Christianity and Greek Philosophy Part 13

"Wherefore, since there were no other G.o.ds among the Pagans besides those above enumerated, unless their images, statues, and symbols should be accounted such (because they were also sometimes abusively called 'G.o.ds'), which could not be supposed by them to have been unmade or without beginning, they being the workmans.h.i.+p of their own hands, we conclude, universally, that all that multiplicity of Pagan G.o.ds which make so great a show and noise was really either nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to his different manifestations, gifts, and effects upon the world personated, or else many inferior understanding beings, generated or created by one supreme: so that one unmade, self-existent Deity, and no more, was acknowledged by the more intelligent Pagans, and, consequently, the Pagan Polytheism (or idolatry) consisted not in wors.h.i.+pping a multiplicity of unmade minds, deities, and creators, self-existent from eternity, and independent upon one Supreme, but in mingling and blending some way or other, unduly, creature-wors.h.i.+p with the wors.h.i.+p of the Creator."[203]

[Footnote 203: Cudworth, "Intellectual System," vol. i. p. 311.]

That the heathen regard the one Supreme Being as the first and chief object of wors.h.i.+p is evident from the apologies which they offered for wors.h.i.+pping, besides Him, many inferior divinities.

1. They claimed to wors.h.i.+p them _only_ as inferior beings, and that therefore they were not guilty of giving them that honor which belonged to the Supreme. They claimed to wors.h.i.+p the supreme G.o.d incomparably above all. 2. That this honor which is bestowed upon the inferior divinities does ultimately redound to the supreme G.o.d, and aggrandize his state and majesty, they being all his ministers and attendants. 3.

That as demons are mediators between the celestial G.o.ds and men, so those celestial G.o.ds are also mediators between men and the supreme G.o.d, and, as it were, convenient steps by which we ought with reverence to approach him. 4. That demons or angels being appointed to preside over kingdoms, cities, and persons, and being many ways benefactors to us, thanks ought to be returned to them by sacrifice. 5. Lastly, that it can not be thought that the Supreme Being will envy those inferior beings that wors.h.i.+p or honor which is bestowed upon them; nor suspect that any of these inferior deities will factiously go about to set up themselves against the Supreme G.o.d.

The Pagans, furthermore, apologized for wors.h.i.+pping G.o.d in images, statues, and symbols, on the ground that these were only schetically wors.h.i.+pped by them, the honor pa.s.sing from them to the prototype. And since we live in bodies, and can scarcely, conceive of any thing without having some image or phantasm, we may therefore be indulged in this infirmity of human nature (at least in the vulgar) to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d under a corporeal image, as a means of preventing men from falling into Atheism.

To the Christian conscience the above reasons a.s.signed furnish no real justification of Polytheism and Idolatry; but they are certainly a tacit confession of their belief in the one Supreme G.o.d, and their conviction that, notwithstanding their idolatry, He only ought to be wors.h.i.+pped.

The heathen polytheists are therefore justly condemned in Scripture, and p.r.o.nounced to be "_inexcusable_." They had the knowledge of the true G.o.d--" they _knew G.o.d_" and yet "they glorified him not as G.o.d." "They changed the glory of the incorruptible G.o.d into a likeness of corruptible man." And, finally, they ended in "wors.h.i.+pping and serving the creature _more_ than the Creator."[204]

[Footnote 204: Romans i. 21, 25.]

It can not, then, with justice be denied that the Athenians had some knowledge of the true G.o.d, and some just and worthy conceptions of his character. It is equally certain that a powerful and influential religious sentiment pervaded the Athenian mind. Their extreme "carefulness in religion" must be conceded by us, and, in some sense, commended by us, as it was by Paul in his address on Mars' Hill. At the same time it must also be admitted and deplored that the purer theology of primitive times was corrupted by offensive legends, and encrusted by polluting myths, though not utterly defaced.[205] The Homeric G.o.ds were for the most part idealized, human personalities, with all the pa.s.sions and weaknesses of humanity. They had their favorites and their enemies; sometimes they fought in one camp, sometimes in another. They were susceptible of hatred, jealousy, sensual pa.s.sion. It would be strange indeed if their wors.h.i.+ppers were not like unto them. The conduct of the Homeric heroes was, however, better than their creed. And there is this strange incongruity and inconsistency in the conduct of the Homeric G.o.ds,--they punish mortals for crimes of which they themselves are guilty, and reward virtues in men which they do not themselves always practise. "They punish with especial severity social and political crimes, such as perjury (Iliad, iii. 279), oppression of the poor (Od.

xvii. 475), and unjust judgment in courts of justice (Iliad, xvi. 386)."

Jupiter is the G.o.d of justice, and of the domestic hearth; he is the protector of the exile, the avenger of the poor, and the vigilant guardian of hospitality. "And with all the imperfections of society, government, and religion, the poem presents a remarkable picture of primitive simplicity, chast.i.ty, justice, and practical piety, under the three-fold influence of moral feeling, mutual respect, and fear of the divine displeasure; such, at least, are the motives to which Telemachus makes his appeal when he endeavors to rouse the a.s.sembled people of Ithaca to the performance of their duty (Od. ii. 64)."[206]

[Footnote 205: "There was always a double current of religious ideas in Greece; one spiritualist, the other tainted with impure legends."--Pressense.]

[Footnote 206: Tyler, "Theology of Greek Poets," pp. 167, 168; Pressense, "Religion before Christ," p. 77.]

The influence of the religious dramas of aeschylus and Sophocles on the Athenian mind must not be overlooked. No writer of pagan antiquity made the voice of conscience speak with the same power and authority that aeschylus did. "Crime," he says, "never dies without posterity." "Blood that has been shed congeals on the ground, crying out for an avenger."

The old poet made himself the echo of what he called "the lyreless hymn of the Furies," who, with him, represented severe Justice striking the guilty when his hour comes, and giving warning beforehand by the terrors which haunt him. His dramas are characterized by deep religious feeling.

Reverence for the G.o.ds, the recognition of an inflexible moral order, resignation to the decisions of Heaven, an abiding presentiment of a future state of reward and punishment, are strikingly predominant.

Whilst aeschylus reveals to us the sombre, terror-stricken side of conscience, Sophocles shows us the divine and luminous side. No one has ever spoken with n.o.bler eloquence than he of moral obligation--of this immortal, inflexible law, in which dwells a G.o.d that never grows old--

"Oh be the lot forever mine Unsullied to maintain, In act and word, with awe divine, What potent laws ordain.

"Laws spring from purer realms above: Their father is the Olympian Jove.

Ne'er shall oblivion veil their front sublime, Th' indwelling G.o.d is great, nor fears the wastes of time."[207]

The religious inspiration that animates Sophocles breaks out with incomparable beauty in the last words of dipus, when the old banished king sees through the darkness of death a mysterious light dawn, which illumines his blind eyes, and which brings to him the a.s.surance of a blessed immortality.[208]

[Footnote 207: "dipus Tyran.," pp. 863-872.]

[Footnote 208: Pressense, "Religion before Christ," pp. 85-87.]

Such a theology could not have been utterly powerless. The influence of truth, in every measure and degree, must be salutary, and especially of truth in relation to G.o.d, to duty, and to immortality. The religion of the Athenians must have had some wholesome and conserving influence of the social and political life of Athens.[209] Those who resign the government of this lower world almost exclusively to Satan, may see, in the religion of the Greeks, a simple creation of Satanic powers. But he who believes that the entire progress of humanity has been under the control and direction of a benignant Providence, must suppose that, in the purposes of G.o.d, even Ethnicism has fulfilled some end, or it would not have been permitted to live. G.o.d has "_never left himself without a witness_" in any nation under heaven. And some preparatory office has been fulfilled by Heathenism which, at least, repealed the _want_, and prepared the mind for, the advent of Christianity.

[Footnote 209: The practice, so common with some theological writers, of drawing dark pictures of heathenism, in which not one luminous spot is visible, in order to exalt the revelations given to the Jews, is exceedingly unfortunate, and highly reprehensible. It is unfortunate, because the skeptical scholar knows that there were some elements of truth and excellence, and even of grandeur, in the religion and civilization of the republics of Greece and Rome; and it is reprehensible, because it is a one-sided and unjust procedure, in so far as it withholds part of the truth. This species of argument is a two-edged sword which cuts both ways. The prevalence of murder, and slavery, and treachery, and polygamy, in Greece and Rome, is no more a proof that "the religions of the pagan nations were destructive of morality" (Watson, vol. i. p. 59), than the polygamy of the Hebrews, the falsehoods and impositions of Mediaeval Christianity, the persecutions and martyrdoms of Catholic Christianity, the oppressions and wrongs of Christian England, and the slavery of Protestant America, are proofs that the Christian religion is "destructive of morality." What a fearful picture of the history of Christian nations might be drawn to-day, if all the lines of light, and goodness, and charity were left out, and the crimes, and wrongs, and cruelties of the Christian nations were alone exhibited!

How much more convincing a proof of the truth of Christianity to find in the religions of the ancient world a latent sympathy with, and an unconscious preparation for, the religion of Christ. "The history of religions of human origin is the most striking evidence of the agreement of revealed religion with the soul of man--for each of these forms of wors.h.i.+p is the expression of the wants of conscience, its eternal thirst for pardon and restoration--rather let us say, its thirst for G.o.d."--Pressense, p. 6.]

The religion of the Athenians was unable to deliver them from the guilt of sin, redeem them from its power, and make them pure and holy. It gave the Athenian no victory over himself, and, practically, brought him no nearer to the living G.o.d. But it awakened and educated the conscience, it developed more fully the sense of sin and guilt, and it made man conscious of his inability to save himself from sin and guilt; and "the day that humanity awakens to the want of something more than mere embellishment and culture, that day it feels the need of being saved and restored from the consequences of sin" by a higher power. aesthetic taste had found its fullest gratification in Athens; poetry, sculpture, architecture, had been carried to the highest perfection; a n.o.ble civilization had been reached; but "the need of something deeper and truer was written on the very stones." The highest consummation of Paganism was an altar to "the unknown G.o.d," the knowledge of whom it needed, as the source of purity and peace.

The strength and the weakness of Grecian mythology consisted in the contradictory character of its divinities. It was a strange blending of the natural and the supernatural, the human and the divine. Zeus, the eternal Father,--the immortal King, whose will is sovereign, and whose power is invincible,--the All-seeing Jove, has some of the weaknesses and pa.s.sions of humanity. G.o.d and man are thus, in some mysterious way, united. And here that deepest longing of the human heart is met--the unconquerable desire to bring G.o.d nearer to the human apprehension, and closer to the human heart. Hence the hold which Polytheism had upon the Grecian mind. But in this human aspect was also found its weakness, for when philosophic thought is brought into contact with, and permitted critically to test mythology, it dethrones the false G.o.ds. The age of spontaneous religious sentiment must necessarily be succeeded by the age of reflective thought. Popular theological faiths must be placed in the hot crucible of dialectic a.n.a.lysis, that the false and the frivolous may be separated from the pure and the true. The reason of man demands to be satisfied, as well as the heart. Faith in G.o.d must have a logical basis, it must be grounded on demonstration and proof. Or, at any rate, the question must be answered, _whether G.o.d is cognizable by human reason_?

If this can be achieved, then a deeper foundation is laid in the mind of humanity, upon which Christianity can rear its higher and n.o.bler truths.

CHAPTER V.

THE UNKNOWN G.o.d.

"As I pa.s.sed by, and beheld your sacred objects, I found an altar with this inscription, _To the Unknown G.o.d_."--ST. PAUL.

"That which can be _known_ of G.o.d is manifested in their hearts, G.o.d himself having shown it to them" [the heathen nations].--ST. PAUL.

Having now reached our first landing-place, from whence we may survey the fields that we have traversed, it may be well to set down in definite propositions the results we have attained. We may then carry them forward, as torches, to illuminate the path of future and still profounder inquiries.

The principles we have a.s.sumed as the only adequate and legitimate interpretation of the facts of religious history, and which an extended study of the most fully-developed religious system of the ancient world confirms, may be thus announced:

I. A religious nature and destination appertain to man, so that the purposes of his existence and the perfection of his being can only be secured in and through religion.

II. The idea of G.o.d as the unconditioned Cause, the infinite Mind, the personal Lord and Lawgiver, and the consciousness of dependence upon and obligation to G.o.d, are the fundamental principles of all religion.

III. Inasmuch as man is a religious being, the instincts and emotions of his nature constraining him to wors.h.i.+p, there must also be implanted in his rational nature some original _a priori_ ideas or laws of thought which furnish the necessary cognition of the object of wors.h.i.+p; that is, some native, spontaneous cognition of G.o.d.

A mere blind impulse would not be adequate to guide man to the true end and perfection of his being without rational ideas; a tendency or appetency, without a revealed object, would be the mockery and misery of his nature--an "ignis fatuus" perpetually alluring and forever deceiving man.

That man has a native, spontaneous apperception of a G.o.d, in the true import of that sacred name, has been denied by men of totally opposite schools and tendencies of thought--by the Idealist and the Materialist; by the Theologian and the Atheist. Though differing essentially in their general principles and method, they are agreed in a.s.serting that G.o.d is absolutely "_the unknown_;" and that, so far as reason and logic are concerned, man can not attain to any knowledge of the first principles and causes of the universe, and, consequently, can not determine whether the first principle or principles be intelligent or unintelligent, personal or impersonal, finite or infinite, one or many righteous or non-righteous, evil or good.

The various opponents of the doctrine that G.o.d can be cognized by human reason may be cla.s.sified as follows: I. _Those who a.s.sert that all human knowledge is necessarily confined to the observation and cla.s.sification of phenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, and resemblance_. Man has no faculty for cognizing substances, causes, forces, reasons, first principles--no power by which he can _know_ G.o.d.

This cla.s.s may be again subdivided into--

1. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and cla.s.sification of _mental_ phenomena (_e. g_., Idealists like J. S. Mill).

2. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and cla.s.sification of _material_ phenomena (_e. g_., Materialists like Comte).

II. _The second cla.s.s comprises all who admit that philosophic knowledge is the knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, and of qualities as inherent in substances; but at the same time a.s.sert that "all knowledge is of the phenomenal_." Philosophy can never attain to a positive knowledge of the First Cause. Of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing. The infinite can not by us be comprehended, conceived, or thought. _Faith_ is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond knowledge. We believe in the existence of G.o.d, but we can not _know_ G.o.d. This cla.s.s, also, may be again subdivided into--

1. Those who affirm that our idea of the Infinite First Cause is grounded on an _intuitional_ or subjective faith, necessitated by an "impotence of thought"--that is, by a mental inability to conceive an absolute limitation or an infinite illimitation, an absolute commencement or an infinite non-commencement. Both contradictory opposites are equally incomprehensible and inconceivable to us; and yet, though unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higher law--the "Law of Excluded Middle"--to admit that one, and only one, is necessary (_e. g_., Hamilton and Mansel).

2. Those who a.s.sert that our idea of G.o.d rests solely on an _historical_ or objective faith in testimony--the testimony of Scripture, which a.s.sures us that, in the course of history, G.o.d has manifested his existence in an objective manner to the senses, and given verbal communications of his character and will to men; human reason being utterly incapacitated by the fall, and the consequent depravity of man, to attain any knowledge of the unity, spirituality, and righteousness of G.o.d (_e. g_., Watson, and Dogmatic Theologians generally).

It will thus be manifest that the great question, the central and vital question which demands a thorough and searching consideration, is the following, to wit: _Is G.o.d cognizable by human reason_? Can man attain to a positive cognition of G.o.d--can he _know_ G.o.d; or is all our supposed knowledge "a learned ignorance,"[210] an unreasoning faith? We venture to answer this question in the affirmative. Human reason is now adequate to the cognition of G.o.d; it is able, with the fullest confidence, to affirm the being of a G.o.d, and, in some degree, to determine his character. The parties and schools above referred to answer this question in the negative form. Whether Theologians or Atheists, they are singularly agreed in denying to human reason all possibility of _knowing_ G.o.d.

[Footnote 210: Hamilton's "Philosophy," p. 512.]

Before entering upon the discussion of the negative positions enumerated in the above cla.s.sification, it may be important we should state our own position explicitly, and exhibit what we regard as the true doctrine of the genesis of the idea of G.o.d in the human intelligence. The real question at issue will then stand out in clear relief, and precision will be given to the entire discussion.

(i.) _We hold that the idea of G.o.d is a common phenomenon of the universal human intelligence_. It is found in all minds where reason has had its normal and healthy development; and no race of men has ever been found utterly dest.i.tute of the idea of G.o.d. The proof of this position has already been furnished in chap, ii.,[211] and needs not be re-stated here. We have simply to remark that the appeal which is made by Locke and others of the sensational school to the experiences of infants, idiots, the deaf and dumb, or, indeed, any cases wherein the proper conditions for the normal development of reason are wanting, are utterly irrelevant to the question. The acorn contains within itself the rudimental germ of the future oak, but its mature and perfect development depends on the exterior conditions of moisture, light, and heat. By these exterior conditions it may be rendered luxuriant in its growth, or it may be stunted in its growth. It may barely exist under one cla.s.s of conditions; it may be distorted and perverted, or it may perish utterly under another. And so in the idiotic mind the ideas of reason may be wanting, or they may be imprisoned by impervious walls of cerebral malformation. In the infant mind the development of reason is yet in an incipient stage. The idea of G.o.d is immanent to the infant thought, but the infant thought is not yet matured. The deaf and dumb are certainly not in that full and normal correlation to the world of sense which is a necessary condition of the development of reason.

Language, the great vehiculum and instrument of thought, is wanting, and reason can not develop itself without words. "Words without thought are dead sounds, _thoughts without words are nothing_. The word is the thought incarnate."[212] Under proper and normal conditions, the idea of G.o.d is the natural and necessary form in which human thought must be developed. And, with these explanations, we repeat our affirmation that the idea of G.o.d is a common phenomenon of the universal human intelligence.