The Letters of Queen Victoria Volume Ii Part 57

_Queen Victoria to Viscount Palmerston._

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _17th February 1850._

The Queen sent the day before yesterday the proposed draft to Mr Wyse back to Lord Palmerston, enclosing a Memorandum from Lord John Russell, and telling Lord Palmerston "that she entirely concurred with Lord John, and wished the draft to be altered accordingly." She has not yet received an answer from Lord Palmerston, but just hears from Lord John, in answer to her enquiry about it, that Lord Palmerston has _sent_ the draft off _unaltered_.[2] The Queen must remark upon this sort of proceeding, of which this is not the first instance, and plainly tell Lord Palmerston that this must not happen again. Lord Palmerston has a perfect right to state to the Queen his reasons for disagreeing with her views, and will always have found her ready to listen to his reasons; but she cannot allow a servant of the Crown and her Minister to act contrary to her orders, and this without her knowledge.

[Footnote 2: _See_ Ashley's _Palmerston_, vol. i. chap. v.]

[Pageheading: PALMERSTON'S EXPLANATION]

_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._

CARLTON GARDENS. _17th February 1850._

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and in reply to your Majesty's communication of this day, he begs to state that upon receiving, the day before yesterday, your Majesty's Memorandum on the proposed draft to Mr Wyse, together with the accompanying Memorandum[3] from Lord John Russell, he altered the draft, and sent it to Lord John Russell, and received it back from Lord John Russell with the accompanying note in answer to that which he wrote to Lord John Russell. It was important that the messenger should go off that evening, and the time occupied in these communications rendered it just, but barely, possible to despatch the messenger by the mail train of that evening. The despatch thus altered coincided with the views of your Majesty and Lord John Russell as to the question in regard to the length of time during which reprisals should be suspended to give scope for the French negotiation. The other question as to giving Mr Wyse a lat.i.tude of discretion to entertain any proposition which might be made to him by the Greek Government was considered by the Cabinet at its meeting yesterday afternoon, and Viscount Palmerston gave Mr Wyse a lat.i.tude of that kind in regard to the claim of Mr Pacifico, the only one to which that question could apply, in a despatch which he sent by the overland Mediterranean mail which went off yesterday afternoon. That despatch also contained some instructions as to the manner in which Mr Wyse is to communicate with Baron Gros,[4] and those instructions were the result of a conversation which Viscount Palmerston had with the French Amba.s.sador after the meeting of the Cabinet. Viscount Palmerston was only waiting for a copy of the despatch of yesterday evening, which, owing to this day being Sunday, he has not yet received, in order to send to your Majesty the altered draft of yesterday evening, with an explanation of the circ.u.mstances which rendered it impossible to submit them to your Majesty before they were sent off.[5]

[Footnote 3: Lord John Russell's opinion was that three weeks should be allowed to Mr Wyse and Sir W. Parker to accept terms as satisfactory as they could obtain, and that Sir W. Parker should not be obliged to resume coercive measures, if the concessions of the Greek Government should appear to afford a prospect of a speedy settlement of the affair.]

[Footnote 4: Baron Gros was the Commissioner despatched by the French Government to Athens to a.s.sist in arranging the dispute.]

[Footnote 5: See subsequent correspondence between Lord John and Lord Palmerston, Walpole's _Russell_, vol. ii. chap. xix.]

[Pageheading: RE-ARRANGEMENT SUGGESTED]

[Pageheading: LORD JOHN RUSSELL'S PLAN]

_Memorandum by the Prince Albert._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _3rd March 1850._

Before leaving Town yesterday we saw Lord John Russell, who came to state what had pa.s.sed with reference to Lord Palmerston. He premised that Lord Palmerston had at all times been a most agreeable and accommodating colleague; that he had acted with Lord John ever since 1831, and had not only never made any difficulty, but acted most boldly and in the most spirited manner on all political questions; besides, he was very popular with the Radical part of the House of Commons as well as with the Protectionist, so that both would be ready to receive him as their Leader; he (Lord John) was therefore most anxious to do nothing which could hurt Lord Palmerston's feelings, nor to bring about a disruption of the Whig Party, which at this moment of Party confusion was the only one which still held together. On the other hand, the fact that the Queen distrusted Lord Palmerston was a serious impediment to the carrying on of the Government. Lord John was therefore anxious to adopt a plan by which Lord Palmerston's services could be retained with his own goodwill, and the Foreign Affairs entrusted to other hands. The only plan he could think of was to give Lord Palmerston the lead in the House of Commons--the highest position a statesman could aspire to--and to go himself to the House of Lords.

He had communicated his views to Lord Lansdowne, who agreed in them, and thought he could do nothing better than speak to Lord Palmerston at once. Lord Palmerston said that he could not have helped to have become aware that he had forfeited the Queen's confidence, but he thought this had not been on _personal_ grounds, but merely on account of his line of policy, with which the Queen disagreed. (The Queen interrupted Lord John by remarking that she distrusted him on _personal_ grounds also, but I remarked that Lord Palmerston had so far at least seen rightly; that he had become disagreeable to the Queen, not on account of his person, but of his political doings, to which the Queen a.s.sented.) Lord Palmerston appeared to Lord John willing to enter into this agreement.

On the question how the Foreign Office should be filled, Lord John said that he thought his father-in-law, Lord Minto, ought to take the Foreign Office.... As the Queen was somewhat startled by this announcement, I said I thought that would not go down with the public.

After Lord Palmerston's removal (who was considered one of the ablest men in the country) he ought not to be replaced but by an equally able statesman; the Office was of _enormous_ importance, and ought not to be entrusted to any one but Lord John himself or Lord Clarendon. On the Queen's enquiry why Lord Clarendon had not been proposed for it, Lord John said he was most anxious that the change of the Minister should not produce a change in the general line of policy which he considered to have been quite right, and that Lord Clarendon did not approve of it; somehow or other he never could agree with Lord Clarendon on Foreign Affairs; he thought Lord Clarendon very anti-French and for an alliance with Austria and Russia. The Queen replied she knew Lord Clarendon's bad opinion of the mode in which the Foreign Affairs had been conducted, and thought that a merit in him, but did not think him Austrian or Russian, but merely disapproving of Lord Palmerston's behaviour. I urged Lord John to take the Foreign Affairs himself, which he said would have to be done if the Queen did not wish Lord Minto to take them; he himself would be able to do the business when in the House of Lords, although he would undertake it unwillingly; with the business in the House of Commons it would have been impossible for him.

The Queen insisted on his trying it with a seat in the House of Lords, adding that, if he found it too much for him, he could at a later period perhaps make the Department over to Lord Clarendon.

I could not help remarking that it was a serious risk to entrust Lord Palmerston with the lead in the House of Commons, that it might be that the Government were defeated and, if once in opposition, Lord Palmerston might take a different line as leader of the Opposition from that which Lord John would like, and might so easily force himself back into office as Prime Minister. Lord John, however, although admitting that danger, thought Lord Palmerston too old to do much in the future (having pa.s.sed his sixty-fifth year); he admitted that Sir George Grey was the natural leader of the Commons, but expected that a little later the lead would still fall into his hands.

The arrangements of the Offices as proposed would be that Lord Palmerston would take the Home Office, and Sir George Grey the Colonial Office, and Lord Grey vacate this office for the Privy Seal. If Lord Minto, however, was not to have the Foreign Office, the arrangement must be recast. Lord Clarendon would become Secretary of State for Ireland, after the abolition of the Lord-Lieutenancy.

Possibly also Sir George Grey might take the office, and Lord Clarendon take the Colonies, which Lord Grey would be glad to be rid of. On my observing that I had thought the Colonies would have done best for Lord Palmerston, leaving Sir George Grey at the Home Office, Lord John acknowledged that he would likewise prefer this arrangement, but considered it rendered impossible from its having been the very thing Lord Grey had proposed in 1845, and upon which the attempt to form a Whig Government at that time had broken down, Lord Palmerston having refused to enter the Cabinet on those terms. Lord John ended by saying that Lord Palmerston having agreed to the change, it was intended that nothing should be done about it till after the close of the Session, in order to avoid debates and questions on the subject; moreover, Lord Lansdowne had agreed to continue still this Session his labours as Leader in the House of Lords, and begged for the _utmost secrecy_ at present.

ALBERT.

Lord John Russell already last year had spoken to me of his wish to go to the House of Lords, finding the work in the House of Commons, together with his other business, too much for him, and Lord Lansdowne being desirous to be relieved from the lead in the Upper House.

ALBERT.

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN'S ULTIMATUM]

_Memorandum by Baron Stockmar._[6]

_12th March 1850._

The least the Queen has a right to require of her Minister is:--

1. That he will distinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in order that the Queen may know as distinctly to what she has to give her royal sanction.

2. Having given once her sanction to a measure, the Minister who, in the execution of such measure alters or modifies it arbitrarily, commits an act of dishonesty towards the Crown, which the Queen has an undoubted const.i.tutional right to visit with the dismissal of that Minister.

STOCKMAR.

[Footnote 6: Compare this with the Memorandum ultimately drawn up on the 12th of August.]

_Queen Victoria to the Marquis of Lansdowne._

BUCKINGHAM PALACE, _16th March 1850._

The Queen wishes to remark to Lord Lansdowne, that his answer to Lord Stanley in the House of Lords last night might possibly lead to the misapprehension that Lord Palmerston's delay in sending the despatch to Mr Wyse had been caused by the time it took to get the Queen's approval of it. She must protest against such an inference being drawn, as being contrary to the fact, Lord Palmerston indeed having sent out in the first instance a different despatch from that which she had approved.

[Pageheading: AFFAIRS IN FRANCE]

_The King of the Belgians to Queen Victoria._

LAEKEN, _25th March 1850._

MY DEAREST VICTORIA,-- ... King Louis Philippe seems better, but still he is evidently breaking; there is no wonder when one considers all he has gone through, and is still to suffer! No one can tell a day [ahead] what may happen in France, and if all the family have, which is but[7] in France, may not be confiscated. The thirst for spoliation is great; the people who lead have no other view, they are not fanatics, their aim is to rise and to enrich themselves; the remainder is mere humbug, exactly as you have it very near home. Never was there a nation in a worse and a more helpless state, and the numerous parties who will _not_ unite render all solutions impossible, and the republic will be maintained for that very reason. It is but a name and no substance, but that _name of_ _republic_ encourages every extravagant or desperate proceeding, and turns people's heads in the old monarchies; every doctor or magistrate sees himself president of some republic, and the ambitions of so many people who see all the impediments which existed formerly removed, and who, according to their _own opinion_, are wonderful people, will be insatiable and much more dangerous than you imagine in England. On the Continent every man thinks himself fit to be at the head of the Government; there is no political measure or scale, and the success of some bookseller or doctor or advocate, etc., turns the heads of all those in similar positions--_on ne doute de rien_. When you consider that a _banqueroutier_ like Ledru Rollin[8] ruled over France _for six months_ almost with _absolute power,_ merely because he took it, you may imagine how many thousands, even of workmen, cooks, stage people, etc., look to be taken to rule over their fellow-citizens; _toujours convaincu de leur propre merite_. I am happy to see that you escaped a ministerial crisis; the peril was great, and it would have been dreadful for you at such a moment.

Albert made a fine long speech, I see.[9] Did he read it? _ex tempore_, it would have been very trying. I trust we may come to that unity of mankind of which he speaks, and of universal peace which our friend Richard Cobden considers as very near at hand; if, however, the red benefactors of mankind at Paris get the upper hand, _universal war_ will be the order of the day. We are so strongly convinced of this that we are very seriously occupied with the means of defence which this country can afford, and we imagine that if we are not abandoned by our friends, it will be impossible to force our positions on the Schelde.