The Life of Napoleon I Part 62

[Footnote 109: Duca.s.se, "Les Rois, Freres de Napoleon," p. 8.]

[Footnote 110: "Memoires de Napoleon," vol. ii.; Bourrienne, "Mems.,"

vol. i., ch. xvii.]

[Footnote 111: "Mems. de Berthier."]

[Footnote 112: On November 4th, 1798, the French Government forwarded to Bonaparte, in triplicate copies, a despatch which, after setting forth the failure of their designs on Ireland, urged him either (1) to remain in Egypt, of which they evidently disapproved, or (2) to march towards India and co-operate with Tippoo Sahib, or (3) to advance on Constantinople in order that France might have a share in the part.i.tion of Turkey, which was then being discussed between the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna. No copy of this despatch seems to have reached Bonaparte before he set out for Syria (February 10th). This curious and perhaps guileful despatch is given in full by Boulay de la Meurthe, "Le Directoire et l'Expedition d'Egypte," Appendix, No. 5.

On the whole, I am compelled to dissent from Captain Mahan ("Influence of Sea Power," vol. i., pp. 324-326), and to regard the larger schemes of Bonaparte in this Syrian enterprise as visionary.]

[Footnote 113: Berthier, "Memoires"; Belliard, "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs," also corrects Bourrienne. As to the dearth of food, denied by Lanfrey, see Captain Krettly, "Souvenirs historiques."]

[Footnote 114: Emouf, "Le General Kleber," p. 201.]

[Footnote 115: "Admiralty Records," Mediterranean, No. 19.]

[Footnote 116: "Corresp.," No. 4124; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. xxi.]

[Footnote 117: Sidney Smith's "Despatch to Nelson" of May 30th, 1799.]

[Footnote 118: J. Miot's words are: "Mais s'il en faut croire cette voix publique, trop souvent organe de la verite tardive, qu'en vain les grands esperent enchainer, c'est un fait trop avere que quelques blesses du Mont Carmel et une grande partie des malades a l'hopital de Jaffa ont peri par les medicaments qui leur ont ete administres." Can this be called evidence?]

[Footnote 119: Larrey, "Relation historique"; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch.

xxi.]

[Footnote 120: See Belliard, "Bourrienne et ses Erreurs"; also a letter of d'Aure, formerly Intendant General of this army, to the "Journal des Debats" of April 16th, 1829, in reply to Bourrienne.]

[Footnote 121: "On disait tout haut qu'il se sauvait lachement," Merme in Guitry's "L'Armee en Egypte." But Bonaparte had prepared for this discouragement and worse eventualities by warning Kleber in the letter of August 22nd, 1799, that if he lost 1,500 men by the plague he was free to treat for the evacuation of Egypt.]

[Footnote 122: Lucien Bonaparte, "Memoires," vol. ii., ch. xiv.]

[Footnote 123: In our "Admiralty Records" (Mediterranean, No. 21) are doc.u.ments which prove the reality of Russian designs on Corsica.]

[Footnote 124: "Consid. sur la Rev. Francaise," bk. iii., ch. xiii.

See too Sciout, "Le Directoire," vol. iv., chs. xiii.-xiv.]

[Footnote 125: La Reveilliere-Lepeaux, "Mems.," vol. ii., ch. xliv.; Hyde de Neuville, vol. i., chs. vi.-vii.; Lavisse, "Rev. Francaise,"

p. 394.]

[Footnote 126: Barras, "Mems.," vol. iv., ch. ii.]

[Footnote 127: "Hist. of the United States" (1801-1813), by H. Adams, vol. i., ch. xiv., and Ste. Beuve's "Talleyrand."]

[Footnote 128: Gohier, "Mems.," vol. i.; Lavalette's "Mems.," ch.

xxii.; Roederer, "OEuvres," vol. iii., p. 301; Madelin's "Fouche," p.

267.]

[Footnote 129: For the story about Arena's dagger, raised against Bonaparte see Sciout, vol. iv., p. 652. It seems due to Lucien Bonaparte. I take the curious details about Bonaparte's sudden pallor from Roederer ("Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 302), who heard it from Montrond, Talleyrand's secretary. So Aulard, "Hist, de la Rev. Fr.,"

p. 699.]

[Footnote 130: Napoleon explained to Metternich in 1812 why he wished to silence the _Corps Legislatif_; "In France everyone runs after applause: they want to be noticed and applauded.... Silence an a.s.sembly, which, if it is anything, must be deliberative, and you discredit it."--Metternich's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 151.]

[Footnote 131: This was still further a.s.sured by the first elections under the new system being postponed till 1801; the functionaries chosen by the Consuls were then placed on the lists of notabilities of the nation without vote. The const.i.tution was put in force Dec. 25th, 1799.]

[Footnote 132: Roederer, "Oeuvres," vol. iii., p. 303. He was the go-between for Bonaparte and Sieyes.]

[Footnote 133: See the "Souvenirs" of Mathieu Dumas for the skilful manner in which Bonaparte gained over the services of this const.i.tutional royalist and employed him to raise a body of volunteer horse.]

[Footnote 134: "Lettres inedites de Napoleon," February 21st, 1800; "Memoires du General d'Andigne," ch. xv.; Madelin's "Fouche," p. 306.]

[Footnote 135: "Georges Cadoudal," par son neveu, G. de Cadoudal; Hyde de Neuville, vol. i., p. 305.]

[Footnote 136: Talleyrand, "Mems.," vol. i., part ii.; Marmont, bk.

v.]

[Footnote 137: "F.O.," Austria, No. 58; "Castlereagh's Despatches," v.

_ad init._ Bowman, in his excellent monograph, "Preliminary Stages of the Peace of Amiens" (Toronto, 1899), has not noted this.]

[Footnote 138: "Nap. Correspond.," February 27th 1800; Thugut, "Briefe" vol. ii., pp. 444-446; Oncken, "Zeitalter," vol. ii. p. 45.]

[Footnote 139: A Foreign Office despatch, dated Downing Street, February 8th, 1800, to Vienna, promised a loan and that 15,000 or 20,000 British troops should be employed in the Mediterranean to act in concert with the Austrians there, and to give "support to the royalist insurrections in the southern provinces of France." No differences of opinion respecting Piedmont can be held a sufficient excuse for the failure of the British Government to fulfil this promise--a failure which contributed to the disaster at Marengo.]

[Footnote 140: Thiers attributes this device to Bonaparte; but the First Consul's bulletin of May 24th ascribes it to Marmont and Ga.s.sendi.]

[Footnote 141: Marbot, "Mems.," ch. ix.; Allardyce, "Memoir of Lord Keith," ch. xiii.; Thiebault's "Journal of the Blockade of Genoa."]

[Footnote 142: That Melas expected such a march is clear from a letter of his of May 23rd, dated from Savillan, to Lord Keith, which I have found in the "Brit. Admiralty Records" (Mediterranean, No. 22), where he says: "L'ennemi a cerne le fort de Bard et s'est avance jusque sous le chateau d'Ivree. Il est clair que son but est de delivrer Ma.s.sena."]

[Footnote 143: Bonaparte did not leave Milan till June 9th: see "Correspondance" and the bulletin of June 10th. Jomini places his departure for the 7th, and thereby confuses his description for these two days. Thiers dates it on June 8th.]

[Footnote 144: Lord W. Bentinck reported to the Brit. Admiralty ("Records," Meditn., No. 22), from Alessandria, on June 15th: "I am sorry to say that General Elsnitz's corps, which was composed of the grenadiers of the finest regiments in the (Austrian) army, arrived here in the most deplorable condition. His men had already suffered much from want of provisions and other hards.h.i.+ps. He was pursued in his retreat by Genl. Suchet, who had with him about 7,000 men. There was an action at Ponte di Nava, in which the French failed; and it will appear scarcely credible, when I tell your Lords.h.i.+p, that the Austrians lost in this retreat, from fatigue only, near 5,000 men; and I have no doubt that Genl. Suchet will notify this to the world as a great victory."]

[Footnote 145: The inaccuracy of Marbot's "Memoires" is nowhere more glaring than in his statement that Marengo must have gone against the French if Ott's 25,000 Austrians from Genoa had joined their comrades.

As a matter of fact, Ott, with 16,000 men, had _already_ fought with Lannes at Montebello; and played a great part in the battle of Marengo.]

[Footnote 146: "Corresp.," vol. vi., p. 365. Fournier, "Hist. Studien und Skizzen," p. 189, argues that the letter was written from Milan, and dated from Marengo for effect.]

[Footnote 147: See Czartoryski's "Memoirs," ch. xi., and Driault's "La Question d'Orient," ch. iii. The British Foreign Office was informed of the plan. In its records (No. 614) is a memoir (pencilled on the back January 31st, 1801) from a M. Leclerc to Mr. Flint, referring the present proposal back to that offered by M. de St. Genie to Catherine II., and proposing that the first French step should be the seizure of Socotra and Perim.]

[Footnote 148: Garden, "Traites," vol. vi., ch. x.x.x.; Captain Mahan's "Life of Nelson," vol. ii., ch. xvi.; Thiers, "Consulate," bk. ix. For the a.s.sa.s.sination of the Czar Paul see "Kaiser Paul's Ende," von R.R.

(Stuttgart, 1897); also Czartoryski's "Memoirs," chs. xiii.-xiv. For Bonaparte's offer of a naval truce to us and his overture of December, 1800, see Bowman, _op. cit_.]

[Footnote 149: Pasquier, " Mems.," vol. i., ch. ii., p. 299. So too Mollien, "Mems.": "With an insatiable activity in details, a restlessness of mind always eager for new cares, he not only reigned and governed, he continued to administer not only as Prime Minister, but more minutely than each Minister."]

[Footnote 150: Lack of s.p.a.ce prevents any account of French finances and the establishment of the Bank of France. But we may note here that the collection of the national taxes was now carried out by a State-appointed director and his subordinates in every Department--a plan which yielded better results than former slipshod methods. The _conseil general_ of the Department a.s.sessed the direct taxes among the smaller areas. "Mems." de Gaudin, Duc de Gaete.]

[Footnote 151: Edmond Blanc, "Napoleon I; ses Inst.i.tutions," p. 27.]

[Footnote 152: Theiner, "Hist. des deux Concordats," vol. i., p. 21.]