Reminiscences of Travel in Australia, America, and Egypt Part 13

There are two cla.s.ses of people who undoubtedly view the British occupation of Egypt with great and well-founded dislike-the military party and the pachas. These cla.s.ses have always played into each other's hands, and always at the expense of the down-trodden and patient fellaheen-the backbone and mainstay of the country. For the latter cla.s.s the presence of the British army is an almost unmixed blessing.

From time immemorial the desirability of connecting the Mediterranean and Red Seas by a ca.n.a.l has been fully recognised; but the work does not appear to have been attempted before the reign of Pharaoh Necho, who undertook to construct a ca.n.a.l between the Nile and the Red Sea. In carrying out this work 120,000 Egyptians perished, and before it was completed the King abandoned it, having been informed by the Oracle that the foreigners alone would profit by the work. Eventually the ca.n.a.l was completed under the rule of Darius the Persian, and of the Ptolemies.

The ca.n.a.l was carried through the lakes Balah and Menzaleh, another branch being constructed to the Bitter Lakes, into which the fresh water ca.n.a.l-watering the land of Goshen-emptied itself; but owing to the constant state of war it fell into decay, and was abandoned.

Many suggestions as to the reopening of the waterway have been made in almost every generation since. Bonaparte, during his expedition to Egypt in 1798, even caused the preliminary works to be undertaken. His chief engineer surveyed the ground, but, owing to a serious miscalculation, threw great doubt on the possibility of carrying out the work. He estimated the level of the Red Sea to be nearly 33ft. higher than that of the Mediterranean, an idea that Leibnitz ridiculed nearly a century before. Vigorous protests against Lepere's theory were not wanting, but it was, nevertheless, sufficient to cause the abandonment of the scheme until Monsieur Lesseps directed his attention to the matter. On his appointment as an Attache to the French Mission, Lesseps had to undergo a lengthy quarantine at Alexandria; here he was supplied with books by his Consul, among them being Lepere's memoirs respecting the scheme for connecting the two seas, the effect of which upon the young Frenchman's mind was never effaced.

In 1847 a Commission of Engineers demonstrated the inaccuracy of Lepere's observations, and proved that the level of the two seas was practically the same. In 1854 Lesseps having matured his plan laid it before the Viceroy, who determined to carry it out. Palmerston, then premier, did his utmost, from political motives, to thwart the enterprise; but early in 1856 permission was given to commence the work.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in raising the capital, but on the 25th April, 1858, operations were actually begun. The Viceroy undertook to pay many of the current expenses, and provided 25,000 workmen, who were to be paid and fed by the Company at an inexpensive rate, and were to be relieved every three months. In order to provide these men with water 4,000 casks suitable for being carried on camels had to be made, and 1,600 of these animals were daily employed in bringing supplies, at a cost of 320 per day.

At the end of December, 1863, the Fresh Water Ca.n.a.l was completed, by which the Company was relieved of the enormous expense of supplying the workmen with water.

On the 18th March, 1869, the water of the Mediterranean was allowed to flow into the nearly dry salt-incrusted basins of the Bitter Lakes, some parts of which lay forty feet below the level of the Mediterranean, while others required extensive dredging operations. The Bitter Lakes have been identified with the Marah of the Bible (Exodus xv., 23-"And when they came to Marah, they could not drink of the waters of Marah for they were bitter"). The captain of our vessel informed me that in these lakes the saltness, and consequently the density, of the water is such as to cause the vessel to rise five inches above the ordinary waterline.

The cost of constructing the Ca.n.a.l amounted to about 19,000,000, more than a third of which was contributed by the Khedive. The original capital of the company in 400,000 shares amounted to 8,000,000, the difference being raised by loans payable at fixed intervals, and adding an annual burden to the scheme of 451,000. The festivities connected with the opening of the Ca.n.a.l in 1869 cost the Khedive-that is to say the taxpayer of Egypt-14,200,000, or more than half the total capital!

The great mercantile importance of the Ca.n.a.l is apparent from the following data:-Between London and Bombay forty-four per cent. of the distance is saved by through-going s.h.i.+ps; between London and Hong Kong twenty-eight per cent., and between Ma.r.s.eilles and Bombay fifty-nine per cent. Over eighty per cent. of the trade pa.s.sing through the Ca.n.a.l is done in British vessels, and in 1875-or six years after the Ca.n.a.l was opened-the English traffic was equal to twelve times that of the French.

In 1870, 486 steamers, representing 493,911 tons, pa.s.sed through the ca.n.a.l, and in 1882 these figures had risen to 3,198 steamers with 7,125,000 tons. (_Baedeker_).

From Port Sad the Ca.n.a.l runs in a nearly straight line to Kantara (a mere group of sheds), its course lying across the shallow lagoon-like Lake Menzaleh, which has an average depth of only three feet. The embankments are low, irregular sand-banks, formed of the dredged material, and having at the margin of the water a coa.r.s.e growth of straggling sedgy-looking vegetation. After pa.s.sing Kantara, the Balah Lakes are reached, and the course is marked out in their open surface by a double line of buoys. Then the most difficult portion of the original work is reached-viz., the cutting of El Guisr, which is six miles long, the depth from ground-level to surface of water being about forty-five feet. This is by far the highest land in the Isthmus. Leaving the El Guisr cutting, the open waters of Lake Timsah, (_Crocodile Lake_) are reached, and far away across its blue mirror-like surface stretches the double line of buoys, marking out the track. On the northern sh.o.r.e of the lake, buried in a delightful ma.s.s of vegetation, lies the French town of Ismaila, once the great centre from which operations during the construction of the Ca.n.a.l were conducted, and now one of the princ.i.p.al stations whence its navigation is controlled by means of telegraph. Lake Timsah has an area of some six or seven square miles, and the huge fleet of war vessels, transports, and tenders which Lord Wolseley used as a base for his operations in the late campaign lay there without difficulty. From Lake Timsah the Suez Ca.n.a.l holds a roughly parallel course with the Freshwater Ca.n.a.l and the Suez line of railway, and pa.s.ses through a long cutting into the Bitter Lakes, an extremely tame and uninteresting sheet of water some fifteen miles long, with flat, low, sandy banks, and thence into another long cutting-some twenty-six feet deep at Shalouf-after which the flat sandy plains of Suez are traversed, and the head of the gulf reached.

The impression is general that the Suez Ca.n.a.l is cut through immense deposits of sand, or sand and water, but this is quite erroneous. The desert, it is true, is sandy and sterile, but the sand is quite superficial, covering a gypseous clay, not at all difficult to work in.

From Balah to the Bitter Lakes there is fine muddy sand, with clay at intervals, and at Serapeum a rocky barrier. From the Bitter Lakes to Suez, however, there is a good clay, with limestone at Shalouf. The sinuosities in the Ca.n.a.l are such as to render the pa.s.sage of vessels over 400 feet long somewhat difficult. It was expected that these curves would prevent the was.h.i.+ng away of the banks, but it is doubtful whether they have at all contributed to the preservation of the sandy embankments. Indeed, most of the predictions of the early destruction of the Ca.n.a.l by the operation of natural causes have been proved to be as ill-founded as such predictions generally are. The banks have no ill-regulated propensity for crumbling away. The Ca.n.a.l is _not_ in perpetual and imminent danger of being silted-up. The enormous and costly dredging operations that were to swallow more than the revenue of the undertaking are unknown, and the sole matter for regret is that the Ca.n.a.l was not made as wide again as it is, for the accommodation of the vast traffic it has created. Among the many confident prophesies made by professional engineers of the day, one stands recorded in the technical papers to the effect that every vessel must necessarily be towed through the Ca.n.a.l, the explanation being that the regulation speed of five miles per hour was not sufficient to afford steering "way"; hence, said the prophet, the slightest wind across the line of the Ca.n.a.l must infallibly blow ash.o.r.e any vessel whose commander should have the temerity to attempt to steam between the two seas. Experience, however, has shown that the largest vessels are under perfect command when propelled by their own engines.

It is impossible for anyone to pa.s.s through the Ca.n.a.l without being impressed with the urgent necessity for vastly increased accommodation for the constantly augmenting traffic. The delays occasioned by the difficulties in coaling, the blocks in the Ca.n.a.l-caused sometimes by the enormous traffic, and sometimes by the sinking of a s.h.i.+p across the narrow channel-are most vexatious. No less than five days elapsed between the time of the arrival of our steamer at Port Sad and of its departure from Suez, a distance of less than one hundred miles.

In every way it is most unfortunate for English commerce that-thanks to the mulish obstinacy of Lord Palmerston-the management of the Ca.n.a.l should have been thrown into the hands of Frenchmen; for, while according the highest meed of praise to M. de Lesseps for his genius, tenacity of purpose, and energy, in designing and carrying out such a vast undertaking in the teeth of obstacles which would have daunted most men, it is impossible to ignore the fact that, as compared with English traffic-managers, the French officials responsible for the working of the Ca.n.a.l are vastly inferior in capacity. The spirit of officialism as displayed by a liberal use of red tape, and a certain non-elasticity in carrying out the laws, so familiar to all travellers in France, exists in an intensified form in the local management of the Ca.n.a.l. To the ordinary traveller through the Ca.n.a.l, for example, it seems absurd that vessels should be stopped for the night while some hours of light remain, yet as soon as the sun goes down no further advance can be made. Again, although daylight comes long before sunrise, it is forbidden to move till the sun is up. Then again, experience shows that by the use of the electric light the largest vessels can be handled with the utmost ease.

An electric light fixed in the foremast of a s.h.i.+p sweeps the Ca.n.a.l from bank to bank, and for all practical purposes gives a light equal to that of day; it seems strange, therefore, that vessels possessing such appliances should not be permitted to proceed during the night. If one ventures to make such a suggestion to a Ca.n.a.l official, he at once replies that the rules laid down for the regulation of the traffic forbid night pa.s.sages, and if one further ventures to remind him that the said rules were made before the introduction of electric lighting, he shrugs his shoulders and plainly intimates that you have tried his patience long enough.

A little delegation of authority from the chief office to the pilot or other Ca.n.a.l official on board the s.h.i.+ps would at once result in a vast diminution of delay, and consequently in an increase to the capability of the Ca.n.a.l, but the genius of French administration appears to be opposed to the granting of any lat.i.tude or freedom of action to inferior officials, and so in the administration of the Ca.n.a.l everything is done by the official at the chief office in Ismaila, who transmits his orders by telegraph.

But, after all the practicable improvements in the navigation of the present Ca.n.a.l have been made, the necessity for a new one will be no less urgent, and it is especially unfortunate that the Conservative party should have made negotiations with M. de Lesseps so difficult by openly suggesting that we should use our accidental supremacy in Egypt to advance the national interests, without regard to the rights possessed by him. Whatever the actual status of M. de Lesseps, under his concession, may be, it is clear that he has always considered he had a monopoly. At the outset he endeavoured to enlist British sympathy and capital in his undertaking by demonstrating that the bulk of the traffic must necessarily come from English sources. Was it probable, therefore, he would have spent the Company's capital in making the Ca.n.a.l if, after having demonstrated its success, an English company were at liberty to make another, alongside, and take away four-fifths of its traffic?

In business matters the French are proverbially short-sighted. They fail to see that "three sixpences are better than one s.h.i.+lling," and are consequently unwilling to surrender present advantages without an absolute certainty of an early and great benefit arising from their doing so. They are much more truly a nation of retailers or shopkeepers than the English are, notwithstanding Napoleon's famous epithet. What is wanted is a greater breadth of view in the administration of the Ca.n.a.l, and it is in this respect that it is particularly unfortunate there is not a larger English representation on the Board of Management. If we had a representation equal to our share of the capital, the result would soon be apparent in the adoption of a line of policy giving the utmost facilities to the Ca.n.a.l's customers, to the great advantage of both.

The recent discussions upon the Suez Ca.n.a.l question cannot fail to be of the greatest use to the Government when they reopen negotiations with M.

de Lesseps, and if the latter finds it impossible to make another ca.n.a.l without a further concession of land, he may probably think it advisable to conciliate his partner and chief customer by making greater concessions in return for the influence of the British Government with that of the Khedive and the Sultan on his behalf.

But even if no further advantages for British commerce be obtained from the Ca.n.a.l Company, this country occupies a unique position as regards communication with the East. In less than fifteen years the whole of the original cost of the British shares, both princ.i.p.al and interest, will have been paid out of profits, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the day will have to decide as to the destination of the revenue which the shares produce. It appears to me that, after making provision for the necessary expenses attending the administration of the property, it would be both just and politic to return the balance to the owners of the s.h.i.+ps whose use of the Ca.n.a.l has been the means of creating the revenue. If this course be adopted British commerce will be immensely benefited, for our s.h.i.+ps will be able to use the Ca.n.a.l at a little more than half the expense falling upon those of other nations, and this great advantage will have been obtained without having cost the British taxpayer a single penny. The money will simply be returned into the hands which contributed it, and the proposal, therefore, does not in any way partake of the character of a bounty.

What is known as the Dual Control was established in 1879. By it the British and French Controllers-General were invested with considerable powers over the administration of the finances, in addition to which the Khedive undertook to a.s.sign a certain portion of the revenue for the discharge of the national obligations.

In the following year a Law of Liquidation, as drawn up by the Commissioners appointed for the purpose, was issued with the agreement of all the interested European Powers.

In return for these concessions, the Foreign Bondholders made a compromise with the Egyptian Government involving the surrender of a considerable portion of their claims. This settlement, while relieving the country from an enormous burden, placed it in a position to meet its liabilities and to progress in the development of its resources, and, in the language of Lord Granville in his despatch to Lord Dufferin, "it was undoubtedly working well for the material prosperity of the country, and promised to do so for the future;" and in a subsequent despatch the Foreign Secretary declared that, through the action of the Control, great advantages had been secured for the natives, such as "the spread of education, the abolition of vexatious taxation, the establishment of the land-tax on a regular and equitable basis, and the diminution of forced labour."

Our dragoman, an intelligent Copt, fully corroborated Lord Granville's statement. He said that all that the Egyptian people required was moderate taxation, certainty as to its amount and as to the time of its collection, and such a military law as would relieve them from the press-gang. He further said that before the inst.i.tution of the Control, whenever the Khedive wanted a new ironclad, or a new palace, or half a dozen additional inmates for his harem, he ordered a new tax to be levied; this tax was sold to some of the rapacious pachas about the Palace, and resold by them to professional tax-gatherers. These wretches committed the greatest atrocities upon the miserable fellaheen, exacting the uttermost farthing under the threat, and often the actual application, of torture; "but now," said my informant, "although the taxes are heavy, their amount is known, and they are collected in coin after the harvest has been gathered."

The country was becoming very prosperous, and there was a surplus in the Treasury when, in February, 1881, a military riot broke out, originating in the arrest of certain Egyptian officers, among whom was the Colonel of the 1st Regiment. The officers of this regiment broke into the Council Room of the Ministry of War, ill-treated the Minister, and then, having released the prisoners, proceeded to the Khedive's Palace, followed by the men of the regiment. In menacing tones they demanded the dismissal of the Minister of War, and redress for their grievances. Arabi Bey was one of the chief actors in this revolt. The Khedive was compelled to submit, the mutinous colonels were reinstated, and tranquillity was restored for the time.

The army officers were not long, however, in showing what their princ.i.p.al object was, for in a few weeks after the revolt, decrees were issued increasing the pay of the army and navy to the extent of nearly 60,000 a year. The Controllers-General had now become aware that everything was at the disposal of the military party, and that the Minister could not guarantee that the officers would not next day insist upon fresh financial concessions. The next demand made by the colonels was that nominations to vacant posts in regiments should rest with them, and this was granted. The object of all this was clear enough-indeed, Arabi declared at one of the meetings of the Commission that "he would not yield unconditional obedience to the War Minister." As time went on fresh symptoms of disaffection broke out, all indicating the determination of the military party to throw off all control and restraint. In September the Ministry was dismissed at the instance of these same men, who throughout the remainder of the year continued a hara.s.sing series of turbulent outbreaks, gradually increasing in audacity, and more and more trenching upon matters of administration.

They went so far as to demand an increase in the army, involving an annual addition to the estimates of 280,000, although the Controllers declared that not nearly half that amount was available.

The princ.i.p.al figure in all these outbreaks was Arabi, who steadily kept himself at the head of the disaffected party, and gradually increased his influence. After being appointed Under Secretary of War, then Chief Secretary, he was described by Sir E. Malet as having become "Arbiter of the destinies of the country." In March he was made Pasha, and the Khedive was compelled to a.s.sent to a number of promotions by Arabi, who insisted on dispensing with the examination required by law for officers.

In a word, the real power had become vested in the chiefs of the military party, and the objects of those chiefs were showing themselves more and more evidently to be, increase of the army, increase of pay and promotion of a large number of officers to high military rank-the desire of all such men in every country of the world.

In the following month Arabi caused numerous arrests to be made among the officers and soldiery in consequence of an alleged conspiracy to murder him. Among the prisoners was the Minister of War, who had been dismissed at the demand of the mutinous regiments in the previous February. The prisoners were tried by a court-martial-irregularly const.i.tuted-and the proceedings were kept secret, while no counsel were allowed for the defence. It was generally believed that torture had been used to extort confession. Forty officers were condemned to exile for life to the farthest limits of the Soudan. The Khedive, with great courage, refused to sanction the sentence, and issued a decree commuting it to simple banishment from Egypt.

In the meantime the excitement continued to increase, and the Governments of France and England decided to send a naval force to Alexandria for the protection of the interests of their subjects in Egypt. The combined fleet arrived at Alexandria on the 20th of May. On June 11th the great riot and ma.s.sacre of Europeans took place, Arabi in the meanwhile erecting new earthworks and strengthening the forts, in spite of his repeated a.s.surances to the contrary. On July 11th, the French fleet having withdrawn, and twenty-four hours' notice having expired, Admiral Seymour opened fire on the forts, and after a few hours completely silenced them; not, however, without his s.h.i.+ps having suffered considerably in the encounter.

The above is a sketch of Arabi's career from the time of his first coming into public notice to the time when he became Dictator. He was at no pains to conceal his character as a military adventurer, and every successive step in his career proves him to have been no other. It is true that during the last few weeks he appeared to carry the country with him, which, however, is not difficult to account for, seeing that he was "master of the legions," and that detachments of the army had been sent out into the highways and byways to compel men to come in at the point of the bayonet. In ordinary times it is no uncommon thing to see a chain-gang going through the streets of Egyptian towns composed, not of criminals, but of unhappy wretches brought in by the press-gang for service in the army, and should any of them falter in their steps through weariness or despair, the heavy stick of the driver is always ready to descend upon their shoulders. The only effect of the success of the movement headed by Arabi would have been the perpetuation and extension of this terrible state of things; and yet this is the man who has been persistently held up to the admiration of the world as a pure-minded patriot by a large section of what is called the Peace Party in England.

In the towns Arabi and his agents worked upon the cupidity of the lower orders by telling them that he intended to drive the foreigners into the sea, and that their property should be given over to a general loot. In the country districts, where the fellaheen are ground down under the heel of the usurer-always a foreigner, as the Koran forbids usury-Arabi promised to cancel the village debts, and banish the usurers; {259a} while in Upper Egypt, where usury is less common, he appealed to Mohammedan fanaticism. But nowhere did he appeal to a national sentiment, {259b} until, indeed, by various devices, he had become absolute master of the country, when perhaps he thought he might say _L'Etat, c'est moi_.

CHAPTER XIV.

A wretched journey of over eight hours by rail brought us to Alexandria shortly before midnight. A fierce gale with rain prevailed during most of the journey, and owing to the dilapidated condition of the carriage, waterproofs were necessary to protect us from the rain, which, in spite of closed windows, found access to every part of the compartment. The line itself and the whole of the rolling stock, were in a miserable condition of disrepair, and utterly unfit for traffic.

The drive from the railway station to the Hotel Abbat gave us our first glimpse of the ruin wrought by the rioters. The raging storm and drenching sleet were singularly in accord with the scene of desolation and misery on every hand. After the long and cold railway journey, and the drive in the open vehicle from the station, we were in hopes of finding comfortable quarters in the hotel, but the wretchedness prevailing outside seemed to have penetrated into every corner of the establishment. It was impossible to get anything hot to eat, and the cold meats were most uninviting. The proprietor, expecting another train in about an hour, deferred serving even this cold cheer until its arrival. Meanwhile nothing remained for us but to try to warm ourselves by pacing up and down the scantily-furnished _salle a manger_.

[Picture: A Familiar Face]

We were glad to get to bed notwithstanding that the carpets in the bedrooms were flapping in the wind in the most vigorous manner during the night.

On rising next morning we found the storm had not abated, indeed it continued with undiminished fury during the whole of our stay. Our time, however, being limited, it was necessary to disregard the weather in order to visit the scene of the recent operations and the ruins of the city. On leaving the hotel our dragoman of three years ago, Kalifa, at once recognised us, and under his guidance we made a tour of the fortresses, going first to Ras-el-Tin. We found the palace of that name, which forms the landward boundary of the fortress, still partially in ruins and apparently deserted. One could not help feeling that the architect, in selecting such a site for a royal residence, must have regarded the possibility of an attack upon the fort from the sea as being too remote to be taken into account. Some of the other forts had at one time stood isolated from the town, but apparently it might be said of the Alexandrians that

"Exceeding peace had made them bold,"

for the approaches to the forts had gradually been built upon until at length some of the houses were even erected against the fortifications.

These were the houses which were destroyed during the bombardment, and the ruin of which gave rise to the impression that the city itself had been sh.e.l.led. All the forts presented the same dismal aspect of ruin.

Shattered ramparts, battered casemates, huge holes in the walls of the store-houses; the heavy Armstrong guns dismantled, some with the muzzle pointed high up in the air, others lying on the ground; in all cases the gun-carriages smashed and crushed into shapelessness; burst sh.e.l.ls, and heaps of stones and mortar lying everywhere; great deep pits in the ground, showing where an "Inflexible" sh.e.l.l had burst. The buildings and ramparts are of loosely-built stonework, hence wherever a sh.e.l.l struck, it told with full and destructive effect. Here and there one could see that a single sh.e.l.l had penetrated a rampart, scattered the earth, upheaved a heavy Armstrong, and enveloped a casemate in a heap of demolished masonry. In Fort Ada an explosion, which wrecked the whole place, occurred early in the action. In the whole of the forts there were Armstrong guns of great calibre and of modern date. Their appearance after the bombardment was most extraordinary: pieces knocked out of the muzzles, huge slabs sheared out of their sides, and in many cases the coils pitted with shot marks. In most places, and at Fort Meks in particular, the muzzles were burst, but this was the work of the landing parties shortly after the action. There can be no question that the armament of these forts was of a very formidable character, and that the condition of the fleet after the encounter might have been a very serious one had the guns throughout been well handled.

After leaving the Forts we went with a friend, long resident in Alexandria, to Ramleh, the fas.h.i.+onable suburb of the city. The word Ramleh means "sand," and that being so it may be said that no place was ever more appropriately named. It is a mere sand waste by the sh.o.r.e, and its villas are separated by sand wastes. The effect is somewhat Australian, and the use of verandahs and Venetian shutters helps the suggestion. Our friend's house was close to what is known as Gun Hill, that is, where the 40-pounders were, and from his Egyptian roof he could see Arabi's advanced position and the whole of the British camp. At 4 p.m. every day it was the custom to go and see the practice from Gun Hill. Mr. A.'s house was open during the whole time, and he told us it was for the most part more like a picnic than a campaign. The officers, however, were frequently called from his billiard table by an alarm from the camp, and on such occasions Mr. A. had an understanding with them that should the English be driven in they were to warn him when retreating past his house by firing a volley through his windows! There were of course times of great anxiety notwithstanding the excitement and interest.

Mr. A. was in Alexandria during the ma.s.sacre, and at the time of the bombardment he was only away two days, being the first to return to his house and live in it. While there, many of the neighbouring houses were looted. His description of the daily shooting of looters reminded one of the accounts of the latter days of the Paris Commune. Mr. A.'s garden is ornamented with heavy English sh.e.l.ls, which, he tells his visitors, fell there-from a cart!

During the afternoon we had a stroll through the European quarter of the city, and were amazed at the destruction to be seen on every hand. The rows of fine houses, the shops, the buildings of the Grand Square, the Place Mohammed Ali, with its gardens, all a ma.s.s of unsightly ruins, from which workmen were getting out the stones and stacking them up in long rows on the footways. We had been pretty familiar with Alexandria, but in the maze of ruined stonework we were completely at a loss and could not find our way. Kalifa, however, came to our a.s.sistance, and guided by him we took a drive through the native quarter, and soon perceived that, though the destruction by incendiarism was unfortunately greatest in the European quarter, the _petroleurs_ had not spared their fellows, for many native houses were burned. The extent to which property was destroyed is incredible. There must be several miles of streets in the sheerest ruin.

The poor shopkeepers of the Place Mohammed Ali now occupy temporary wooden shanties, and the general aspect of this once gay and opulent quarter is wretched in the extreme.

We next day paid a visit to Fort Meks, but except that its armament was somewhat heavier than that of its fellows, there were no new features to be seen. The same desolate appearance of ruin and destruction-crippled gun-carriages, burst guns, crumbling ramparts, and sh.e.l.l-ploughed ground.

This fort, from the accuracy of its gun practice, was the most troublesome to the fleet. The five terrible "Armstrongs," however, lay burst and useless in the sand drifts, with the rude and forgotten graves of the poor gunners round about them.

A flood of misplaced eloquence has been expended in denouncing the conduct of the British Government for having "bombarded and utterly destroyed a defenceless commercial city," and the statement has been repeated so often as to be believed by many; but I will venture to say that no one will for one moment believe it who has had the opportunity, as I have, of being conducted over the city and the fortifications by an intelligent gentleman, an old resident, who was present during the whole of the operations, and who emphatically denies that the bombardment of the forts caused any greater damage than I have described. The charge has come mainly from the advocates of peace; but it is a misfortune that such a sacred cause should be damaged by gross exaggerations, and by statements which it is impossible to sustain. The cause of peace, like the temperance cause, has suffered greatly by this habit of exaggeration.