The History of Cuba Volume II Part 3

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE OLD ESPADA CEMETERY, HAVANA, 1750]

Thus was the whole year 1761 wasted, while the signs of the impending outbreak multiplied and the danger of the dreaded invasion came nearer and nearer. On the sixteenth of January, war was declared and only on the twenty-sixth of February did the news reach Prado, for the vessel carrying the dispatches of the Spanish government had been captured by the tender of the _Dublin_. He called at once a meeting of the council and asked for one thousand veterans to replace the losses which the troops had sustained through the epidemic. He also demanded that he be furnished four thousand rounds of powder. The army that he could muster in the eventuality of an invasion did not number at that time more than four thousand six hundred men. Yet Prado could not be roused from a curious apathy that possessed him and that made him again lapse into the indolence of Creole life. It seemed impossible for him to realize that anybody would dare to attempt what neither Hossier, nor Vernon, nor Knowles had dared. M. de Blenac, who commanded a French fleet charged with the protection of Santo Domingo, and Prado's friend Madriaga were equally unsuspecting. Had the former come to an understanding with the commander of the Royal Spanish transports, they might have surprised the British in the straits of Bahama and averted the disaster.

On the twenty first of May, a business man from Santiago, Martin de Arana, who had been on an errand to Kingston and in his patriotic anxiety perceived the armaments and supplies that were being collected there, came to Havana to inform the government. Reluctantly Governor Prado consented to an interview with this man who had braved the sea voyage and suffered privations to save his country from the menacing attack. The att.i.tude of the people as soon as the news spread was commendable. The sugar-planters promised their negroes freedom if they joined the troops of defense and the clergy went about rousing the spirit of the people to action. Bishop Pedro Agustino Morell of Santa Cruz did admirable work. He had during the expedition of Edward Vernon traversed the country on horseback, and stirred the people to resist the invaders. Beloved by his paris.h.i.+oners, whom he inspired with his zeal, he had for twenty years preached the holy war against the enemies of his native soil. His generosity and his self-denial knew no bounds. The word of such a man at such a moment had weight and the people were ready to go to any length of sacrifice; but the man at the head of the government seemed oblivious to the gravity of the situation and did nothing efficiently to prepare the defense of the city. Prado presided at the meetings of the War Junta which failed to suit the action of the word and wasted time in heated discussions. This War Council consisted of the "Marques" of the Royal Transports, the honorary marine quartermaster, D.

Juan Montalvo, Col. del Rio D. Alejandro Arroyo, the engineer D.

Balthasar Ricaut, and the captains of the vessels anch.o.r.ed in the bay.

Later it was joined by the Lieutenant-General D. Jose Manso de Velasco, the former viceroy of Peru, the Field Marshal D. Diego Tabares, ex-governor of Cartagena, and the Lieutenant-General Conde de Superanda, then visiting Havana. The council did not heed the warning of D. Martin de Arana, the Santiago trader, any more than did Governor Prado.

In the meantime the British fleet was approaching through the straits of Bahama, clear of purpose, strong of will, and bent upon conquest. An interesting doc.u.ment of that event is "An Authentic Journal of the Siege of the Havana By an Officer. Printed in London MDCCLXII. Reprinted in Dublin, by Boulton Grierson, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty." That record of the expedition had evidently for its author a man of sound judgment and is imbued throughout with a rare sense of justice towards British and Spanish alike. Spanish authorities, among them Blanchet, give the number of line s.h.i.+ps in the fleet as twenty-six, fifteen frigates and an infinite number of smaller vessels, and about twenty thousand combatants. The author of the journal reports nineteen s.h.i.+ps of the line, about eighteen frigates, sloops, and other vessels and one hundred and fifty transports with ten thousand troops. The commander of the fleet was Sir George Poc.o.c.ke, Knight of the Bath, Admiral of the Blue, etc., and the commander of the troops, Lieutenant-General Earl of Albemarle. The witness writes that they left Cape Nicolas, northwest of Hispaniola, on the twenty-seventh of May and sailed in seven divisions through the old straits of Bahama--"an undertaking far superior to anything we know in our times, or read of in the past, as few s.h.i.+ps care to go through this pa.s.sage at any time, much less such a fleet, dest.i.tute of pilots that professed any knowledge of it and almost of any information of the pa.s.sage that could be relied on." He goes on to say that "frigates, smaller vessels and even the great s.h.i.+ps' boats were sent ahead and so distributed on both sh.o.r.es, with such proper and well adapted signals for day and night, that not only reconciled every one to the dangers and risk of so hazardous an undertaking, but almost ensured our success. We were often in sight of the keys or shoals on each side."

In the first days of June some of the British s.h.i.+ps engaged in a fight with and took a Spanish frigate of twenty-four guns and a smaller vessel of eighteen guns, a brig and a schooner, all of which had sailed ten days before from Havana for timber. Through the crews of these vessels, the British learned that at the time of their sailing the people of Havana had not yet been informed of the declaration of war. On the fifth of June the fleet cleared the straits and the next day was off Puerto de Terrara, about thirty-six miles windward of Havana. Colonel Carleton and Colonel Howe went to reconnoitre the coast for landing. The siege of Morro Castle was left to Commodore Keppel. "The Admiral went himself with the rest of the fleet off the harbor, to block up the enemy's s.h.i.+ps and in order to more effectually draw the attention of the enemy that way, took with him all the victualling s.h.i.+ps, store s.h.i.+ps and transports, whose troops had over night been put in those men-of-war appointed for securing the landing." By daylight the troops were in the flat and other boats, and Captain Hervey gave the signal for descent on the sandy beach between Boconao and Cojimar. The enemy had thrown up small breastworks near the old tower commanding the mouth of Boconao and attempted a defense, but was soon dispersed by fire from two s.h.i.+ps anch.o.r.ed close to sh.o.r.e. At three o'clock in the afternoon the army was on sh.o.r.e and began to advance toward the Morro, five miles away, along a road which had a thick wood to the left and the sea to the right. The ten guns of the old stone fort of Cojimar were soon silenced by the _Dragon_, anch.o.r.ed close by. Two and a half miles from the Morro the British lay down for the night upon their arms in a heavy rain.

While the British were continuing their advance upon Havana, the authorities of the Cuban metropolis were deliberating in the sessions of the War Junta, and the Governor was still unconvinced of the serious intention of the British, this time determined not to rest until Havana was in their possession. Valdes reports that this state of affairs lasted until on the sixth of June there appeared on the weather-side about two hundred and fifty vessels. Everybody but Governor Prado was convinced that they had come ready to fight. He supposed them to be a flotilla come from Jamaica to discharge their cargo. Nevertheless he went that morning to the Morro to observe the movements of the armada.

He found the garrison under arms by order of the royal lieutenant D.

Dionisio Soler. Much vexed by what he considered exaggerated fear and suspicion, he rescinded the order and commanded the soldiers to return to their quarters. That afternoon, however, the report came from the Morro, that the fleet had arrived and was preparing to land troops.

[Ill.u.s.tration: LAUREL DITCH, CABANAS FORTRESS

The Cabanas fortress stands near the Morro Castle, at the eastern side of the entrance to the harbor of Havana, and ranks with the Morro and La Punta, on the western headland, as one of the historic fortifications of the capital. Like the Morro Castle, it was used by the Spaniards as a prison, and the Laurel Ditch, under its landward walls, was the scene of many a martyrdom of Cuban patriots. Here men and boys innumerable, during the years of Cuba's struggles to be free, were lined up to be shot, until the ma.s.sive wall was thickly pitted with the marks of bullets fired not at the foes but at the friends of Cuba.]

The consternation of the inhabitants can be imagined when suddenly the bells began to ring and the cannons to thunder. The people rushed out of their houses. Some were armed; but the greater part had no weapons and hurried to the Sala Real, where fifteen hundred guns were stored away with some old carabines, swords, bayonets, and other weapons, mostly out of order and too old to be of any use. They were quickly distributed among the people. The war council a.s.sembled. The governor, the Royal Lieutenant, the General of the Navy, the Marques of the Royal Transports, the Commissary D. Lorenzo Montalvo and the distinguished visitors, the Commander-in-Chief Conde de Superanda and Field Marshal D.

Diego Tabares were present. It was decided to charge Colonel D. Carlos Caro with the task of opposing and preventing the enemy's debarkation at Cojimar and Boconao, and to collect the cavalry of that place, a few companies of infantry, militia and lancers, in all about three thousand men, at this point. La Cabanas was rapidly supplied with artillery. But in the meantime the enemy, according to the testimony of a British officer's journal, had already landed troops and overcome the resistance of the very places to the support of which these forces were sent!

The military defense of Havana, as described by Blanchet, presented a sorry spectacle. It consisted of eight hundred and ten cavalry, three thousand five hundred infantry, three hundred artillery, nine thousand marines and fourteen thousand militia. The armament of these troops was insufficient in quant.i.ty and inferior in quality. Twelve vessels were anch.o.r.ed in the port. The entrance was protected by the Morro with fourteen cannons, the battery of the Doce Apostoles with twelve guns, that of the Divina Pastora with fourteen guns and the fort of la Punta.

In the city there were the twenty two guns of la Fuerza, the residence of the Captain-General, and the depository of the royal estates. The condition of the walls was unsatisfactory. The town was dominated by fortified heights, which, however, were very accessible. It is not difficult to imagine the state of the people when the news reached the town that Cojimar and Boconao had fallen. When on the following day General Eliot defeated D. Luis Rasave and took Guanabacoa, Colonel Caro, who had been little more than a spectator, retired to Havana. The population was in a panic.

The war council then entrusted the defense of the Morro to D. Luis Vicente Velasco, a native of Villa de Noja in Santander and commander of the vessel _La Reina_. Defenses were hurriedly put up at Chorrera and Cabanas. All residents unable to bear arms were advised to leave the city. Soon a procession of women and children and members of the religious orders of both s.e.xes, with here and there the calash of some wealthy family, were seen to proceed along the roads radiating from the city towards the suburbs and the more remote haciendas, under the protection of a detachment of troops. It was a heartrending picture to see these crowds, trudging along on foot in the cruel heat of the tropical sun, on roads almost impa.s.sable from recent rains. Many succ.u.mbed to the hards.h.i.+ps of this exodus. Others were dumb with terror as they realized that they might never again see their fathers, brothers and husbands. Again others gave vent to their high-strung emotions by loud wails. About the time this evacuation took place, fire was set to the suburbs outside of the city walls and unspeakable was the distress of innumerable unfortunate families, who in the face of foreign invasion saw their homes reduced to ashes.

A part of the British fleet was seen sailing at this time towards the leeward part of the island with the manifest intention of making another landing. The population was dazed. Some men rushed out to defend their homes and their women, but the greater number was so overcome by the calamity confronting them, that their wills seemed paralyzed and they dumbly awaited the blow that was coming. The next day the work of fortifying la Cabanas began in such an exposed place on the border of the city that rifle bullets could reach the Plaza de los Armas. The construction of a trench was also begun. It was intended to hold one hundred cannon, but after nine or ten had been mounted, the war council changed its plan, ordered the destruction of the trench and had the artillery brought down. This was done in the night of the ninth of June and fire was set to some houses on the hill. The people were startled by this surprising procedure and began not only to grumble, but to talk of treason.

As the British fleet was then menacing the port, the three vessels, _Neptune_, _Europa_ and _Asia_, were concentrated in the ca.n.a.l of the entrance. With the huge iron beams that closed it and the artillery of the harbor, they acted like forts securing its safety. It seemed as if these land batteries could prevent the landing of any enemy vessel. But the war council wanted to improve upon this measure and decided to sink _Neptune_ and _Europa_, during the hurried execution of which order two sailors were drowned. Still bent upon what seemed an improvement, two days later the _Asia_, too, was sunk. The British, supposing the port to be closed, anch.o.r.ed along the coast, landed five thousand men and after defeating the land forces, the fleet entered the ca.n.a.l without encountering serious obstacles. But the Spanish authorities continued to commit more blunders. Appointing as commanders of the land-forces officers of the fleet, the army of course resented this as an insult.

The task of mobilizing the troops was entrusted to D. Juan Ignacio de Madriaga; the defense of el Morro had been given to D. Luis Vicente de Velasco, whose second was D. Bartolome Montes, and that of la Punta to D. Manuel Briseno, who was soon relieved by D. Fernando de Lortia.

Almost all the army posts were occupied by officers of the fleet. The reasons for these measures which seemed absolutely senseless in view of the critical situation, were hotly discussed and some malicious tongues a.s.serted that the object of this curious disposition was to prevent the fleet from making its escape.

On the tenth of June a British division moved from the leeward part of the fort of Chorrera, a short distance from the port, with the object of landing troops. They met with greater resistance than they had reason to expect; for the defense was here aided by the loyal executor D. Luis de Aguiar, who had been appointed Colonel of the militia. All day his men fought bravely; they consisted of whites and negroes. They expected a supply of powder and ammunition from an official of Guadeloupe, but he by mistake had delivered them at la Caleta. Finally their stock gave out, and, obeying the order of a superior officer, Aguiar withdrew his troops with little loss. The British then advanced about three thousand men strong, until they reached the hill of San Lazaro, where they dug trenches and prepared a new encampment. They also occupied and fortified the height of the caves, called Taganana, where they mounted three cannon and two large mortars. With two vessels, armed with bombs, in the small bay, the fire they kept up helped the camp on the weather-side, at which the chief force was concentrated. They then proceeded to erect batteries on the height of la Cabanas and were at first much molested during their work by Aguiar, Chacon and the guerilla Pepe Antonio, who had collected a force at that point. A detachment of militia under the command of Captain D. Pedro de Morales was sent to reenforce them, but on the next day he was surprised by the British, who thus came into possession of this important place.

In the meantime, the British expedition was beginning to suffer much from incessant rains, alternating with excessive heat. Their work was r.e.t.a.r.ded as much by the weather as by the physical condition of their forces, which began to suffer from the climate and fatigue. The resistance of the Cubans was increasing in proportion as the enemy drew near. During the last days of June, Colonel D. Alejandro de Arroyo landed a body of six hundred men at Pastora battery. Simultaneously the naval lieutenant D. Francisco de Corral placed three hundred men at Norno de Barba. The plan was to spike up the enemy's artillery. But laudable as was the ambition of the commanders, their ability of achievement was not in proportion. Their forces, too, were sadly inferior in number to those of the British. The Captain of the infantry of the fleet, D. Manuel de Frias, was made prisoner, three hundred of his troops were killed and forty men wounded. The force of Col. Arroyo also sustained heavy losses, especially the grenadiers of Arrajon.

A council held at el Morro resulted in the election by the commanders of D. Luis Vicente de Velasco as their head and chief. No man was more able or worthy to fill this responsible position. Untiring in his efforts to defend the fortress, Velasco resolutely and capably endeavored to foil the enemy's designs. But he was out-numbered and the danger grew daily nearer. Though at a great loss to their forces, the British forged ahead and surrounded Velasco with a continuous fire. With the port closed to the Cuban squadron they were free to place their cannon as they went along. The rain of bullets, bombs and grenades was incessant and the breakdown of the bastions inevitable. The garrison seemed to be doomed.

The commander declared that it would not be possible to maintain his position without some aid from the camp, but while the walls were being gradually destroyed by the enemy, he did not venture a well organized sortie. On the first of July el Morro was attacked by the batteries which the British had planted on el Cabanas and the fire from three vessels, among them the _Cambridge_ and the _Dragon_. The valor of Velasco inspired his troops, pathetically small in comparison with those of the British. After seven hours of the hottest fire, the _Cambridge_ and the _Dragon_ were so badly battered that they were forced to the rear. The British lost three hundred men, among them Captain Goostree of the _Cambridge_. So fierce had been the resistance offered by Velasco and the few cannon at his disposal, that the British camp, which had been pouring a rain of bombs on el Morro, finally ceased firing. So the honor of this day belonged to the Spanish commander.

It is interesting at this point to revert to the journal of the British officer, who took part in this memorable siege of Havana. After reporting under date of July third that their great battery had caught fire, he continues on the following day:

"The Morro was now found to be tougher work and the Spaniards more resolute than was at first imagined. Our people grew fatigued by the heat and hard labour and the want of water near them was a sensible distress, and the disappointment of the Morro's not being reduced so speedily as at first they were made to hope, helped to depress the spirits of the weak and low minds; but we found every want relieved and amply made up for by the Admiral's attention, not only to supply every article that could be asked, but by his own sagacity, foreseeing and his precaution providing everything we could want."

During the following days the British seem to have suffered much from the climate. The writer of the journal records that the men in general "fall down with fevers and fluxes, but few are carried off by them."

Admiral Keppel was much weakened by illness and fatigue, but this discouraging entry is followed immediately by a cheerier note, dated July 8th and 9th:

"Every one was exerting himself in his different station and with such zeal as gave fresh hopes to our undertaking, notwithstanding the melancholy scene of the infinite number of sick and the apprehension of the approaching hurricane season."

The British had begun to realize the failure of the naval attempt to reduce el Morro. They tried to fortify themselves in the harbor and established the lee-sh.o.r.e camp on the slope of Aroztegui, the same on which El Principe was situated. From this point they undertook many movements, but were always driven back. In spite of these temporary and local successes the Cuban authorities now fully realized that their situation was almost hopeless and devised various measures to stay the progress of the enemy. The magistrates D. Luis de Aguiar and D. Laureane Chacon were made colonels of the militia. They decided to stop the forays and attacks from that encampment, and D. Aguiar established himself in the Horon and tried to dislodge the enemy from various points to which they had penetrated. His undertaking was successful, as was proved by the number of prisoners taken. The hostile forces at Taganana, however, did much mischief and he resolved to attack them on the night of the eighteenth of July. His troops consisted of peasants and negro slaves and fought so effectively, that he was able to send to the fortress eighteen prisoners, including an officer and many trophies. The governor was so elated by this success that he gave one hundred and four negro slaves, that had taken part, their liberty.

The British officer in his journal alludes in the entries of these days to the heavy losses sustained by the British, but dwells more upon the ravages caused by disease. The sick list increasing, the guards had to be reduced. The necessity of having a supply of fresh meat for the invalids and convalescents worried them much. They had counted upon getting it from Santiago and Bejucal, where the rich plantations and pastures were, and a monastery that promised rich loot. But D. Laureane Chacon antic.i.p.ated their movements in that direction. He concentrated some troops four leagues leeward from Wajay, and thus not only checked their progress, but by his persistent opposition weakened their forces.

Many of the smaller actions that were undertaken against the British by the Cubans were by volunteer forces recruited by veteran fighters, who had not been a.s.sociated with the army proper, and their manner of waging war was of the kind called guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless they did active and efficient work and had they not been hindered and restrained by orders from the regulars, they might have accomplished much more. The Lieutenant Diego Ruiz lost his life in such an enterprise. Another famous guerrilla, the valiant fighter known as Pepe Antonio, had won the esteem of the whole army by his courage. He had collected a force of three hundred men and was planning an ambitious a.s.sault upon the enemy, when he was called to report to Colonel Caro, who commanded the encampment at Jesus del Monte and San Juan. Colonel Caro, who had not during the siege distinguished himself by any extraordinary achievements, not only censured Pepe Antonio severely, but discharged him. The valiant patriot hero of many daring exploits was so grieved by this injustice that he died within five days.

Among these side plays of the great siege an expedition led by Colonel Gutierrez had some successful encounters with the British. D. Luis de Aguiar and D. Laureane Chacon, too, who had gathered under their command the brave youths of the country side, were untiring in their efforts to weaken the British. They prevented them from establis.h.i.+ng a cordon and cutting communication with the fort and were themselves enabled uninterruptedly to secure provisions and supplies with which to carry on their operations. Less fortunate was the attack upon Cabanas by D. Juan Benito Lujan with a thousand militia men from the interior of the island. At daybreak, on the twenty-second of July, according to the British officer, the Spanish at el Morro, having been enforced by twelve hundred men from the town, furiously attacked the British. But Brigadier Carleton directed so fierce a fire against them that their forces were driven into the water. He describes them as having consisted mainly of militia, some seamen, mulattoes and negroes. They lost four hundred dead, many wounded and seventy prisoners. A violent cannonade followed, during which Carleton was wounded.

While the British troops were encamped from La Cabanas to Cojimar they made many looting raids in the neighborhood, extending their incursions as far as San Miguel and Santa Maria del Rosario. They not only ransacked the churches for their treasures, but also private estates, and took away whatever they could carry. They had approached el Morro by the bulwark of Pina and a body of forty to fifty men in the shelter of some rocks maintained an incessant gunfire. The garrison of the fort, which was being steadily reduced by the rain of bombs and grenades, wanted to make a sortie into the open country, hoping there to be reenforced. Remaining in el Morro was becoming more and more perilous, because the enemy had undermined the fortress. D. Luis de Velasco, broken down by the strain and overwork received a blow on the shoulder, which temporarily disabled him. His aide, Mentes, was likewise wounded, and the two were replaced by D. Francisco Medina and D. Manuel de Cordova. During their absence nothing was done, for the peasantry, fond as they were of Velasco, were reluctant to fight and perhaps die under the command of another. Mentes returned on the third day, appointed Lieutenant-Colonel, and, joined by D. Juan Benito Lujan, who commanded one thousand men of Tierradentro and some colored troops from the fort, attempted a sally. But the British on the heights threw themselves upon the Cubans and overpowered them. The loss on both sides was so great, however, that the enemy had to ask for a truce to bury their dead. As the British said, the Spanish were valiant, but they had no head. If there had been at their head a man of foresight, and if unity of command had been insured at the beginning, the disaster might have been avoided.

The British forces were at this time beginning to suffer painfully for want of water and lack of fresh provisions. Five thousand men, and a great proportion of officers among them, were unfit for duty. But the arrival of North American troops under convoy of the _Intrepid_ of sixty-four guns, revived the spirit of the expedition. The North Americans had lost a s.h.i.+p of forty guns and six transports in the old straits of Bahama, but the people were saved and encamped upon the sh.o.r.es, and the British Admiral sent frigates for them. One thousand and four hundred men under Brigadier Burton reenforced Col. Howe on the west side. The Cuban defense was also encouraged in these days, for Velasco, who had been wounded on the sixteenth of July, with second, Mentes, forced to seek medical care in the city, returned to his post at el Morro on the twenty-fourth. During the siege the Spanish vessels, with the exception of the frigate _Perla_, which was sunk by the foe, were singularly inactive. The critical and decisive moment of the siege came on the thirteenth of July, when at two o'clock in the afternoon the British sprung their mines. Through the breach they rapidly entered and captured the battery of San Nicolas. Although the garrison was so terrified that not a few soldiers had fled, the remaining offered a brave opposition to the invaders. D. Fernando Parrayo and thirteen men, supported by two cannon, fought heroically, while the British forces poured into the port. The British officer gives due credit to the Cuban commanders who desperately tried to save the honor of their country. He writes:

"The Marquis de Gonzales, commander of a man of war, etc., second in command of the fort, fell bravely endeavoring to animate and rally his people. Don Luis de Velasco, also Captain of the _Reina_ man-of-war, soon after shared the same fate endeavoring to defend the colours of the fort, round which he had made a breastwork and had collected about 100 men, who soon fled and left him to that stroke he seemed to invite and wait for; for being shot through the breast he fell, offering his sword to the conquerors. Confusion and fright ensued, and as much slaughter; for near 400 of the enemy fell by the sword; as many more taken prisoners to whom the soldiers had generously given quarters, though no ways obliged by the rules of war. English colours were soon flying on the fort, that were welcomed by the loud huzzas of all the rejoiced army and navy. A parley ensued, and D. Luis de Velasco (not yet dead) was at his own request sent to breathe out his last at the Havana, where he expired a day after, leaving a name behind and a character that justly merited admiration and esteem from his opposites as respect and love from his confederates."

The historian Blanchet also reports that the British showed due reverence to the dead leader and that hostilities were for that reason suspended during the following day. They received a reenforcement of troops from New York on the second of August; but they had fallen in with three French men-of-war and some frigates on their pa.s.sage, who took five or six transports with about five hundred men. Their forces were being decimated by the climate and the hards.h.i.+ps. The British witness writes that finis.h.i.+ng the batteries on Cabanas cost the lives of many poor seamen who were obliged to be day and night filling vessels with water for the men at work. Some men-of-war were sent down with transports to Mariel, for want of men made it unsafe for them to remain any longer on this most open and frightful coast, where the Spaniards as well as West Indians expressed their surprise and dread at seeing such a fleet ride so long in such a season.

When the British entered el Morro, they found only one hundred and two bronze cannon of various calibres, two hundred iron cannon, nine bronze mortars, two iron mortars, four thousand one hundred and fifty-seven rifles, five hundred hand grenades, four hundred and seventy empty grenades of various quality, seventeen thousand four hundred and four cannon b.a.l.l.s, thirty quintals of rifle b.a.l.l.s, one hundred and twenty-five thousand cartridges and five hundred quintals of powder. The sorrow at being forced to give up el Morro was great. Supported by the vessel _Aquilon_ the quick fire from la Punta and the bulwarks of the place promptly demolished the fort. The Cuban vessels retired to the interior of the bay, fearing the bombs from la Cabanas. The commanders for the same reason sought shelter in the hospiteum of St. Isidore, which was situated at the point farthest away from the fire. Yet the determination to continue to resist the invaders prevailed and a battery was formed on the elevation of Soto, where the fort of Attares was located, and fortifications were continued to be strengthened wherever it was possible.

The batteries of the British were completed on August tenth, and Lord Albemarle summoned the city to surrender. But Governor Prado relied upon reenforcements promised him by the governor of Santiago de Cuba and hoped also for the possible arrival of a French squadron, so he refused.

The people, too, were opposed to surrender, for they had within the last six days received reenforcements from several sides; two hundred and twelve rifles and ammunition from the town of Cuba, five hundred more from Jagua and fifteen hundred on the very last day. However, the fierce fire which the British opened against Havana at daybreak on the eleventh of August, induced the commander of the Cuban forces to give up the last hope. About noon the Spanish ceased firing and at three o'clock in the afternoon flags of truce appeared everywhere. The governor sent word that Havana was ready to capitulate.

According to the British officer's journal the victors took possession of the town and port of Havana on the next day; they also became the owners of nine s.h.i.+ps of the line, of seventy four and sixty four guns, two very large ones on the stocks, nearly completed, about twenty-five loaded merchant s.h.i.+ps; nearly three million dollars belonging to the King and the Royal Company; about six hundred pieces of cannon, and great magazines of stores and merchandise of all kinds. He continues:

"But the most grateful at the time was, that it furnished us with fresh provisions, rest and shelter for the many thousands poor sick wretches we had in our camp and hospital s.h.i.+ps, all mouldering away for want of nourishment when their disorders had left them. Our battalion is so weak that we have not above one hundred and fifty men fit for duty. I am told the navy is badly off. Our loss of killed and wounded is very trifling in comparison to that of the enemy. Theirs amounts to upwards of six thousand killed and dead of their wounds since, and of sickness."

The following day the governor ordered all weapons to be surrendered by military bodies as private individuals and Mayor D. Antonio Ramirez de Estenez was authorized to accord the articles of capitulation.

ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION

ARTICLE I

The garrison will leave by the puerta de Tierra on the twenty-eighth of the present month, if there should not arrive before sufficient help to raise the siege, with all military honors, the soldiers with arms, hoisted flags, six field cannon, and the regiments will also remove the military cases with their contents, and besides six carriages of the Governor.

ARTICLE II

Said garrison will be permitted to remove from the town all luggage and money, and transport them to another place of the island.

ARTICLE III

That the s.h.i.+p crews of the port that had served on land shall in their departure enjoy the same honors as the garrison and be brought back to their vessels. They may sail to any other place of Spanish domination, on the condition that on their voyage until their arrival at their destination they shall not attack any vessel of H. British Majesty, of his allies, or any vessel of his subjects.

ARTICLE IV

That of all the artillery, arms, ammunition and provisions belonging to his Catholic Majesty, excepting those that particularly correspond with said fleet, an exact inventory shall be taken, with the a.s.sistance of four subjects of the king of Spain, who will be appointed by the governor, and four subjects of H. British Majesty, chosen by H. Ex Count Albemarle, who will take possession of all until both sovereigns agree otherwise.