History of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States Part 26

"The first object of a free people is the preservation of their liberty, and liberty is only to be preserved by maintaining const.i.tutional restraints and just division of political power. Nothing is more deceptive or more dangerous than the pretense of a desire to simplify government. The simplest governments are despotisms; the next simplest, limited monarchies; but all republics, all governments of law, must impose numerous limitations and qualifications of authority and give many positive and many qualified rights. In other words, they must be subject to rule and regulation. This is the very essence of free political inst.i.tutions. The spirit of liberty is, indeed, a bold and fearless spirit; but it is also a sharp-sighted spirit: it is a cautious, sagacious, discriminating, far-seeing intelligence; it is jealous of encroachment, jealous of power, jealous of man. It demands checks; it seeks for guards; it insists on securities; it entrenches itself behind strong defenses, and fortifies itself with all possible care against the a.s.saults of ambition and pa.s.sion. It does not trust the amiable weaknesses of human nature, and, therefore, it will not permit power to overstep its prescribed limits, though benevolence, good intent, and patriotic purpose come along with it. Neither does it satisfy itself with flashy and temporary resistance to illegal authority. Far otherwise. It seeks for duration and permanence; it looks before and after; and, building on the experience of ages which are past, it labors diligently for the benefit of ages to come. This is the nature of const.i.tutional liberty; and this is our liberty, if we will rightly understand and preserve it. Every free government is necessarily complicated, because all such governments establish restraints, as well on the power of government itself as on that of individuals. If we will abolish the distinction of branches, and have but one branch; if we will abolish jury trials, and leave all to the judge; if we will then ordain that the legislator shall himself be that judge; and if we will place the executive power in the same hands, we may readily simplify government. We may easily bring it to the simplest of all possible forms, a pure despotism. But a separation of departments, so far as practicable, and the preservation of clear lines of division between them, is the fundamental idea in the creation of all our const.i.tutions; and, doubtless, the continuance of regulated liberty depends on maintaining these boundaries."

Each department is supreme within its own const.i.tutionally prescribed limits, and the Supreme Court is made the umpire for the definition of the limits and the protection of the rights of all. Neither Congress, nor the Executive, are authorized to determine the const.i.tutionality and therefore the validity of their acts, or the limits of their jurisdiction under the Const.i.tution, but the Supreme Court is so authorized, and it is the umpire before which all differences in that regard must be determined. It is the tribunal of last resort, save the people themselves, before whom both Senate and House, and the Executive, must bow, and its decision is final in the interpretation of the Const.i.tution.

A due regard, therefore, for the interpretation of law and the division of powers thus established, const.i.tutes the great safeguard upon which the harmonious and successful operation of our political system depends.

On its religious observance rests, primarily, the preservation of our free inst.i.tutions and the perpetuation of our peculiar system of popular government. That quality of co-ordination--of the equality of the several Departments as adjusted by the Organic Act--const.i.tutes the balance wheel of our political system.

The logical effect of the doctrines promulgated by the House of Representatives in that regard, and re-echoed on the floor of the Senate, in the press and on the stump throughout the North, were therefore not only revolutionary, but destructive. To have removed the President upon accusations in reality based upon partisan and personal--not amounting even to substantial political differences--would have been the establishment of a precedent of the most dangerous character.

In a large sense, the American system of politics and of government was on trial, quite as much as was Andrew Johnson. The extreme element of American politics was in absolute control in the House of Representatives, and practically so, in the Senate. The impeachment and removal of the President on unsubstantiated, or even remotely doubtful charges, simply: because of a disagreement between himself and Congress as to the method of treating a great public emergency, would have introduced a new and destructive practice into our political system.

Logically, the introduction of such a practice on that occasion would have been construed as a precedent for the treatment of future public emergencies. Thus, it would have tended to disturb the now perfect adjustment of the balance of powers between the co-ordinate branches.

That quality of absolute supremacy of the several departments in their respective spheres, or functions, and of co-ordination or equality in their relations to each other, established by the Const.i.tution as a guarantee of the perpetuity of our political system, would have been endangered, and the result could not have been otherwise than disaster in the future.

Logically, the Presidency would in time have been degraded to the position of a mere department for the execution of the decrees of the legislative branch. Not illogically, the Supreme Court would have been the next object of attack, and the legislature have become, by this unconst.i.tutional absorption of the powers of Government, the sole, controlling force--in short the Government.

That would, in time, by equally logical sequence, have been the natural, inevitable result--and the end. The wreckage of the Great Republic of the age would have been strown upon the sands of the political seash.o.r.e--relics of the disregard of the checks and balances established by the wisdom of its framers, in the fundamental law--and all for the satisfaction of personal ambitions and the hates of factional animosities.

History affords too many ill.u.s.trations of that tendency to decadence and disruption from disregard of the proper and necessary checks and balances in the distribution and equalization of the powers of government, to permit us to doubt what the final end would have been had the President been removed on the unsubstantiated accusation preferred by the House of Representatives, Our peculiar system of political government--a Democratic Republic--pa.s.sed the danger point of its history in that hour.

It was indeed a narrow escape. The history of civilization records no precisely similar condition. The country then pa.s.sed the most threatening period of its history--but pa.s.sed it safely. The result was the highest possible testimonial to the strength and endurance of properly adjusted Democratic inst.i.tutions that history records.

It emphasized not only the capacity of the American people for intelligent and orderly self-government, but also the strength and endurance of our popular forms. It was a profound surprise to those habituated to different political conditions. They had witnessed with astonishment the quiet disbandment of millions of men but as yesterday engaged in mortal strife--the vast armies as peacefully returning to former vocations as though from a great parade--and now, from a state of civil convulsion that in many another nation would have produced armed collision and public disorder, they saw an entire people quietly accepting the verdict of the highest authoritive body of the land, and practically dismissing the subject from thought. It was a splendid world-wide tribute to the strength and endurance of our system of popular government.

Yet the conclusion must not be deduced that the power of impeachment is not a wise provision of our Const.i.tution, nor in any sense inconsistent with our popular forms. Conditions may, and are not unlikely to arise, some day, when the exercise of the power to impeach and remove the President may be quite as essential to the preservation of our political system as it threatened to become in this instance destructive of that system. Should that day ever come, it is to be hoped that the remedy of impeachment, as established by the Const.i.tution, may be as patriotically, as fearlessly, and as unselfishly applied as it was on this occasion rejected.

SUPPLEMENT.

Copy of letter addressed to each of the members of the Cabinet present at the conversation between the President and General Grant on the 14th of January, 1868, and the answers thereto:

Executive Mansion, Was.h.i.+ngton, D. C., February 5, 1868.

Sir:--The Chronicle of this morning contains a correspondence between the President and General Grant, reported from the War Department, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives. I beg to call your attention to that correspondence, and especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant, at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, and to request you to state what was said in that conversation.

Very respectfully yours, Andrew Johnson.

Was.h.i.+ngton, D. C., February 5, 1868.

Sir:---Your note of this date was handed to me this evening. My recollection of the conversation at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, corresponds with your statement of it in the letter of the 31st ultimo, in the published correspondence. The three points specified in that letter, giving your recollection of the conversation, are correctly stated.

Very respectfully, Gideon Welles.

To the President.

Treasury Department, February 6, 1868.

Sir:--I have received your note of the 5th instant, calling my attention to the correspondence between yourself and General Grant, as published in the Chronicle of yesterday, especially to that part of it which relates to what occurred at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday the 14th ultimo, and requesting me to state what was said in the conversation referred to.

I cannot undertake to state the precise language used, but I have no hesitation in saying that your account of that conversation, as given in your letter to General Grant under date of the 31st ultimo substantially and in all important particulars accords with my recollection of it.

With great respect, your obedient servant. Hugh McCulloch. To the President.

Post Office Department Was.h.i.+ngton, February 6, 1868.

Sir:--I am in receipt of your letter of the 5th of February, calling my attention to the correspondence published in the Chronicle between the President and General Grant, and especially to that part of it which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, with a request that I state what was said in that conversation. In reply, I have the honor to state that I have read carefully the correspondence in question, and particularly the letter of the President to General Grant, dated January 31, 1868. The following extract from your letter of the 31st January to General Grant is, according to my recollection, a correct statement of the conversation that took place between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on the 14th of January last. In the presence of the Cabinet the President asked General Grant whether, "in conversation which took place after his appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, he did not agree either to remain at the head of the War Department and abide any judicial proceedings that might follow the non-concurrence by the Senate in Mr. Stanton's suspension, or, should he wish not to become involved in such a controversy, to put the President in the same position with respect to the office as he occupied previous to General Grant's appointment by returning it to the President in time to antic.i.p.ate such action by the Senate." This General Grant admitted.

The President then asked General Grant if, at the conference on the preceding Sat.u.r.day, he had not, to avoid misunderstanding, requested General Grant to state what he intended to do; and further, if in reply to that inquiry he (General Grant) had not referred to their former conversations, saying that from them the President understood his position, and that his (General Grant's) action would be consistent with the understanding which had been reached. To these questions General Grant replied in the affirmative.

The President asked General Grant if, at the conclusion of their interview on Sat.u.r.day, it was not understood that they were to have another conference on Monday, before final action by the Senate in the case of Mr. Stanton.

General Grant replied that such was the understanding, but that he did not suppose the Senate would act so soon; that on Monday he had been engaged in a conference with General Sherman, and was occupied with "many little matters," and asked if General Sherman had not called on that day.

I take this mode of complying with the request contained in the President's letter to me, because my attention had been called to the subject before, when the conversation between the President and General Grant was under consideration.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Alexander W. Randall, Postmaster General. To the President.

Department of the Interior, Was.h.i.+ngton, D. C., February 6, 1868.

Sir:--I am in receipt of yours of yesterday, calling my attention to a correspondence between yourself and General Grant, published in the Chronicle newspaper, and especially to that part of said correspondence "which refers to the conversation between the President and General Grant at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January," and requesting me "to state what was said in that conversation."

In reply, I submit the following statement: At the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 14th of January, 1868, General Grant appeared and took his accustomed seat at the board. When he had been reached in the order of business the President asked him, as usual, if he had anything to present?

In reply, the General, after referring to a note which he had that morning addressed to the President, inclosing a copy of the resolution of the Senate refusing to concur in the reasons for the suspension of Mr. Stanton, proceeded to say that he regarded his duties as Secretary of War ad interim terminated by that resolution, and that he could not lawfully exercise such duties for a moment after the adoption of the resolution by the Senate. That the resolution reached him last night, and that this morning he had gone to the War Department, entered the Secretary's room, bolted one door on the inside, locked the other on the outside, delivered the key to the Adjutant General, and proceeded to the headquarters of the Army, and addressed the note above mentioned to the President, informing him that he (General Grant) was no longer Secretary of War ad interim.

The President expressed great surprise at the course which General Grant had thought proper to pursue, and, addressing himself to the General, proceeded to say, in substance, that he had antic.i.p.ated such action on the part of the Senate, and being very desirous to have the const.i.tutionality of the Tenure-of-Office bill tested, and his right to suspend or remove a member of the Cabinet decided by the judicial tribunals of the country, he had some time ago, and shortly after General Grant's appointment as Secretary of War ad interim, asked the General what his action would be in the event that the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension of Mr. Stanton, and that the General had agreed either to remain at the head of the War Department till a decision could be obtained from the court or resign the office in the hands of the President before the case was acted upon by the Senate, so as to place the President in the same situation he occupied at the time of his (Grant's) appointment.

The President further said that the conversation was renewed on the preceding Sunday, at which time he asked the General what he intended to do if the Senate should undertake to reinstate Mr. Stanton; in reply to which the General referred to their former conversation upon the same subject, and said. "You understand my position, and my conduct will be conformable to that understanding:" that he (the General) then expressed a repugnance to being made a party to a judicial proceeding, saying that he would expose himself to fine and imprisonment by doing so, as his continuing to discharge the duties of Secretary of War ad interim, after the Senate should have refused to concur in the suspension of Mr.

Stanton would be a violation of the Tenure-of-Office bill. That in reply to this he (the President) informed General Grant he had not suspended Mr. Stanton under the Tenure-of-Office bill, but by virtue of the powers conferred on him by the Const.i.tution: and that, as to the fine and imprisonment, he (the President) would pay whatever fine was imposed and submit to whatever imprisonment might be adjudged against him (the General.) That they continued the conversation for some time, discussing the law at length, and that they finally separated without having reached a definite conclusion, and with the understanding that the General would see the President again on Monday.

In reply, General Grant admitted that the conversation had occurred, and said that at the first conversation he had given it as his opinion to the President that in the event of non-concurrence by the Senate in the action of the President in respect to the Secretary of War the question would have to be decided by the court; that Mr. Stanton would have to appeal to the court to reinstate him in office; that he would remain in till they could be displaced and the outs put in by legal proceeding; and that he then thought so, and had agreed that if he should change his mind he would notify the President in time to enable him to make another appointment, but that at the time of the first conversation he had not looked very closely into the law; that it had recently been discussed by the newspapers, and that this had induced him to examine it more carefully, and that he had come to the conclusion that if the Senate should refuse to concur in the suspension Mr. Stanton would thereby be reinstated, and that he (Grant) could not continue thereafter to act as Secretary of War ad interim, without subjecting himself to fine and imprisonment; and that he came over on Sat.u.r.day to inform the President of this change in his views, and did so inform him, that the President replied that he had not suspended Mr Stanton under the Tenure-of-Office bill, but under the Const.i.tution, and appointed him (Grant) by virtue of the authority derived from the Const.i.tution, &c.; that they continued to discuss the matter some time, and finally he left without any conclusion having been reached, expecting to see the President again on Monday.

He then proceeded to explain why he had not called on the President on Monday, saying that he had had a long interview with General Sherman; that various little matters had occupied his time till it was late, and that he did not think the Senate would act so soon, and asked, "did not General Sherman call on you on Monday?"

I do not know what pa.s.sed between the President and General Grant on Sat.u.r.day, except as I learned it from the conversation between them at the Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, and the foregoing is substantially what then occurred. The precise words used on the occasion are not, of course, given exactly in the order in which they were spoken, but the ideas expressed and the facts stated are faithfully preserved and presented. I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant.

O. H. Browning.

The President.

Department of State, Was.h.i.+ngton, February 6, 1868.

Sir: The meeting to which you refer in your letter was a regular Cabinet meeting. While the members were a.s.sembling, and before the President had entered the Council Chamber, General Grant, on coming in, said to me that he was in attendance there, not as a member of the Cabinet, but upon invitation, and I replied by the inquiry whether there was a change in the War Department. After the President had taken his seat business went on in the usual way of hearing matters submitted by the several secretaries. When the time came for the Secretary of War General Grant said that he was now there not as Secretary of War, but upon the President's invitation, that he had retired from the War Department. A Blight difference then appeared about the supposed invitation, General Grant saying that the officer who had borne his letter to the President that morning, announcing his retirement from the War Department, had told him that the President desired to see him at the Cabinet, to which the President answered, that when General Grant's communication was delivered to him the President simply replied that he supposed General Grant would be very soon at the Cabinet meeting. I regarded the conversation thus begun as an incidental one. It went on quite informally, and consisted of a statement, on your part, of your views in regard to the understanding of the tenure upon which General Grant had a.s.sented to hold the War Department ad interim, and of his replies by way of answer and explanation. It was respectful and courteous on both sides. Being in this conversational form, its details could only have been preserved by verbatim report. So far as I know, no such report was made at the time. I can give only the general effect of the conversation.

Certainly you stated that although you had reported the reasons for Mr.

Stanton's suspension to the Senate, you nevertheless held that he would not be ent.i.tled to resume the office of Secretary of War, even if the Senate should disapprove of his suspension, and that you had proposed to have the question tested by judicial process, to be applied to the person who should be the inc.u.mbent of the Department, under your designation of Secretary of War ad interim in the place of Mr. Stanton.

You contended that this was well understood between yourself and Gen.

Grant; that when he entered the War Department as Secretary ad interim he expressed his concurrence in a belief that the question of Mr.

Stanton's restoration would be a question for the courts; that in a subsequent conversation with General Grant you had adverted to the understanding thus had, and that General Grant expressed his concurrence in it: that at some conversation which had been previously held General Grant said he still adhered to the same construction of the law, but said if he should change his opinion he would give you seasonable notice of it, so that you should in any case, be placed in the same position in regard to the War Department that you were while General Grant held it ad interim. I did not understand General Grant as denying, nor as explicitly admitting, these statements in the form and full extent to which you made them. The admission of them was rather indirect and circ.u.mstantial, though I did not understand it to be an evasive one.