The American Type of Isthmian Canal Part 1

The American Type of Isthmian Ca.n.a.l.

by John Fairfield Dryden.

_The ancient "Dream of Navigators" has at last been realized in the completion and successful operation of the PANAMA Ca.n.a.l, fittingly commemorated by the Panama-Pacific International Exposition. Among the men who contributed in a measurable degree to the attainment of this national ideal was the late United States Senator_, JOHN F. DRYDEN, _President of THE PRUDENTIAL. As a member of the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Ca.n.a.ls, Mr. Dryden, after mature and extended consideration, gave the weight of his influence and vote in favor of the lock-level principle of ca.n.a.l construction. The lock-level type was finally decided upon, although the majority of Mr. Dryden's conferees and the International Board of Consulting Engineers at first strongly favored the sea-level type. By his determined support of the one and his well-reasoned opposition to the other, Mr. Dryden was able to secure the enactment of legislation in accordance with his views and to bring about the completion of this tremendous undertaking within our time, thus leaving a permanent imprint upon the country's history._

THE AMERICAN TYPE OF ISTHMIAN Ca.n.a.l

It was on June 14, 1906, when the Ca.n.a.l subject was up for final consideration, that Mr. Dryden addressed the Senate. The official records show that "S. 6191, to provide for the construction of a sea-level ca.n.a.l connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the method of construction," was before Congress, and it was in opposition to this measure that Mr. Dryden patriotically pledged his devotion to American enterprise and American ability by declaring for the lock-level type of ca.n.a.l, built by American engineers and under American supervision, concluding with the following words, which deserve to be recalled on this memorable occasion as a tribute to the native genius and enterprise of the American people:

"I am entirely convinced that the judgment and experience of American engineers in favor of a lock ca.n.a.l may be relied upon with entire confidence and that such an enterprise will be brought to a successful termination. I believe that in a national undertaking of this kind, fraught with the gravest possible political and commercial consequences, only the judgment of our own people should govern, for the protection of our own interests, which are primarily at stake. I also prefer to accept the view and convictions of the members of the Isthmian Commission, and of its chief engineer, a man of extraordinary ability and large experience. It is a subject upon which opinions will differ and upon which honest convictions may be widely at variance, but in a question of such surpa.s.sing importance to the nation, I, for one, shall side with those who take the American point of view, place their reliance upon American experience, and show their faith in American engineers."

The Panama Ca.n.a.l problem has reached a stage where a decision should be made to fix permanently the type of the waterway, whether it shall be a sea-level or a lock ca.n.a.l. An immense amount of evidence on the subject has in the past and during recent years been presented to Congress. An overwhelming amount of expert opinion has been collected, and an International Board of Consulting Engineers has made a final report to the President, in which experts of the highest standing divide upon the question. The Senate Committee on Interoceanic Ca.n.a.ls has likewise divided. It is an issue of transcendent importance, involving the expenditure of an enormous sum of money, and political and commercial consequences of the greatest magnitude, not only to the American people, but to the world at large.

The report of the International Board has been printed and placed before Congress. A critical discussion of the facts and opinion presented by this Board, all more or less of a technical and involved nature, would unduly impose upon the time of the Senate at this late day of the session. In addition, there is the testimony of witnesses called before the Senate committee, which has also been printed in three large volumes, exceeding 3,000 pages of printed matter. To properly separate the evidence for and against one type of ca.n.a.l or the other, to argue upon the facts, which present the greatest conflict of engineering opinion of modern times, would be a mere waste of effort and time, since the evidence and opinions are as far apart and as irreconcilable as the final conclusions themselves. It is, therefore, rather a question which the practical experience and judgment of members of Congress must decide, and I have entire confidence that the will of the nation, as expressed in its final mandate, will be carried into successful execution, whether that mandate be for lock ca.n.a.l or sea-level waterway.

The Panama Ca.n.a.l presents at once the most interesting and the most stupendous project of mankind to overcome by human ingenuity "what Nature herself seems to have attempted, but in vain." From the time when the first Spanish navigators extended their explorations into every bay and inlet of the Central American isthmus, to discover, if possible, a short route to the Indies, or "from Cadiz to Cathay," the human mind has not been willing to rest content and accept as insurmountable the natural obstacles on the Isthmus which prevent uninterrupted communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Excepting, possibly, Arctic explorations, in all the romantic history of ancient and modern commerce, in all the annals of the early navigators and explorers, there is no chapter that equals in interest the never-ceasing efforts to make the Central American isthmus a natural highway for the world's commerce--a direct route of trade and transportation from the uttermost East to the uttermost West.

As early as 1536 Charles V ordered an exploration of the Chagres River to learn whether a s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l could not be subst.i.tuted for an existing wagon road, and Philip II, in 1561, had a similar survey made in Nicaragua for the same purpose. From that day to this the greatest minds in commerce and engineering have given their attention to the problem of an interoceanic waterway; every conceivable plan has been considered, every possible road has been explored, and every mile of land and sea has been gone over to find the best and most practical solution of the problem.

The history of these early attempts is most interesting, but it is no longer of practical value, for it has no direct bearing upon present-day problems. Most of the efforts were wasted, and many of them were ill advised, but the present can profitably consider the more important lessons of the past. It was written in the book of fate that this enterprise, the most important in the world of commerce and navigation, should be American in its ending as it had been in its practical beginning. From the day when the first train of cars crossed the Isthmus from Panama to Aspinwall, to facilitate the transportation of pa.s.sengers and freight across the narrow belt of land connecting the northern and southern continents, the imperative necessity of a s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l was made apparent. Just as the railway followed the earlier wagon roads of the Spanish adventurers, so a s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l will naturally succeed or supplement the railway.

Natural conditions on the Isthmus materially enhance the physical difficulties to be overcome in ca.n.a.l construction. Even the precise locality or section best adapted to the purpose has for many years been a question of serious doubt. The Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the Nicaraguan route, the utilizing of a lake of large extent, and finally the narrow band of land and mountain chain at Panama, each offers distinct advantages peculiar to itself, with corresponding disadvantages or local difficulties not met with in the others. Many other projects have been advanced; in all, at least some twenty distinct routes have been laid out by scientific surveys, but the most eminent American engineering talent, considering impartially the natural advantages and local obstacles of each, finally, in 1849, decided upon the isthmus between the Bay of Panama and Limon Bay as the most feasible for the building of the railroad, and some fifty years later for the building of the Isthmian Ca.n.a.l. Every further study, survey, and inquiry has confirmed the wisdom of the earlier choice, which has been adopted as the best and as the permanent plan of the American government, which is now to build a ca.n.a.l at the expense of the nation, but for the ultimate benefit of all mankind.

The Panama railway marked the beginning of a new era in the history of interoceanic communication. The great practical usefulness of the road soon made the construction of a ca.n.a.l a commercial necessity. The eyes of all the world were upon the Isthmus, but no nation made the subject a matter of more profound study and inquiry than the United States. One surveying party followed another, and every promising project received careful consideration. The conflicting evidence, the great engineering difficulties, the natural obstacles, and, most of all, the Civil War, delayed active efforts; but public interest was maintained and the general public continued to view the project with favor and to demand an American ca.n.a.l.

During the seventies a French commission made surveys and investigations on the Isthmus which terminated in the efforts of De Lesseps, who undertook to construct a ca.n.a.l, and, in 1879, called an international scientific congress to consider the project in all its aspects and determine upon a practical solution. The United States was invited to be represented by two official delegates, and accordingly President Hayes appointed Admiral Ammen and A.C. Menocal, of the United States Navy, both of whom had been connected with surveys and explorations on the Isthmus. Mr. Menocal presented his plan for a ca.n.a.l by way of Nicaragua, but it was evident that the Wyse project, of a ca.n.a.l by way of the Isthmus of Panama, had the majority in its favor, and the only question to determine was whether the ca.n.a.l to be constructed should be a sea-level or a lock ca.n.a.l. The American delegates were convinced, in the light of their knowledge and experience, that a sea-level ca.n.a.l would be impracticable, if not impossible. In this they were seconded by Sir John Hawkshaw, a man thoroughly familiar with ca.n.a.l problems, and who exposed the hopelessness of an attempt to make a sea-level s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l, pointing out that there would be a cataract of the Chagres River at Matachin of 42 feet, which in periods of floods would be 78 feet high, and a body of water that would be 36 feet deep, with a width of 1,500 feet.

Opposition to the sea-level project proved of no avail. The facts were ignored or treated with indifference by the French, who were determined upon a ca.n.a.l at Panama and at sea level, resting their conclusions upon the success at Suez, with which enterprise many of those present at the congress, in addition to De Lesseps, had been connected. But the problems and conditions to be met on the Isthmus of Panama were decidedly different from those at Suez, and subsequent experience proved the serious error of the sea-level plan as finally adopted. The congress included a large a.s.semblage of non-professional men, and of the French engineers present only one or two had ever been on the Isthmus. The final vote was seventy-five in favor of and eight opposed to a sea-level ca.n.a.l. Rear-admiral Ammen said: "I abstained from voting on the ground that only able engineers can form an opinion _after careful study_ of what is actually possible and what is relatively economical in the construction of a s.h.i.+p ca.n.a.l." Of those in favor of a sea-level ca.n.a.l not one had made a practical and exhaustive study of the facts. The project at this stage was in a state of hopeless confusion. In spite of these obstacles, De Lesseps, with undaunted courage, proceeded to organize a company for the construction of a sea-level ca.n.a.l.

As soon as possible after the adjournment of the scientific congress of 1879 the Panama Ca.n.a.l Company was organized, with Ferdinand De Lesseps as president. The company purchased the Wyse concession, and by 1880 sufficient funds had been secured to proceed with the preliminary work.

The next two years were used for scientific investigations, surveys, etc., and the actual work commenced in 1883. The plan adopted was for a sea-level ca.n.a.l having a depth of 29.5 feet and a bottom width of 72 feet. This plan in outline and intent was adhered to practically to the cessation of operations in 1888.

In that year operations on the Isthmus came to an end for want of funds.

The failure of the company proved disastrous to a very large number of shareholders, mostly French peasants of small means, and for a time the project of interoceanic communication by way of Panama seemed hopeless.

The experience, however, proved clearly the utter impossibility of private enterprise carrying forward a project of such magnitude and which had attained a stage where large additional funds were needed to make good enormous losses, due to errors in plans, to miscarriage of effort, and, last but not least, to fraud on stupendous scale. With admirable courage, however, the affairs of the first Panama Ca.n.a.l Company were reorganized, after the appointment of a receiver, on February 4, 1889. A scientific commission of inquiry was appointed to reinvestigate the entire project and report upon the work actually accomplished and its value in future operations. The commission, made up of eminent engineers, sent five of its members to the Isthmus to study the technical aspects of the problem, and a final report was rendered on May 5, 1890. The recommendation of the commission was for the construction of a ca.n.a.l with locks, the abandonment of the sea-level idea, and for a further and still more thorough inquiry into the facts, upon the ground that the acc.u.mulated data were "far from possessing the precision essential to a definite project." This took the project of ca.n.a.l construction out of the domain of preconceived ideas based upon guesswork into the substantial field of a scientific undertaking for commercial purposes. The receiver at once commenced to reorganize the affairs of the company, and accordingly, on October 21, 1894, the new Panama Ca.n.a.l Company came into existence under the general laws of France. The charter of the new company provided for the appointment of a technical committee to formulate a final project for the completion of the ca.n.a.l. This committee was organized in February, 1896, and reached a unanimous conclusion on November 16, 1898, embodied in an elaborate report, which is probably the most authoritative doc.u.ment ever presented on an engineering subject. The recommendation of the commission was unanimously in favor of a lock ca.n.a.l.[1]

The subsequent history of the De Lesseps project and the American effort for a practical route across the Isthmus are still fresh in our minds and need not be restated. The Spanish-American war and the voyage of the _Oregon_ by way of Cape Horn, more than any other causes, combined to direct the attention of the American people to conditions on the Isthmus, and led to the public demand that by one route or another an American waterway be constructed within a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable cost. It will serve no practical purpose to recite the subsequent facts and the chain of events which led to the pa.s.sage of the act of March 3, 1899, which authorized the President to have a full and complete investigation made of the entire subject of Isthmian ca.n.a.ls.

A million dollars was appropriated for the expenses of a commission, and in pursuance of the provisions of the act the President appointed a commission consisting of Rear-admiral Walker, United States Navy, president, and nine members eminent in their respective professions as experts or engineers. A report was rendered under the date of November 30, 1901, in which the cost of constructing a ca.n.a.l by way of Nicaragua was estimated at $189,864,062 and by way of Panama at $184,233,358, including in the last estimate $40,000,000 for the estimated value of the rights and property of the New Panama Ca.n.a.l Company. The company, however, held its property at a much higher value, or some $109,000,000, which the Commission considered exorbitant, and thus the only alternative was to recommend the construction of a ca.n.a.l by way of the Nicaraguan route. Convinced, however, that the American people were in earnest, the New Panama Company expressed a willingness to reconsider the matter, and finally agreed to the purchase price fixed by the Isthmian Commission.

By the Spooner act, pa.s.sed June 28, 1902, Congress authorized the President to purchase the property of the New Panama Ca.n.a.l Company for a price not exceeding $40,000,000, the t.i.tle to the property having been fully investigated and found valid. The Isthmian Commission, therefore, recommended to Congress the purchase of the property, but the majority of the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Ca.n.a.ls disagreed, and it is only to the courage and rare ability of the late Senator Hanna and his a.s.sociates, as minority members of the committee, that the nation owes the abandonment of the Nicaraguan project, the acquirement of the Panama Ca.n.a.l rights at a reasonable price and the making of the project a national enterprise.

The report of the minority members of the Senate committee was made under date of May 31, 1902. It is, without question, a most able and comprehensive dissertation upon the subject, and forms a most valuable addition to the truly voluminous literature of Isthmian ca.n.a.l construction. The report was signed by Senators Hanna, Pritchard, Millard, and Kittredge. "We consider," said the committee, "that the Panama route is the best route for an isthmian ca.n.a.l to be owned, constructed, controlled, and protected by the United States." It was a bold challenge of the conclusions of the majority members of the committee, but in entire harmony with and in strict conformity to the views and final conclusions of the Isthmian Commission. The minority report was accepted by the Congress and a ca.n.a.l at Panama became an American enterprise for the benefit of the American people and the world at large.

Such, in broad outline, is the present status of the Panama Ca.n.a.l. A grave question presents itself at this time, which demands to be disposed of by Congress, and to which all others are subservient. Shall the waterway be a sea-level or a lock ca.n.a.l? It is a question of tremendous importance--a question of choice equally as important as the one of the route itself. A choice _must_ be made, and it must be made soon. All the subsidiary work, all the related enterprises, depend upon the fundamental difference in type. Opinions differ as widely to-day as they did at the time when the project was first considered by the international committee in 1879. Engineers of the highest standing at home and abroad have expressed themselves for or against one type or the other, but it is a question upon which no complete agreement is possible. In theory a sea-level ca.n.a.l has unquestionable advantages, but, practically, the elements of cost and time necessary for the construction preclude to-day, as they did in 1894, when the New Ca.n.a.l Company recommenced active operations, the building of a sea-level ca.n.a.l. It is _not a question of the ideally most desirable, but of the practically most expedient_, that confronts the American people and demands solution.

The New Panama Ca.n.a.l Company had approved the lock plan, which placed the minimum elevation of the summit level at 97.5 feet above the sea and the maximum level at 102.5 feet above the same datum. In the words of Prof. William H. Burr:

It provided for a depth of 29.5 feet of water and a bottom width of ca.n.a.l prism of about 98 feet, except at special places, where this width was increased. A dam was to be built near Bohio, which would thus form an artificial lake, with its surface varying from 52.5 to 65.6 feet above the sea. The location of this line was practically the same as that of the old company. The available length of each lock chamber was 738 feet, while the available width was 82 feet, the depth in the clear being 32 feet 10 inches. The lifts were to vary from 26 to 33 feet. It was estimated that the cost of finis.h.i.+ng the ca.n.a.l on this plan would be $101,850,000, exclusive of administration and financing.

The Isthmian Commission of 1899-1901 considered the project, reexamined into the facts, and as stated by Professor Burr--

The feasibility of a sea-level ca.n.a.l, but with a tidal lock at the Panama end, was carefully considered by the Commission, and an approximate estimate of the cost of completing the work on that plan was made. In round numbers this estimated cost was about $250,000,000, and _the time required to complete the work would probably be nearly or quite twice that needed for the construction of a ca.n.a.l with locks_. The Commission therefore adopted a project for the ca.n.a.l locks. Both plans and estimates were carefully developed in accordance therewith.

Professor Burr, now in favor of a sea-level ca.n.a.l, _then_ concurred in the report in favor of a lock ca.n.a.l.

Since the Panama ca.n.a.l became the property of the nation a vast amount of necessary and preliminary work has been done preparatory to the actual construction of the ca.n.a.l. A complete civil government of the Ca.n.a.l Zone has been established, an army of experts and engineers has been organized, the work of sanitation and police control is in excellent hands, and the Isthmus, or, more properly speaking, the Ca.n.a.l Zone, is to-day in a better, cleaner, and more healthful condition than at any previous time in its history. A considerable amount of excavation and necessary improvements in transportation facilities have been carried to a point where further work must stop until the Isthmian Commission knows the final plan or type of the ca.n.a.l. The reports which have been made of the work of the Commission during its two years of actual control are a complete and affirmative answer to the question whether what has been done so far has been done wisely and well, and the facts and evidence prove that the present state of affairs on the Isthmus is in all respects to the credit of the nation.

Now, it is evident that the question of plan or type of ca.n.a.l is largely one for engineers to determine, but even a layman can form an intelligent opinion, without entering into all the details of so complex a problem as the relative advantage or disadvantage of a sea-level versus a lock ca.n.a.l. This much, however, is readily apparent, that a sea-level ca.n.a.l will cost a vast amount of money and may take twice the time to build, while it will not necessarily accommodate a larger traffic or s.h.i.+ps of a larger size. A lock ca.n.a.l can be built which will meet all requirements; it can be built deep enough and wide enough to accommodate the largest vessels afloat; it can be so built that transit across the Isthmus can be effected in a reasonably short period of time--in a word, it is a practical project, which will solve every pending question involved in the construction of a transisthmian ca.n.a.l in a practical way, at a reasonable cost, and within a reasonable period of time.

To determine the question the President appointed an International Board of Consulting Engineers. The Board included in its members.h.i.+p the world's foremost men in engineering science, and the report is without question a most valuable doc.u.ment. The President, in his address to the members of the Board on September 11, 1905, outlined his views with regard to the desirability of a sea-level ca.n.a.l, if such a one could be constructed at a reasonable cost within a reasonable time. He said--

If to build a sea-level ca.n.a.l will but slightly increase the risk and will take but little longer than a multilock high-level ca.n.a.l, this, of course, is preferable. But if to adopt the plan of a sea-level ca.n.a.l means to incur great hazard and to incur indefinite delay, then it is not preferable.

The problem as viewed by the American people could not be more concisely stated. Other things equal, a sea-level ca.n.a.l, no doubt, would be preferable; but it remains to be shown that such a ca.n.a.l would in all essentials provide safe, cheap, and earlier navigation across the Isthmus than a lock ca.n.a.l.

For, as the President further said on the same occasion, there are two essential considerations: First, the greatest possible speed of construction; second, the practical certainty that the proposed plan will be feasible; that it can be carried out with the minimum risk; and in conclusion that--

There may be good reason why the delay incident to the adoption of a plan for an ideal ca.n.a.l should be incurred; but if there is not, then I hope to see the ca.n.a.l constructed on a system which will bring to the nearest possible date in the future the time when it is practicable to take the first s.h.i.+p across the Isthmus--that is, which will in the shortest time possible secure a Panama waterway between the oceans of such a character as to guarantee permanent and ample communication for the greatest s.h.i.+ps of our Navy and for the largest steamers on either the Atlantic or the Pacific. The delay in transit of the vessels owing to additional locks would be of small consequence when compared with shortening the time for the construction of the ca.n.a.l or diminis.h.i.+ng the risks in the construction. In short, I desire your best judgment on all the various questions to be considered in choosing among the various plans for a comparatively high-level multilock ca.n.a.l, for a lower-level ca.n.a.l with fewer locks, and for a sea-level ca.n.a.l.

Finally, I urge upon you the necessity of as great expedition in coming to a decision as is compatible with thoroughness in considering the conditions.

The Board organized and met in the city of Was.h.i.+ngton on September 1, 1905, and on the 10th of January, 1906, or about four months later, made its final report to the President through the Secretary of War. The Board divided upon the question of type for the proposed ca.n.a.l, a majority of eight--five foreign engineers and three American engineers--being in favor of a ca.n.a.l at sea-level, while a minority of five--all American engineers--favored a lock ca.n.a.l at a summit level of eighty-five feet. The two propositions require separate consideration, each upon its own merits, before a final opinion can be arrived at as to the best type of a waterway adapted to our needs and requirements under existing conditions.

Upon a question so involved and complex, where the most eminent engineers divide and disagree, a layman can not be expected to view the problem otherwise than as a business proposition which, demanding solution, must be disposed of by a strictly impartial examination of the facts. Weighed and tested by practical experience in other fields of commercial enterprise, it is probably not going too far to say, as in fact it has been said, that there is entirely too much mere engineering opinion upon this subject and not a well-defined concentrated ma.s.s of data and solid convictions. It is equally true, and should be kept in mind, that the time given by the Board to the consideration of the subject in all its practical bearings, including an examination of actual conditions on the Isthmus, was limited to so short a period that it would be contrary to all human experience that this report should represent an infallible or final verdict for or against either of the two propositions.

It is necessary to keep in mind certain facts which may be concisely stated, and which I do not think have been previously brought to the attention of Congress. While the Board had been appointed by the President on June 24, 1905, the first business meeting did not take place until September 1st, and the final meeting of the full Board occurred on November 24th of the same year. This was the twenty-seventh meeting during a period of eighty-five days, after which there were three more meetings of the American members, the last having been held on January 31, 1906. Thus the actual proceedings of the full Board were condensed into twenty-seven meetings during less than three months, a part of which time--or, to be specific, six days--was spent on the Isthmus.

The minutes of the proceedings have been printed and form a part of the final report made to the President under date of January 10, 1906. They do not afford as complete an insight into the business transactions of the Board as would be desirable, and the evidence is wanting that the subject was as thoroughly discussed in all its details, with particular reference to the two propositions of a sea-level or a lock ca.n.a.l, as would seem necessary. Very important features necessary to the sea-level plan were treated in the most superficial way, guessed at, or wholly ignored. I do not hesitate to say that no banking house in the world called upon to provide funds necessary for an enterprise of this magnitude as a private undertaking would advance a single dollar upon a project as it is here presented by the majority of the Board to the American Congress as the final conclusion of engineers of the highest standing. The Board, as I have said, divided upon the question, and by a majority of eight p.r.o.nounced in favor of a sea-level against a minority of five in favor of a lock ca.n.a.l. Let us inquire how this conclusion, of momentous importance to the nation, was arrived at and whether the minutes of the Board furnish a conclusive answer.

As early as the sixth meeting, or on September 16th--that is, after the Board had been only fifteen days in existence--a resolution was introduced by Mr. Hunter, chief engineer of the Manchester s.h.i.+p Ca.n.a.l, requesting that a special committee be appointed to prepare at once a project for a sea-level ca.n.a.l.

_Mr. Spooner._--What was the date of the resolution with respect to the lock ca.n.a.l?

_Mr. Dryden._--October 3d, seventeen days afterwards.

In marked contrast, it was not until after the Board had visited the Isthmus and while the members were on their way home--that is, at sea--on October 3d, that, on motion of Mr. Stearns, a corresponding committee was appointed to prepare plans for a lock ca.n.a.l. The recital of dates is of very considerable importance, for it is evident that there was a decided and early preference on the part of certain members of the Board for a sea-level ca.n.a.l, and that to this particular project more attention was given and a more determined attempt was made to secure data in its defense than to the corresponding project for a lock ca.n.a.l. That is to say, while the special committee for the consideration of a sea-level ca.n.a.l had been appointed on September 16th, the corresponding committee to consider the lock project was not appointed until October 3d, or seventeen days later, with the additional disadvantage of the Board being on the ocean, with no opportunity to send for persons and papers during the short period of time remaining to take into due consideration all the facts pertaining to a lock ca.n.a.l, for, as I have said before, the last business meeting was held on November 24th.

_Mr. Foraker._--Mr. President----

_The Vice President._--Does the Senator from New Jersey yield to the Senator from Ohio?

_Mr. Dryden._--Certainly.

_Mr. Foraker._--I would like to ask the Senator whether on the 16th of September, when this motion was made by Mr. Hunter, if I remember correctly, the Board of Engineers had completed their investigations and explorations on the Isthmus? I did not observe.