The Philippines: Past and Present Volume I Part 7

"Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point; you will communicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who will recognize the gravity of the subject." [74]

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa's initials were forged in order to gain the prestige of his name for this treacherous plan, we have definitely set forth the purpose of the Filipinos to deceive the Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight with them, and then to attack them.

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo's advice to Aguinaldo, given under date of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendly relations should be maintained with the Americans until the diplomatic negotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be made to find out the future status of the islands "by deceitful means,"

and that confidence should never be put in the Americans.

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutsh.e.l.l in a postscript to this letter, saying:--

"You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs should employ a policy of friends.h.i.+p toward the Americans until our status is defined; but said order should be confidentially given. Try to mislead them." [75]

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Paris conference. [76]

Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Paris would leave their country to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans, [77] and adds that having helped us take the city of Manila, they "felt that they had been 'given the double cross,'" "believed that the Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian, and that was the cause of the war." [78]

The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainly that the princ.i.p.al thing for which the Filipinos were waiting was the ousting of Spain from the Philippines by the United States; those which follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a result of a a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question of whether a United States protectorate, or even annexation to the United States, might be considered, was left open to a very late date. [79]

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniards without our a.s.sistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish sovereignty had practically disappeared from the islands at the time Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that "decrepit"

Spain "could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have 'eaten them up.'" [80]

But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no means sanguine. Their more intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresaw that they could not win unaided. Senor Antonio Regidor was at the time residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence and exceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation, and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:--

"In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send a telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, especially of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever form, would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos en ma.s.se should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore. London commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept American flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to remain." [81]

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor's views, but Agoncillo did not share them. He replied on July 29:--

"Provisional government's aspiration is independence. Make this campaign." [82]

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows, addressing his communication to Basa:

"America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with natives international question other difficulties necessary to encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally raising American flag great demonstrations necessary to influence outside opinion show islands resolved united America high circles advise in view present circ.u.mstances only feasible programme is protectorate." [83]

Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, for on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statements and inquiries:--

"If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions which will arise are these: Have we sufficient arms to maintain the war against Spain in order to secure our independence? If the other nations are opposed to our independence and wish that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty, have we sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory over Spain and over them in the future? If you think that we have not sufficient strength to fight against them, should we accept independence under the American protectorate? And if so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the United States? You should carefully consider the preceding questions, and I suggest that you should, in a confidential manner, consult them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as with your private secretary and military chiefs of rank; and your decision be notified to our representatives abroad in order that they may know what they must do in their negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressed to me by Regidor that he suggests to me to send a message to MacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit to them [the U. S.] unconditionally. As I do not agree with him and as I cannot take any action which is against the instructions of the government, I replied to him that the only desire of our government is independence. This may be seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of this reply, he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards sent a telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter, upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful patriots, and they adopted a resolution to send a message to MacKinley requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the meeting there was present Dr. Justo Lucban, who protested against such measure. In view of this protest, they again agreed that I should be present in the meeting, since I am the representative of our government. At the meeting where I was present, I pointed out the inadvisability of their resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, that we should await your instructions in regard to the matter before sending any message of that character. So the message was not sent; but I was later informed that Basa had, after all, sent it yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure our cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by pa.s.sion and went so far as to say to Basa the following: 'Many of us, especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being so; politicians for what we hear from others; we claim to be patriots, but we are only so in words; we wish to be chiefs, but none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.' To this he did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of an act of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to await your letter. What union can you expect from this people?" [84]

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials were forged on the letter quoted on page 67.

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back once more to the question of independence under a protectorate and made it very clear that at this late day he did not know whether this was or was not what the Filipinos desired. [85]

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be an easy matter to escape from Spanish domination, much less that the islands were already rid of it, for he wrote to Mabini that the United States were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of Spain. He said that "if events will be what their telegrams indicate, we have a dark and b.l.o.o.d.y future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and b.l.o.o.d.y war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us... Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba." [86] Apacible thought that the best thing was independence under an American protectorate.

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States he should "not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain independence." [87]

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo from the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of the Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:--

"The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle for the independence of 'the Philippines' as far as our strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexation will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that the recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or diplomacy, is impossible." [88]

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation if necessary. [89] He was apparently not sanguine at this time as to the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events, he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come, and desired to know on what terms it could be had. [90]

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made themselves heard.

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:--

"I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact, I have had the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would not raise one finger unless I could a.s.sure them that the United States intended to give them United States citizens.h.i.+p if they wished it." [91]

We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who insisted that the Islands must remain American, [92] and that of Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo's name and his own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending the occupation of Manila, and a.s.suring the people of the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos, [93]

but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was only one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong. [94]

Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos there were in favour of it.

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:--

"In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano [95] addressed to Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a letter written from the town of Pagsanjan, province of Laguna, in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the United States and said: 'Avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be time enough to make laws.' Mabini, whose influence at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo's government, paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and before congress had promulgated a Philippine const.i.tution, Messrs. Arellano and Pardo [96] still more earnestly advocated union with America, the first as secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chief diplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the United States to acknowledge the independence of the country under a protectorate through the mediation of General Otis, and this plan was accepted at a cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference with the j.a.panese consul and had been told by him: 'that if Aguinaldo would support absolute independence the j.a.panese Government would help.' Aguinaldo believed Sandico's story (which turned out to be absolutely false) and did not carry out the resolution adopted by the cabinet. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separated themselves from the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards that he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Was.h.i.+ngton, a.s.suring him that a majority of the American people were inclined to acknowledge the independence of the Philippines and of Cuba." [97]

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the vicinity of Manila.

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from four thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented southern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to annexation. [98]

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All were agreed that the a.s.sistance of the United States was necessary in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were to be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spain was ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to "show their teeth," and see "who was deceiving whom," resorting to "force of arms" if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only when it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence, won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible.

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the United States or a United States protectorate, but their views were in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter had the guns their ideas prevailed.

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important to bear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent records relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attacking the American troops.

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the cooperation alleged to have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following points are not in dispute:--

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to cooperate with Dewey.

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would do so.

Dewey a.s.sisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by bringing him and his a.s.sociates back to the Philippines; by furnis.h.i.+ng them arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported by the Insurgents.

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces and used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large numbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the position of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the provinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to s.h.i.+ft for itself.

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by a.s.sault.

It lay at the mercy of Dewey's guns, and it would have been possible for the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at first have garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought of attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo's help? Let us consider his testimony on the subject:--

"_Senator Carmack_. You did want a man there who could organize and rouse the people?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I didn't want anybody. I would like to say now that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul Pratt and Consul Wildman; I didn't do anything--

"_Senator Carmack_. Did they have any power to force him upon you?