History of the Impeachment of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States Part 24

These three Articles--the Second, Third and Eleventh--being the only Articles of the entire list of eleven put to a vote, and having been taken up and pa.s.sed upon out of their numerical but in the order of their supposed availability--must therefore be regarded as confessedly the strongest and most likely of the entire list to command the support of the Senate. They were selected and set out for the test. That selection was equivalent to saying, "we put the Impeachment cause to test on these three Articles. If they fail, we have nothing more to offer."

They were put to test and failed. They failed because of their innate weakness. Failed because they proved nothing. Failed because not a single allegation of the entire indictment was or could be proven or tortured into all impeachable offense. Not a remark made by the President or an act performed in all the long and bitter controversy that had subsisted between himself and Congress could be brought nearer to the impeachment mark, in fact, few if any of them so near, as had been the every day rule in the House of Representatives during the previous two years in their treatment of the President. Yet n.o.body thought of impeaching members of the House for their every day personal vituperations against him.

Bill after bill had been offered in Congress, and law after law enacted, with apparently the sole purpose of hampering the Const.i.tutional authority apparently functions of the President--even the a.s.sumption of Executive powers and judicial functions by Congress--the not remote purpose of which seemed to be his entrapment into some measure of resistance upon which could be based an indictment. The House seemed to be literally "lying in wait" for him, with traps set on every side for his ensnarement.

At last, after two years of this sort of scheming and impatient and anxious waiting, the opportunity seemed to have offered in the alleged violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act. The fosterers of the impeachment crusade, weary with their long vigil and growing desperate with every additional day's delay, clutched at the new turn of affairs like a drowning man at a floating straw, and with the avidity of a starved gudgeon at a painted fly.

It was not strange that this sort of diplomacy, developed and exposed as it was in the Senate, in spite of the unfair and partisan maneuvering of the prosecution to prevent it, should have reacted, and contributed to turn against the impeachment movement gentlemen who entered upon the investigation under oath to give Mr. Johnson a fair, non-partisan trial.

The only surprise was that, after the exposure of the malignant partisan spirit that sat in judgment upon Mr. Johnson, and the utter and absolute failure to prove any violation of law on his part, but on the contrary, a determination to preserve from infringement the functions of his office and prevent a revolution from fundamental political forms by the absorption of the Executive authority by the legislative branch of the government--that even a majority, and more especially, that nearly two-thirds of the Senate, could have been found at the close in support of the Impeachment.

This record will serve to explain the omission to vote on the First Article--Messrs. Sherman and Howe being precluded from supporting it in consequence of the position taken by them in the controversy between the two Houses of Congress over the first section of the Tenure-of-Office Bill while that bill was pending, and to avoid defeat on the first vote taken, which was inevitable on that Article--and also to explain, so far as any explanation is possible, the zig-zag method of conducting the ballot--skipping all the first ten Articles and going down to the bottom of the list for the first vote, with the promise of then going back to the first Article and continuing to the end, but instead, skipping that for the second time, and starting in again on the Second and then the Third.

Of course, the natural effect of this battle-dore and shuttle-c.o.c.k method of treating so grave a matter as an impeachment of the President of the United States, added to the effect of the manifest unfairness of the majority in their treatment of testimony offered in the President's defense--was to disgust some who doubtless entered upon the trial honestly inclined to vote for Andrew Johnson's impeachment, but wanted it done fairly and openly, without any suppression of pertinent testimony or juggling for a verdict--and amusing to others, who viewed it as proof of weakness in the indictment, and of misgiving as to the result on the part of its supporters.

To still others it was more than that. It was not only an indication of weakness, but of a determination to take every possible advantage, fair and unfair, to save votes for conviction. The impeachers not unnaturally feared the effect of the defeat of the First Article by the nay votes of Messrs. Sherman and Howe, and probably other Republicans, which was certain to follow the submission of that Article to a vote. Its only allegation was the unlawful removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War in violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act. That alleged offense was repeated in varied but more or less specific forms, in every succeeding Article of the Impeachment except the Tenth, and const.i.tuted the sum and substance--the gravamen--of the entire indictment. It was the basis upon which the impeachment super-structure had been erected.

Without that Article there was not only no foundation, but no coherence in the recital of Mr. Johnson's alleged offenses, and when that fell by its abandonment, the entire impeachment scheme fell with it--as, if there were nothing in the First Article on which to hang an impeachment, there could be nothing in those that followed and were but an amplification--a mere exploitation--of the First.

In substantiation of this view of the First Article, the declaration of Mr. Boutwell to that effect is here inserted. Mr. Boutwell was chairman of the committee of the House appointed to prepare the Articles of Impeachment upon which Mr. Johnson was tried. On his report of these Articles to the House he said, after speaking particularly of the Tenth Article:

The other Articles are based upon facts which are of public knowledge, growing out of the attempt of the President to remove Secretary Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War.

That is, that the basis of the entire accusation was the alleged violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act in the removal of Mr. Stanton, as recited in the First Article.

So, after taking the vote on the Second and Third Articles and their defeat by the same vote as that on the Eleventh, it became manifest that further effort to the impeachment of the president on any of the remaining eight Articles would be useless, and Mr. Williams moved that the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, adjourn sine die, which motion was carried by the following vote:

Yeas--Anthony, Cameron, Cattell, Chandler, Cole, Conkling Corbett, Cragin, Drake, Edmunds, Ferry, Frelinghuysen, Harlan, Howard, Morgan, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Morton, Nye, Patterson of New Hamps.h.i.+re, Pomeroy, Ramsay, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Thayer, Tipton, Van Winkle, Wade. Willey, Williams, Wilson, Yates--34.

Nays--Bayard, Buckalew, Davis, Dixon, Doolittle, Fowler, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, McCreery, Norton, Patterson of Tennessee, Ross, Saulsbury, Trumbull, Vickers--16.

Every Senator present who had voted for conviction voted to abandon the prosecution and end the trial, and every Senator present who had voted against conviction, voted to continue and go through the indictment.

Of course, it was useless to go farther with any hope of success, as, it will be seen by this record, all the remaining Articles were dead, beaten in caucus before the voting commenced, and by the professed friends and leaders of the movement.

Possibly it was the antic.i.p.ation of this effect of the abandonment of the First Article, that was the "sickness" to which Mr. Edmunds, at the outset of the voting, ten days before, ascribed the peculiar order of taking the vote.

It is not intended to aver that there was any privity or concert in this particular manipulation--yet it is suggestive. The Impeachment had been dragging since the 22nd of February, to May 26th--more than three months,--and had been everywhere the engrossing topic of the time. It was becoming tiresome-not only to the Senate, but to the general public.

Notwithstanding the City of Was.h.i.+ngton was still filled with people who had been waiting weary weeks and months for the deposition of Mr. Johnson and the accession of Mr. Wade to the Presidency, for the fulfillment of pledges of appointment based thereon, and who were still importunate for impeachment, the business element of the country at large was tiring of it and its depressing effect upon the commercial activities. Even Senators and Congressmen were being moved to a sense of the obstructive and somewhat ridiculous phases the impeachment movement was beginning to take on--and not a few of those who in its earlier stages had honestly favored the movement, inside as well as outside the members.h.i.+p of both Houses of Congress, had begun to realize the actual nature and purposes, as also the shallowness of the impeachment movement that from whatever motives it had originated, it had degenerated very much into a game of personal ambition--of vindictiveness--and office getting and spoils--and practically nothing higher.

While some of its supporters who had manifestly entered upon the trial with a determination to convict, were still insistent for further prosecution had there been a shadow of ultimate success, there were others who had begun to realize, weeks before the end came, the awkwardness of the predicament in which they had allowed themselves and their party to be placed, and desired to abandon the enterprise.

The strain was becoming too great--there was certain to be a recoil sooner or later. The foundations of the Impeachment were shown to be too slender. There was a future ahead that must be faced, but Senators must preserve their consistency. They could not go before their pro-impeachment const.i.tuencies with a record indicating any degree of weakening in the impeachment crusade. They had insisted for months that Mr. Johnson must be removed, and it would be politically inexpedient to retract.

But they wanted somebody to "help them let go."

So the plan of "desultory" procedure herein outlined seems to have "happened"--whether by design or otherwise, is immaterial--and that plan was made easy by the concerted abandonment of the head and front of the indictment--the First Article--which was side-tracked and logically carried with it all that followed, as would manifestly have been the result if the voting had begun on that Article.

While, to degree, the turmoils and bitterness of that time have pa.s.sed out of public mind, there are still many living who retain a keen remembrance of the struggle and the enmities it produced. There were during the trial many thousands of men in the City of Was.h.i.+ngton awaiting the Impeachment and removal of the President for the fulfillment of pledges of official appointment based thereon, and their numbers increased as the trial progressed.

These antic.i.p.ated beneficiaries were naturally not idle in efforts to the stimulation of zeal in the cause of Impeachment, and Senators were importuned at all seasonable and unseasonable hours in behalf of immediate and positive action. The lively anxiety, even anxious haste, of these patriots for their earliest possible entry upon the service of the Government, was emphasized on every corner and at every place of gathering, day and night, and the lobbies of the Capitol were thronged by them during the sessions of the Senate. No opportunity for a word with a Senator in behalf of the immediate deposition of the President, nor any appliance that seemed to promise a successful overture, was overlooked or forgotten.

When these seemed to fail of the desired effect, more direct and, it was hoped, more effective methods were resorted to. The beleaguered Senator was reminded that the applicant represented the united sentiment of the people of the State from which he held his Senatorial seat--that they demanded Mr. Johnson's conviction and removal--that that demand could not be safely denied, trifled with, or delayed; and that if money was wanted, to use the language of a notorious inquisitor of the House, Mr.

Butler, speaking of the possibility of securing a designated vote for Impeachment "tell the d----d scoundrel that if he wants money, there is a bushel of it here to be had!" Mr. Butler's message was delivered.

So desperate were the inquisitors, and so close the certainty of the vote, that even a project of kidnapping a Senator under the pretense of taking a trip to Baltimore for much needed rest, where, if the terms to be there proffered were refused, a vacancy was to be created--by a.s.sa.s.sination, if necessary--then a recess of the Senate to afford time for the appointment by the Governor of that Senator's State of a successor who would vote for the Impeachment, of the President--was entered upon and its execution attempted. But the trip to Baltimore for "rest" was not taken.

These are not pleasant facts to contemplate, but they somewhat conspicuously characterized the conditions of that time, and ill.u.s.trate the real nature of the impeachment scheme. They boded the control of the Government by the worst element of American politics. It is unnecessary to say here what that control would have involved. During all the previous history of the Government--its wars and political turmoils--the Democratic-Republican forms that characterize its administrations have never faced so insidious or threatening a danger as during that hour.

It was a crucial test, and the result a magnificent vindication of the wisdom and patriotism of the founders of our composite form of Government. Its results have but strengthened those forms and broadened the scope of the beneficent political inst.i.tutions that have grown up under and characterize its operation.

It was a test such as probably no other form of Government on earth could have successfully pa.s.sed, and it is to be hoped that its like may never return.

CHAPTER XII. -- WAS IT A PARTISAN PROSECUTION?

The weakest point in the entire record of the Prosecution of President Johnson, from the indictment by the House of Representatives to the finish in the Senate, except the Bill of Impeachment itself, was the refusal of the more than three-fourths Republican majority of the Senate to permit the reception of testimony in his behalf. That majority naturally gave them absolute control of the proceedings, and they should have realized from the outset that they could not afford to give it the least tinge of partisan bias.

It is therefore not material to discuss in detail the instances of the two interrogatories put by counsel for the Prosecution and rejected, Nos. 4 and 28, because it was shown that their answer would prove nothing against the President, but rather to his vindication, and their rejection could not have occurred but for the intervention of many more nay Republican than Democratic votes--but will pa.s.s to the a.n.a.lyzation of the votes on the twelve interrogatories propounded by counsel for Defense and rejected, which rejections could not have occurred but by the intervention of a large preponderance, in every instance, of the Republican votes cast thereon, and many of them by a unanimous Republican vote.

Without doubt, many of these votes on the admissibility of testimony were governed by, the usual rules prevailing in the courts, but it was deemed by others that every question not manifestly frivolous, or not pertinent, should be permitted answer without objection, regardless of such rules--that the Senate sitting for the trial of an Impeachment of the President of the United States--the occasion a great State Trial--should not be trammeled or belittled by the technicalities common to ordinary court practice--that the Senate was composed supposedly of gentlemen and lawyers of high standing in their profession and familiar with public affairs and public law--that they were sitting in a semi-judicial capacity--not merely as Senators or jurors, but, judges also--judges of fact as well as of law--and const.i.tuted the highest trial body known to our laws--a tribunal from which there was no appeal--that each of its members had taken a solemn oath to "do impartial justice" in this cause, absolutely unswerved by partisan or personal considerations, and that as such each member had not only the right, but it was his duty under his oath, as well, to hermit no obstacle or condition to unnecessarily keep from him a knowledge of all available facts pertinent to the cause, no matter on which side they might weigh--to help or to hurt. That the body, each member for himself, was the proper party to determine the admissibility of testimony, as Mr. Manager Boutwell had declared in his opening argument, "AFTER HE HAD HEARD IT," and knew its trend an purport. Every member of that body had the right to know all the witness knew about the case, and, moreover, the witnesses were brought for the purpose, and for the sole purpose, of telling what they knew.

The same a.s.surance of absolute fairness as that of Mr. Boutwell, was also given by Mr. Bingham, another of the Managers of the Prosecution on the part of the House, in his opening plea before the Senate: "It is,"

said he, "certainly very competent for the Senate, as it is competent for any court of justice in the trial of cases where questions of doubt arise, to HEAR THE EVIDENCE, and, where they themselves are the judges of both the law and the fact, to DISMISS SO MUCH OF IT AS THEY MAY FIND INCOMPETENT, if any of it be incompetent. * * * Under the Plea of Not Guilty, as provided in the rules, every conceivable defense that the accused party could make to the Articles here preferred, can be admitted."

Mr. Manager Butler also said, on the same occasion: "Upon this so great trial, I pray let us not belittle ourselves with the a.n.a.lyses of the common law courts, or the criminal courts, because nothing is so dangerous to mislead us."

These and other like a.s.surances were given of the widest reasonable lat.i.tude in the reception of testimony in the trial then opening. There was thus every reason to expect that Mr. Johnson would have a fair trial. But no sooner had the Prosecution completed its examination of witnesses, in which but seven interrogatories had been objected to of the long list proffered by the Prosecution, than a different rule seemed to have been established for the treatment of proffered testimony, and a large ma.s.s of relevant and valuable testimony in behalf of the President was ruled out on objection of the Prosecution, as inadmissible, and, as a rule that, had very few exceptions, on partisan divisions of the Senate.

Of course it will not be admitted, nor is it here charged, that these refusals to hear testimony were because of any fear that the answers would have any improper force or effect upon the Senate. Nor will it signify to say that the President's attorneys could not have proved what they offered to prove. They hail the right to an opportunity to so prove, and the denial of that right and opportunity was not only a denial of a manifest right of the attorneys, but especially in this case, a more flagrant denial of the rights of the accused, and not only that, but they amounted to an impugnment of the discretion of the Senate.

It is conspicuous, too, that while the defense objected to but seven of the interrogatories submitted by the Prosecution, and five of them were permitted answer by the vote of the Senate; twenty-one of the proffers of testimony by the defense were objected to by the prosecution and but nine of them permitted answer: and that condition was aggravated by the fact that the numerical strength of the majority party in the Senate was sufficient to determine absolutely the disposition of every question, and they could therefore afford to be strictly fair to the accused, and by the further fact that the objections to testimony offered in behalf of the defense were as three to one of the objections to testimony offered in behalf of the prosecution.

These denials of testimony in behalf of the defense were unfortunate.

That practice lowered the dignity of the occasion and of the proceeding, as they could but have given ground for criticism of partisan bias and a vindictive judgment in case of successful impeachment. Most, if not all these rejected interrogatories implied important information in possession of the witnesses which the Senate had a right to, and which the party offering had the right to have produced. Moreover, it was the right and the duty of the Senate to know what the witness was presumed to know, and then to judge, each Senator for himself, of the relevancy of the testimony.

As stated, the princ.i.p.al averment against the President, was his alleged violation of the Tenure-of-Office Act in the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War, presented in various phases throughout the Articles of Impeachment.

In ill.u.s.tration of the treatment of testimony offered in the President's behalf by a majority of the Republican Senators, the record shows that on the eighth disputed interrogatory, the second put by the defense, General Sherman being on the witness stand:--Defense asked as to a certain conversation relating to that removal, had between the General and the President at an interview specified. The prosecution objected to the question being answered, and a vote of the Senate was demanded. The vote was--for receiving the testimony, 23; against receiving it, 28. Of the latter number, twenty-seven, all Republicans, voted at the close of the trial to convict the President of violating the Tenure-of-Office Act, in the removal of Mr. Stanton, after refusing to hear testimony in his behalf on that charge.

The next interrogatory, No. 9, was "when the President asked the witness (Gen. Sherman,) to accept the War Office, was anything further said in reference to it?" This was objected to by the prosecution, and the vote thereon was 23 to 29. Twenty-eight of the twenty-nine gentlemen thus refusing answer to this question, afterwards voting to convict the President, after refusing to bear the testimony of a very important witness in his behalf, which his counsel proposed to produce and tried in vain to get before the Senate.

On the tenth interrogatory, by Defense, "whether the President had stated to the witness, (General Sherman), his object in asking him to accept the War Office," the vote was 7 to 44 against receiving it, and thirty-one of the gentlemen voting not to hear this testimony, at the close of the hearing voted to convict Mr. Johnson of a high misdemeanor in office in the removal of Mr. Stanton, after refusing to hear his defense.

The next, No. 11, was as to the President's attempt to get a case before the Supreme Court for a judicial determination of Mr. Stanton's right to retain the War Office against the President's wish. This testimony was refused by a vote of 25 to 27--every nay vote being cast by a Republican, every one of whom at the close of the trial, voting in effect to convict Mr. Johnson of a high misdemeanor in office in seeking resort to the courts to test the legality of an act of Congress pa.s.sed for the practically sole purpose of restricting an executive function never before questioned.

The next interrogatory, No. 12, was whether the witness, (General Sherman), had formed an opinion whether the good of the service required a Secretary of War other than Mr. Stanton. It was well understood that General Sherman believed that for the good of the service Mr. Stanton ought to retire, and as the Chief Officer of the Army his opinion was certainly ent.i.tled to weight, and the President had a right to the benefit of his judgment. This interrogatory was objected to by the Prosecution, and was rejected by a vote of 18 to 35--thirty-one of the thirty-five being Republicans, who at the close of the trial voted to convict Mr. Johnson of a high misdemeanor in the removal of Mr. Stanton, after refusing him the benefit of the opinion of the Chief Officer of the Army on a question affecting the military service, and to which he was in all fairness clearly ent.i.tled.

No. 13, General Sherman was asked whether he had advised, the President to appoint a successor to Mr. Stanton. (It was well understood that he had.) Answer to this was refused, 18 to 32--thirty of the latter, all Republicans, voting at the close of the trial to convict Mr. Johnson, after refusing to hear this important testimony in his behalf. No.