Christianity and Greek Philosophy Part 9

Fear of the Divine displeasure seems to have been the leading feature of their religious impressions; and in the diversity, the costliness, the cruelty of their sacrifices they sought to appease G.o.ds to whose wrath they felt themselves exposed, from a consciousness of sin, unrelieved by any information as to the means of escaping its effects."[136]

[Footnote 135: Punishment is the penalty due to sin; or, to use the favorite expression of Homer, not unusual in the Scriptures also, it is the payment of a debt incurred by sin. When he is punished, the criminal is said to pay off or pay back (?p?t??e??) his crimes; in other words, to expiate or atone for them (Iliad, iv. 161,162),

s?? te e???? ?p?t?sa? s?? sf?s?? ?efa??s? ???a??? te ?a?

te??ess??.

That is, they shall pay off, pay back, atone, etc., for their treachery with a great price, with their lives, and their wives and children.--Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets," p. 194.]

[Footnote 136: Magee, "On the Atonement," No. V. p. 30.]

It must be known to every one at all acquainted with Greek mythology that the idea of _expiation_--atonement--was a fundamental idea of their religion. Independent of any historical research, a very slight glance at the Greek and Roman cla.s.sics, especially the poets, who were the theologians of that age, can leave little doubt upon this head.[137]

Their language everywhere announces the notion of _propitiation_, and, particularly the Latin, furnishes the terms which are still employed in theology. We need only mention the words ??as??, ???s??a?, ??t???, pe????a, as examples from the Greek, and _placare, propitiare, expiare, piaculum_, from the Latin. All these indicate that the notion of expiation was interwoven into the very modes of thought and framework of the language of the ancient Greeks.

[Footnote 137: In Homer the doctrine is expressly taught that the G.o.ds may, and sometimes do, remit the penalty, when duly propitiated by prayers and sacrifices accompanied by suitable reparations ("Iliad," ix.

497 sqq.). "We have a practical ill.u.s.tration of this doctrine in the first book of the Iliad, where Apollo averts the pestilence from the army, when the daughter of his priest is returned without ransom, and a _sacrifice_ (??at??) is sent to the altar of the G.o.d at sacred Chrysa.... Apollo hearkens to the intercession of his priest, accepts the sacred hecatomb, is delighted with the accompanying songs and libations, and sends back the emba.s.sy with a favoring breeze, and a favorable answer to the army, who meanwhile had been _purifying_ (?pe??a????t?) themselves, and offering unblemished hecatombs of bulls and goats on the sh.o.r.e of the sea which washes the place of their encampment."

"The object of the propitiatory emba.s.sy to Apollo is thus stated by Ulysses: Agamemnon, king of men, has sent me to bring back thy daughter Chryses, and to offer a sacred hecatomb for (?p??) the Greeks, that we may _propitiate_ (??as?es?a) the king, who now sends woes and many groans upon the Argives" (442 sqq.).--Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets,"

pp. 196, 197.]

We do not deem it needful to discuss at length the question which has been so earnestly debated among theologians, as to whether the idea of expiation be a primitive and necessary idea of the human mind, or whether the practice of piacular sacrifices came into the post-diluvian world with Noah, as a positive inst.i.tution of a primitive religion then first directly inst.i.tuted by G.o.d. On either hypothesis the practice of expiatory rites derives its authority from G.o.d; in the latter case, by an outward and verbal revelation, in the former by an inward and intuitive revelation.

This much, however, must be conceded on all hands, that there are certain fundamental intuitions, universal and necessary, which underlie the almost universal practice of expiatory sacrifice, namely, _the universal consciousness of guilt, and the universal conviction that something must be done to expiate guilt_, to compensate for wrong, and to atone for past misdeeds. But _how_ that expiation can be effected, how that atonement can be made, is a question which reason does not seem competent to answer. That personal sin can be atoned for by vicarious suffering, that national guilt can be expiated and national punishment averted by animal sacrifices, or even by human sacrifices, is repugnant to rather than conformable with natural reason. There exists no discernible connection between the one and the other. We may suppose that eucharistic, penitential, and even deprecatory sacrifices may have originated in the light of nature and reason, but we are unable to account for the practice of piacular sacrifices for subst.i.tutional atonement, on the same principle. The ethical principle, that one's own sins are not transferable either in their guilt or punishment, is so obviously just that we feel it must have been as clear to the mind of the Greek who brought his victim to be offered to Zeus, as it is to the philosophic mind of to-day.[138] The knowledge that the Divine displeasure can be averted by sacrifice is not, by Plato, grounded upon any intuition of reason, as is the existence of G.o.d, the idea of the true, the just, and good, but on "tradition,"[139] and the "interpretations" of Apollo. "To the Delphian Apollo there remains the greatest, n.o.blest, and most important of legal inst.i.tutions--the erection of temples, sacrifices, and other services to the G.o.ds,... and what other services should be gone through with a view to their _propitiation_. Such things as these, indeed, _we neither know ourselves, nor in founding the State would we intrust them to others_, if we be wise;... the G.o.d of the country is the natural interpreter to all men about such matters."[140]

[Footnote 138: "He that hath done the deed, to suffer for it--thus cries a proverb thrice hallowed by age."--aeschylus, "Choeph," 311.]

[Footnote 139: "Laws," book vi. ch. xv.]

[Footnote 140: "Republic," book iv. ch. v.]

The origin of expiatory sacrifices can not, we think, be explained except on the principle of a primitive revelation and a positive appointment of G.o.d. They can not be understood except as a divinely-appointed symbolism, in which there is exhibited a confession of personal guilt and desert of punishment; an intimation and a hope that G.o.d will be propitious and merciful; and a typical promise and prophecy of a future Redeemer from sin, who shall "put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." This sacred rite was inst.i.tuted in connection with the _protevangelium_ given to our first parents; it was diffused among the nations by tradition, and has been kept alive as a general, and, indeed, almost universal observance, by that deep sense of sin, and consciousness of guilt, and personal urgency of the need of a reconciliation, which are so clearly displayed in Grecian mythology.

The legitimate inference we find ourselves ent.i.tled to draw from the words of Paul, when fairly interpreted in the light of the past religious history of the world, is, that the Athenians were a religious people; that is, _they were, however unknowing, believers in and wors.h.i.+ppers of the One Supreme G.o.d_.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RELIGION OF THE ATHENIANS: ITS MYTHOLOGICAL AND SYMBOLICAL ASPECTS.

"That there is one Supreme Deity, both philosophers and poets, and even the vulgar wors.h.i.+ppers of the G.o.ds themselves frequently acknowledge; which because the a.s.sertors of G.o.ds well understood, they affirm these G.o.ds of theirs to preside over the several parts of the world, yet so that there is only one chief governor. Whence it follows, that all their other G.o.ds can be no other than ministers and officers which one greatest G.o.d, who is omnipotent, hath variously appointed, and const.i.tuted so as to serve his command."--LACTANTIUS.

The conclusion reached in the previous chapter that the Athenians were believers in and wors.h.i.+ppers of the One Supreme G.o.d, has been challenged with some considerable show of reason and force, on the ground that they were _Polytheists_ and _Idolaters_.

An objection which presents itself so immediately on the very face of the sacred narrative, and which is sustained by the unanimous voice of history, is ent.i.tled to the fullest consideration. And as the interests of truth are infinitely more precious than the maintenance of any theory, however plausible, we are constrained to accord to this objection the fullest weight, and give to it the most impartial consideration. We can not do otherwise than at once admit that the Athenians were _Polytheists_--they wors.h.i.+pped "many G.o.ds" besides "the unknown G.o.d." It is equally true that they were _Idolaters_--they wors.h.i.+pped images or statues of the G.o.ds, which images were also, by an easy metonymy, called "G.o.ds."

But surely no one supposes that this is all that can be said upon the subject, and that, after such admissions, the discussion must be closed.

On the contrary, we have, as yet, scarce caught a glimpse of the real character and genius of Grecian polytheistic wors.h.i.+p, and we have not made the first approach towards a philosophy of Grecian mythology.

The a.s.sumption that the heathen regarded the images "graven by art and device of man" as the real creators of the world and man, or as having any control over the destinies of men, sinks at once under the weight of its own absurdity. Such hypothesis is repudiated with scorn and indignation by the heathens themselves. Cotta, in _Cicero_, declares explicitly: "though it be common and familiar language amongst us to call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one so mad as to take that to be really a G.o.d that he feeds upon?"[141] And _Plutarch_ condemns the whole practice of giving the names of G.o.ds and G.o.ddesses to inanimate objects, as absurd, impious, and atheistical: "they who give the names of G.o.ds to senseless matter and inanimate things, and such as are destroyed by men in the using, beget most wicked and atheistical opinions in the minds of men, since it can not be conceived how these things should be G.o.ds, for nothing that is inanimate is a G.o.d."[142] And so also the Hindoo, the Buddhist, the American Indian, the Fijian of to-day, repel the notion that their visible images are real G.o.ds, or that they wors.h.i.+p them instead of the unseen G.o.d.

[Footnote 141: Cudworth's "Intell. System," vol. ii. p. 257, Eng. ed.]

[Footnote 142: Quoted in Cudworth's "Intell. System," vol. ii. p. 258, Eng. ed.]

And furthermore, that even the invisible divinities which these images were designed to represent, were each independent, self-existent beings, and that the stories which are told concerning them by Homer and Hesiod were received in a literal sense, is equally improbable. The earliest philosophers knew as well as we know, that the Deity, in order to be Deity, must be either _perfect_ or nothing--that he must be _one_, not many--without parts and pa.s.sions; and they were scandalized and shocked by the religious fables of the ancient mythology as much as we are.

_Xenophanes_, who lived, as we know, before Pythagoras, accuses Homer and Hesiod of having ascribed to the G.o.ds every thing that is disgraceful amongst men, as stealing, adultery, and deceit. He remarks "that men seem to have created their G.o.ds, and to have given them their own mind, and voice, and figure." He himself declares that "G.o.d is _one,_ the greatest amongst G.o.ds and men, neither in form nor in thought like unto men." He calls the battles of the t.i.tans and the Giants, and the Centaurs, "the inventions of former generations," and he demands that G.o.d shall be praised in holy songs and n.o.bler strains.[143]

Diogenes Laertius relates the following of _Pythagoras_, "that when he descended to the shades below, he saw the soul of Hesiod bound to a pillar of bra.s.s and gnas.h.i.+ng his teeth; and that of Homer, as suspended on a tree, and surrounded by serpents; as a punishment for the things they had said of the G.o.ds."[144] These poets, who had corrupted theology, _Plato_ proposes to exclude from his ideal Republic; or if permitted at all, they must be subjected to a rigid expurgation. "We shall," says he, "have to repudiate a large part of those fables which are now in vogue; and, especially, of what I call the greater fables,--the stories which Hesiod and Homer tell us. In these stories there is a fault which deserves the gravest condemnation; namely, when an author gives a _bad representation of G.o.ds and heroes_. We must condemn such a poet, as we should condemn a painter, whose pictures bear no resemblance to the objects which he tries to imitate. For instance, the poet Hesiod related an ugly story when he told how Ura.n.u.s acted, and how Kronos had his revenge upon him. They are offensive stories, and must not be repeated in our cities. Not yet is it proper to say, in any case,--what is indeed untrue--that G.o.ds wage war against G.o.ds, and intrigue and fight among themselves. Stories like the chaining of Juno by her son Vulcan, and the flinging of Vulcan out of heaven for trying to take his mother's part when his father was beating her, and all other battles of the G.o.ds which are found in Homer, must be refused admission into our state, _whether they are allegorical or not_. For a child can not discriminate between what is allegorical and what is not; and whatever is adopted, as a matter of belief, in childhood, has a tendency to become fixed and indelible; and therefore we ought to esteem it as of the greatest importance that the fables which children first hear should be adapted, as far as possible, to promote virtue."[145]

[Footnote 143: Max Muller, "Science of Language," pp. 405, 406.]

[Footnote 144: "Lives," bk. viii. ch. xix. p. 347.]

[Footnote 145: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xvii.]

If, then, poetic and allegorical representations of divine things are to be permitted in the ideal republic, then the founders of the state are to prescribe "the moulds in which the poets are to cast their fictions."

"Now what are these moulds to be in the case of _Theology?_ They may be described as follows: It is right always to represent G.o.d as he really is, whether the poet describe him in an epic, or a lyric, or a dramatic poem. Now G.o.d is, beyond all else, _good in reality_, and therefore so to be represented. But nothing that is good is hurtful. That which is good hurts not; does no evil; is the cause of no evil. That which is good is beneficial; is the cause of good. And, therefore, that which is good is not the cause of _all_ which is and happens, but only of that which is as it should be.... The good things we must ascribe to G.o.d, whilst we must seek elsewhere, and not in him, the causes of evil things."

We must, then, express our disapprobation of Homer, or any other poet, who is guilty of such a foolish blunder as to tell us (Iliad, xxiv. 660) that:

'Fast by the threshold of Jove's court are placed Two casks--one stored with evil, one with good:'

and that he for whom the Thunderer mingles both--

'He leads a life checkered with good and ill.'

But as for the man to whom he gives the bitter cup unmixed--

'He walks The blessed earth unbless'd, go where he will.'

And if any one a.s.serts that the violation of oaths and treaties by the act of Pandarus was brought about by Athene and Zeus (Iliad, ii. 60), we should refuse our approbation. Nor can we allow it to be said that the strife and trial of strength between tween the G.o.ds (Iliad, xx.) was instigated by Themis and Zeus.... Such language can not be used without irreverence; it is both injurious to us, and contradictory in itself.[146]

Inasmuch as G.o.d is perfect to the utmost in beauty and goodness, _he abides ever the same_, and without any variation in his form. Then let no poet tell us that (Odyss. xvii. 582)

'In similitude of strangers oft The G.o.ds, who can with ease all shapes a.s.sume, Repair to populous cities.'

And let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, or introduce in tragedies, or any other poems, Hera transformed into the guise of a princess collecting

'Alms for the life-giving children of Inachus, river of Argos,'

not to mention many other falsehoods which we must interdict.[147]

"When a poet holds such language concerning the G.o.ds, we shall be angry with him, and refuse him a chorus. Neither shall we allow our teachers to use his writings for the instruction of the young, if we would have our guards grow up to be as G.o.d-like and G.o.d-fearing as it is possible for men to be."[148]

We are thus constrained by the statements of the heathens themselves, as well as by the dictates of common sense, to look beyond the external drapery and the material forms of Polytheism for some deeper and truer meaning that shall be more in harmony with the facts of the universal religious consciousness of our race. The religion of ancient Greece consisted in something more than the fables of Jupiter and Juno, of Apollo and Minerva, of Venus and Bacchus. "Through the rank and poisonous vegetation of mythic phraseology, we may always catch a glimpse of an original stem round which it creeps and winds itself, and without which it can not enjoy that parasitical existence which has been mistaken for independent vitality."[149]

[Footnote 146: "Republic," bk. ii. ch. xix.]