Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War Part 9

The Virginians were partially concealed by a strip of woodland, and when the Federal skirmishers, deployed on either side of the highway, moved forward to the attack, they were received by a heavy and unexpected fire. As the enemy fell back, a portion of the Confederate line was thrown forward, occupying a house and barn; and despite the fire of two guns which the Federals had brought up, the men, with the impetuous rashness of young troops, dashed out to the attack. But Jackson intervened. The enemy, who had two brigades of infantry well closed up, was deploying a heavy force; his skirmishers were again advancing, and the 5th Virginia, in danger of being outflanked, was ordered to retire to its first position. The movement was misconstrued by the Federals, and down the high road, in solid column, came the pursuing cavalry. A well-aimed shot from the single field-piece sufficed to check their progress; a confused ma.s.s of hors.e.m.e.n went flying to the rear; and the Confederate gunners turned their attention to the hostile battery. Stuart, at the same time, performed a notable feat. He had moved with fifty troopers to attack the enemy's right flank, and in reconnoitring through the woods had become detached for the moment from his command. As he rode along a winding lane he saw resting in a field a company of Federal infantry.

He still wore the uniform of the United States army; the enemy suspected nothing, taking him for one of their own cavalry, and he determined to effect their capture. Riding up to the fence he bade one of the men remove the bars. This was done with respectful alacrity, and he then galloped among them, shouting "Throw down your arms, or you are all dead men!" The stentorian order was at once obeyed: the raw troops not only dropped their rifles but fell upon their faces, and the Confederate troopers, coming to their leader's aid, marched the whole company as prisoners to the rear.

So firm was the att.i.tude of Jackson's command that General Patterson was thoroughly imposed upon. Slowly and cautiously he pushed out right and left, and it was not till near noon that the Confederates were finally ordered to retreat. Beyond desultory skirmis.h.i.+ng there was no further fighting. The 5th Virginia fell back on the main body; Stuart came in with his string of captives, and leaving the cavalry to watch the enemy, the First Brigade went into camp some two miles south of Martinsburg. Patterson reported to his Government that he had been opposed by 3500 men, exactly ten times Jackson's actual number.* (* O.R. volume 2 page 157.) The losses on either side were inconsiderable, a few men killed and 10 or 15 wounded; and if the Confederates carried off 50 prisoners, the Federals had the satisfaction of burning some tents which Jackson had been unable to remove. The engagement, however, had the best effect on the morale of the Southern troops, and they were not so ignorant as to overlook the skill and coolness with which they had been manoeuvred. It is possible that their commander appeared in an unexpected light, and that they had watched his behaviour with some amount of curiosity.

They certainly discovered that a distaste for show and frippery is no indication of an unwarlike spirit. In the midst of the action, while he was writing a dispatch, a cannon ball had torn a tree above his head to splinters. Not a muscle moved, and he wrote on as if he were seated in his own tent.

July 3.

The day after Falling Waters, on Johnston's recommendation, Jackson received from General Lee his commission as brigadier-general in the Confederate army. "My promotion," he wrote to his wife, "was beyond what I had antic.i.p.ated, as I only expected it to be in the Volunteer forces of the State. One of my greatest desires for advancement is the gratification it will give my darling, and (the opportunity) of serving my country more efficiently. I have had all that I ought to desire in the line of promotion. I should be very ungrateful if I were not contented, and exceedingly thankful to our kind Heavenly Father."

Of Patterson's further movements it is unnecessary to speak at length. The Federal army crawled on to Martinsburg. Halting seven miles south-west Jackson was reinforced by Johnston's whole command; and here, for four days, the Confederates, drawn up in line of battle, awaited attack. But the Federals stood fast in Martinsburg; and on the fourth day Johnston withdrew to Winchester. The Virginia soldiers were bitterly dissatisfied. At first even Jackson chafed. He was eager for further action. His experiences at Falling Waters had given him no exalted notion of the enemy's prowess, and he was ready to engage them single-handed. "I want my brigade," he said, "to feel that it can itself whip Patterson's whole army, and I believe we can do it." But Johnston's self-control was admirable. He was ready to receive attack, believing that, in his selected position, he could repulse superior numbers. But he was deaf to all who clamoured for an offensive movement, to the murmurs of the men, and to the remonstrances of the officers. The stone houses of Martinsburg and its walled inclosures were proof against a.s.sault, and promised at most a b.l.o.o.d.y victory. His stock of ammunition was scanty in the extreme; the infantry had but fourteen cartridges apiece; and although his patience was construed by his troops as a want of enterprise, he had in truth displayed great daring in offering battle south of Martinsburg.

The Federal army at Was.h.i.+ngton, commanded by General McDowell, amounted to 50,000 men; a portion of this force was already south of the Potomac, and Beauregard's 20,000 Confederates, at Mana.s.sas Junction, were seriously threatened. In West Virginia the enemy had advanced, moving, fortunately, in the direction of Staunton, at the southern end of the Valley, and not on Winchester.

July 11.

On July 11, this force of 20,000 men defeated a Confederate detachment at Rich Mountain, not far from Jackson's birthplace; and although it was still in the heart of the Alleghanies, a few marches, which there were practically no troops to oppose, would give it the control of the Upper Valley.

Thus menaced by three columns of invasion, numbering together over 80,000 men, the chances of the Confederates, who mustered no more than 32,000 all told, looked small indeed. But the three Federal columns were widely separated, and it was possible, by means of the Mana.s.sas Gap Railway, for Johnston and Beauregard to unite with greater rapidity than their opponents.

President Davis, acting on the advice of General Lee, had therefore determined to concentrate the whole available force at Mana.s.sas Junction, and to meet at that point the column advancing from Was.h.i.+ngton.* (* O.R. volume 2 page 515.) The difficulty was for the Army of the Shenandoah to give Patterson the slip. This could easily have been done while that officer stood fast at Martinsburg; but, in Lee's opinion, if the enemy found that the whole force of the Confederacy was concentrating at Mana.s.sas Junction, the Was.h.i.+ngton column would remain within its intrenchments round the capital, and the Confederates "would be put to the great disadvantage of achieving nothing, and leaving the other points (Winchester and Staunton) exposed." The concentration, therefore, was to be postponed until the Was.h.i.+ngton column advanced.* (* O.R. volume 2 page 507.)

But by that time Patterson might be close to Winchester or threatening the Mana.s.sas Railway. Johnston had thus a most delicate task before him; and in view of the superior numbers which the Federals could bring against Mana.s.sas, it was essential that not a man should he wasted in minor enterprises. The defeat of Patterson, even had it been practicable, would not have prevented the Was.h.i.+ngton column from advancing; and every Confederate rifleman who fell in the Valley would be one the less at Mana.s.sas.

July 15.

On July 15 Patterson left Martinsburg and moved in the direction of Winchester. On the 16th he remained halted at Bunker's Hill, nine miles north; and on the 17th, instead of continuing his advance, moved to his left and occupied Charlestown. His indecision was manifest. He, too, had no easy part to play. His instructions were to hold Johnston in the Valley, while McDowell advanced against Beauregard. But his instructions were either too definite or not definite enough, and he himself was overcautious. He believed, and so did General Scott, that Johnston might be retained at Winchester by demonstrations--that is, by making a show of strength and by feigned attacks. For more vigorous action Patterson was not in the least inclined; and we can hardly wonder if he hesitated to trust his ill-trained regiments to the confusion and chances of an attack. Even in that day of raw soldiers and inexperienced leaders his troops had an unenviable reputation. They had enlisted for three months, and their term of service was nearly up. Their commander had no influence with them; and, turning a deaf ear to his appeals, they stubbornly refused to remain with the colours even for a few days over their term of service. They were possibly disgusted with the treatment they had received from the Government. The men had received no pay. Many were without shoes, and others, according to their general, were "without pants!" "They cannot march," he adds, "and, unless a paymaster goes with them, they will be indecently clad and have just cause of complaint."* (* O.R. volume 2 pages 169, 170.)

Nevertheless, the Federal authorities made a grievous mistake when they allowed Patterson and his sans-culottes to move to Charlestown.

McDowell marched against Beauregard on the afternoon of the 16th, and Patterson should have been instructed to attack Johnston at any cost.

Even had the latter been successful, he could hardly have reinforced the main army in time to meet McDowell.

July 18.

At 1 A.M. on the morning of the 18th Johnston received a telegram from the President to the effect that McDowell was advancing on Mana.s.sas. Stuart was immediately directed to keep Patterson amused; and leaving their sick, 1700 in number, to the care of Winchester, the troops were ordered to strike tents and prepare to march. No man knew the object of the movement, and when the regiments pa.s.sed through Winchester, marching southward, with their backs to the enemy, the step was lagging and the men dispirited. A few miles out, as they turned eastward, the brigades were halted and an order was read to them. "Our gallant army under General Beauregard is now attacked by overwhelming numbers. The Commanding General hopes that his troops will step out like men, and make a forced march to save the country." The effect of this stirring appeal was instantaneous.

"The soldiers," says Jackson, "rent the air with shouts of joy, and all was eagerness and animation." The march was resumed, and as mile after mile was pa.s.sed, although there was much useless delay and the pace was slow, the faint outlines of the Blue Ridge, rising high above the Valley, changed imperceptibly to a mighty wall of rock and forest. As the night came down a long reach of the Shenandoah crossed the road. The ford was waist-deep, but the tall Virginians, plunging without hesitation into the strong current, gained the opposite sh.o.r.e with little loss of time. The guns and waggons followed in long succession through the darkling waters, and still the heavy tramp of the toiling column pa.s.sed eastward through the quiet fields. The Blue Ridge was crossed at Ashby's Gap; and at two o'clock in the morning, near the little village of Paris, the First Brigade was halted on the further slope. They had marched over twenty miles, and so great was their exhaustion that the men sank prostrate on the ground beside their muskets.* (* "The discouragements of that day's march," says Johnston, "to one accustomed to the steady gait of regular soldiers, is indescribable. The views of military obedience and command then taken both by officers and men confined their duties and obligations almost exclusively to the drill-ground and guards. In camps and marches they were scarcely known. Consequently, frequent and unreasonable delays caused so slow a rate of marching as to make me despair of joining General Beauregard in time to aid him." Johnston's Narrative.) They were already sleeping, when an officer reminded Jackson that there were no pickets round the bivouac. "Let the poor fellows sleep," was the reply; "I will guard the camp myself." And so, through the watches of the summer night, the general himself stood sentry over his unconscious troops.* (* Letter to Mrs. Jackson, Memoirs page 176.)

(MAP. SITUATION NIGHT OF JULY 17TH, 1861. Showing West: Winchester, North: Harper's Ferry, South: Warrenton and East: Was.h.i.+ngton.)

CHAPTER 1.6. THE FIRST BATTLE OF MANa.s.sAS OR BULL RUN.

July 19.

At the first streak of dawn, Jackson aroused his men and resumed the march. Before the column gained the plain, Stuart's cavalry clattered past, leaving Patterson at Charlestown, in ignorance of his adversary's escape, and congratulating himself on the success of his cautious strategy. At Piedmont, a station at the foot of the Blue Ridge, trains were waiting for the conveyance of the troops; and at four o'clock in the afternoon Jackson and his brigade had reached Mana.s.sas Junction. The cavalry, artillery, and waggons moved by road; and the remainder of Johnston's infantry was expected to follow the First Brigade without delay. But in war, unless there has been ample time for preparation, railways are not always an expeditious means of travel. The line was single; so short notice had been given that it was impossible to collect enough rolling-stock; the officials were inexperienced; there was much mismanagement; and on the morning of Sunday, July 21, only three brigades of the Army of the Shenandoah--Jackson's, Bee's, and Bartow's--together with the cavalry and artillery, had joined Beauregard. Kirby Smith's brigade, about 1900 strong, was still upon the railway.

The delay might easily have been disastrous. Happily, the Federal movements were even more tardy. Had the invading army been well organised, Beauregard would probably have been defeated before Johnston could have reached him. McDowell had advanced from Was.h.i.+ngton on the afternoon of the 16th with 35,000 men. On the morning of the 18th, the greater part of his force was concentrated at Centreville, twenty-two miles from Was.h.i.+ngton, and five and a half north-east of Mana.s.sas Junction. Beauregard's outposts had already fallen back to the banks of Bull Run, a stream made difficult by wooded and precipitous banks, from two to three miles south, and of much the same width as the Thames at Oxford.

It would have been possible to have attacked on the morning of the 19th, but the Federal commander was confronted by many obstacles. He knew little of the country. Although it was almost within sight of the capital, the maps were indifferent. Guides who could describe roads and positions from a military point of view were not forthcoming. All information had to be procured by personal reconnaissance, and few of his officers had been trained to such work. Moreover, the army was most unwieldy. 35,000 men, together with ten batteries, and the requisite train of waggons, was a force far larger than any American officer had yet set eyes upon; and the movement of such a ma.s.s demanded precise arrangement on the part of the staff, and on the part of the troops most careful attention to order and punctuality; but of these both staff and troops were incapable. The invading force might have done well in a defensive position, which it would have had time to occupy, and where the supply of food and forage, carried on from stationary magazines, would have been comparatively easy; but directly it was put in motion, inexperience and indiscipline stood like giants in the path.

The Federal troops were utterly unfitted for offensive movement, and both Scott and McDowell had protested against an immediate advance.

The regiments had only been organised in brigades a week previously.

They had never been exercised in ma.s.s. Deployment for battle had not yet been practised, and to deploy 10,000 or 20,000 men for attack is a difficult operation, even with well-drilled troops and an experienced staff. Nor were the supply arrangements yet completed.

The full complement of waggons had not arrived, and the drivers on the spot were as ignorant as they were insubordinate. The troops had received no instruction in musketry, and many of the regiments went into action without having once fired their rifles. But the protests of the generals were of no effect. The Federal Cabinet decided that in face of the public impatience it was impossible to postpone the movement. "On to Richmond" was the universal cry. The halls of Congress resounded with the fervid eloquence of the politicians. The press teemed with bombastic articles, in which the Northern troops were favourably compared with the regular armies of Europe, and the need of discipline and training for the fearless and intelligent representatives of the sovereign people was scornfully repudiated.

Ignorance of war and contempt for the lessons of history were to cost the nation dear.

The march from Was.h.i.+ngton was a brilliant spectacle. The roads south of the Potomac were covered with ma.s.ses of men, well armed and well clothed, amply furnished with artillery, and led by regular officers.

To the sound of martial music they had defiled before the President.

They were accompanied by scores of carriages. Senators, members of Congress, and even ladies swelled the long procession. A crowd of reporters rode beside the columns; and the return of a victorious army could hardly have been hailed with more enthusiasm than the departure of these untrained and unblooded volunteers. Yet, pitiful masquerade as the march must have appeared to a soldier's eye, the majority of those who broke camp that summer morning were brave men and good Americans. To restore the Union, to avenge the insult to their country's flag, they had come forward with no other compulsion than the love of their mother-land. If their self-confidence was supreme and even arrogant, it was the self-confidence of a strong and a fearless people, and their patriotism was of the loftiest kind. It would have been easy for the North, with her enormous wealth, to have organised a vast army of mercenaries wherewith to crush the South.

But no! her sons were not willing that their country's honour should be committed to meaner hands.

As they advanced into Virginia, the men, animated by their surroundings, stepped briskly forward, and the country-side was gay with fantastic uniforms and gorgeous standards. But the heat was oppressive, and the roads lay deep in dust. Knapsack, rifle, and blankets became a grievous burden. The excitement died away, and unbroken to the monotonous exertion of the march the three-months'

recruits lost all semblance of subordination. The compact array of the columns was gradually lost, and a tail of laggards, rapidly increasing, brought up the rear. Regiment mingled with regiment. By each roadside brook the men fell out in numbers. Every blackberry bush was surrounded by a knot of stragglers; and, heedless of the orders of those officers who still attempted to keep them in the ranks, scores of so-called soldiers sought the cool shade of the surrounding woods.* (* Sherman's Memoirs volume 1 page 181.) When darkness fell the army was but six miles from its morning bivouacs; and it was not till late the next day that the stragglers rejoined their regiments.

McDowell had intended to attack at once. "But I could not," he says, "get the troops forward earlier than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second day, but when I went to urge them forward, I was told that it was impossible for the men to march further. They had only come from Vienna, about six miles, and it was not more than six and a half miles further to Centreville, in all a march of twelve and a half miles; but the men were foot-weary--not so much, I was told, by the distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused by the obstructions in the road, and the slow pace we had to move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed to marching, and not used to carrying even the load of "light marching order..." The trains, hurriedly gotten together, with horses, waggons, drivers, and waggon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with difficulty and disorder, and were the cause of a day's delay in getting the provisions forward."* (* O.R. volume 2 page 324. McDowell's Report.)

On the morning of the 18th, in order to attract the enemy's attention from his right, a brigade was sent south, in the direction of Bull Run. The Confederate outposts fell back over Blackburn's Ford. The woods about the stream concealed the defenders' forces, and the Federals pushed on, bringing artillery into action. Two Confederate guns, after firing a few shots, were withdrawn under cover, and the attacking troops reached the ford. Suddenly, from the high timber on the further bank, volleys of musketry blazed out in their very faces, and then came proof that some at least of the Federal regiments were no more to be relied upon in action than on the march. A portion of the force, despite the strong position of the enemy and the heavy fire, showed a bold front, but at least one regiment turned and fled, and was only rallied far in rear. The whole affair was a mistake on the part of the commander. His troops had been heedlessly pushed forward, and General Longstreet, commanding the opposing brigade, by carefully concealing his infantry, had drawn him into an ambuscade.

The results of the action were not without importance. The Federals fell back with a loss of 83 officers and men, and the Confederates were much elated at their easy success. Among some of the Northerners, on the other hand, the sudden check to the advance, and the bold bearing of the enemy, turned confidence and enthusiasm into irrational despondency. A regiment and a battery, which had enlisted for three months and whose time was up, demanded their discharge, and notwithstanding the appeals of the Secretary of War, "moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon."* (* O.R. volume 2 page 324.

McDowell's Report.)

McDowell's plans were affected by the behaviour of his troops. He was still ignorant, so skilfully had the march from the Valley been carried out, that Johnston had escaped Patterson. He was well aware, however, that such movement was within the bounds of possibility, yet he found himself compelled to postpone attack until the 21st. The 19th and 20th were spent in reconnaissance, and in bringing up supplies; and the lack of organisation made the issue of rations a long process. But it was the general's want of confidence in his soldiers that was the main cause of delay.

The Confederates were strongly posted. The bridges and fords across Bull Run, with the exception of Sudley Ford, a long way up stream to the Federal right, were obstructed with felled trees, and covered by rude intrenchments. Even with regular troops a direct attack on a single point of pa.s.sage would have been difficult. McDowell's first idea was to pa.s.s across the front of the defences, and turn the right at Wolf Run Shoals, five miles south-east of Union Mills. The country, however, on this flank was found to be unfit for the operations of large ma.s.ses, and it was consequently determined to turn the Confederate left by way of Sudley Springs.

The Federal army consisted of five divisions of infantry, forty-three guns, and seven troops of regular cavalry. Nine batteries and eight companies of infantry were supplied by the United States army, and there was a small battalion of marines. The strength of the force told off for the attack amounted to 30,000 all told.*

(* The rifles (muzzle-loaders) used throughout the war by both Federals and Confederates compare as follows with more modern weapons:-- Sighted to Effective range yards yards American 1,000 250 Needle-gun (1866 and 1870) 660 250 Cha.s.sepot (1870) 1,320 350 Martini-Henry 2,100 400 Magazine 3,200 600

By effective range is meant the distance where, under ordinary conditions, the enemy's losses are sufficient to stop his advance.

The effective range of Brown Bess was about 60 yards. The American rifled artillery was effective, in clear weather, at 2000 yards, the 12-pounder smooth-bore at 1600, the 6-pounder at 1200.)

The Confederates, along the banks of Bull Run, disposed of 26,000 infantry, 2500 cavalry, and 55 guns. Johnston, who had arrived on the 20th, had a.s.sumed command; but, ignorant of the country, he had allowed Beauregard to make the dispositions for the expected battle.

The line occupied was extensive, six miles in length, stretching from the Stone Bridge, where the Warrenton highroad crosses Bull Run, on the left, to the ford at Union Mills on the right. Besides these two points of pa.s.sage there were no less than six fords, to each of which ran a road from Centreville. The country to the north was undulating and densely wooded, and it would have been possible for the Federals, especially as the Southern cavalry was held back south of the stream, to ma.s.s before any one of the fords, un.o.bserved, in superior numbers.

Several of the fords, moreover, were weakly guarded, for Beauregard, who had made up his mind to attack, had ma.s.sed the greater part of his army near the railroad. The Shenandoah troops were in reserve; Bee's and Bartow's brigades between McLean's and Blackburn's fords, Jackson's between Blackburn's and Mitch.e.l.l's fords, in rear of the right centre.

The position south of Bull Run, originally selected by General Lee,*

was better adapted for defence than for attack. (* O.R. volume 2 page 505.) The stream, with its high banks, ran like the ditch of a fortress along the front; and to the south was the plateau on which stands Mana.s.sas Junction. The plateau is intersected by several creeks, running through deep depressions, and dividing the high ground into a series of bold undulations, level on the top, and with gentle slopes. The most important of the creeks is Young's Branch, surrounding on two sides the commanding eminence crowned by the Henry House, and joining Bull Run a short distance below the Stone Bridge.

That part of the field which borders on Flat Run, and lies immediately north of Mana.s.sas Junction, is generally thickly wooded; but shortly after pa.s.sing New Market, the Mana.s.sas-Sudley road, running north-west, emerges into more open country, and, from the Henry House onward, pa.s.ses over several parallel ridges, deep in gra.s.s and corn, and studded between with groves of oak and pine. Here the large fields, without hedges, and scantily fenced, formed an admirable manoeuvre ground; the wide depressions of the creeks, separating the crests of the ridges by a s.p.a.ce of fifteen or sixteen hundred yards, gave free play to the artillery; the long easy slopes could be swept by fire, and the groves were no obstruction to the view. The left flank of the Confederate position, facing north, on either side of the Mana.s.sas-Sudley road, was thus an ideal battle-field.

(MAP 2. Dispositions morning of July 21st, 1861. Showing West: Groveton, North: Centreville, South: Mana.s.sas Junction and East: Union Mills.)

July 21. 6.30 A.M.

Sunday morning, the 21st of July, broke clear and warm. Through a miscarriage of orders, the Confederate offensive movement was delayed; and soon after six o'clock the Federals opened with musketry and artillery against the small brigade commanded by Colonel Evans, which held the Stone Bridge on the extreme left of the Confederate line. An hour later the Shenandoah brigades, Bee's, Bartow's, and Jackson's, together with Bonham's, were ordered up in support.

8.30 A.M.

The attack was feebly pressed, and at 8.30 Evans, observing a heavy cloud of dust rising above the woods to the north of the Warrenton road, became satisfied that the movement to his front was but a feint, and that a column of the enemy was meanwhile marching to turn his flank by way of Sudley Springs, about two miles north-west.

9 A.M.