Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War Part 18

No battle was ever yet fought in exact accordance with the demands of theory, and Kernstown, great in its results, gives openings to the critics. Jackson, it is said, attacked with tired troops, on insufficient information, and contrary to orders. As to the first, it may be said that his decision to give the enemy no time to bring up fresh troops was absolutely justified by events. On hearing of his approach to Kernstown, Banks immediately countermarched a brigade of Williams' division from Castleman's Ferry. A second brigade was recalled from Snicker's Gap on the morning of the 24th, and reached Winchester the same evening, after a march of six-and-twenty miles.

Had attack been deferred, s.h.i.+elds would have been strongly reinforced.

As to the second, Jackson had used every means in his power to get accurate intelligence.* (* The truth is that in war, accurate intelligence, especially when two armies are in close contact, is exceedingly difficult to obtain. At Jena, even after the battle ended, Napoleon believed that the Prussians had put 80,000 men in line instead of 45,000. The night before Eylau, misled by the reports of Murat's cavalry, he was convinced that the Russians were retreating; and before Ligny he underestimated Blucher's strength by 40,000. The curious misconceptions under which the Germans commenced the battles of Spicheren, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte will also occur to the military reader.) Ashby had done his best. Although the Federals had 780 cavalry present, and every approach to Winchester was strongly picketed, his scouts had pushed within the Federal lines, and had communicated with the citizens of Winchester. Their reports were confirmed, according to Jackson's despatch, "from a source which had been remarkable for its reliability," and for the last two days a retrograde movement towards Snicker's Gap had been reported. The ground, it is true, favoured an ambush. But the strategic situation demanded instant action. McClellan's advanced guard was within fifty miles of Johnston's position on the Rapidan, and a few days' march might bring the main armies into collision. If Jackson was to bring Banks back to the Valley, and himself join Johnston before the expected battle, he had no time to spare.

Moreover, the information to hand was quite sufficient to justify him in trusting something to fortune. Even a defeat, if the attack were resolutely pushed, might have the best effect.

The third reproach, that Jackson disobeyed orders, can hardly be sustained. He was in command of a detached force operating at a distance from the main army, and Johnston, with a wise discretion, had given him not orders, but instructions; that is, the general-in-chief had merely indicated the purpose for which Jackson's force had been detached, and left to his judgment the manner in which that purpose was to be achieved. Johnston had certainly suggested that he should not expose himself to the danger of defeat. But when it became clear that he could not retain the enemy in the Valley unless he closed with him, to have refrained from attack would have been to disobey the spirit of his instructions.

Again, when Jackson attacked he had good reason to believe that he ran no risk of defeat whatever. The force before him was reported as inferior to his own, and he might well have argued: "To confine myself to observation will be to confess my weakness, and Banks is not likely to arrest his march to Mana.s.sas because of the presence of an enemy who dare not attack an insignificant rearguard."

Demonstrations, such as Johnston had advised, may undoubtedly serve a temporary purpose, but if protracted the enemy sees through them. On the 22nd, for instance, it was reported to Banks that the Confederates were advancing. The rear brigade of Williams' division was therefore countermarched from Snicker's Gap to Berryville; but the other two were suffered to proceed. Had Jackson remained quiescent in front of s.h.i.+elds, tacitly admitting his inferiority, the rear brigade would in all probability have soon been ordered to resume its march; and Lincoln, with no fear for Was.h.i.+ngton, would have allowed Blenker and McDowell to join McClellan.

Johnston, at least, held that his subordinate was justified. In publis.h.i.+ng the thanks of the Confederate Congress tendered to Jackson and his division, he expressed, at the same time, "his own sense of their admirable conduct, by which they fully earned the high reward bestowed."

During the evening of the 23rd the medical director of the Valley army was ordered to collect vehicles, and send the wounded to the rear before the troops continued their retreat. Some time after midnight Dr. McGuire, finding that there were still a large number awaiting removal, reported the circ.u.mstances to the general, adding that he did not know where to get the means of transport, and that unless some expedient were discovered the men must be abandoned.

Jackson ordered him to impress carriages in the neighbourhood. "But,"

said the surgeon, "that requires time; can you stay till it has been done?" "Make yourself easy, sir," was the reply. "This army stays here until the last man is removed. Before I leave them to the enemy I will lose many men more." Fortunately, before daylight the work was finished.

NOTE TO CHAPTER 1.8.

The exact losses at Kernstown were as follows:--

BY BRIGADE: COLUMN 1: BRIGADE. COLUMN 2: KILLED. COLUMN 3: WOUNDED.

COLUMN 4: MISSING. COLUMN 5: TOTAL.

CONFEDERATES. Stonewall Brigade : 40 : 151 : 152 : 343. Burke's Brigade : 24 : 114 : 39 : 177. Fulkerson's Brigade : 15 : 76 : 71 : 162. Cavalry : 1 : 17 : - : 18. Artillery : - : 17 : 1 : 18.

BY REGIMENT. COLUMN 1: REGIMENT. COLUMN 2: STRENGTH. COLUMN 3: KILLED. COLUMN 4: WOUNDED. COLUMN 5: MISSING. COLUMN 6: TOTAL.

2nd Virginia : 320 N.C.O. and men : 6 : 33 : 51 : 90 4th Virginia : 203 N.C.O. and men : 5 : 23 : 48 : 76 5th Virginia : 450 N.C.O. and men : 9 : 48 : 4 : 61 27th Virginia : 170 N.C.O.

and men : 2 : 20 : 35 : 57 33rd Virginia : 275 N.C.O. and men : 18 : 27 : 14 : 59 21st Virginia : 270 officers and men : 7 : 44 : 9 : 60 42nd Virginia : 293 officers and men : 11 : 50 : 9 : 70 1st Virginia : 187 officers and men : 6 : 20 : 21 : 47 23rd Virginia : 177 officers and men : 3 : 14 : 32 : 49 27th Virginia : 897 N.C.O.

and men : 12 : 62 : 39 : 113

Total casualties = 718: 80 killed including 5 officers. 375 wounded including 22 officers. 263 missing including 10 officers. 13 per cent killed and wounded. 20 per cent killed, wounded and missing.

FEDERALS.

Total casualties = 590: 118 killed including 6 officers. 450 wounded including 27 officers. 22 missing. 6 per cent.

According to the reports of his regimental commanders, Jackson took into battle (including 48th Virginia) 3087 N.C.O. and men of infantry, 290 cavalry, and 27 guns. 2742 infantry, 290 cavalry, and 18 guns were engaged, and his total strength, including officers, was probably about 3500. s.h.i.+elds, in his first report of the battle, put down the strength of his own division as between 7000 and 8000 men.

Four days later he declared that it did not exceed 7000, namely 6000 infantry, 750 cavalry, and 24 guns. It is probable that only those actually engaged are included in this estimate, for on March 17 he reported the strength of the troops which were present at Kernstown six days later as 8374 infantry, 608 artillerymen, and 780 cavalry; total, 9752.* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 4.)

CHAPTER 1.9. M'DOWELL.

1862. March 23.

The stars were still s.h.i.+ning when the Confederates began their retreat from Kernstown. With the exception of seventy, all the wounded had been brought in, and the army followed the ambulances as far as Woodstock.

March 25.

There was little attempt on the part of the Federals to improve their victory. The hard fighting of the Virginians had left its impress on the generals. Jackson's numbers were estimated at 15,000, and Banks, who arrived in time to take direction of the pursuit, preferred to wait till Williams' two brigades came up before he moved. He encamped that night at Cedar Creek, eight miles from Kernstown. The next day he reached Strasburg. The cavalry pushed on to near Woodstock, and there, for the time being, the pursuit terminated. s.h.i.+elds, who remained at Winchester to nurse his wound, sent enthusiastic telegrams announcing that the retreat was a flight, and that the houses along the road were filled with Jackson's dead and dying; yet the truth was that the Confederates were in nowise pressed, and only the hopeless cases had been left behind.* (* Major Harman wrote on March 26 that 150 wounded had been brought to Woodstock. Ma.n.u.script.) Had the 2000 troopers at Banks' disposal been sent forward at daybreak on the 24th, something might have been done. The squadrons, however, incapable of moving across country, were practically useless in pursuit; and to start even at daybreak was to start too late. If the fruits of victory are to be secured, the work must be put in hand whilst the enemy is still reeling under the shock. A few hours' delay gives him time to recover his equilibrium, to organise a rear-guard, and to gain many miles on his rearward march.

March 26.

On the night of the 26th, sixty hours after the battle ceased, the Federal outposts were established along Tom's Brook, seventeen miles from Kernstown. On the opposite bank were Ashby's cavalry, while Burks' brigade lay at Woodstock, six miles further south. The remainder of the Valley army had reached Mount Jackson.

These positions were occupied until April 1, and for six whole days Banks, with 19,000 men, was content to observe a force one-sixth his strength, which had been defeated by just half the numbers he had now at his disposal. This was hardly the "vigorous action" which McClellan had demanded. "As soon as you are strong enough," he had telegraphed, "push Jackson hard, drive him well beyond Strasburg, pursuing at least as far as Woodstock, if possible, with cavalry to Mount Jackson."* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 16. The telegrams and letters quoted in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, are from this volume.)

In vain he reiterated the message on the 27th: "Feel Jackson's rear-guard smartly and push him well." Not a single Federal crossed Tom's Brook. "The superb scenery of the Valley," writes General G.H.

Gordon, a comrade of Jackson's at West Point, and now commanding the 2nd Ma.s.sachusetts, one of Banks' best regiments, "opened before us--the sparkling waters of the Shenandoah, winding between the parallel ranges, the groves of cedar and pine that lined its banks, the rolling surfaces of the Valley, peacefully resting by the mountain side, and occupied by rich fields and quiet farms. A mile beyond I could see the rebel cavalry. Sometimes the enemy amused himself by throwing sh.e.l.ls at our pickets, when they were a little too venturesome; but beyond a feeble show of strength and ugliness, nothing transpired to disturb the dulness of the camp."* (* From Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain page 133.)

Banks, far from all support, and with a cavalry unable to procure information, was by no means free from apprehension. Johnston had already fallen back into the interior of Virginia, and the Army of the Potomac, instead of following him, was taking s.h.i.+p at Alexandria.

Information had reached Strasburg that the Confederates were behind the Rapidan, with their left at Gordonsville. Now Gordonsville is sixty-five miles, or four marches, from Mount Jackson, and there was reason to believe that reinforcements had already been sent to Jackson from that locality. On March 25 Banks telegraphed to Mr.

Stanton: "Reported by rebel Jackson's aide (a prisoner) that they were a.s.sured of reinforcements to 30,000, but don't credit it." On March 26: "The enemy is broken, but will rally. Their purpose is to unite Jackson's and Longstreet's* (* Commanding a division under Johnston.) forces, some 20,000, at New Market (seven miles south of Mount Jackson) or Was.h.i.+ngton (east of Blue Ridge) in order to operate on either side of the mountains, and will desire to prevent our junction with the force at Mana.s.sas. At present they will not attack here. It will relieve me greatly to know how far the enemy (i.e.

Johnston) will be pressed in front of Mana.s.sas." On the 27th his news was less alarming: "Enemy is about four miles below Woodstock. No reinforcement received yet. Jackson has constant communication with Johnston, who is east of the mountains, probably at Gordonsville. His pickets are very strong and vigilant, none of the country people being allowed to pa.s.s the lines under any circ.u.mstances. The same rule is applied to troops, stragglers from Winchester not being permitted to enter their lines. We shall press them further and quickly."

The pressure, however, was postponed; and on the 29th McClellan desired Banks to ascertain the intentions of the enemy as soon as possible, and if he were in force to drive him from the Valley of the Shenandoah. Thus spurred, Banks at last resolved to cross the Rubicon. "Deficiency," he replied, "in ammunition for s.h.i.+elds'

artillery detains us here; expect it hourly, when we shall push Jackson sharply." It was not, however, till April 2, four days later, that Mr. Lincoln's protege crossed Tom's Brook. His advanced guard, after a brisk skirmish with Ashby, reached the village of Edenburg, ten miles south, the same evening. The main body occupied Woodstock, and McClellan telegraphed that he was "much pleased with the vigorous pursuit!"

It is not impossible that Banks suspected that McClellan's commendations were ironical. In any case, praise had no more effect upon him than a peremptory order or the promise of reinforcements. He was instructed to push forward as far as New Market; he was told that he would be joined by two regiments of cavalry, and that two brigades of Blenker's division were marching to Strasburg. But Jackson, although Ashby had been driven in, still held obstinately to his position, and from Woodstock and Edenburg Banks refused to move.

On April 4, becoming independent of McClellan,* (* On this date McClellan ceased to be Commander-in-Chief.) he at once reported to the Secretary of War that he hoped "immediately to strike Jackson an effective blow." "Immediately," however, in Banks' opinion, was capable of a very liberal interpretation, for it was not till April 17 that he once more broke up his camps. Well might Gordon write that life at Edenburg became monotonous!

It is but fair to mention that during the whole of this time Banks was much troubled about supply and transport. His magazines were at Winchester, connected with Harper's Ferry and Was.h.i.+ngton by a line of railway which had been rapidly repaired, and on April 12 this line had become unserviceable through the spreading of the road-bed.* (*

The bridges over the railway between Strasburg and Mana.s.sas Gap, which would have made a second line available, had not yet been repaired.) His waggon train, moreover, had been diverted to Mana.s.sas before the fight at Kernstown, and was several days late in reaching Strasburg. The country in which he was operating was rich, and requisitions were made upon the farmers; but in the absence of the waggons, according to his own report, it was impossible to collect sufficient supplies for a further advance.* (* On April 3 Jackson wrote that the country around Banks was "very much drained of forage.") The weather, too, had been unfavourable. The first days of April were like summer. "But hardly," says Gordon, "had we begun to feel in harmony with sunny days and blooming peach trees and warm showers, before a chill came over us, bitter as the hatred of the women of Virginia: the ground covered with snow, the air thick with hail, and the mountains hidden in the chilly atmosphere. Our s.h.i.+vering sentinels on the outer lines met at times the gaze of half-frozen hors.e.m.e.n of the enemy, peering through the mist to see what the Yankees had been doing within the last twenty-four hours. It was hard to believe that we were in the 'sunny South.'"

All this, however, was hardly an excuse for absolute inaction. The Confederate position on the open ridge called Rude's Hill, two and a half miles south of Mount Jackson, was certainly strong. It was defended in front by Mill Creek, swollen by the snows to a turbulent and unfordable river; and by the North Fork of the Shenandoah. But with all its natural strength Rude's Hill was but weakly held, and Banks knew it. Moreover, it was most unlikely that Jackson would be reinforced, for Johnston's army, with the exception of a detachment under General Ewell, had left Orange Court House for Richmond on April 5. "The enemy," Banks wrote to McClellan on April 6, "is reduced to about 6000 men (sic), much demoralised by defeat, desertion, and the general depression of spirits resting on the Southern army. He is not in a condition to attack, neither to make a strong resistance, and I do not believe he will make a determined stand there. I do not believe Johnston will reinforce him." If Banks had supplies enough to enable him to remain at Woodstock, there seems to have been no valid reason why he should not have been able to drive away a demoralised enemy, and to hold a position twelve miles further south.

But the Federal commander, despite his brave words, had not yet got rid of his misgivings. Jackson had lured him into a most uncomfortable situation. Between the two branches of the Shenandoah, in the very centre of the Valley, rises a gigantic ma.s.s of mountain ridges, parallel throughout their length of fifty miles to the Blue Ridge and the Alleghanies. These are the famous Ma.s.sanuttons, the glory of the Valley. The peaks which form their northern faces sink as abruptly to the level near Strasburg as does the single hill which looks down on Harrisonburg. Dense forests of oak and pine cover ridge and ravine, and 2500 feet below, on either hand, parted by the mighty barrier, are the dales watered by the Forks of the Shenandoah. That to the east is the narrower and less open; the Blue Ridge is nowhere more than ten miles distant from the Ma.s.sanuttons, and the s.p.a.ce between them, the Luray or the South Fork Valley, through which a single road leads northward, is clothed by continuous forest. West of the great mountain, a broad expanse of green pasture and rich arable extends to the foothills of the Alleghanies, dotted with woods and homesteads, and here, in the Valley of the North Fork, is freer air and more s.p.a.ce for movement.

The separation of the two valleys is accentuated by the fact that save at one point only the Ma.s.sanuttons are practically impa.s.sable.

From New Market, in the western valley, a good road climbs the heights, and crossing the lofty plateau, sinks sharply down to Luray, the princ.i.p.al village on the South Fork. Elsewhere precipitous gullies and sheer rock faces forbid all access to the mountain, and a few hunters' paths alone wind tediously through the woods up the steep hillside. Nor are signal stations to be found on the wide area of unbroken forest which clothes the summit. Except from the peaks at either end, or from one or two points on the New Market-Luray road, the view is intercepted by the sea of foliage and the rolling spurs.

Striking eastward from Luray, two good roads cross the Blue Ridge; one running to Culpeper Court House, through Thornton's Gap; the other through Fisher's Gap to Gordonsville.

It was the Ma.s.sanuttons that weighed on the mind of Banks. The Valley of the South Fork gave the Confederates a covered approach against his line of communications. Issuing from that strait cleft between the mountains Ashby's squadrons might at any time sweep down upon his trains of waggons, his hospitals, and his magazines; and should Jackson be reinforced, Ashby might be supported by infantry and guns, and both Strasburg and Winchester be endangered. It was not within Banks' power to watch the defile. "His cavalry," he reported, "was weak in numbers and spirit, much exhausted with night and day work."

Good cavalry, he declared, would help incalculably, and he admitted that in this arm he was greatly inferior to the enemy.

Nor was he more happy as to the Alleghanies on his right. Fremont was meditating an advance on Lewisburg, Staunton, and the Virginia and Tennessee Railway with 25,000 men.* (* See ante.) One column was to start from Gauley Bridge, in the Kanawha Valley; the other from the South Branch of the Potomac. Milroy's brigade, from Cheat Mountain, had therefore occupied Monterey, and Schenck's brigade had marched from Romney to Moorefield. But Moorefield was thirty miles west of Woodstock, and between them rose a succession of rugged ridges, within whose deep valleys the Confederate hors.e.m.e.n might find paths by which to reach to Banks' rear.

It was essential, then, that his communications should be strongly guarded, and as he advanced up the Valley his force had diminished at every march. According to his own report he had, on April 6, 16,700 men fit for duty. Of these 4100 were detached along the road from Woodstock to Harper's Ferry. His effective strength for battle was thus reduced to 12,600, or, including the troops escorting convoys and the garrison of Strasburg, to 14,500 men, with 40 pieces of artillery.* (* O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 50.)

Such were the considerations that influenced the Federal commander.

Had he occupied New Market, as McClellan had desired, he would have secured the Luray road, have opened the South Fork Valley to his scouts, and have overcome half the difficulties presented by the Ma.s.sanuttons. A vigorous advance would have turned the attention of the Confederates from his communications to their own; and to drive Jackson from the Valley was the best method of protecting the trains and the magazines. But Banks was not inclined to beard the lion in his den, and on April 16 Jackson had been unmolested for more than three weeks. Ashby's troopers were the only men who had even seen the enemy. Daily that indefatigable soldier had called to arms the Federal outposts. "Our stay at Edenburg," says Gordon, "was a continuous season of artillery brawling and picket stalking. The creek that separated the outposts was not more than ten yards wide.

About one-fourth of a mile away there was a thick wood, in which the enemy concealed his batteries until he chose to stir us up, when he would sneak up behind the cover, open upon us at an unexpected moment, and retreat rapidly when we replied." It was doubtless by such constant evidence of his vigilance that Ashby imposed caution on the enemy's reconnoitring parties. The fact remains that Jackson's camps, six miles to the rear, were never once alarmed, nor could Banks obtain any reliable information.

This period of repose was spent by Jackson in reorganising his regiments, in writing letters to his wife, and, like his old cla.s.s-mate, Gordon, in admiring the scenery. It is not to be supposed that his enforced inaction was altogether to his taste. With an enemy within sight of his outposts his bold and aggressive spirit must have been sorely tried. But with his inferior numbers prudence cried patience, and he had reason to be well content with the situation. He had been instructed to prevent Banks from detaching troops to reinforce McClellan. To attain an object in war the first consideration is to make no mistakes yourself; the next, to take instant advantage of those made by your opponent. But compliance with this rule does not embrace the whole art of generals.h.i.+p. The enemy may be too discreet to commit himself to risky manoeuvres. If the campaigns of the great masters of war are examined, it will be found that they but seldom adopted a quiescent att.i.tude, but by one means or another, by acting on their adversary's morale, or by creating false impressions, they induced him to make a false step, and to place himself in a position which made it easy for them to attain their object. The greatest general has been defined as "he who makes the fewest mistakes;" but "he who compels his adversary to make the most mistakes" is a definition of equal force; and it may even be questioned whether the general whose imagination is unequal to the stratagems which bring mistakes about is worthy of the name. He may be a trustworthy subordinate, but he can scarcely become a great leader.

Johnston had advised, when, at the beginning of March, the retreat of the Confederates from Winchester was determined on, that Jackson should fall back on Front Royal, and thence, if necessary, up the South Fork of the Shenandoah. His force would thus be in close communication with the main army behind the Rapidan; and it was contrary, in the General-in-Chief's opinion, to all sound discretion to permit the enemy to attain a point, such as Front Royal, which would render it possible for him to place himself between them.