: so that if the king had commanded to take the life of an innocent man, they were not to deliver him, Josh. xx. throughout. But besides the elders of cities, there were the elders and heads of the people, who had judicial power to cognosce on all criminal matters, even when Joshua was judge in Israel we find they a.s.sumed this power, to judge of that matter of the two tribes and the half, Josh. xxii. 30. And they had power to make kings, as Saul and David, as was shewed: and it must needs follow, they had power to unmake them in case of tyranny.

(3.) They had power to conveen, even without the indiction of the ruler, as in that, Josh. xxii. They conveen without him; and without advice or knowledge of Samuel, the ruler, they conveen to ask a king, 1 Sam. viii.

And without any head or superior, they conveen and make David king, notwithstanding of Ishbosheth's hereditary right. Without and against tyrannous Athaliah's consent, they conveen and make Joash king, and cared not for her Treason, treason, 2 Kings xi. But now the king alone challenges the prerogative power of calling and dissolving parliaments as he pleases, and condemns all meetings of estates without his warrant, which is purely tyrannical; for, in cases of necessity, by the very law of nature, they may and must conveen. The power is given to the king only by a positive law, for order's sake; but otherwise, they have an intrinsical power to a.s.semble themselves. All the forecited commands, admonitions, and certifications, to execute judgment, must necessarily involve and imply a power to conveen, without which they could not be in a capacity for it: not only unjust judgment, but no judgment, in a time when truth is fallen in the streets, and equity cannot enter, is charged as the sin of the state; therefore they must conveen to prevent this sin, and the wrath of G.o.d for it: G.o.d hath committed the keeping of the commonwealth, not to the king's only, but also to the people's representatives and heads. And if the king have power to break up all conventions of this nature, then he hath power to hinder judgement to proceed, which the Lord commands: and this would be an excuse, when G.o.d threatens vengeance for it. We would not execute judgment, because the king forbade us. Yet many of these forementioned reproofs, threatnings, and certifications were given, in the time of tyrannous and idolatrous kings, who, no doubt, would inhibit and discharge the doing of their duty; yet we see that was no excuse, but the Lord denounces wrath for the omission. (4.) They had power to execute judgment against the will of the prince. Samuel killed Agag against Saul's will, but according to the command of G.o.d, 1 Sam. xv. 32. Against Ahab's will and mind Elijah caused kill the priests of Baal, according to G.o.d's express law, 1 Kings xviii. 40. It is true it was extraordinary, but no otherwise than it is this day; when there is no magistrate that will execute the judgment of the Lord, then they who have power to make the magistrate, may and ought to execute it, when wicked men make the law of G.o.d of none effect. So the princes of Judah had power, against the king's will, to put Jeremiah to death, which the king supposes, when he directs him what to say to them, Jer. x.x.xviii. 25. They had really such a power, though in Jeremiah's case it would have been wickedly perverted. See Lex Rex, q.

19, 20. (5.) They had a power to execute judgment upon the king himself, as in the case of Amaziah and Uzziah, as shall be cleared afterwards. I conclude with repeating the argument: if the king be accountable, whensover this account shall be taken, we are confident our disowning him for the present will be justified, and all will be obliged to imitate it: if he be not, then we cannot own his authority, that so presumptuously exalts himself above the people.

10. If we will further consider the nature of magistracy, it will appear what authority can conscientiously be owned, to wit, that which is power, not authorised power, not might or force; moral power, not merely natural. There is a great difference betwixt these two: natural power is common to brutes, moral power is peculiar to men; natural power is more in the subjects, because they have more strength and force; moral power is in the magistrate, they can never meet adequately in the same subject; natural power can, moral only may warrantably exercise rule; natural power is opposed to impotency and weakness, moral to illicitness or unlawfulness; natural power consists in strength, moral in righteousness; natural power may be in a rout of rogues making an uproar, moral only in the rulers; they cannot be distinguished by their acts, but by the principle from which the acts proceed; in the one from mere force, in the other from authority. The principle of natural power is its own might and will, and the end only self; moral hath its rise from positive const.i.tution, and its end is public safety. The strength of natural power lies in the sword, whereby its might gives law; the strength of moral power is in its word, whereby reason gives law, unto which the sword is added for punishment of contraveeners: natural power takes the sword, Matth. xxvi. 52. Moral bears the sword, Rom. xiii. 4.

In natural power the sword is the cause; in moral it is only the consequent of authority; in natural power the sword legitimates the sceptre; in moral the sceptre legitimates the sword: the sword of the natural is only backed with metal, the sword of the moral power is backed with G.o.d's warrant: natural power involves men in pa.s.sive subjection, as a traveller is made to yield to a robber; moral power reduces to conscientious subordination. Hence the power that is only natural, not moral authority, not power, cannot be owned; but the power of a tyrant's and usurper's is only natural, not moral, authority, not power: Ergo it cannot be owned. The major cannot be denied; for it is only the moral power that is ordained of G.o.d, unto which we must be subject for conscience sake. The minor also; for the power of tyrants is not moral, because not authorized, nor warranted, or ordained of G.o.d by his preceptive ordinance, and therefore no lawful magistratical power.

For the clearer understanding of this, let it be observed, there are four things required to the making of a moral or lawful power; the matter of it must be lawful, the person lawful, the t.i.tle lawful, and the use lawful. 1. The matter of it, about which it is exerted, or the work to be done by it, must be lawful and warranted by G.o.d: and if it be unlawful it destroys its moral being. As the pope's power, in dispensing with divine laws, is null and no moral power; and so also the king's power, in dispensing with both divine and human laws is null. Hence that power, which is, in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by G.o.d, cannot be owned; but absolute power, which is the power of tyrants and usurpers, (and particularly of this of ours) is in regard of matter unlawful, and never warranted by G.o.d: Ergo--2. The person holding the power must be such as not only is capable of, but competent to the tenure of it, and to whom the holding of it is allowed; and if it be prohibited, it evacuates the morality of the power. Korah and his company arrogated to themselves the office of the priesthood, this power was prohibited to them, their power then was a nullity. As therefore a person that should not be a minister, when he usurps that office is no minister; so a person that should not be a magistrate, when he usurps that office, is no magistrate. Hence, a person that is incapable and incompetent for government cannot be owned for a governor; but the duke of York is such a person, not only not qualified as the word of G.o.d requires a magistrate to be, but by the laws of the land declared incapable of rule, because he is a papist, a murderer, an adulterer, &c.

5. There must be a moral power, a lawful t.i.tle and invest.i.ture, as is shewed above; which, if it be wanting, the power is null, and the person but a scenical king, like John of Leyden. This is essentially necessary to the being of a magistrate; which only properly distinguishes him from a private man; for when a person becomes a magistrate, what is the change that is wrought in him? what new habit or endowment is produced in him? he hath no more natural power than he had before, only now he hath the moral power, right and authority to rule, legally impowering him to govern. Let it be considered, what makes a subordinate magistrate, whom we own as such; it must be only his commission from a superior power, otherwise we reject him; if one come to us of his own head, taking upon him the stile and office of a bailiff, sheriff or judge, and command our persons, demand our purses, or exact our oaths; we think we may deny him, not taking ourselves to owe him any subjection, not owning any bond of conscience to him; why? because he hath no lawful commission. Now, if we require this qualification in the subordinate, why not in the supreme? Hence, that magistrate, that cannot produce his legal invest.i.ture, cannot be owned; but the duke of York cannot produce his legal invest.i.ture, his admission to the crown upon oath and compact, and with the consent of the subjects, according to the laws of the land, as is shewed above: therefore----4. There must also be the lawful use of the power; which must be not only legal for its composure, but right for its practice; its course and process in government must be just, governing according to law, otherwise it is mere tyranny: for what is government, but the subjecting of the community to the rule of governors, for peace and order's sake, and the security of all their precious interests? and for what end was it ordained, and continued among men, but that the stronger may not domineer over the weaker? and what is anarchy, but the playing the rex of the natural power over the moral? Hence, that power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical, can tie none to subjection; but the power of the king, abused to the destruction of laws, religion and liberties, giving his power and strength unto the beast, and making war with the Lamb, Rev. xvii. 13, 14. is a power contrary to law, evil and tyrannical: therefore it can tie none to subjection: wickedness by no imaginable reason can oblige any man. It is objected by some, from Rom.

xiii. 1. There is no power but of G.o.d; the usurping power is a power: therefore it is of G.o.d, and consequently we owe subjection to it. Ans.

1. The original reading is not universal, but this: for there is no power if not from G.o.d: which confirms what I plead for, that we are not to own any authority, if it be not authorized by G.o.d.

The words are only relative to higher powers, in a restricted sense and at most are but indefinite, to be determined according to the matter; not all power simply, but all lawful power. 2. It is a fallacy from what is said according to a certain thing, there is no power but of G.o.d, that is no moral power, as universal negatives use to be understood, Heb. v.

4. No man taketh his honour unto himself, but he that is called of G.o.d; which is clear, must not be understood for the negation of the fact, as if no man at all doth or ever did take unto himself that honour, for Korah did it, &c. but, no man taketh it warrantably, with a moral right and G.o.d's allowance without G.o.d's call: so also the universal imperative, in that same text, must not be taken absolutely without restriction; for if every soul without exception were to be subject, there could be none left to be the higher powers; but it is understood with restriction to the relation of a subject. So here, no power but of G.o.d, to be understood with restriction to the relation of a lawful magistrate. It is also to be understood indiscriminately, in reference to the divers species, sorts and degrees of lawful power, supreme and subordinate, whether to the king as supreme, or to governors, &c. as Peter expresses it: or whether they be Christian or pagan; it cannot be meant of all universally, that may pretend to power, and may attain to prevailing potency; for then by this text, we must subject ourselves to the papacy now intended to be introduced; and indeed if we subject ourselves to this papist, the next thing he will require will be that.

3. To the minor proposition, I answer, the usurping power is a power; it is power, I grant, that it is power, or authority, I deny.

Therefore it is of G.o.d by his providence, I concede; by his ordinance, I deny. Consequently we owe subjection to it, I deny. We may be subject pa.s.sively, I grant. Actively, out of conscience, I deny. But some will object, 2. Though the power be usurped, and so not morally lawful in all these respects; yet it may do good, its laws and administrations may be good. Answ. I grant all is good that ends well, and hath a good beginning. This cannot be good which hath a bad principle, good from the entire cause. Some government for const.i.tution good, may, in some acts, be bad; but a government for const.i.tution bad cannot, for the acts it puts forth, be good. These good acts may be good for matters but formally they are not good, as done by the usurper: they may be comparatively good, that is better so than worse; but they cannot be absolutely, and in a moral sense good: for to make a politic action good, not only the matter must be warrantable, but the call also. It may indeed induce subjects to bear and improve to the best, what cannot be remedied; but cannot oblige to own a magistratical relation.

II. The nature of the power thus discovered, let us see the nature of that relative duty, which we owe and must own as due to magistrates, and what sort of owning we must give them; which, to inquire a little into, will give light to the question. All the duty and deference the Lord requires of us, towards them whom we must own as magistrates, is comprehended in these two expressions, honour required in the fifth command, and subjection required in Rom. xiii. 1. &c. 1 Pet. ii. 13. &c.

Whomsoever then we own as magistrates, we must own honour and subjection as due to them: and if so be, we cannot, upon a conscientious ground, give them honour and subjection, we cannot own them as magistrates. The least deference we can pay to magistrates is subjection, as it is required in these words; Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, and, submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake.

But this cannot be given to tyrants and usurpers; therefore no deference can be paid to them at all: and consequently they cannot be owned. That this subjection, which is required to the higher powers, cannot be owned to tyrants, will be apparent, if we consider, 1. The subjection required is orderly subjection to an orderly power, that we be regularly under him that is regularly above; but usurpation and tyranny is not an orderly power, orderly placed above us; therefore we cannot be orderly under it. This is gathered from the original language, where the powers to be subjected to, are ordained of G.o.d and the ordinance of G.o.d, and he that resisteth the power is counter-ordered, or contrary to his orderly duty; so the duty is to be subject. They are all words coming from one root, which signifies to order; so that subjection is to be placed in order under another relative to an orderly superiority; but, to occupy the seat of dignity unauthorized, is an ataxy, a breaking of order, and bringing the commonwealth quite out of order. Whereby it may appear, that, in relation to an arbitrary government, there can be properly no orderly subjection. 2. The thing itself must import that relative duty which the fifth command requires; not only a pa.s.sive stooping endurance, or a feigned counterfeit submission, but a real active duty including obedience to lawful commands; and not only so, but support and maintenance; and that both to the acts of his administration, and to his standing and keeping his station, a.s.sisting him with all our abilities, both human and Christian; and not only as to the external acts of duties, but the inward motions of the heart, as consent, love, reverence, and honour, and all sincere fealty and allegiance.

But can a subjection of this extent be paid to a tyrant or usurper? Can we support those we are bound to suppress? Shall we love the unG.o.dly, and help those that hate the Lord? Can we consent, that we and our posterity should be slaves? Can we honour them who are vile, and the vilest of men; how high soever they be exalted? 3. The ground of this subjection is for conscience sake, not for wrath, that is, so far and so long as one is constrained by fear, and, to avoid a greater evil, to stoop to him, but out of conscience of duty, both that of piety to G.o.d who ordained magistracy, and that of equity to him who is his minister for good, and under pain of d.a.m.nation if we break this orderly subjection, Rom. xiii. 2, 5. But can it be imagined, that all this is due to a tyrant and usurper? Can it be out of conscience, because he is the Lord's minister for good? The contrary is clear, that he is the devil's drudge serving his interest: Is resistance to tyrants a d.a.m.nable sin? I hope to prove it to be a duty. 4. If subjection to tyrants and usurpers will inveigle us in their snares, and involve us in their sin and judgment, then it is not to be owned to them; but the former is true; therefore the latter. In the foregoing head I drew an argument, for withdrawing from and disowning the prelatic ministers, from the hazard of partaking in their sin, and of being obnoxious to their judgment, because people are often punished for their pastor's sins; Aaron and his sons polluting themselves, would have brought wrath upon all the people, Lev. x. 6. because the teachers had transgressed against the Lord, therefore was Jacob given to the curse, and Israel to reproaches, Isa. xliii. 27, 28. and all these miseries lamented by the church, were inflicted for the sins of her prophets, and the iniquities of her priests, Lam. iv. 13. the reason was, because they owned then, followed them, countenanced them, complied with them, or connived at them, or did not hinder, or else disown them. The same argument will evince the necessity of withdrawing our subjection from, and disowning, usurping, and tyrannical rulers, when we cannot hinder their wickedness, nor give any other testimony against them, to avert the wrath of the Lord. If the defections of ministers will bring on the whole nation desolacing judgments; then much more have we reason to fear it, when both magistrates and ministers are involved in, and jointly carrying on, and caressing and encouraging each other in promoting a woful apostasy from G.o.d: when the heads of the house of Jacob and princes of the house of Israel, abhor judgment, and pervert all equity. The heads judge for reward, and the priests teach for hire, and the prophets divine for money, and yet lean upon the Lord, and say, is not the Lord among us: none evil can come upon us. Then we can expect nothing, but that Zion for their sake shall be plowed as a field, and Jerusalem become heaps, and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest, Mic.

iii. 9, 11, 12. Certain it is, that subjects have smarted sore for the sins of their rulers: for Saul's sin, in breaking covenant with the Gibeonites, the land suffered three years famine, 2 Sam. xxi. 1. and the wrath of the Lord could not be appeased, till seven of his sons were hanged up unto the Lord. What then shall appease the wrath of G.o.d, for the unparalleled breach of covenant with G.o.d in our days? For David's sin of numbering the people, 70,000 men died by the pestilence, 2 Sam.

xxiv. 5. For Jeroboam's sin of idolatry, who made Israel to sin, the Lord threatens to give Israel up, because of the sins of Jeroboam, I Kings xiv. 16. only they escaped this judgment, who withdrew themselves and fell into Judah. For Ahab's sin of letting go a man whom the Lord had appointed to utter destruction, the Lord threatens him, thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people, 1 Kings xx. 42.

Because Mana.s.seh, king of Judah, did many abominations, therefore the Lord threatened to bring such evil upon Jerusalem and Judah, that whosoever heard it, his ears should tingle, &c. 2 Kings xxi. 11, 12. and notwithstanding of his repentance and the reformation in the days of Josiah, notwithstanding the Lord turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations that Mana.s.seh had provoked him withal, 2 Kings xxiii. 26. which was accomplished by the hands of the Chaldeans, in Jehoiakim's time. Surely, at the commandment of the Lord, came this upon Judah, to remove them out of his sight, for the sins of Mana.s.seh according to all that he did, and also for the innocent blood which he shed,----which the Lord would not pardon, 2 Kings xxiv. 3, 4. And Jeremiah further threatens, that they should be removed into all kingdoms of the earth, because of Mana.s.seh for that which he did in Jerusalem, Jer. xv. 4. Certainly pa.s.sages were recorded for our learning, Rom. xv. 4. and for our examples, to the intent we should not do as they did, 1 Cor. x. 6. and for our admonition, ver. 11. Whence we may be admonished, that it is not enough to keep ourselves free of public sins of rulers; many of those then punished, were free of all actual accession to them; but they became accessory to, and involved in the guilt of them, when they did not endeavour to hinder them, and bring them to condign punishment for them, according to the law of G.o.d, which respecteth not persons; or, at least, because they did not revolt from them, as Libnah did: there might be other provocations on the peoples part, no doubt, which the Lord did also punish by these judgments; but when the Lord specifies the sin of rulers as the particular procuring cause of the judgment; it were presumption to make it the occasion only of the Lord's punis.h.i.+ng them: for plain it is, if these sins of rulers had not been committed, which was the ground of the threatening and execution, the judgment would have been prevented; and if the people had bestirred themselves as became them, in repressing and restraining such wickedness, they had not so smarted; and when that sin, so threatened and punished, was removed, then the judgment itself was removed or deterred. It is just and necessary, that the subjects, being jointly included with their rulers in the same bond of fidelity to G.o.d, be liable to be punished for their rebellion and apostacy, when they continue under the bond of subjection to them. But how deplorable were our condition, if we should stand obnoxious to divine judgments, for the atheism, idolatry, murders, and adulteries of our rulers, and yet be neither authorized nor capacitated to hinder it, nor permitted to withdraw ourselves from subjection to them? But it is not so; for, the Lord's making us responsible for their debt, is an impowering us either to repress their wickedness when he gives us capacity, or at least to save ourselves harmless from their crimes, by disowning them; that being the only way of standing no longer accountable for their souls.

12. It remains to consider the ends for which government was inst.i.tute by G.o.d, and const.i.tute by men; from whence I argue, that government, that destroys the ends of government, is not to be owned; but tyranny, and especially this under which we howl, destroys all the ends of government; therefore it is not to be owned. The minor I prove thus, That government, that destroys all religion and safety, destroys all the ends of government; but this popish and arbitrary absolute power, destroys religion and safety; therefore--it is evident, both from the laws of nature and revelation, that the ends of government are the glory of G.o.d, and the good of mankind. The first is the glory of G.o.d, the ultimate end of all ordinances; to which whatever is opposite, is not to be owned by them that fear him: whatever power then is destructive to religion, and is applied and employed against the glory of the universal King, and for withdrawing us from our fealty and obedience to him, is nothing but rebellion against the supreme Lord and Lawgiver, and a traiterous conspiracy against the Almighty, and therefore not to be owned: and they are enemies to religion, or strangers to it, who are not sensible this hath been the design of the present government, at least these twenty-seven years, to overturn the reformed covenanted religion, and to introduce popery. Hence, seeing a king at his best and highest elevation, is only a mean for preserving religion, and for this end only chosen of the people to be keeper of both tables of the law, he is not to be regarded, but wholly laid aside, when he not only moves without his sphere, but his motion infers the ruin of the ends of his erection, and when he employs all his power for the destruction of the cause of Christ, and advancement of antichrist, giving his power to the beast; he is so far from deserving the deference of the power ordained of G.o.d, that he is to be looked upon, and treated as a traitor to G.o.d, and stated enemy to religion and all righteousness. The second end of government is the good of the people, which is the supreme and cardinal law; the safety of the people is the supreme law. Which cannot be denied, if it be considered, 1. For this only the magistrate is appointed of G.o.d to be his minister for the people's good, Rom. xiii. 4.

and they have no goodness but as they conduce to this end: for all the power they have of G.o.d is with this proviso, to promote his people's prosperity. (It were blasphemy to say, they are his authorised ministers for their destruction) to which if their conduct degenerate, they degrade themselves, and so must be disowned. He is therefore, in his inst.i.tution, no more than a mean for this end; and himself cannot be either the whole or half of the end; for then he should be both the end and the mean of government; and it is contrary to G.o.d's mould to have this for his end, to multiply to himself silver and gold, or lift up himself above his brethren, Deut. xvii. 17, 20. If therefore he hath any other end than the good of the people, he cannot be owned as one of G.o.d's moulding, 2. This only is the highest pitch of good princes ambition, to postpone their own safety to the peoples safety. Moses desired, rather than the people should be destroyed, that his name should be razed out of the book of life. And David would rather the Lord's hand be on him and his father's house, than on the people, that they should be plagued, 1 Chron. xxi. 17. But he that would seek his own ambitious ends, with the destruction of the people, hath the spirit of the devil, and is to be carried towards as one possessed with that malignant spirit. 3. Originally their power is from the people, from whom all their dignity is derived, with reserve of their safety, which is not the donative of kings, nor held by concession from them, nor can it be resigned or surrendered to the disposal of kings; since G.o.d hath provided, in his universal laws, that no authority make any disposal, but for the good of the people. This cannot be forfeited by the usurpation of monarchs, but being always fixed in the essential laws of government, they may reclaim and recover it when they please. Since then we cannot alienate our safety, we cannot own that authority which is inconsistent with it. 4. The attaining this end was the main ground and motive of peoples deliberating to const.i.tute a government, and to choose such a form, because they thought it most conducible for their good; and to admit such persons as fittest instuments for compa.s.sing this end; and to establish such a conveyance, as they thought most contributive for this end. When therefore princes cease to be what they could be const.i.tute for, they cease to have an authority to be owned; but ceasing to answer these ends of government, they cease to be what they could be const.i.tute for. 5. For no other end were magistrates limited with conditions, but to bound them, that they might do nothing against the peoples good and safety.

Whosoever then breaking through all legal limitations, shall become injurious to the community, lists himself in the number of enemies, and is only to be looked upon as such. 6. For this end all laws are ratified or rescinded, as they conduce to this end, which is the soul and reason of the law: then it is but reason, that the law establis.h.i.+ng such a king, which proves an enemy to this, should be rescinded also. 7.

Contrary to this end no law can be of force; if then, either law or king be prejudicial to the realm, they are to be abolished. 8. For this end, in cases of necessity, kings are allowed sometimes to neglect the letter of the laws, or private interests, for the safety of the community: but if they neglect the public safety, and make laws for their own interests, they are no more trustees but traitors. 9. If it were not for this end, it were more eligible to live in desarts, than to enter into societies. When therefore a ruler, in direct opposition to the ends of government, seeks the ruin, not only of religion, but also of the peoples safety, he must certainly forfeit his right to reign. And what a vast, as well as innocent number, have, for religion, and their adherence to their fundamental rights, been ruined, rooted out of their families possessions, oppressed, persecuted, murdered, and destroyed by this and the deceased tyrant, all Scotland can tell, and all Europe hath heard. If ever the ends of government were perverted and subverted in any place. Britain is the stage where this tragedy has been acted.

13. I may argue from the covenant, that to own this authority is contrary to all the articles thereof. 1. That authority which overturns the reformation of religion in doctrine, wors.h.i.+p, discipline and government, which we are sworn to preserve against the common enemies thereof, in the first article, cannot be owned; but the present pretended authority overturned (and continues more to overturn) the reformation of religion, &c. therefore it cannot be owned. For against what common enemy must we preserve it, if not against him that is the chief enemy thereof? And how can we own that authority, that is wholly employed and applied for the destruction of religion? 2. If we are obliged to extirpate popery, without respect of persons, lest we partake in other mens sins; then we are obliged to extirpate papists without respect of persons; and consequently the head of them. (For how otherwise can popery be extirpated? Or how otherwise can we cleanse the land of their sins?) But in the 2d article we are obliged to extirpate popery without respect of persons, lest we partake in others mens sins: therefore we are obliged to extirpate papists without respect of persons, and consequently the crowned Jesuit, and therefore cannot own him: for how can we own him, whom we are bound to exstirpate? 3. If we be engaged to preserve the rights and liberties of parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and the king's authority only in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms, then we cannot own his authority, when it is inconsistent with, opposite to, and destructive of all these precious interests, as now it is with a witness. But in the 3d article we are engaged to preserve the rights and privileges of parliaments, and the liberties of the kingdoms, and the king's authority only in the preservation and defence of the true religion and liberties of the kingdoms: therefore all allegiance that we can own to any man, must stand perpetually thus qualified, in defence of religion and liberty; that is, so far as it is not contrary to religion and liberty, and no further; for if it be destructive of these, it is null. If we should then own this man, with this restricted allegiance, and apply into his own authority (as we must apply it to all authority that we can own) it were to mock G.o.d and the world, and own contradictions: for can we maintain the destroyer of religion, in defence of religion, and the destroyer of all our rights and liberties, and all our legal securities for them, in the preservation of these rights and liberties? That were pure nonsense. 4.

If we be obliged to endeavour, that all incendiaries and malignants, &c.

be brought to condign punishment, then we cannot own the authority of the head of these incendiaries and malignant enemies; but in the fourth article, we are obliged to endeavour, that all incendiaries and malignants, &c. be brought to condign punishment: therefore----The connexion of the major cannot well be doubted, for is it imaginable, that the head of that unhallowed party, the great malignant enemy, who is the spring, and gives life unto all these abominations shall be exempted from punishment, or owned for a sacred majesty? shall we be obliged to discover, and bring to justice the little petty malignants, and this implacably stated enemy to Christ escape with a crown on his head? Nay, we are by this obliged, if ever we be in case, to bring these stated enemies to G.o.d and the country to condign punishment, from the highest to the lowest: and this we are to do, as we would have the anger of the Lord turned away from us, which cannot be, without hanging up their heads before the Lord against the sun, as was done in the matter of Peor, Numb. xxv. 4. For hath not he and his accomplices made the kingdom a curse? and we, with our own consent, have made ourselves obnoxious to it, if we do not procure, each in our capacities, and pursue these traitors and rebels, that the judgment of the Lord be executed upon the accursed. 5. No wilful opposer of peace and union between the kingdoms is to be owned; but, according to the 5th article, we are obliged to endeavour, that justice be done upon him: but this man and his brother have been wilful opposers of peace and union between the kingdoms, all true peace and union, except an union in confederacy against the Lord; for they have taken peace from both the kingdoms, and destroyed and annulled that which was the bond of their union, to wit, the solemn league and covenant. 6. If we are obliged to a.s.sist and defend all those that enter into this league and covenant, in the maintaining and pursuing thereof, and never to suffer ourselves to be divided, to make defection to the contrary part, &c. According to the 6th article then, we must not owt the butcher of our covenanted brethren, who hath imbrued his hands in their blood, in maintaining and pursuing thereof, and would have us withdrawn into so detestable a defection; for we cannot both own him as he requires to be owned, and as G.o.d requires every magistrate to be owned (so as not to resist him under pain of d.a.m.nation, Rom. xiii. 2.) and a.s.sist our brethren too in refilling his murders: and our owning of him were a dividing of ourselves from our brethren that oppose him, into a defection to the contrary part, whereof he is head and patron. Lastly, In the conclusion, we are obliged to be humbled for the sins of these kingdoms, and to amend in a real reformation; whereof this is one to be mourned for, that after the Lord had delivered us from the yoke of this tyrannical family, we again joined in amity with the people of these abominations, and took these serpents into our bosom again, which hath bit us so sore, and wherewith the Lord hath scourged us severely. And if it was our sin to engage with them at first, then it is our sin to continue under their subjection; and is not consistent with that repentance, that the Lord's contendings call for, to continue owning that power which was our sin to own at first.

III. In the third place, I promised to confirm my thesis from more express scripture arguments. Therefore I shall endeavour to gather them as briefly as may be. 1. From scripture inferences, nearly and natively consequential. 2.