The Philippines: Past and Present Volume I Part 17

The Insurgents grew surer and surer that the Americans were cowards, [223] and openly boasted that when the attack began they would drive them into the sea.

On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey that:--

"The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines and have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that very shortly they will give us battle. My best information is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and within the city before our additional troops arrive, and the least spark may start a conflagration." [224]

As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work of strengthening the Insurgent positions around Manila was pushed with all possible speed. [225]

About the middle of January General Otis stationed the First Nebraska Regiment upon the high ground at Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Of conditions at this time, and of the circ.u.mstances leading to the actual outbreak of hostilities Taylor says:--

"During the latter part of January General Otis was informed on good insurgent authority that the insurgents meditated an attack upon those troops, and he was advised to remove them, as in their exposed position they would kill them all. General MacArthur, under whose command the regiment was, placed two guns in position there, as it was fully expected that the insurgents would direct their attack upon that point, as in fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tents of the regiment covered the ridge, and its outposts extended along the San Juan River, a small stream which formed part of the line of delimitation between the Americans and the insurgents.

"For some days before the outbreak of hostilities the pressure of the insurgents was constant along this position, so constant indeed that in the light of subsequent events it indicated a premeditated purpose on the part of some one in the insurgent army to force a collision at that point. On February 2 General MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of the Eighth Army Corps, wrote to the commanding general of the Filipino troops in the third zone in front of him that--

"'An armed party from your command now occupies the village in front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than a hundred yards on my side of the line, and is very active in exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line at once. From this date if the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary.'

"Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan del Monte, replied upon the receipt of this communication that the action of his troops was foreign to his wishes and that he would give immediate orders for them to retire. At about half past 8 on the night of February 4 a small insurgent patrol entered the territory within the American lines at blockhouse No. 7 and advanced to the little village of Santol in front of an outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point from which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February 2. An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent patrol continued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the insurgent patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from which fire was immediately opened upon the Americans. This fire spread rapidly down the American and insurgent lines and both forces at once sprang to arms." [226]

General Otis's account of the opening of active hostilities follows:--

"On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

"The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to a.s.sume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which antic.i.p.ated their premeditated action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila." [227]

Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so carefully planned for. We learn from the Insurgent records that the shot of the American sentry missed its mark. There was no reason why it should have provoked a hot return fire, but it did.

The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what the Insurgents had antic.i.p.ated. The Americans did not drive very well. It was but a short time before they themselves were routed and driven from their positions.

Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that his troops had been wantonly attacked. The plain fact is that the Insurgent patrol in question deliberately drew the fire of the American sentry, and this was just as much an act of war as was the firing of the shot. Whether the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher authority is not definitely known.

In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain Zialcita from Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9.55 P.M., to Major Gray, San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting:

"I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General Ricarte is not here. I believe (that if the) Americans open fire we shall attack. Will ask instructions (of) Malolos." [228]

This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something was to be done to draw the American fire.

Aguinaldo's first statement relative to the opening of hostilities is embodied in a general order dated Malolos, February 4, 1899, and reads in part as follows:--

"Nine o'clock P.M., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

"No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I have a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friends.h.i.+p with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

"... I order and command:--

"1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

"2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

"3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the const.i.tutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war." [229]

Aguinaldo's protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilities are absurd, in view of his own instructions concerning the attack to be made simultaneously within and without the city of Manila.

There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation which existed immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. On January 25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled from Was.h.i.+ngton to Apacible in Hongkong: "Recommend you await beginning American aggression, justifying our conduct nations." [230]

Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for on January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate in Was.h.i.+ngton would take final vote upon the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain on February 6, and said:--

"It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately before the ratification of the treaty. A conflict after the ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in public opinion." [231]

Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendation that hostilities begin before February 6 if America did not answer meanwhile. It was evidently well understood in Hongkong that Aguinaldo's receipt of Apacible's letter might cause war to begin, for on February 3, 1899, Bray, antic.i.p.ating the outbreak of hostilities of the following day, cabled Senator h.o.a.r at Was.h.i.+ngton as follows:--

"Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here denied Filipino circles supposed political move influence vote Senate to-day any ease insignificant skirmish due intentional provocation.

"_Bray_." [232]

The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted leave no escape from the conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred on February 4, 1899, had been carefully prepared for and was deliberately precipitated by the Filipinos themselves.

Blount says:--

"It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever expected to succeed in a war with us." [233]

It may have been wooden-headed for the Filipinos to expect this, but expect it they certainly did. We have seen how they held their soldiers in check until after Spain had been ousted from the Philippines by the Treaty of Paris as they had originally planned to do. It now only remained to carry out the balance of their original plan to get rid of the Americans in one way or another.

General Otis states that "when Aguinaldo had completed his preparations for attack he prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, the full text of which was published at Malolos on the evening, and very shortly after, hostilities began. This declaration was circulated in Manila on the morning of February 5." [234]

The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the punishment which they received on February 4 and 5.

Blount has stated [235] that if the resolutions of Senator Bacon introduced on January 11, 1899, had pa.s.sed, we never should have had any war with the Filipinos. The resolutions in question concluded thus:--

"That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands except for the pacification thereof, and a.s.sert their determination when an independent government shall have been duly erected therein ent.i.tled to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people."

I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which these resolutions might have had if pa.s.sed. The Insurgents felt themselves to be fully competent to bring about such pacification of the islands as they deemed necessary. At the time the resolutions were presented in the Senate their soldiers were straining at the leash, ready to attack their American opponents upon the most slender excuse. Aguinaldo himself could not have held them much longer, and it is not impossible that they got away from him as it was. They would have interpreted the pa.s.sage of the Bacon resolutions as a further evidence of weakness, and hastened their attack. As we have seen, "war, war, war" was what they wanted.

Blount has endeavoured to s.h.i.+ft the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities to the United States by claiming that certain words italicized by him in what he calls the "Benevolent a.s.similation Proclamation" were necessarily, to the Insurgents, "fighting words." The expressions referred to have to do with the establishment of United States sovereignty and the exercise of governmental control in the Philippine Islands.

These words were not "fighting words," the Insurgent policy being, as I have shown by the records, to consider the acceptance of a protectorate or of annexation in the event that it did not prove possible to negotiate absolute independence, or probable that the American troops could be driven from the islands.

The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their ability to whip the cowardly Americans, rather than any fixed determination on their part to push a struggle for independence to the bitter end, led to their attack.

CHAPTER V

Insurgent Rule and the Wilc.o.x-Sargent Report