Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War Part 52

September 20.

Lee, on receiving Pendleton's report, long after midnight, sent off orders for Jackson to drive the enemy back. When the messenger arrived, Jackson had already ridden to the front. He, too, had received news of the capture of the guns; and ordering A.P. Hill and Early,* (* Commanding Ewell's division, vice Lawton, wounded at Sharpsburg.) who were in camp near Martinsburg, to march at once to Shepherdstown, he had gone forward to reconnoitre the enemy's movements. When Lee's courier found him he was on the Shepherdstown road, awaiting the arrival of his divisions, and watching, unattended by a single aide-de-camp, the advance of Porter's infantry. He had at once grasped the situation. The Confederates were in no condition to resist an attack in force. The army was not concentrated. The cavalry was absent. No reconnaissance had been made either of lines of march or of positions. The roads were still blocked by the trains. The men were exhausted by their late exertions, and depressed by their retreat, and the straggling was terrible. The only chance of safety lay in driving back the enemy's advanced guard across the river before it could be reinforced; and the chance was seized without an instant's hesitation.

The Federals advanced leisurely, for the cavalry which should have led the way had received its orders too late to reach the rendezvous at the appointed hour, and the infantry, compelled to reconnoitre for itself, made slow progress. Porter's leading brigade was consequently not more than a mile and a half from the river when the Light Division reported to Jackson. Hill was ordered to form his troops in two lines, and with Early in close support to move at once to the attack. The Federals, confronted by a large force, and with no further object than to ascertain the whereabouts of the Confederate army, made no attempt to hold their ground. Their left and centre, composed mainly of regulars, withdrew in good order. The right, hampered by broken country, was slow to move; and Hill's soldiers, who had done much at Sharpsburg with but little loss, were confident of victory. The Federal artillery beyond the river included many of their heavy batteries, and when the long lines of the Southerners appeared in the open, they were met by a storm of sh.e.l.ls. But without a check, even to close the gaps in the ranks, or to give time to the batteries to reply to the enemy's fire, the Light Division pressed forward to the charge. The conflict was short. The Northern regulars had already pa.s.sed the ford, and only a brigade of volunteers was left on the southern bank. Bringing up his reserve regiment, the Federal general made a vain effort to prolong his front. Hill answered by calling up a brigade from his second line; and then, outnumbered and outflanked, the enemy was driven down the bluffs and across the river. The losses in this affair were comparatively small.

The Federals reported 340 killed and wounded, and of these a raw regiment, armed with condemned Enfield rifles, accounted for no less than 240. Hill's casualties were 271. Yet the engagement was not without importance. Jackson's quick action and resolute advance convinced the enemy that the Confederates were still dangerous; and McClellan, disturbed by Stuart's threat against his rear, abandoned all idea of crossing the Potomac in pursuit of Lee.

The losses at Sharpsburg may be here recorded.

JONES' DIVISION--1,800 The Stonewall Brigade, 250 strong 88 Taliaferro's Brigade 178 Starke's Brigade 287 Jones' Brigade 152 --- 700 (38 p.c.)

EWELL'S (LAWTON) DIVISION--8,600.

Lawton's Brigade, 1,150 strong 567 Early's Brigade, 1,200 strong 194 Trimble's Brigade, 700 strong 237 Hays' Brigade, 550 strong 336 ----- 1,334 (47 p.c.)

THE LIGHT DIVISION--3,000 Branch's Brigade 104 Gregg's Brigade 165 Archer's Brigade 105 Pender's Brigade 30 Field's Brigade (not engaged) -- Thomas' Brigade (at Harper's Ferry) -- --- 404 Artillery (Estimated) 50 Total 2,488 (209 officers)

D.H. HILL'S DIVISION--3,500 Rodes' Brigade 203 Garland's Brigade (estimated) 300 Anderson's Brigade 302 Ripley's Brigade (estimated) 300 Colquitt's Brigade (estimated) 300 ----- 1,405

McLAWS' DIVISION--4,500 Kershaw's Brigade 355 Cobb's Brigade 156 Semmes' Brigade 314*

Barksdale's Brigade 294 ----- 1,119

(* Semmes' four regiments, engaged in Jackson's counterstroke, reported the following percentage of loss. 53rd Georgia, 30 per cent.; 32nd Virginia, 45 per cent.; 10th Georgia, 57 per cent.; 15th Virginia, 58 per cent.)

D.R. JONES' DIVISION--3,500 Toombs' Brigade (estimated) 125 Drayton's Brigade (estimated) 400 Anderson's Brigade 87 Garnett's Brigade 99 Jenkins' Brigade 210 Kemper's Brigade (estimated) 120 ----- 1,041

WALKER'S DIVISION--3,500 Walker's Brigade 825 Ransom's Brigade 187 ----- 1,012

HOOD'S DIVISION--2,000.

Laws' Brigade 454 Hood's Brigade 548 ----- 1,002 Evans' Brigade, 250 strong 200

B.H. ANDERSON'S DIVISION--3,500 Featherston's Brigade 304 Mahone's Brigade 76 Pryor's Brigade 182 Armistead's Brigade 35 Wright's Brigade 203 Wilc.o.x' Brigade 221 ----- 1,021

ARTILLERY.

Colonel S.D. Lee's Battalion 85 Was.h.i.+ngton Artillery 34 Cavalry, etc. etc. (estimated) 143 --- 262 Grand total 9,550

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC First Corps--Hooker 2,590 Second Corps--Sumner 5,138 Fifth Corps--Porter 109 Sixth Corps--Franklin 439 Ninth Corps--Burnside 2,349 Twelfth Corps--Mansfield 1,746 Cavalry Division, etc. 39 ------ (2,108 killed) 12,410*

(* For the losses in various great battles, see Note at end of volume.)

With Porter's repulse the summer campaign of 1862 was closed. Begun on the Chickahominy, within thirty miles of Richmond, it ended on the Potomac, within seventy miles of Was.h.i.+ngton; and six months of continuous fighting had brought both belligerents to the last stage of exhaustion. Falling apart like two great battles.h.i.+ps of the older wars,

The smoke of battle drifting slow a-lee.

hulls rent by roundshot, and scuppers awash with blood, but with the colours still flying over shattered spars and tangled shrouds, the armies drew off from the tremendous struggle. Neither Confederates nor Federals were capable of further effort. Lee, gathering in his stragglers, left Stuart to cover his front, and fell back towards Winchester. McClellan was content with seizing the Maryland Heights at Harper's Ferry, and except the cavalry patrols, not a single Federal soldier was sent across the river.

The organisation was absolutely imperative. The Army of the Potomac was in no condition to undertake the invasion of Virginia. Not only had the losses in battle been very large, but the supply train, hurriedly got together after Pope's defeat, had broken down; in every arm there was great deficiency of horses; the troops, especially those who had been engaged in the Peninsula, were half-clad and badly shod; and, above all, the army was very far from sharing McClellan's conviction that Sharpsburg was a brilliant victory. The men in the ranks were not so easily deceived as their commander. McClellan, relying on a return drawn up by General Banks, now in command at Was.h.i.+ngton, estimated the Confederate army at 97,000 men, and his official reports made frequent mention of Lee's overwhelming strength.* (* Mr. Lincoln had long before this recognised the tendency of McClellan and others to exaggerate the enemy's strength.

As a deputation from New England was one day leaving the White House, a delegate turned round and said: "Mr. President, I should much like to know what you reckon to be the number the rebels have in arms against us." Without a moment's hesitation Mr. Lincoln replied: "Sir, I have the best possible reason for knowing the number to be one million of men, for whenever one of our generals engages a rebel army he reports that he has encountered a force twice his strength. Now I know we have half a million soldiers, so I am bound to believe that the rebels have twice that number.")

The soldiers knew better. They had been close enough to the enemy's lines to learn for themselves how thin was the force which manned them. They were perfectly well aware that they had been held in check by inferior numbers, and that the battle on the Antietam, tactically speaking, was no more of a victory for the North than Malvern Hill had been for the South. From dawn to dark on September 18 they had seen the tattered colours and bright bayonets of the Confederates still covering the Sharpsburg ridge; they had seen the grey line, immovable and defiant, in undisputed possession of the battle-ground, while their own guns were silent and their own generals reluctant to renew the fight. Both the Government and the people expected McClellan to complete his success by attacking Lee in Virginia. The Confederates, it was said--and men based their opinions on McClellan's reports--had been heavily defeated, not only at Antietam, but also at South Mountain; and although the Army of the Potomac might be unfit for protracted operations, the condition of the enemy must necessarily be far worse.

Such arguments, however, were entirely inapplicable to the situation.

The Confederates had not been defeated at all, either at South Mountain or Sharpsburg; and although they had eventually abandoned their positions they had suffered less than their opponents. The retreat, however, across the Potomac had undoubtedly shaken their morale. "In a military point of view," wrote Lee to Davis on September 25, "the best move, in my opinion, the army could make would be to advance upon Hagerstown and endeavour to defeat the enemy at that point. I would not hesitate to make it even with our diminished numbers did the army exhibit its former temper and condition, but, as far as I am able to judge, the hazard would be great and reverse disastrous."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 627.) But McClellan was not more cheerful. "The army," he said on the 27th, "is not now in a condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary." So far from thinking of pursuit, he thought only of the defence of the Potomac, apprehending a renewed attempt to enter Maryland, and by no means over-confident that the two army corps which he had at last sent to Harper's Ferry would be able to maintain their position if attacked.* (* O.R. volume 19 part 1 page 70.) Nor were the soldiers more eager than their commander to cross swords with their formidable enemy. "It would be useless," says General G.H.

Gordon, who now commanded a Federal division, "to deny that at this period there was a despondent feeling in the army," and the Special Correspondents of the New York newspapers, the 'World' and 'Tribune,'

confirm the truth of this statement. But the clearest evidence as to the condition of the troops is furnished in the numerous reports which deal with straggling. The vice had reached a pitch which is almost inconceivable. Thousands and tens of thousands, Federals as well as Confederates, were absent from their commands.

"The States of the North," wrote McClellan, "are flooded with deserters and absentees. One corps of this army has 18,000 men present and 15,000 absent; of this 15,000, 8,000 probably are at work at home."* (* Ibid part 2 page 365.) On September 28, General Meade, who had succeeded to the command of Hooker's corps, reported that over 8000 men, including 250 officers, had quitted the ranks either before or during the battle of Antietam; adding that "this terrible and serious evil seems to pervade the whole body."* (* Ibid page 348.) The Confederates, although the privations of the troops during the forced marches, their indifferent equipment, and the deficiencies of the commissariat were contributory causes, had almost as much reason to complain. It is said that in the vicinity of Leesburg alone over 10,000 men were living on the citizens. Jackson's own division, which took into action 1600 effectives on September 17 and lost 700, had 3900 present for duty on September 30; Lawton's division rose from 2500 to 4450 during the same period; and the returns show that the strength of Longstreet's and Jackson's corps was only 87, 992 on September 22, but 52,019 on October 1.* (* O.R. volume 19 part 2 pages 621, 639.) It is thus evident that in eight days the army was increased by more than 14,000 men, yet only a few conscripts had been enrolled. Lee's official reports and correspondence allude in the strongest terms to the indiscipline of his army. "The absent," he wrote on September 23, "are scattered broadcast over the land;" and in the dispatches of his subordinates are to be found many references to the vagrant tendencies of their commands.* (* General orders, September 4; Lee to Davis, September 7; Lee to Davis, September 13; special orders, September 21; circular order, September 22; Lee to Davis, September 23; Lee to Secretary of War, September 23; Lee to Pendleton, September 24; Lee to Davis, September 24; Lee to Davis, September 28; Lee to Davis October 2; O.R. volume 19 part 2. See also Report of D.H. Hill, O.R. volume 19 part 1 page l026. Stuart to Secretary of War, October 13. On September 21, Jackson's adjutant-general wrote, "We should have gained a victory and routed them, had it not been for the straggling. We were twenty-five thousand short by this cause." Memoirs of W.N. Pendleton, D.D. page 217. It is but fair to say that on September 13 there was a camp of 900 barefooted men at Winchester, and "a great many more with the army." Lee to Quarter-Master General, O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 614.) A strong provost guard was established at Winchester for the purpose of collecting stragglers. Parties of cavalry were sent out to protect the farms from pillage, and to bring in the marauders as prisoners. The most stringent regulations were issued as to the preservation of order on the march, the security of private property, and the proper performance of their duties by regimental and commissariat officers. On September 23, General Jones reported from Winchester that the country was full of stragglers, that be had already sent back 5000 or 6000, and that the numbers of officers amongst them was astonis.h.i.+ng.* (*3 O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 629.) The most earnest representations were made to the President, suggesting trial of the offenders by drumhead court-martial, and ordinary police duties became the engrossing occupation of every general officer.

It can hardly be said, then, that the Confederates had drawn much profit from the invasion of Maryland. The capture of Harper's Ferry made but small amends for the retreat into Virginia; and the stubborn endurance of Sharpsburg, however remarkable in the annals of war, had served no useful purpose beyond crippling for the time being the Federal army. The battle must be cla.s.sed with Aspern and Talavera; Lee's soldiers saved their honour, but no more. The facts were not to be disguised. The Confederates had missed their mark. Only a few hundred recruits had been raised in Maryland, and there had been no popular outbreak against the Union Government. The Union army had escaped defeat; Lincoln had been able to announce to the Northern people that Lee's victorious career had at length been checked; and 12,000 veteran soldiers, the flower of the Southern army, had fallen in battle. Had General Longstreet's advice been taken, and the troops withdrawn across the Potomac after the fall of Harper's Ferry, this enormous loss, which the Confederacy could so ill afford, would certainly have been avoided. Yet Lee was not ill-satisfied with the results of the campaign, nor did Jackson doubt the wisdom of accepting battle on the Antietam.

The hazard was great, but the stake was greater. To achieve decisive success in war some risk must be run. "It is impossible," says Moltke, "to forecast the result of a pitched battle;" but this is no reason that pitched battles, if there is a fair prospect of success, should be s.h.i.+rked. And in the Sharpsburg campaign the Confederates had undoubtedly fair prospects of success. If the lost order had not fallen into McClellan's hands, Lee in all probability would have had ample time to select his battlefield and concentrate his army; there would have been no need of forced marches, and consequently much less straggling. Both Lee and Jackson counted on the caution of their opponent. Both were surprised by the unwonted vigour be displayed, especially at South Mountain and in the march to Sharpsburg. Such resolution in action, they were aware, was foreign to his nature. "I cannot understand this move of McClellan's," was Jackson's remark, when it was reported that the Federal general had boldly advanced against the strong position on South Mountain. But neither Lee nor Jackson was aware that McClellan had exact information of their dispositions, and that the carelessness of a Confederate staff officer had done more for the Union than all the Northern scouts and spies in Maryland. Jackson had been disposed to leave a larger margin for accidents than his commander. He would have left Harper's Ferry alone, and have fought the Federals in the mountains;* (* Dabney volume 2 page 302.) and he was probably right, for in the Gettysburg campaign of the following year, when Lee again crossed the Potomac, Harper's Ferry was ignored, although occupied by a strong garrison, and neither in advance nor retreat were the Confederate communications troubled. But as to the wisdom of giving battle on the Antietam, after the fall of Harper's Ferry, there was no divergence of opinion between Lee and his lieutenant. They had no reason to respect the Union army as a weapon of offence, and very great reason to believe that McClellan was incapable of wielding it. Their antic.i.p.ations were well founded. The Federal attack was badly designed and badly executed. If it be compared with the German attack at Worth, the defects of McClellan, the defects of his subordinates, the want of sound training throughout the whole army, become at once apparent. On August 6, 1870, there was certainly, early in the day, much disjointed fighting, due in great part to the difficulties of the country, the absence of the Crown Prince, and the anxiety of the generals to render each other loyal support. But when once the Commander-in-Chief appeared upon the field, and, a.s.suming direction of the battle, infused harmony into the operations, the strength and unity of the attack could hardly have been surpa.s.sed. Almost at the same moment 30,000 men were launched against McMahon's front, 25,000 against his right, and 10,000 against his left. Every battalion within sound of the cannon partic.i.p.ated in the forward movement; and numerous batteries, crossing the stream which corresponds with the Antietam, supported the infantry at the closest range. No general hesitated to act on his own responsibility. Everywhere there was co-operation, between infantry and artillery, between division and division, between army corps and army corps; and such co-operation, due to a sound system of command, is the characteristic mark of a well-trained army and a wise leader. At Sharpsburg, on the other hand, there was no combination whatever, and even the army corps commanders dared not act without specific orders. There was nothing like the close concert and the aggressive energy which had carried the Southerners to victory at Gaines' Mill and the Second Mana.s.sas.

The principle of mutual support was utterly ignored. The army corps attacked in succession and not simultaneously, and in succession they were defeated. McClellan fought three separate battles, from dawn to 10 A.M. against Lee's left; from 10 A.M. to 1 P.M. against his centre; from 1 to 4 P.M. against his right. The subordinate generals, although, with a few exceptions, they handled their commands skilfully, showed no initiative, and waited for orders instead of improving the opportunity. Only two-thirds of the army was engaged; 25,000 men hardly fired a shot, and from first to last there was not the slightest attempt at co-operation. McClellan was made aware by his signallers on the Red Hill of every movement that took place in his opponent's lines, and yet he was unable to take advantage of Lee's weakness. He had still to grasp the elementary rule that the combination of superior numbers and of all arms against a single point is necessary to win battles.

The Northern infantry, indeed, had not fought like troops who own their opponents as the better men. Rather had they displayed an elasticity of spirit unsuspected by their enemies; and the Confederate soldiers, who knew with what fierce courage the attack had been sustained, looked on the battle of Sharpsburg as the most splendid of their achievements. No small share of the glory fell to Jackson. Since the victory of Cedar Run, his fame, somewhat obscured by Frayser's Farm and Malvern Hill, had increased by leaps and bounds, and the defence of the West Wood was cla.s.sed with the march to Mana.s.sas Junction, the three days' battle about Groveton, and the swift seizure of Harper's Ferry. On October 2, Lee proposed to the President that the Army of Northern Virginia should be organised in two army corps, for the command of which he recommended Longstreet and Jackson. "My opinion," wrote Lee, "of General Jackson has been greatly enhanced during this expedition. He is true, honest, and brave; has a single eye to the good of the service, and spares no exertion to accomplish his object."* (* O.R. volume 19 part 2 page 643.) On October 11, Jackson received his promotion as Lieutenant-General, and was appointed to the Second Army Corps, consisting at that date of his own division, the Light Division, Ewell's, and D.H. Hill's, together with Colonel Brown's battalion of artillery; a force of 1917 officers, 25,000 men, and 126 guns.

Jackson does not appear to have been unduly elated by his promotion, for two days after his appointment he wrote to his wife that there was no position in the world equal to that of a minister of the Gospel, and his letter was princ.i.p.ally concerned with the lessons he had learned from the sermon of the previous Sunday.* (* About this time he made a successful appearance in a new role. In September, General Bradley T. Johnson was told off to accompany Colonel Garnet Wolseley, the Hon. Francis Lawley, Special Correspondent to the Times, and Mr. Vizetelly, Special Correspondent of the Ill.u.s.trated London News, round the Confederate camps. "By order of General Lee,"

he says, "I introduced the party to General Jackson. We were all seated in front of General Jackson's tent, and he took up the conversation. He had been to England, and had been greatly impressed with the architecture of Durham Cathedral and with the history of the bishopric. The Bishops had been Palatines from the date of the Conquest, and exercised semi-royal authority over their bishopric.

"There is a fair history of the Palatinate of Durham in Blackstone and c.o.ke, but I can hardly think that General Jackson derived his information from those two fountains of the law. Anyhow, he cross-examined the Englishmen in detail about the cathedral and the close and the rights of the bishops, etc. etc. He gave them no chance to talk, and kept them busy answering questions, for he knew more about Durham than they did.

"As we rode away, I said: "Gentlemen, you have disclosed Jackson in a new character to me, and I've been carefully observing him for a year and a half. You have made him exhibit finesse, for he did all the talking to keep you from asking too curious or embarra.s.sing questions. I never saw anything like it in him before.* We all laughed, and agreed that the General had been too much for the interviewers." (* Memoirs pages 580 and 581.)

The soldiers of the Second Army Corps, however, did not allow him to forget his greatness. In their bivouacs by the clear waters of the Opequon, with abundance of supplies and with ample leisure for recuperation, the troops rapidly regained their strength and spirit.

The reaction found vent in the most extravagant gaiety. No circ.u.mstance that promised entertainment was permitted to pa.s.s without attention, and the jest started at the expense of some unfortunate wight, conspicuous for peculiarity of dress or demeanour, was taken up by a hundred voices. None were spared. A trim staff officer was horrified at the irreverent reception of his nicely twisted moustache, as he heard from behind innumerable trees: "Take them mice out o' your mouth! take 'em out--no use to say they ain't there, see their tails hanging out!" Another, sporting immense whiskers, was urged "to come out o' that bunch of hair! I know you're in there! I see your ears a-working!" So the soldiers chaffed the dandies, and the camp rang with laughter; fun and frolic were always in the air, and the fierce fighters of Sharpsburg behaved like schoolboys on a holiday. But when the general rode by the men remembered the victories they had won and to whom they owed them, the hards.h.i.+ps they had endured, and who had shared them; and the appearance of 'Little Sorrel' was the sure precursor of a scene of the wildest enthusiasm. The horse soon learned what the cheers implied, and directly they began he would break into a gallop, as if to carry his rider as quickly as possible through the embarra.s.sing ordeal. But the soldiers were not to be deterred by their commander's modesty, and whenever he was compelled to pa.s.s through the bivouacs the same tribute was so invariably offered that the sound of a distant cheer, rolling down the lines of the Second Army Corps, always evoked the exclamation: "Boys, look out! here comes old Stonewall or an old hare!" "These being the only individuals," writes one of Jackson's soldiers, "who never failed to bring down the whole house."

Nothing could express more clearly the loyalty of the soldiers to their general than this quaint estimate of his popularity. The Anglo-Saxon is averse to the unrestrained display of personal affection; and when his natural reluctance is overborne by irrepressible emotion, he attempts to hide it by a jest. So Jackson's veterans laughed at his peculiarities, at his dingy uniform, his battered cap, his respect for clergymen, his punctilious courtesy, and his blushes. They delighted in the phrase, when a distant yell was heard, "Here's "Old Jack" or a rabbit!" They delighted more in his confusion when he galloped through the shouting camp. "Here he comes," they said, "we'll make him take his hat off." They invented strange fables of which he was the hero. "Stonewall died," ran one of the most popular, "and two angels came down from heaven to take him back with them. They went to his tent. He was not there. They went to the hospital. He was not there. They went to the outposts. He was not there. They went to the prayer-meeting. He was not there. So they had to return without him; but when they reported that he had disappeared, they found that he had made a flank march and reached heaven before them." Another was to the effect that whereas Moses took forty years to get the children of Israel through the wilderness, ""Old Jack" would have double-quicked them through in three days on half rations!"

But, nevertheless, beneath this affectation of hilarity lay a deep and pa.s.sionate devotion; and two incidents which occurred at this time show the extent of this feeling, and at least one reason for its existence. "On October 8th," writes Major Heros von Borcke, adjutant-general of the cavalry division, "I was honoured with the pleasing mission of presenting to Stonewall, as a slight token of Stuart's high regard, a new uniform coat, which had just arrived from the hands of a Richmond tailor. Starting at once, I reached the simple tent of our great general just in time for dinner. I found him in his old weather-stained coat, from which all the b.u.t.tons had been clipped by the fair hands of patriotic ladies, and which, from exposure to sun, rain, and powder-smoke, and by reason of many rents and patches, was in a very unseemly condition. When I had dispatched more important matters, I produced General Stuart's present in all its magnificence of gilt b.u.t.tons and sheeny facings and gold lace, and I was heartily amused at the modest confusion with which the hero of many battles regarded the fine uniform, scarcely daring to touch it, and at the quiet way in which at last he folded it up carefully and deposited it in his portmanteau, saying to me, "Give Stuart my best thanks, Major; the coat is much too handsome for me, but I shall take the best care of it, and shall prize it highly as a souvenir.

And now let us have some dinner." But I protested emphatically against the summary disposition of the matter of the coat, deeming my mission indeed but half executed, and remarked that Stuart would certainly ask how the coat fitted, and that I should take it as a personal favour if he would put it on. To this with a smile he readily a.s.sented, and having donned the garment, he escorted me outside the tent to the table where dinner had been served in the open air. The whole of the staff were in a perfect ecstasy at their chief's brilliant appearance, and the old negro servant, who was bearing the roast turkey to the board, stopped in mid career with a most bewildered expression, and gazed in such wonderment at his master as if he had been transfigured before him. Meanwhile, the rumour of the change ran like electricity through the neighbouring camps, the soldiers came running by hundreds to the spot, desirous of seeing their beloved Stonewall in his new attire; and the first wearing of a new robe by Louis XIV, at whose morning toilette all the world was accustomed to a.s.semble, never created half the excitement at Versailles that was roused in the woods of Virginia by the investment of Jackson in the new regulation uniform."* (* Memoirs of the Confederate War volume 1.)

The second incident is less amusing, but was not less appreciated by the rank and file. Riding one morning near Front Royal, accompanied by his staff, Jackson was stopped by a countrywoman, with a chubby child on either side, who inquired anxiously for her son Johnnie, serving, she said, "in Captain Jackson's company." The general, with the deferential courtesy he never laid aside, introduced himself as her son's commanding officer, but begged for further information as to his regiment. The good dame, however, whose interest in the war centred on one individual, appeared astonished that Captain Jackson "did not know her particular Johnnie," and repeated her inquiries with such tearful emphasis that the young staff officers began to smile. Unfortunately for themselves, Jackson heard a t.i.tter, and turning on them with a scathing rebuke for their want of manners, he sent them off in different directions to discover Johnnie, giving them no rest until mother and son were brought together.

But if the soldiers loved Jackson for his simplicity, and respected him for his honesty, beyond and above was the sense of his strength and power, of his indomitable will, of the inflexibility of his justice, and of the unmeasured resources of his vigorous intellect.

It is curious even after the long lapse of years to hear his veterans speak of their commander. Laughter mingles with tears; each has some droll anecdote to relate, each some instance of thoughtful sympathy or kindly deed; but it is still plain to be seen how they feared his displeasure, how hard they found his discipline, how conscious they were of their own mental inferiority. The mighty phantom of their lost leader still dominates their thoughts; just as in the battles of the Confederacy his earthly presentment dominated the will of the Second Army Corps. In the campaign which had driven the invaders from Virginia, and carried the Confederate colours to within sight of Was.h.i.+ngton, his men had found their master. They had forgotten how to criticise. His generals had learned to trust him. Success and adulation had not indeed made him more expansive. He was as reticent as ever, and his troops--the foot-cavalry as they were now called--were still marched to and fro without knowing why or whither.

But men and officers, instead of grumbling when they were roused at untimely hours, or when their marches were prolonged, without apparent necessity, obeyed with alacrity, and amused themselves by wondering what new surprise the general was preparing. "Where are you going?" they were asked as they were turned out for an unexpected march: "We don't know, but Old Jack does," was the laughing reply.

And they had learned something of his methods. They had discovered the value of time, of activity, of mystery, of resolution. They discussed his stratagems, gradually evolving, for they were by no means apparent at the time, the object and aim of his manoeuvres; and the stirring verses, sung round every camp-fire, show that the soldiers not only grasped his principles of warfare, but that they knew right well to whom their victories were to be attributed.

STONEWALL JACKSON'S WAY

Come, stack arms, men, pile on the rails; Stir up the camp-fires bright; No matter if the canteen fails, We'll make a roaring night.

Here Shenandoah brawls along, There lofty Blue Ridge echoes strong, To swell the Brigade's roaring song Of Stonewall Jackson's way.

We see him now--the old slouched has, c.o.c.ked o'er his eye askew; The shrewd dry smile--the speech so pat, So calm, so blunt, so true.

The "Blue-Light Elder" knows them well: Says he, "That's Banks--he's fond of sh.e.l.l; Lord save his soul! we'll give him ----" well, That's Stonewall Jackson's way.

Silence! ground arms! kneel all! caps off!

Old Blue-Light's going to pray; Strangle the fool that dares to scoff!

Attention! it's his way!

Appealing from his native sod, In forma pauperis to G.o.d, "Lay bare thine arm-stretch forth thy rod, Amen!" That's Stonewall's way.