The History of Cuba Volume II Part 9

CHAPTER X

In the mean time events in North America continued to agitate the diplomatic world of Europe and to stir up trouble. As Great Britain had begun to interfere with the commerce and navigation of France, the relations between the two countries grew daily more strained. France had come to an understanding with Spain, that by the beginning of the year 1778, the two powers would have to combine to make war on Britain, but Carlos III., getting old and more and more conservative, did not want to depart from his policy of neutrality and wanted to end his days in peace. When on the thirteenth of March, the British secretary of state received from the French amba.s.sador a note, saying that France and the United States of North America had signed a treaty of friends.h.i.+p and commerce without any definite advantage to France, but that the king was determined to protect the lawful commerce of his subjects, a state of war was established between the two kingdoms. Efforts to change the decision of Spain were repeated; the return of Florida to Spain was offered with the consent of the United States. But Florida had by this time lost all charm for the conservative court of Spain, so awed by the fact that a republic was to be the neighbor of her American possessions that it was bound not to do anything that might help the insurgents, and sooner or later kindle the desire for independence in their own colonies. Only the prospect of recovering Gibraltar might at that moment have swayed the decision of Spain. But that seemed beyond reasonable possibility.

The king was in an embarra.s.sing position. The compact entered into by the two countries when the Bourbons ascended the Spanish throne, a certain respect for the senior branch of the family and the grudge which he bore Britain, tempted him many a time to revise his decision. His ministers, too, were by no means unanimous in approving Spain's neutrality. While some held that to a.s.sist rebels in their fight upon their mother country was morally wrong and politically imprudent, others, impatient of the pa.s.sive inactivity to which they were reduced, modestly expressed their disapproval. One of them, Florida Blanca, more ambitious for himself than for his country, eager at any moment to embrace an opportunity of making a name for himself, continued to negotiate with the statesmen of France and secretly hoped that somehow he would have a hand in the return of Gibraltar to Spain. In this vague hope he quietly worked to enlarge and improve both the army and the fleet of his country; he collected a large number of battering cannon at Seville, and the port of Cadiz soon held a greater number of well-built vessels than it had seen since the golden age of Spanish maritime power.

Cunningly holding out the prospect of a final alliance against the common enemy to France, while at the same time offering Britain to become a mediator in the b.l.o.o.d.y conflict, he succeeded in delaying any decisive action on the part of France. The French became irritable.

Finally the diplomats of the two powers came to an agreement and on the twelfth of April, 1779, a treaty of alliance was signed.

The terms of this treaty were as follows: France was to invade Great Britain or Ireland; if she succeeded in wresting from the British Newfoundland, she pledged herself to share the fisheries exclusively with Spain; she also pledged herself to secure for Spain the return of Minorca, Pensacola and Mobile, the Bay of Honduras and the coast of Campeche. Moreover, the two powers pledged themselves to continue the war on Britain, until that country agreed to return Gibraltar to Spain.

From the United States Spain expected as reward of her services the basin of the St. Lawrence and the lakes, the unrestricted navigation of the Mississippi and all the territory lying between that river and the Alleghany mountains. The United States were by this treaty to be free to make peace with Britain, as soon as their independence was recognized, but were not in any way expected to continue war until Gibraltar was returned to Spain.

The Spanish colonies in America proved at this time that the distance which separated them from the mother country, and the greater sense of s.p.a.ce and elbowroom which they enjoyed and in which several generations of their people had been born, was beginning to differentiate the Spanish Americans from their kinsmen in old Spain. Unable in the varying aspects of rough pioneer life to preserve the old traditions and conventions, the character of the people themselves had changed. They were not to be bound by the numerous considerations that entered into every step European nations took. They were not slow in taking action, when there was cause and opportunity for such. The news of the alliance between France and Spain against Britain was received in Cuba and Louisiana with intense interest. Within a few days both colonies were swayed by the desire to avenge wrongs formerly suffered at the hands of the British, and with a remarkable promptness framed measures to this effect. Governor Navarro immediately issued privateering patents to Spanish s.h.i.+ps and they as promptly set out on their quest and captured a number of British vessels. The coasts of Cuba were closely watched for the possible arrival of a hostile fleet, and the garrison of el Morro was keenly on the alert.

In Louisiana the feeling against the British ripened into the plan of reconquering Pensacola. D. Bernardo de Galvez, who had settled in that colony in 1776, had in 1779 been elected Governor and invested with full rights, proprietary and otherwise. The official council of the colony was of the opinion that Louisiana should a.s.sume a pa.s.sive defensive, until advices and perhaps reenforcements were received from Havana. But Galvez, enterprising and energetic in all his undertakings, and a fighter whose valor had been tried before, was determined to attack the British without delay. He collected a force of only seven hundred men, according to Valdes, fourteen hundred according to Blanchet, among them many veterans and militia men, and marched towards Fort Manchac. It was a perilous and trying expedition through a country then little more than a wilderness. But he arrived at his goal and surprised the garrison, taking the British prisoners. Encouraged by this success, he left the captured fort under guard of a part of his force and turned towards Baton Rouge. There he found the enemy much stronger; the British under command of Lieutenant-Colonel d.i.c.kson opposed his attacks so strenuously, that his forces had to entrench themselves in antic.i.p.ation of a prolonged siege. But after nine days, on the twenty first of September, d.i.c.kson surrendered and his garrison, too, were made prisoners. Point Thompson and Point Smith, British establishments on the eastern bank of the Mississippi, followed, and leaving General de Camp in charge of the conquered territory, Galvez hurried to Cuba to secure reenforcements for his attack on Mobile and Pensacola.

In Havana he found everything in readiness to engage in or furnish an expedition against the British possessions. He had in the meantime been raised to the rank of Field Marshal and everything seemed to favor his plan. During the preparations there arrived in the port the squadron of D. Jose Solano, consisting of eight thousand men under the command of the Lieutenant-General D. Victorio Navia. Receiving a valuable addition to his troops from Solano, Galvez prepared to embark with five regiments, a small squadron of dragoons, two companies of artillery and forty pieces of ordnance. The expedition was abundantly supplied with ammunition and provisions. On the sixteenth of October, 1780, they set sail with fifty transports, escorted by Solano, seven s.h.i.+ps, five frigates and three brigantines. But on the following day a terrible hurricane surprised them out at sea, seriously damaging some of the s.h.i.+ps and dispersing the others. Galvez was obliged to return to the sailing port without even knowing the fate of some of his vessels. A number of them on escaping from the storm drifted towards Campeche, others to the mouth of the Mississippi, still others to unknown ports and one was known to have been wrecked.

News coming to Havana, that the forces at Mobile, which had in the meantime been taken by General de Campo, were in need of food and threatened with an attack by the British, a council of generals was held and ordered two s.h.i.+ps, capable of transporting five hundred men and carry a sufficient amount of provisions, to be immediately prepared and sent on their way. The convoy sailed on the sixth of December under the command of the Captain of the frigate, D. Jose de Rada. On arriving at the mouth of the Mobile, he did not dare to enter, having found some variation in the channel, and sailed directly for the Balize of the Mississippi. He left his cargo at the entrance and returned to Havana.

Two days later two British frigates penetrated the very Bay of Mobile and the detachment of the village was reported to be attacked. D.

Bernardo de Galvez urged that, although the state of things did not permit a repet.i.tion of the expedition that had sailed from Havana in October, some troops be given him with which to reenforce the garrisons of Louisiana and Mobile. There, as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself, he would pledge the inhabitants to a further effort and attack Pensacola. The plan was approved by the council, thirteen hundred and fifteen men were organized, including five companies of grenadiers, five vessels were equipped as transports and the war-s.h.i.+p _San Ramon_, under command of D. Jose Calvo, the frigate _Santa Clara_, commanded by Captain D. Miguel Alderato, the _Santa Cecilia_, commanded by Captain D. Miguel de Goicochoa, the tender _Caiman_, commanded by Captain D. Jose Serrato, and the packet _San Gil_ under Captain D. Jose Maria Chacon, were designated as escorts. The whole fleet was placed under the command of D. Bernardo de Galvez, who now bore the t.i.tle of General.

A communication sent by the General of the Marine to D. Jose Calvo shows in what esteem Galvez was held and how eager were the Spanish authorities to help him with his attack on Pensacola:

"To the question contained in your paper of yesterday, that I manifest to you the terms under which you must subordinate to and obey the orders of the Field Marshal of the Royal armies, D. Bernardo de Galvez, I beg to advise that your honor shall put in practice with all your well-known and notorious diligence those that the expressed Don Bernardo shall give your Honor relative to the conquest of Pensacola, without separating yourself in other things from what the Royal Ordinances of the Armada provide, endeavoring that the strictest discipline be observed in all the s.h.i.+ps under your orders as provided therein. May our Lord keep you many years.

"JUAN BAUTISTA BONET,

"Sr. D. Jose Calvo.

"Havana, 6th of February, 1781."

Galvez embarked on the thirteenth of February, the troops followed on the fourteenth and the convoy sailed on the twenty-eighth. The General had previously sent Captain D. Emiliano Maxent in a schooner to New Orleans with orders to the Commandant of Arms, so that the troops which D. Jose Rada had left and those that had arrived there on account of the October hurricane should set out to meet the convoy. He had ordered them to be ready to sail at the first signal. On the first of March the General sent D. Miguel de Herrera of the Regiment of Spain to Mobile by schooner with letters for D. Jose Espeleta, directing him to proceed to the east of Santa Rose island, fronting the port of Pensacola. He advised him to march by land to form a union with the troops of his command. Such were the extensive and well calculated preparations made by the Spaniards for the recapture of Pensacola. After Galvez had effected the junction of his troops with those of Mobile and New Orleans, he proceeded towards the place which was well fortified and garrisoned.

The progress of the blockade was at first very slow. Colonel Campbell, who commanded the British, offered a stubborn resistance to the attacks of the Spanish troops. But Galvez was equally persistent and undaunted continued in his operations. Very much smaller in number than the Spanish forces, the British seemed from the first to be doomed to defeat. But the decisions of the siege hung a long time in the balance.

After a brave struggle against odds, the British began to relax in their firing, while the Spaniards seemed ever to bring into the firing line new batteries. Finally the powder magazine was blown up and demolished some of the advance works, and on the ninth of May, 1781, the British garrison surrendered with honors. The conquest of Pensacola decided the fate of Florida, which returned to Spanish dominion. As a reward for his valor the king promoted D. Galvez to the rank of Lieutenant-General and gave him the t.i.tle Conde de Galvez. The British garrison had to pledge themselves not to serve during the war against Spain or her allies, but were left free to do so against the United States.

During the administration of Governor Navarro, which was soon to come to an end, there was one measure enacted, which antic.i.p.ated our modern prohibition. It was promulgated by means of a proclamation of the year 1780, which prohibited, except for medicinal uses, the sale of liquor.

So disastrous and wide-spread were the ravages caused by an immoderate consumption of distilled spirits, brandy, wine, etc., in the population of the island, and especially among the soldiers, that heavy fines were imposed upon the offenders; the first offence was punished by a fine of fifty pesos, the second by one of one hundred pesos and the third by banishment and a fine. The fear that the British would invade Havana or Puerto Rico caused a revival of all military activities and the building of additions and improvements of the fortifications. In the year 1781 Governor Navarro, being old and sickly, resigned his office and retired to Spain, where the king rewarded his services with the Captain-Generals.h.i.+p of Estramadura.

CHAPTER XI

Was.h.i.+ngton's warning of entangling alliances comes to one's mind on reading the curious results of the concerted action against Britain decided upon by France and Spain in Europe, while the United States were fighting the British in North America, and the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Louisiana were attempting to wrest from them the Gulf coast. The lure of Gibraltar had led to a state of blockade; but this was far from satisfying to the insatiable ambition of the Spanish prime minister, Florida Blanca, still bent upon making the world ring with the sonority of his name. Ignoring all arguments to the contrary presented by the French statesman Vergennes, and even by some of the Spanish authorities familiar with the situation, he began to insist upon an immediate attack on Britain and gradually persuaded the French allies. An expedition was fitted out and in June, 1779, the fleet consisting of thirty-one French s.h.i.+ps of line and twenty Spanish wars.h.i.+ps sailed for the Channel.

It was the largest and best equipped force that had been seen on the Atlantic in many years; for the Spanish s.h.i.+pbuilders had been busy during the past years of unrest and threatening war clouds and had turned out vessels far superior in construction to those of Britain. The French were not over hopeful; even light-hearted Marie Antoinette was conscious of the importance of the enterprise and the great risk it involved; for she wrote in a private letter: "Everything depends on the present moment. Our fleets being united, we have a great superiority.

They are in the Channel; and I cannot think without a shudder that, from one moment to the next, our destiny will be decided." The French staked their hope upon the reputation of the Spanish as fighters on sea.

Montmorin said: "I hope the Spanish marine will fight well; but I should like it better if the British, frightened at their number, would retreat to their own harbors without fighting." King Carlos alone was optimistic; he imagined a rapid invasion, a prompt victory and the humiliation of Britain, which he had so long wished for.

The unexpected was to happen for both French and Spaniards. The fleet appeared at Plymouth on the sixteenth of August, but, without even an attempt at attacking the town, for some unexplained reason was idle for two whole days. Then a storm came up and drove it westward. When the weather became more favorable, the vessels returned and the British retired before them. There was no action to speak of; there was nothing lost and nothing gained, and realizing the futility of the undertaking, the chiefs decided to abandon it. The French returned to Brest, and the Spanish to Cadiz. To the onlooking world the actions of the expedition appeared nothing less than quixotic. The reasons for this incomprehensible performance gradually became known; the expedition had sailed under many chiefs, but it lacked the one chief, whose will and word was to prevail and insure unity of purpose. Unable to agree upon any one plan of action, they decided upon no action whatever. The Spanish admiral, who had been fired with the spirit of Florida Blanca and been eager to display the famous military prowess of his nation in a big fight with the enemy, was so furious, that he vowed on his honor after this experience rather to serve against France than Britain. Marie Antoinette wrote to her mother: "The doing of nothing at all will have cost us a great deal of money."

But while a legitimate engagement between the French and Spanish vessels on the one and the British on the other side was for the time being avoided, the three countries did not disdain to stoop to smaller means to inflict damage upon the commerce and the navigation of one another.

Nor did they hesitate to attack the vessels of neutral countries, if they suspected them of lending aid to the belligerent they were opposing; and as this spirit began to spread, it led to a state of anarchy upon the seas, which recalled the golden age of piracy. British privateers and other vessels cruised about the ocean in quest of booty and attacked and robbed indiscriminately whatever s.h.i.+ps they suspected; and very frequently this suspicion was only a pretext. Dutch commerce and navigation especially suffered from these depredations, and as French and Spanish vessels began to vie with the British in these violations of neutrality, the council chambers of the European powers, from Lisbon to Petrograd and from Naples to Christiania began to ring with vociferous protests against these disgraceful conditions. When Spain issued an order that all s.h.i.+ps found by her vessels to be carrying provisions and to be bound for Mediterranean ports, should be brought into the harbor of Cadiz and their cargoes sold to the highest bidder, even Britain was alarmed and indignant.

That was the moment which brought into prominence Sir George Rodney, the British commander, whose naval exploits soon were to worry the Spanish colonies, as did once those of British freebooters. Rodney sailed with his squadron on the twenty-ninth of December, 1779, and by the eighth of January had captured seven wars.h.i.+ps and fifteen merchantmen. At Cape St.

Vincent, where he arrived on the sixteenth, he destroyed a part of the Spanish squadron under command of D. Languara. In the spring of the same year he had several encounters with the French fleet, under command of Admiral Guichen, with results so favorable for him that Britain soon resounded with his praise. His progress had so far been almost un.o.bstructed, but in the summer it was temporarily checked, when the Spanish squadron, commanded by D. Solano, joined that of the French.

However, the curious disparity of French and Spanish temperament once more manifested itself in a manner which disastrously affected their work. Unable to agree on important questions of action, their cooperation threatened to come to naught. In the mean time an epidemic of fever broke out in both fleets and D. Solano returned with his s.h.i.+ps to Havana, while Admiral Guichen sailed for France.

The new governor, who had succeeded Navarro in the administration of Cuba, was Lieutenant-General D. Juan Manuel de Cagigal. Alcazar calls his governors.h.i.+p a provisional one; Blanchet a.s.serts that he received his appointment in reward for the valuable services he had rendered during the recent conquest of Pensacola, he having been the first to enter through the breach which the Spanish had made in the fortifications. Cagigal was a native of Cuba; he entered upon his office on the twenty-ninth of May, 1781, and remained until December of the same year. He contributed largely to the efficiency of the expedition which was fitted out under the command of D. Solano, the General of the Spanish fleet, consisting of twelve vessels with one thousand men on board, and was to join the French fleet at Guarico. The object of the expedition was to capture the island of Providence and eventually take other island possessions of the British in the contiguous seas.

According to Alcazar, Providence was taken, but the defeat of the French squadron by Rodney made the position of Cagigal critical and attention had to be concentrated upon the defense of Havana.

According to Blanchet this joint expedition of the French and Spanish forces, which had for its ultimate object the capture of Jamaica, had elected for its chief D. Jose de Galvez, giving him for the duration of the campaign authority over the Captain-General of Cuba and the president of Santo Domingo. By order of Galvez, Cagigal had set out from Havana in April, 1782, with forty-eight transports and two thousand men to possess himself of the British island of Bahama, and in particular of Providence. During his absence D. Jose Dahan exercised the authority of the governor. Cagigal was not aware that a week before his sailing Admiral Rodney had defeated the French squadron of Count de Gra.s.se, which he was to join in the attack on Jamaica. However, Providence was taken and a sufficient garrison left there to make the conquest secure.

Blanchet indulges in some criticism of Cagigal that he had left Havana, and taken all the troops with him at such a critical time. For when he reached Matanzas after a heavy gale which had dispersed his s.h.i.+ps, he found the authorities no little alarmed since a British fleet had been sighted.

Cagigal immediately hurried to the capital, fortified the approaches, employing one thousand negroes in the work, and formed an intrenched camp. He armed the militia, which was reenforced by many civilians, eager to fight the enemy, and when on the fifth of August el Morro gave notice of the presence of the British, everybody was prepared for the defence. Sir George Rodney, now Admiral, had calculated upon taking Havana by surprise. He brought with him a squadron composed of twenty-six s.h.i.+ps of the line, and carrying a large number of troops.

When he arrived and began to reconnoiter, he perceived the formidable preparations that had been made for the defence of the place, and deciding that it was imprudent to attack Havana by land, planned to approach it from Jarico. In the meantime Cagigal had received reenforcements which seemed to a.s.sure the safety of the capital. Daring as was the gallant Britisher, he was not inclined to waste his material in an enterprise so doubtful of success, and to the great relief of the Cubans he sailed away.

In his administration Cagigal did not prove as efficient as in his military operations. He was a born soldier. He had followed the military profession in Portugal, Oran and at Gibraltar; he had partic.i.p.ated in the unfortunate expedition against Argel, had fought in Florida and had been with D. Pedro Caballero at Buenos Aires. He disliked the atmosphere of official bureaus and the complicated machinery of government. This lack of interest in the indispensable functions of his office brought him into serious trouble. He had counselors or asesores attend to matters which did not immediately require his intervention, and as such had employed the Venezuelan D. Francisco Miranda, who eventually became prominent in the history of his own country. When Miranda returned from a commission in Jamaica, he disembarked some contraband in Batabano. The Intendente Urriza, who was informed of the matter, at once sent a complaint to Cagigal, who, either from indifference or indolence, never even stopped to examine the case, but simply resolved to suppress it. He had, however, not taken into account the presence of the functionaries of the royal Hacienda or Treasury, who communicated the incident to the proper authorities in Spain. An urgent order for Cagigal's removal from office was the result; and the Captain-General of Caracas, D. Luis de Unzaga, was sent to take his place as governor of Cuba. Miranda fled.

Cagigal was sent to Guarico and later dispatched by D. Jose de Galvez to Cadiz, where he was for four years a prisoner in Fort Santa Catalina.

During the proceedings against him it was found that he was in no way implicated in the smuggling operation of Miranda. He was rehabilitated during the reign of King Carlos IV. and in the war with the French Republic had once more an opportunity to prove his military abilities.

He died as Captain General of Valencia.

The strong impulse towards progress which had been given to Cuba in that period of peace when the administrations of Buccarelli and la Torre devoted their main energies to internal improvements and to modest attempts at laying the foundations of Cuban culture, had of course subsided during the recent unrest and the predominance of military interests. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the spark kindled a few years before was not quite dead. A long-felt want had been the absence of any periodical publication that would give the people of Cuba information upon the current political events and also be a medium for advertising purposes. According to some historians the first periodical of this kind, the _Gazeta_, published under the direction of D. Diego de la Barrera, made its appearance in the year 1780; others give as the date of its foundation the year 1782.

Whatever the date of its publication may have been, the _Gazeta de la Habana_ became a medium through which the people were kept informed of the doings of the various administrative departments. The issue dated April eleventh, 1783, contains some statistics concerning the silver coins with milled edges cut away, which had been recently withdrawn from circulation, which is of interest as it suggests the relative financial rank of the different localities mentioned.

In the Treasury of the General Silver Reales Administration: with milled edges Weight cut away in ounces Havana 311,625 23,340 10 Guanabacoa 2,808 151 Santa Maria del Rosario 21,870 1,117 12 Arroyo Arenas 7,049 380 14 Santa Clara 237,665 12,558 San Juan de Los Remedios 68,153 3,848 Trinidad 40,137 2,145 Sancti Spiritus 197,905 11,670 14 Puerto Principe 73,792 3,207 Bayamo 94,499 4,615 7 Holguin 31,013 1,701 Baracoa 6,396 1,465 -------- ------ 1,092,940 66,231 5

The _Gazeta_ added to this report: "There have been collected from the public over two million pesos (cut away), and in their exchange they yielded a little over eighty thousand pesos fuertes (efficacious), and although the loss is excessive as a whole it must be stated, that in particular it was not very grave, the money being distributed in small amounts among the public."

This was a critical period in the conflict which had gradually involved the princ.i.p.al countries and was watched with apprehension by all the sovereigns of Europe. Up to this date Florida Blanca, who, from a simple lawyer in the provinces had risen to be prime minister of Spain, had not attained the goal of his ambition and secured for Spain victories, the glory of which should cast a halo about his name. On the contrary, circ.u.mstances began so to complicate the task which he had imagined to be comparatively easy, that he was puzzled and began to lose some of his extraordinary self-a.s.surance. Bancroft gives in his "History of the United States" (Vol. VI. p. 441) a very interesting review of the situation and of the relation of Spain to the Revolutionary War, which was drawing towards its close. He says:

"The hatred of America as a self-existent state became every day more intense in Spain from the desperate weakness of her authority in her trans-atlantic possessions. Her rule was dreaded in them all; and, as even her allies confessed, with good reason. The seeds of rebellion were already sown in the vice-royalties of Buenes Ayres and Peru; and a union of Creoles and Indians might prove at any moment fatal to metropolitan dominion. French statesmen were of the opinion that England, by emanc.i.p.ating South America, might indemnify itself for all loss from the independence of a part of its own colonial empire; and they foresaw in such a revolution the greatest benefit to the commerce of their own country. Immense naval preparations had been made by the Bourbons for the conquest of Jamaica; but now, from the fear of spreading the love of change Florida Blanca suppressed every wish to acquire that nest of hated contraband trade. When the French amba.s.sador reported to him the proposal of Vergennes to const.i.tute its inhabitants an independent republic, he seemed to hear the tocsin of insurrection sounding from the La Plata to San Francisco, and from that time had nothing to propose for the employment of the allied fleets in the West Indies. He was perplexed beyond the power of extrication. One hope only remained. Minorca having been wrested from the English, he concentrated all the force of Spain in Europe on the one great object of recovering Gibraltar, and held France to her promise not to make peace until that fortress should be given up."

From that time began a series of secret manoeuvres in favor of a general peace, and rumors of the signing of treaties that had then not even been drafted, began to float across the ocean and agitate the colonies of Spanish America. But naval operations in the waters of the West Indies continued almost without cessation. The French fleet under de Gra.s.se had before its return to France restored to the Dutch St. Eustatius. It had captured St. Christopher, Nevis and Montserrat. When in February, 1782, Admiral Rodney appeared at Barbados with twelve new s.h.i.+ps of line in addition to his fleet, and was towards the end of the month joined by the squadron under command of Hood at Antigua, it became necessary for the French to look for a junction with the Spanish fleet. For this purpose de Gra.s.se left Port Royal to Martinique on the eighth of April and hurriedly sailed for Hispaniola. After a small engagement at Dominica, Admiral Rodney by a skillful ruse brought on a battle with the French between Guadeloupe, Saintes and Marie Galante. The British had on their side superiority in number and quality, having thirty six vessels, all in good repair and manned by well-trained and disciplined sailors.

The French s.h.i.+ps were better constructed, but inferior in number, and their mariners were known to be less efficient and experienced. The combat raged for eleven hours. Four of de Gra.s.se's s.h.i.+ps were captured, one sunk. The British lost about one thousand men in killed and wounded, the French about three times as many. This defeat of their ally tended to depress the spirits of the Spanish people, both in the mother country and the colonies, for they saw Britain once more exercising almost undisputed authority over the seas.

By this time the belligerents were all becoming tired of the war and were seriously hoping for peace. The situation in France had after this new defeat become specially precarious. Her coffers had been depleted by partic.i.p.ating in a war in which she had nothing to gain. Hence her statesmen were particularly anxious to end a conflict the ideal aim of which had been attained by the recognition of the independence of the United States from Britain. But she was bound by the alliance with Spain; and Spain was inflexible in refusing to acknowledge that independence and in insisting upon her demands, among them above all others, in Europe, the return of Gibraltar, in America the territory east of the Mississippi, including the right of navigation on that river. Conferences between John Jay and Benjamin Franklin, the special American emissaries, and the French minister Vergennes and his able a.s.sistant Rayneval were constantly taking place. Couriers were speeding back and forth between Paris and London. Rayneval attempted to bring the subject of Gibraltar to the attention of the Earl of Shelburne, saying: "Gibraltar is as dear to the king of Spain as his life," but he was told that it was out of the question even to propose to the government to cede it to Spain. He pleaded for Spain's claim of the Mississippi and its eastern valley, and received an ambiguous reply, implying that Britain might be induced to cede Jamaica. But the indirect offer was ignored, just as had been that of Porto Rico some time before. The more the negotiations progressed, the more did Spain, persisting in her traditional conservatism, prove a stumbling block to peace. For as late as September, 1782, in a meeting between Lafayette, Jay and Aranda, did the latter, as representative of King Carlos III., refuse to acknowledge the independence of the new republic.

In the mean time Spain was clamoring for action against Gibraltar, and the French and Spanish fleets united in an attempt to reduce the fort under the command of the Duke of Crillon. But three years of blockade, with intervals of famine and privation, had not broken the spirit of the British garrison. While the first question of the king of Spain on awakening every morning was: "Is Gibraltar taken?" the British continued to defend it with a stubbornness which threatened to prolong the struggle interminably. Receiving constant supplies from the British fleet under Lord Howe, General Eliot was able to hold his own and the futility of this expedition soon became apparent. When the Spanish batteries were blown up and General Eliot made his audacious sortie, the hope of this victory had to be abandoned.

Spain at last realized the necessity of yielding to the inevitable. Her debt had been increased by twenty millions sterling, her navy had been almost annihilated and she had gained nothing but an island or two. King Carlos III., who had so long withheld his recognition of the United States and blocked the negotiations for peace, because the American envoys justly demanded that recognition before they could deal with the representatives of Spain, finally yielded to the pressure of the moment and the preliminaries of peace were signed on the thirtieth of November, 1782. By the separate articles of this treaty, the claim of the United States to all the country from the St. Croix to the southwestern Mississippi, from the Lake of the Woods to the St. Mary's, was verified.

By a separate article the line of north boundary between West Florida and the United States was defined, in case Great Britain at the conclusion of the war should recover that province.

Thus was the republic, the consummation of which King Carlos III. had in his loyalty to the old tradition of sovereignty so zealously tried to prevent, established upon the very continent, which Columbus had discovered, and to the greater part of which Spain had laid claim. If the Spanish king and his cabinet were at all conscious of the a.n.a.logy presented by comparison of the commercial and other restrictions placed upon both colonies by the kingdoms from which they had sprung, they had reason to be filled with vague apprehensions at the rise of this new and free power among the countries of the world. They could not help seeing in the republic which by a long and tenacious fight had won her independence from the mother country, a neighbor whose example offered a dangerous precedent.

Perhaps it was with the intention of forestalling the development of such events in Cuba, as had led to the Declaration of Independence by the colonies to the north, that the Spanish King had some years before begun to remove the restrictions which had for two centuries and more hampered the growth of Cuban commerce and r.e.t.a.r.ded her general development. It was a proof of his own growth towards a more liberal conception of the relations between a country and her colonies, that the removal of these restrictions was effected within so short a time. He opened the trade of Cuba and the other islands of his possessions in America in 1765, and that of Louisiana in 1768 to eight Spanish ports besides Cadiz; he gradually permitted direct trade from the Spanish ports to his dependencies in South and Central America; and in 1782 even allowed New Orleans and Pensacola to trade with French ports that had Spanish consuls.