History of the Russian Revolution Vol 1 Part 12

Kronstadt was getting ready, however, to take a more signi.cant revenge. The baiting of the bourgeois press had-made it a factor of all-national importance. "Fortifying itself in Kronstadt," writes Miliukov, "Bolshevism with the help of suitably trained agitators threw out widely over Russia a net of propaganda. Kronstadt emissaries were sent also to the front, where they undermined discipline, and to the rear, into the villages, where they incited to the sacking of estates. The Kronstadt Soviet gave these emissaries special mandates: 'N. N. has been sent to his province to be present with the right of a deciding vote in the county, district and village committees, and also to speak at meetings and call meetings at his own discretion where ever he wants to,' with 'the right to bear arms, with unhindered and free transportation on all railroads and steams.h.i.+ps.' And therewith 'the inviolability of the person of the said agitator is guaranteed by the Soviet of the City of Kronstadt.' "

In exposing the undermining work of the Baltic sailors Miliukov only forgets to explain how and why, notwithstanding the presence of learned authorities, inst.i.tutions and news-papers, solitary sailors armed with this strange mandate of the Kronstadt Soviet travelled all over the country without hindrance, found food and lodging everywhere, were admitted to all popular meetings, everywhere attentively listened to, and left the imprint of a sailor's hand on the events of history. The historian in the service of liberal politics does not ask himself this simple question. But the Kronstadt miracle was thinkable only because the sailors far more deeply expressed the demands of historic evolution than the very intel-ligent professors. The semi-literate mandate was, to speak in the language of Hegel real because it was reasonable, whereas the subjectively most intelligent plans were spectral because the reason of history was not even camping in them for the night.

The soviets lagged behind the shop committees. The shop committees lagged behind the ma.s.ses. The soldiers lagged behind the workers. Still more the provinces lagged behind the capital. Such is the inevitable dynamic of a revolutionary process, which creates thousands of contradictions only in order accidentally and in pa.s.sing, as though in play, to resolve them and immediately create new ones. The party also lagged behind the revolutionary dynamic-an organisation which has the least right to lag, especially in a time of revolu-tion. In such workers' centres as Ekaterinburg, Perm, Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Sormovo, Kolomna, Yuzovka, the Bolsheviks separated from the Mensheviks only at the end of May. In Odessa, Nikolaev, Elisavetgrad, Poltava and other points in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks did not have independent organisations even in the middle of June. In Baku, Zlatioust, Bezhetsk, Kostroma, the Bolsheviks divided from the Mensheviks only towards the end of June. These facts cannot but seem surprising when you take into consideration that within four months the Bolsheviks are going to seize the power. How far the party during the war had fallen behind the molecular process in the ma.s.ses, and how far the March leaders.h.i.+p of Kamenev and Stalin lagged behind the gigantic historic tasks! The most revolutionary party which human history until this time had ever known was nevertheless caught unawares by the events of history. It reconstructed itself in the .res, and straightened out its ranks under the onslaught, of events. The ma.s.ses at the turning point were "a hundred times" to the left of the extreme left party. The growth of the Bolshevik in.uence, which took place with the force of a natural historical process, reveals its own contradiction upon a closer examina-tion, its zigzags, its ebbs and .ows. The ma.s.ses are not h.o.m.ogeneous, and more over they learn to handle the .re of revolution only by burning their hands and jumping away. The Bolsheviks could only accelerate the process of education of the ma.s.ses. They patiently explained. And history this time did not take advantage of their patience.

While the Bolsheviks were resolutely winning the shops, factories and regiments, the elections to the democratic dumas gave an enormous and apparently growing advantage to the Compromisers. This was one of the sharpest and most enigmatical contradictions of the revolution. To be sure, the duma of the Vyborg district, which was purely proletarian, prided itself upon its Bolshevik majority. But that was an exception. In the city elections of Moscow in June, the Social Revolutionaries got more than 60 per cent of the votes. They themselves were astonished at this .gure, for they could not but feel that their in.uence was swiftly dwindling. In the effort to understand the mutual relation between the real development of the revolution and its re.ection in the mirrors of democracy the Moscow elections have an extraordinary interest. The vast layers of workers and soldiers were already hastily shaking off their Compromisist illusions. Meanwhile, the broadest layers of the small town people were also beginning to stir. For these scattered ma.s.ses the democratic elections offered almost the .rst, and in any case one of the very rare opportunities to show themselves politically. While the worker, yesterday's Menshevik or Social Revolutionary, gave his vote to the Bolshevik Party and drew the soldier along with him, the cabman, the deliveryman, the janitor, the market woman, the shopkeeper, his a.s.sistant, the teacher, in performing so heroic a deed as giving their vote to the Social Revolutionaries, for the .rst time emerged from political non-existence. The petty bourgeois layers belatedly voted for Kerensky because he personi.ed in their eyes the February revolution, which had only to-day seeped down to them. With its 60 per cent Social Revolutionary majority the Moscow Duma glowed with the last .are of a dying luminary. It was so also with all the other organs of democratic self-administration. Having barely arrived, they were already stricken with the impotence of belatedness. That meant that the course of the revolution depended upon the workers and soldiers, and not upon that human dust which had been kicked up and was dancing in the whirlwind of the revolution.

Such is the deep and at the same time simple dialectic of the revolutionary awakening of the oppressed cla.s.ses. The most dangerous of the aberrations of the revolution arises when the mechanical accountant of democracy balances in one column yesterday, to-day and to-morrow, and thereby impels the formal democrats to look for the head of the revolution where in reality is to be found its very heavy tail. Lenin taught his party to distinguish head from tail.

CHAPTER 22.

THE SOVIET CONGRESS AND THEJUNE DEMONSTRATION.

The .rst congress of the soviets, which sanctioned the offensive for Kerensky, a.s.sembled in Petrograd on June 3 in the building of the Cadet Corps. There were 820 delegates with a vote and 268 with a voice. They represented 305 local soviets, 53 district and regional organisations at the front, the rear inst.i.tutions of the army, and a few peasant organisations. The right to a vote was accorded to Soviets containing not less than 25,000 men. Soviets containing from 10,000 to 25,000 had a voice. On the basis of this ruleby the way, none too strictly observedwe may a.s.sume that over 20,000,000 people stood behind the soviets. Out of 777 delegates giving information as to their party allegiance, 285 were Social Revolutionaries, 248 Mensheviks, 105 Bolsheviks; a few belonged to less important groups. The left wingthe Bolsheviks, and the Internationalists adhering to themconst.i.tuted less than a .fth of the delegates. The congress consisted for the most part of people who had registered as socialists in March but got tired of the revolution by June. Petrograd must have seemed to them a town gone mad.

The Congress began by ratifying the banishment of Grimm, an unhappy Swiss socialist who had been trying to save the Russian revolution and the German social democracy by means of back-stage negotiations with the Hohenzollern diplomats. The demand of the left wing that they take up immediately the question of the coming offensive was rejected by an overwhelming majority. The Bolsheviks looked like a tiny group. But on that very day and perhaps hour, a conference of the factory and shop committees of Petrograd adopted, also with an overwhelming majority, a resolution that only a government of soviets could save the country.

The Compromisers, no matter how near-sighted they were, could not help seeing what 312.

was happening around them every day. In the session of June 4 the Bolshevik-hater, Lieber, evidently under the in.uence of the provincials, denounced the good-for-nothing commis-sars of the government to whom the power had not been surrendered in the provinces. "A whole series of functions of the governmental organs have as a result gone over into the hands of the soviets, even when the soviets did not want them." Those people had to complain to somebody even against themselves.

One of the delegates, a school teacher, complained to the congress that after four months of revolution there had not been the slightest change in the sphere of education. All of the old teachers, inspectors, directors, overseers of districts, many of them former members of the Black Hundreds, all of the old school programmes, reactionary textbooks, even the old a.s.sis tant ministers, remained peacefully at their posts. Only the czar's portraits had been removed to the attics, and these might any day be stuck back in their places.

The congress could not make up its mind to lift a hand against the State Duma, or against the State Council. Its timid ity before the reaction was covered up by the Menshevik orator Bogdanov with the remark that the Duma and the Soviet are "dead and non-existent organisations anyway." Martov, with his polemical wit, answered: "Bogdanov proposes that we should declare the Duma dead but not make any attempt upon its life."

The congress, in spite of its solid government majority, proceeded in an atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty. Patriotism had grown rather damp and gave out only lazy .ashes. It was obvious that the ma.s.ses were dissatis.ed, and the Bolsheviks were immeasurably stronger throughout the country, and especially in the capital, than at the congress. Re-duced to its elements, the quarrel between the Bolsheviks and the Compromisers invariably revolved around the question: With whom shall the democrats side, the imperialists or the workers? The shadow of the Entente stood over the congress. The question of the offensive was predetermined; the democrats had nothing to do but accede.

"At this critical moment," preached Tseretelli, "not one social force ought to be thrown out of the scales, so long as it may be useful to the cause of the people." Such was the justi.cation for a coalition with the bourgeoisie. Seeing that the proletariat, the army, and the peasantry were upsetting their plans at every step, the democrats had to open a war against the people under guise of a war against the Bolsheviks. Thus Tseretelli had declared the Kronstadt sailors apostates in order not to throw out of his scales the Kadet Pepelyaev. The coalition was rati.ed by a majority of 543 votes against 126, with 52 abstaining.

The work of this enormous and .abby a.s.sembly in the Cadet Corps was distinguished by grandeur in the matter of declarations, and conservative stinginess in practical tasks. This laid on all its decisions a stamp of hopelessness and hypocrisy. The congress recognised the right of all Russian nationalities to self. determination, but gave the key to this problematic right not to the oppressed nations themselves, but to a future Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, in which the Compromisers hoped to be in a majority and capitulate before the imperialists, exactly as they had done in the government.

The congress refused to pa.s.s a decree on the eight-hour day. Tseretelli explained this side-stepping by the dif.culty of reconciling the interests of the different layers of the pop-ulation. As though any single great need in history was ever accomplished by "reconciling interests," and not by the victory of progressive interests over reactionary!

Grohman, a Soviet economist, introduced toward the end of the congress his inevitable resolution: as to. the oncoming economic catastrophe and the necessity of governmental regulation. The congress adopted this ritual resolution, but only so that everything might remain as before.

"Having deported Grimm," wrote Trotsky, on the 7th of June, "the congress returned to the order of the day. But capitalistic pro.ts remain as before inviolable for Skobelev and his colleagues. The food crisis is getting sharper every hour. In the diplomatic sphere the government is taking blow after blow. And .nally this so hysterically proclaimed offensive is obviously getting ready to come down on the nation, a monstrous adven hire.

"We should be willing to watch peacefully the sancti.ed activities of the ministersLvov TereshchenkoTseretellifor a number of months. We need time for our own preparations. But the underground mole digs too fast. With the help of the 'socialist' ministers the prob-lem of power may rise before the members of this congress a great deal sooner than any of us imagine"

Trying to s.h.i.+eld themselves from the ma.s.ses with a higher authority, the leaders dragged the congress into all current con.icts, pitilessly compromising it in the eyes of the Petrograd workers and soldiers. The most resounding episode of this kind was the incident about the summer home of Durnovo, an old czarist bureaucrat who had made himself famous as Minister of the Interior by putting down the revolution of 1905. The vacant home of this hated, and moreover dirty-handed, bureaucrat was seized by workers' organisations on the Vyborg sidechie.y because of the enormous gardens which became a favourite playground for children. The bourgeois press represented the place as a lair of pogromists and hold-up menthe Kronstadt of the Vyborg district. No one took the trouble to .nd out what the facts were. The government, carefully avoiding all important questions, undertook with fresh pa.s.sion to rescue this house. They demanded sanction for the heroic undertaking from the Executive Committee, and Tseretelli of course did not refuse. The Procuror gave an order to evict the group of anarchists from the place in twenty-four hours. Learning about the military activities in preparation, the workers sounded the alarm. The anarchists on their side threatened armed resistance. Twenty-eight factories proclaimed a protest strike. The Executive Committee issued a proclamation accusing the Vyborg workers of aiding the counter-revolution. After all these preliminaries a representative of justice and the militia penetrated into the lions' den. They found complete order reigning; the house was occupied by a number of workers' educational organisations. They were compelled to withdraw in shame. This history had, however, a further development.

On the 9th of June a bomb was exploded at the congress: in the morning's edition of Pravda appeared an appeal for a demonstration on the following day. Cheidze, who knew how to get scared, and was therefore inclined to scare others, announced in a voice from the tomb: "If measures are not taken by the congress, to-morrow will be fatal." The delegates lifted their heads in alarm.

The idea of a show-down between the Petrograd workers and soldiers and the congress was suggested by the whole situation. The ma.s.ses were urging on the Bolsheviks. The garrison especially was seethingfearing that in connection with the offensive they would be distributed among the regiments and scattered along the front. To this was united a bitter satisfaction with the "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier," which had been a big backward step in comparison with "Order No. I," and with the r'egime actually established in the army. The initiative for the demonstration came from the military organisation of the Bolsheviks. Its leaders a.s.serted, and quite rightly as events showed, that if the party did not take the leaders.h.i.+p upon itself, the soldiers themselves would go into the streets. That sharp turn in the mood of the ma.s.ses, however, could not be easily apprehended, and hence there was a certain vacillation in the ranks of the Bolsheviks themselves. Volodarsky was not sure that the workers would come out on the street. There was fear, too, as to the possible character of the demonstration. Representatives of the military organisation declared that the soldiers, fearing attacks and reprisals, would not go out without weapons. "What will come out of the demonstration' asked the prudent Tomsky, and demanded supplementary deliberations. Stalin thought that "the fermentation among the soldiers is a fact; among the workers there is no such de.nite mood," but nevertheless judged it necessary to show resistance to the government. Kalinin, always more inclined to avoid than welcome a battle, spoke emphatically against the demonstration, referring to the absence of any clear motive, especially among the workers: "The demonstration will be purely arti.cial." On June 8, at a conference with the representatives of the workers' sections, after a series of preliminary Votes, 131 hands against 6 were .nally raised for the demonstration, with 22 abstaining.

The work of preparation was carried on up to the last moment secretly, in order not to permit the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks to start a counter-agitation. That legit-imate measure of caution was afterwards interpreted as evidence of a military conspiracy. The Central Council of Factory and Shop Committees joined in the decision to organise the demonstration. "Upon the insistence of Trotsky and against the objection of Lunacharsky," writes Yugov, "the Committee of the Mezhrayontzi decided to join the demonstration." Preparations were carried on with boiling energy.

The manifestation was to raise the banner of "Power to the Soviets." The .ghting slogan ran: "Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists" That was the simplest possible expression for a break-up of the coalition with the bourgeoisie. The pro cession was to march to the Cadet Corps where the congress was sitting. This was to emphasise that the question was not of overthrowing the government, but of bringing pressure on the Soviet leaders.

To be sure, other ideas were expressed at the preliminary conferences of the Bolsheviks. For instance, Smilga, then a young member of the Central Committee, proposed that they should not "hesitate to seize the Post Of.ce, telegraph, and a.r.s.enal, if events developed to the point of a clash." Another partic.i.p.ant in the conference, a member of the Petrograd Committee, Latsis, comments in his diary upon the rejection of Smilga's proposal: "I can-not reconcile myself ... I arrange with comrades Semashko and Rakhia to be fully armed in case of necessity and seize the railroad terminals, a.r.s.enals, banks, post and telegraph of.ces, with the help of a machine-gun regiment." Semashko was the of.cer of a machine-gun regiment. Rakhia, a worker, one of the militant Bolsheviks.

The existence of such moods is easily understandable. The whole course of the party was toward a seizure of power, and the question was merely of appraising the present situation. An obvious break in favour of the Bolsheviks was taking place in Petrograd, but in the provinces the same process was going slower. Moreover the front needed the lesson of an advance before it could shake off its distrust of the Bolsheviks. Lenin therefore stood .rm on his April position: "Patiently explain."

Sukhanov in his Notes describes the plan of the demonstration of June 10, as a direct device of Lenin for seizing the power "if the situation proves favourable." As a matter of fact, only individual Bolsheviks tried to put the matter this way, aiming according to the ironic expression of Lenin, "just a wee bit too far to the left." Strangely enough, Sukhanov does not even try to compare his arbitrary guesses with the political line of Lenin expressed in innumerable speeches and articles.[see Appendix 3 for more information on this]

The Bureau of the Executive Committee immediately presented the Bolsheviks with a demand to call off the demonstration. On what grounds? Only the state power, obviously, could formally forbid a demonstration; but the state power did not dare think of it. How could the Soviet, itself a "private organisation," led by a bloc composed of two political par-ties, pre vent a third party from demonstrating? The Bolshevik Central Committee refused to accede to the demand, but decided to emphasise more sharply the peaceful character of the demonstration. On the 9th of June, a Bolshevik proclamation was pasted up in the workers' districts. "We are free citizens, we have the right to protest, and we ought to use this right before it is too late. The right to a peaceful demonstration is ours."

The Compromisers carried the question before the congress. It was at that moment that Cheidze p.r.o.nounced his words about the fatal outcome, and that it would be necessary for the congress to sit all night. A member of the praesidium, Gegechkori, also one of the sons of the Gironde, concluded his speech with a rude cry in the direction of the Bolshe-viks: "Take your dirty hands off a glorious cause' They did not give the Bolsheviks time, though it was demanded, to take up the question in a meeting of their faction. The congress pa.s.sed a resolution for bidding all demonstrations for three days. Besides being an act of violence with relation to the Bolsheviks, this was an act of usurpation with relation to the government. The soviets continued to steal the power from under their own pillow.

Miliukov was speaking at this time at a Cossack conference, and called the Bolsheviks "the chief enemies of the Russian revolution." Its chief friend, he allowed them to infer, was Miliukov himself, who just before February had agreed to accept defeat from the Germans rather than revolution from the Russian people. To a question from the Cossacks as to the att.i.tude towards Leninists, Miliukov answered: "It's time to make an end of these people." The leader of the bourgeoisie was in too great a hurry. However, he really could not afford to waste time.

Meanwhile meetings were being held in factories and regiments, adopting resolutions to go into the streets the next day with the slogan "All Power to the Soviets." Under the noise of the soviet and Cossack congresses, the fact pa.s.sed unnoticed that 37 Bolsheviks were elected to the duma of the Vyborg district, only 22 from the Social Revolutionary-Menshevik bloc, and 4 Kadets.

Confronted with the categorical resolution of the congress and moreover with a mys-terious reference to a threatening blow from the rightthe Bolsheviks decided to reconsider the question. They wanted a peaceful demonstration, not an insurrection, and they could not have any motive for converting a for bidden demonstration into a half-insurrection. On its side the presidium of the congress decided to take measures. Several hundred delegates were grouped in tens and sent out to the workers' districts and the barracks to prevent the demonstration. They were to meet in the morning at the Tauride Palace and compare notes. The executive committee of the peasant deputies joined in this expedition, appointing 70 from its members.h.i.+p.

Thus, in however unexpected a manner, the Bolsheviks achieved their goal. The del-egates of the congress found them selves obliged to get acquainted with the workers and soldiers of the capital. If the mountain was not allowed to come to the prophet, the prophet at least went to the mountain. The meeting proved instructive in the highest degree. In the Izvestia of the Moscow Soviet, a Menshevik correspondent paints the following pic-ture: "All night long, without a wink of sleep, a majority of the congress, more than 500 members, dividing themselves into tens, travelled through the factories and shops and mil-itary units of Petrograd, urging everybody to stay away from the demonstration. . . . The congress had no authority in a good many of the factories and shops, and also in several regiments of the garrison. . . . The members were frequently met in a far from friendly manner, sometimes hostilely, and quite often they were sent away with insults." This of-.cial Soviet organ does not exaggerate in the least. On the contrary, it gives a very much softened picture of this nocturnal meeting of two different worlds.

The Petrograd ma.s.ses at least left no doubt among the dele gates as to who was able henceforth to summon a demonstration, or to call it off. The workers of the Putilov factory agreed to paste up the declaration of the congress against the demonstration only after they learned from Pravda that it did not contradict the resolution of the Bolsheviks. The .rst ma-chine gun regimentwhich played the leading role in the garrison, as did the Putilov factory among the workersafter hearing the speeches of Cheidze and Avksentiev representing the two executive committees, adopted the following resolution: "In agreement with the Cen-tral Committee of the Bolsheviks and their military organisation, the regiment postpones its action."

This brigade of paci.ers arrived at the Tauride Palace after their sleepless night in a condition of complete demoralisation. They had a.s.sumed that the authority of the congress was in violable, but had run into a stone wall of distrust and hostility. "The ma.s.ses are thick with Bolsheviks." "The att.i.tude to the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries is hostile." "They trust only Pravda." "In some places they shouted: 'We are not your comrades.'" One after another the delegates reported how, although they had called off the battle, they were defeated.

The ma.s.ses submitted to the decision of the Bolsheviks, but not without protest and indignation. In certain factories they adopted resolutions of censure of the Central Com-mittee. The more .ery members of the patty in the sections tore up their members.h.i.+p cards. That was a serious warning.

The Compromisers had motivated their three-day veto of demonstrations by references to a monarchist plot, which hoped to avail itself of the action of the Bolsheviks; they men-tioned the partic.i.p.ation in it of a part of the Cossack congress and the approach to Petrograd of counter-revolutionary troops.

It is not surprising if after calling off the demonstration the Bolsheviks demanded an explanation as to this conspiracy. In place of an answer the leaders of the congress accused the Bolsheviks themselves of a conspiracy. They found this happy way out of the situation.

It must be acknowledged that on the night of June 10 the Compromisers did discover a conspiracy, and one which shook them badlya conspiracy of the ma.s.ses with the Bolsheviks against the Compromisers. However, the submission of the Bolsheviks to the resolution of the congress encouraged them and permitted their panic to turn into madness. The Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries decided to show aniron energy. On the 10th of June the Menshevik paper wrote: "It is time to brand the Leninists as traitors and betrayers of the revolution." A representative of the Executive Committee appeared at the Cossack congress and requested them to support the Soviet against the Bolsheviks. He was answered by the chairman, the ataman of the Urals, Dutov: "We, Cossacks, will never go against the Soviet." Against the Bolsheviks the reactionaries were ready to go hand in hand even with the Soviet-in order the better to strangle it later on.

On June 11 there a.s.sembles a formidable court of justice: the Executive Committee, members of the presidium of the congress, leaders of the actionsin all about a hundred men. Tseretelli as usual appears in the role of prosecutor. Choking with rage, he demands deadly measures, and scornfully waves away Dan, who is always ready to bait the Bolsheviks, but still not quite ready to destroy them. "What the Bolsheviks are now doing is not ideological propaganda, but a conspiracy.

The Bolsheviks must excuse us. Now we are going to adopt different methods of strug-gle. .. . We have got to disarm the Bolsheviks. We cannot leave in their hands those two great technical instruments which they have possessed up to now. We cannot leave ma-chine guns and ri.es in their hands. We will not tolerate conspiracies." That was a new note. What did it mean exactly to disarm the Bolsheviks? Sukhanov writes on this subject: "The Bolsheviks really did not have any special stores of weapons. All the weapons were actually in the hands of soldiers and workers, the immense ma.s.s of whom were following the Bolsheviks. Disarming the Bolsheviks could mean only disarming the proletariat. More than that, it meant disarming the troops."

In other words, that cla.s.sic moment of the revolution had arrived when the bourgeois democracy, upon the demand of the reaction, undertakes to disarm the workers who had guaranteed the revolutionary victory. These democratic gentlemen, among whom were well-read people, had invariably given their sympathy to the disarmed, not to the disarm-ersso long as it was a question of reading old books. But when this question presented itself in reality, they did not recognise it. The mere fact that Tseretelli, a revolutionist, a man who had spent years at hard labour, a Zimmerwaldist of yesterday, was undertaking to disarm the workers, had some dif.culty in making its way into people's heads. The hall was stunned into silence. The provincial delegates nevertheless felt that someone was pus.h.i.+ng them into an abyss. One of the of.cers went into hysterics.

No less pale than Tseretelli, Kamenev rose in his seat and cried out with a dignity the strength of which was felt by the audience: "Mr. Minister, if you are not merely talking into the wind, you have no right to con.ne yourself to speech. Arrest me, and try me for conspiracy against the revolution." The Bolsheviks left the hall with a protest, refusing to partic.i.p.ate in this mockery of their own party. The tenseness in the hall became almost unbearable. Lieber hastened to the aid of Tseretelli. Restrained rage was replaced by hysterical fury. Lieber called for ruthless measures. "If you want to win the ma.s.ses who follow the Bolsheviks, then break with Bolshevism." But he was heard without sympathy, even with a half-hostility.

Impressionable as always, Lunacharsky immediately tried to .nd a common ground with the majority: Although the Bolsheviks had a.s.sured him that they had in mind only a peaceful demonstration, nevertheless his own experience had convinced him that "it was a mistake to organise a demonstration"; however, we must not sharpen the con.icts. Without pacifying his enemies, Lunacharsky irritated his friends.

"We are not .ghting with the left tendency," said Dan jesuiticallyhe was the most expe-rienced, but also most futile of the leaders of the swamp. "We are .ghting with the counter revolution. It is not our fault if behind your shoulders stand the agents of Germany." The reference to Germans was merely a subst.i.tute for an argument. Of course these gentlemen could not point to any agents of Germany.

Tseretelli wanted to deal a blow; Dan merely wanted to show his .st. In its helplessness the Executive Committee sided with Dan. The resolution offered to the congress next day had the character of an exceptional law against Bolsheviks, but without immediate practical inferences.

"You can have no doubt after the visit of your delegates to the factories and regiments," said a declaration addressed to the congress in writing by the Bolsheviks, "that if the demonstration did not take place, it was not because of your veto, but because our party called it off.... The .ction of a military conspiracy was created by the members of the Pro-visional Government in order to carry out the disarming of the proletariat of Petrograd and the disbanding of the Petrograd garrison.. . . Even if the state power went over wholly into the hands of the Sovietwhich we advocateand the Soviet tried to put fetters upon our agitation, that would not make us pa.s.sively submit; we should go to meet imprisonment and other punishments in the name of the idea of international socialism which separates us from you."

The Soviet majority and the Soviet minority confronted each other breast to breast three days as though for a decisive battle. But both sides stepped back at the last moment. The Bolsheviks gave up the demonstration. The Compromisers abandoned the idea of disarming the workers.

Tseretelli remained in the minority among his own people. But nevertheless from his point of view he was right. The policy of union with the bourgeoisie had arrived at a point where it became necessary to paralyse the ma.s.ses who were not reconciled to the coalition. To carry the Compromise policy through to a successful endthat is, to the establishment of a parliamentary rule of the bourgeoisiedemanded the disarming of the workers and soldiers.

But Tseretelli was not only right. He was besides that powerless. Neither the soldiers nor the workers would have voluntarily given up their arms. It would have been necessary to employ force against them. But Tseretelli was already without forces. He could procure them, if at all, only from the hands of the reaction. But they, In case of a successful crus.h.i.+ng of the Bolsheviks, would have immediately taken up the job of crus.h.i.+ng the Compromise soviets, and would not have failed to remind Tseretelli that he was a former hard-labour convict and nothing more. However, the further course of events will show that even the reaction did not have forces enough for this.

Politically Tseretelli grounded his argument for .ghting the Bolsheviks upon the a.s.ser-tion that they were separating the proletariat from the peasantry. Martov answered him: Tseretelli does not get his guiding ideas "from the depth of the peasantry. A group of right Kadets, a group of capitalists, a group of landlords, a group of imperialists, the bourgeoisie of the West"these are the ones who are demanding the disarmament of the workers and soldiers. Martov was right: the possessing cla.s.ses have more than once in history hidden their pretensions behind the backs of a peasantry.

From the moment of publication of Lenin's April theses, a reference to the danger of isolating the proletariat from the peasants became the princ.i.p.al argument of all those who wanted to drag the revolution backward. It was no accident that Lenin compared Tseretelli to the "old Bolsheviks."

In one of his works of the year 1917, Trotsky wrote on this theme: "The isolation of our party from the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, even its extreme isolation, even by way of solitary con.nement, would still in no case mean the isolation of the proletariat from the oppressed peasantry and the oppressed city ma.s.ses. On the contrary, a sharp demarcation of the policy of the revolutionary proletariat from the treacherous apostasy of the present leaders of the Soviet, can alone bring a saving political differentiation into the peasant millions, draw away the poor peasants from the traitorous leaders.h.i.+p of the aggressive Social Revolutionary type of muzhik and convert the socialist proletariat into genuine leaders of the national plebeian revolution."

But Tseretelli's totally false argument remained alive. On the eve of the October revolu-tion it reappeared with redoubled force as the argument of many "old Bolsheviks" against the uprising. Several years later when the intellectual reaction against October began, Tseretelli's formula became the chief theoretical weapon of the school of the epigones.

***: At the same session of the congress which condemned the Bolsheviks in their absence, a representative of the Mensheviks unexpectedly moved to appoint for the follow-ing Sunday, the 18th of June, a manifestation of workers and soldiers in Petro grad and other important cities, in order to demonstrate to the enemy the unity and strength of the democracy. The motion was carried, although not without bewilderment. Something over a month later Miliukov fairly well explained this un expected turn on the part of the Com-promisers: "In delivering Kadet speeches at the congress of the soviets, in disorganising the armed demonstration of June 10 . . . the minister. socialists felt that they had gone too far in our direction, that the ground was slipping under their feet. They got frightened and backed away abruptly toward the Bolsheviks." The decision to hold a demonstration on June 18 was, of course not a step in the direction of the Bolsheviks, but an attempt to turn toward the ma.s.ses as against the Bolsheviks. Their nocturnal experience with the workers and soldiers bad caused a certain amount of trepidation among the heads of the soviets. Thus, for instance, in direct opposition to what had been in mind at the beginning of the congress, they hastily produced in the name of the government a resolution calling for the abolition of the State Duma and the summoning of a Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly for the 30th of September. The slogans of the demonstration were chosen with this same idea of not causing any irritation to the ma.s.ses: "Universal Peace," "Immediate Con vocation of a Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly," "Democratic Republic." Not a word either about the offensive or the coalition. Lenin asked in Pravda: "And what has become of 'Complete Con.dence to the Provisional Government,' gentlemen? . . Why does your tongue stick in your throat' This irony was accurately to the point: the Compromisers did not dare demand of the ma.s.ses con.dence in that government of which they themselves were members.

The Soviet delegates, having a second time made the rounds of the workers' districts and the barracks, gave wholly encouraging reports on the eve of the demonstration to the Exec-utive Committee. Tseretelli, to whom these communications restored his equilibrium and inclination towards complacent sermonising, addressed some remarks to the Bolsheviks: "Now we shall have an open and honest review of the revolutionary forces. . . . Now we shall see whom the majority is following, you or us." The Bolsheviks had accepted the challenge even before it was so incautiously formulated. "We shall join the demonstration on the 18th," wrote Pravda, "in order to struggle for those aims for which we had intended to demonstrate on the 10th."

The line of marchevidently in memory of the funeral procession of three months before, which had been, at least super.cially, a gigantic manifestation of the unity of the democra-cyagain led to Mars Field and the grave of the February martyrs. But aside from the line of march nothing whatever was reminiscent of those earlier days. About 400,000 people paraded, considerably less than at the funeral: absent from the Soviet demonstration were not only the bourgeoisie with whom the soviets were in coalition, but also the radical intel-ligentsia, which had occupied so prominent a place in the former parades of the democracy. Few but the factories and barracks marched.

The delegates of the congress, a.s.sembled on Mars Field, read and counted the placards.

The .rst Bolshevik slogans were met half-laughinglyTseretelli had so con.dently thrown down his challenge the day before. But these same slogans were repeated again and again. "Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists' "Down with the Offensive" "All Power to the Soviets' The ironical smiles froze, and then gradually disappeared. Bolshevik banners .oated everywhere. The delegates stopped counting the uncomfortable totals. The tri-umph of the Bolsheviks was too obvious. "Here and there," writes Sukhanov, "the chain of Bolshevik banners and columns would be broken by speci.cally Social Revolutionary or of.cial Soviet slogans. But these were drowned in the ma.s.s. Soviet of.cialdom was recounting the next day 'how .ercely here and there the crowd tore up banners bearing the slogan "Con.dence to the Provisional Government."'" There is obvious exaggeration in this. Only three small groups carried placards in honour of the Provisional Govern-ment: the circle of Plekhanov, a Cossack detachment, and a handful of Jewish intellectuals who belonged to the Bund. This threefold combination, which gave the impression with its variegated members.h.i.+p of a political curio, seemed to have set itself the task of pub-licly exhibiting the impotence of the r'egime. Under the hostile cries of the crowd the Plekhanovites and the Bund lowered their placards. The Cossacks were stubborn, and their banners were literally torn from them by the demonstrators, and destroyed. "The stream which had been .owing quietly along until then," writes Izve 4ia, "turned into a veritable river at the .ood, just at the point of over.owing its banks." That was the Vyborg section, all under the banners of the Bolsheviks. "Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists" One of the factories carried a placard: "The right to Life is Higher than the rights of Private Property." This slogan had not been suggested by the party.

Dismayed provincials were looking everywhere for their leaders. The latter lowered their eyes or simply went into hiding. The Bolsheviks went after the provincials. Does this look like a gang of conspirators? The delegates agreed that it did not. "In Petrograd you are the power," they conceded in a totally different tone from that in which they had spoken at the of.cial sessions, "but not in the provinces, not at the front. Petrograd Cannot go against the whole country." That's all right, answered the Bolsheviks, your turn will soon comethe same slogans will be raised.

"During this demonstration," wrote the old man Plekhanov, "I stood on Mars Field be-side Cheidze: I saw in his face that he was not deceiving himself in the least about the sig-ni.cance of the astonis.h.i.+ng number of placards demanding the over throw of the capitalist ministers. It was emphasised as though intentionally by the veritably imperious commands with which some of the Leninists addressed him as they pa.s.sed by like people celebrating a holiday." The Bolsheviks certainly had ground for a holiday feeling. "Judging by the plac-ards and slogans of the demonstrators," wrote Gorky's paper, "the Sun day demonstration revealed the complete triumph of Bolshevism among the Petersburg proletariat." It was a great victory, and moreover it was won on the arena and with the weapons chosen by the enemy. While sanctioning the offensive, recognising the coalition, and condemning the Bolsheviks, the soviet congress had called the ma.s.ses on its own initiative into the streets. They came with the announcement: We don't want either offensive or coalition; we are for Bolshevism. Such was the political meaning &f the demonstration. No wonder the papers of the Mensheviks, who had initiated the demonstration, asked themselves mournfully the next day: Who suggested that unhappy idea?

Of course not all the workers and soldiers in the capital took part in the demonstration, and not all the demonstrators were Bolsheviks. But by this time not one of them wanted a coalition. Those workers who still remained hostile to Bolshevism did not know what to oppose to it. Their hostility was thus converted into a watchful neutrality. Under the Bolshevik slogans marched no small number of Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries who had not yet broken with their party, but had already lost faith in its slogans.

The demonstration of June18 made an enormous impression on its own partic.i.p.ants. The ma.s.ses saw that the Bolsheviks had become a power, and the vacillating were drawn to them. In Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and many other provincial towns the demonstrations revealed an immense growth of the in.uence of the Bolsheviks. Every-where the same slogans were advanced, and they struck at the very heart of the February regime. It was impossible not to draw conclusions. It seemed as though the Compromisers had nowhere to go. But the offensive helped them at the very last moment. On the 19th of June, there was a patriotic demonstration on the Nevsky under the leaders.h.i.+p of Kadets, and with a portrait of Keren sky. In the words of Miliukov, "It was so different from what happened on the same street the day before that there mingled with the feeling of triumph an involuntary feeling of uneasiness." Legitimate feeling! But the Compromisers gave a sigh of relief. Their thoughts immediately soared above both demonstrations in the form of a democratic synthesis. Those people were fated to drain the cup of illusion and humiliation to the dregs.

In the April days two simultaneous demonstrations, one revolutionary and the other patriotic, had gone to meet each other, and their clash resulted in casualties. The hostile demonstrations of the 18th and 19th of June followed one after the other. There was no direct clash then. But a clash was not to be avoided. It had only been postponed for two weeks.

The anarchists, not knowing how else to show their independence, availed themselves of the demonstration of June 18 for an attack on the Vyborg prisons. The prisoners, a majority of them criminal, were liberated without a .ght and without casualtiesand not from one prison, but from several simultaneously. It seems obvious that the attack had not caught the administration unawaresthat the administration had gladly gone half-way to meet actual and pretended anarchists. That whole enigmatical episode had nothing whatever to do with the demonstration. But the patriotic press linked them together. The Bolsheviks proposed to the congress of soviets a strict investigation of the manner in which 460 criminals had been let loose from various prisons. However, the Compromisers could not permit themselves this luxury: they were afraid they would run into men higher up in the administration and their own allies in a political bloc. Moreover, they had no desire to defend their own demonstration against malicious slanders.

The Minister of Justice, Pereverzevwho had disgraced himself a few days before in connection with the summer house of Durnovodecided to have vengeance, and under the pre text of a search for escaped convicts made a new raid on the place. The anarchists resisted; one of them was killed, and the house wrecked. The workers of the Vyborg side, considering the house their own, sounded the alarm. Several factories quit work; the alarm spread to other sections and even to the bar racks.

The last days of June pa.s.s in a continual commotion. A machine gun regiment pre-pares for an immediate attack on the Provisional Government. Workers from the striking factories make the rounds of the regiments calling them into the streets. Bearded peas-ants in soldiers' coats, many of them grey-haired, pa.s.s in processions of protest along the pavements: these middle-aged peasants are demanding that they be discharged for work in the .elds. The Bolsheviks are carrying on an agitation against going into the streets: The demonstration of the 18th has said all that can be said: in order to produce a change, demonstrating is not enough; and yet the hour of revolution has not yet struck. On the 22nd of June, the Bolshevik press appeals to the garrison: "Do not trust any summons to action in the Street delivered in the name of the Military Organisation." Delegates are arriving from the front with complaints of violence and punishments. Threats to reorganise the unsub-missive regiments Dour oil on the .re. "In many regiments the soldiers are sleeping with weapons in their hands," says a declaration of the Bolsheviks to the Executive Commit-tee. Patriotic demonstrations, often armed, lead to street .ghts. These are small discharges of the acc.u.mulated electricity. Neither side directly intends to attack: the reaction is too weak, the revolution is not yet fully con.dent of its power. But the streets of the town seem paved with explosive material. A battle hovers in the air. The Bolshevik press explains and restrains. The patriotic press gives away its fright with an un bridled baiting of Bolsheviks. On the 25th, Lenin writes: "This universal wild cry of spite and rage against the Bolsheviks is the common complaint of Kadets, Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks against their own .abbiness. They are in a majority. They are the government. They are all together in a bloc. And they see that nothing comes of it. What can they do but rage against the Bolsheviks'

CHAPTER 23.

CONCLUSION.

In the .rst pages of this work we tried to show how deeply the October revolution was rooted in the social relations of Russia. Our a.n.a.lysis, far from having been accommo-dated ex post Thdo to the achieved events, was on the contrary made by us long before the revolutionindeed before its prologue of 1905.

In the further pages we tried to see how the social forces of Russia revealed themselves in the events of the revolution. We recorded the activity of the political parties in their interrelations with the cla.s.ses. The sympathies and antipathies of the author may be set aside. A historic exposition has a right to demand that its objectivity be recognised if, resting upon accurately established facts, it reproduces their inner connection on the basis of the real development of social relations. The inner casual order of the process thus coming to life becomes itself the best proof of the objectivity of the exposition.

The events of the February revolution pa.s.sing before the reader have con.rmed our theoretical prognosis for the time being by one half at leastthrough a method of successive elimination. Before the proletariat came to power all the other variants of the political development were subjected to the test of life and thrown aside as worthless.

The government of the liberal bourgeoisie with Kerensky as a democratic hostage, proved a total failure. The "April days' were the .rst candid warning addressed by the October to the February revolution. The bourgeois Provisional Government was replaced after this by a Coalition whose fruitless ness was revealed on every day of its existence, In the June demonstration summoned by the Executive Committee on its own initiative, although perhaps not quite voluntarily, the February revolution tried to measure strength with the October and suffered a cruel defeat. The defeat was the more fatal in that it oc-curred in the Petrograd arena, and at the hands of those same workers and soldiers who had achieved the February revolution and turned it over to the rest of the country. The June 326.

demonstration proved that the workers and soldiers of Petrograd were on their way to a new revolution whose alms were inscribed on their banners. Unmistakable signs testi.ed that all the rest of the country, although with an inevitable delay, would catch up with Pet-rograd. Thus by the end of its fourth month the February revolution had already exhausted itself politically. The Compromisers had lost the con.dence of the soldiers and workers. A con.ict between the leading soviet parties and the soviet ma.s.ses now became in evitable. After the manifestation of June 18, which was a peaceful test of the correlation of forces of the two revolutions, the contradiction between them must inevitably take an open and violent form.

Thus arose the "July days." Two weeks after the demonstration which had been organ-ised from above, the same workers and soldiers went out into the street on their own initia-tive and demanded of the Central Executive Committee that it seize the power. The Com-promisers .atly refused. The July days led to street encounters and casualties, and ended with the dispersion of the Bolsheviks who were declared responsible for the bankruptcy of the February regime. That resolution which Tseretelli had introduced on June II and which was then voted downto declare the Bolsheviks beyond the law and disarm themwas carried out in full at the beginning of July. The Bolshevik papers were shut down; the Bolshevik military units were dissolved. The workers were disarmed. The leaders of the party were declared hirelings of the German Staff. One of them went into hiding, the others were locked up in jail.

But just this "victory" of the Compromisers over the Bolsheviks completely revealed the impotence of the democracy. Against the workers and soldiers the democrats were compelled to employ notoriously counter-revolutionary units, hostile not only to the Bol-sheviks, but also to the Soviet: the Executive Committee already had no troops of its own.

The liberals drew from this the correct conclusion, which Miliukov formulated in the form of an alternative: Kornilov or Lenin? The revolution actually left no more room for the empire of the golden mean. The counter-revolution was saying to itself: now or never. The supreme commander-in-chief, Kornilov, raised a rebellion against the revolution under the guise of a campaign against the Bolsheviks. Just as all forms of the legal opposition before the revolution had adopted the camou.age of patriotismthat is, the necessities of the struggle against the Germansso now all forms of legal counter-revolution adopted as camou.age the necessities of the struggle against the Bolsheviks. Kornilov had the sup-port of the possess mu cla.s.ses and their party, the Kadets. This did not hinder, but rather promoted, the result that the troops deployed against Petrograd by Kornilov were defeated without a .ght, capitulated without an encounter, went up in vapour like a drop falling on a hot stove-lid. Thus the attempt at a revolution from the right was made, and moreover by a man standing at the head of the army. The correlation of forces between the possessing cla.s.ses and the people was tested in action. In the choice between Kornilov and Lenin, Kornilov fell like a rotten fruit, although Lenin was still at that time compelled to re main in deep hiding.

What variant after that still remained unused, untried, untested? The variant of Bolshe-vism. Actually after the Kerni by attempt and its inglorious collapse, the ma.s.ses stormily and decisively swung over to the Bolsheviks. The October revolution advanced with a phys-ical necessity. In distinction from the February revolution, which has been called bloodless al though it cost Petrograd a considerable number of victims, the October revolution was actually achieved in the capital without bloodshed. Have we not the right to ask: What further demonstration could be given of the deep natural inevitability of the October revo-lution? Is it not clear that this revolution can seem the fruit of adventurism and demagogy only to those whom it damaged at the most sensitive point, the pocketbook? The b.l.o.o.d.y struggle breaks out only after the conquest of power by the Bolshevik soviets when the overthrown cla.s.ses, with material support from the governments of the Entente, make des-perate efforts to get back what they have lost. Then come the years of civil war. The Red Army is created, the hungry country is put under the r'egime of military communism and converted into a Spartan war camp. The October revolution step by step lays down its road, beats back all enemies, pa.s.ses over the solution of its industrial problems, heals the heav-iest wounds of the imperialist and civil war, and achieves gigantic successes in the sphere of the development of industry. There arise before it, however, new dif.culties .owing from its isolated position with mighty capitalistic lands surrounding it. That belatedness of development which had brought the Russian proletariat to power, has imposed upon that power tasks which in their essence cannot be fully achieved within the framework of an isolated state. The fate of that state is thus wholly bound up with the further course of world history.

This .rst volume, dedicated to the February revolution, shows how and why that rev-olution was bound to come to nothing, The second volume will show how the October revolution triumphed.

APPENDIX I.

(To the Chapter Peculiarities of Russia's Development): The question of the peculiar-ities of Russia's historic development. and, bound up therewith, the question of its future destinies, lay at the bottom of all the debates and groupings of the Russian intelligentsia throughout almost the whole of the nineteenth century. Slavophilism and westernism re-solved this question in opposite ways but with similar dogmatism. They were replaced by the theories of the Narodniks and Marxism. Before the Narodnik theory conclusively faded out under the in.uence of bourgeois liberalism, it long and stubbornly defended the idea of a completely unique course of development for Russia, a detour around capitalism. In this sense the Narodniks continued the Slavophile tradition, purging it how ever of monarchist-churchly-Pan-Slavic elements, and giving it a revolutionary-democratic character.

In the essence of the matter the Slavophile conception, with all its reactionary fantas-ticness, and also Narodnikism, with all its democratic illusions, were by no means mere speculations, but rested upon indubitable and moreover deep peculiarities of Russia's de-velopment, understood one-sidedly however and incorrectly evaluated. In its struggle with Narodnikism, Russian Marxism, demonstrating the ident.i.ty of the laws of development for all countries, not infrequently fell into a dogmatic mechanisation discovering a tendency to pour out the baby with the bath. This tendency is revealed especially sharply in many of the works of the well-known Professor Pokrovsky.

In 1922 Pokrovsky came down upon the historic conception of the author which lies at the basis of the theory of Permanent Revolution, We consider it useful, at least for readers interesting them selves not only in the dramatic course of events but also in revolution-ary doctrine, to adduce here the more essential excerpts from our answers to Professor Pokrovsky published in two issues of the central organ of the Bolshevik Party, Pravda, July land 2,1922: Concerning the Peculiarities of Russia's Historic Development: Pokrovsky has published an article dedicated to my book: 1905, which demonstratesnegatively, alas !what a com-plex matter it is to apply methods of historic materialism to living human history, and what 329.

a rubber-stamp affair is often made out of history even by such deeply erudite people as Pokrovsky. The book which Pokrovsky criticises was directly called out by a desire to establish historically and justify theoretically the slogan of the conquest of power by the proletariat, as against the slogan of a bourgeois democratic republic, and also that of a democratic government of the proletariat and the peasantry. . . . This line of thought produced a very great theoretic indignation on the part of no small number of Marxists, indeed an overwhelming majority of them. Those who expressed this indignation were not only Mensheviks, but also Kamenev and Rozhkov (a Bolshevik-historian). Their point of view in broad outlines was as follows: The political rule of the bourgeoisie must precede the political rule of the proletariat; the bourgeois democratic republic must be a prolonged historic schooling for the proletariat; the attempt to jump over this stage is adventurism; if the working cla.s.s in the West has not yet conquered the power, how can the Russian prole-tariat set itself this task? etc., etc. From the point of view of this pseudo-Marxism, which con.nes itself to historical mechanisms, formal a.n.a.logies, converting historic epochs into a logical succession of in.exible social categories (feudalism, capitalism, socialism, autoc-racy, bourgeois republic, dictators.h.i.+p of the proletariat)from this point of view the slogan of the conquest of power by the working cla.s.s in Russia must have seemed a monstrous departure from Marxism. However, a serious empirical evaluation of the social forces as they stood in 190305 powerfully suggested the entire viability of a struggle for a conquest of power by the working cla.s.s. Is this a peculiarity, or is it not? Does it a.s.sume profound peculiarities in the whole historical development or does it not? How does it come that such a task arose before the proletariat of Russia-i-that is, the most backward (with Pokrovsky's permission) country of Europe?

And in what consists the backwardness of Russia? Merely in the fact that Russia is belatedly repeating the history of the western European countries? But in that case would it be possible to talk of a conquest of power by the Russian proletariat? This conquest, how ever (We permit ourselves to remember), was actually made. Where lies the essence of all this? In that the indubitable and irrefutable belatedness of Russia's development under in.uence and pressure of the higher culture from the West, results not in a simple repet.i.tion of the Western European historic process, but in the creation of profound peculiarities demanding independent study.

This deep uniqueness in our political situation, which led to the victorious October revolution before the beginning of the revolution in Europe, had its roots in the peculiar correlation of forces among the different cla.s.ses and the state power. When Pokrovsky and Rozhkov quarrelled with the Narodniks or liberals, demonstrating that the organisation and policy of czarism was determined by the economic development and the interests of the possessing cla.s.ses, they were fundamentally right. But when Pokrovsky tries to repeat this against me, he simply hits the wrong mark.

The result of our belated historic development, in the conditions of the imperialist en-circlement, was that our bourgeoisie did not have time to push out czarism before the proletariat had become an independent revolutionary force.

But for Pokrovsky the very question which const.i.tutes for us the central theme of the investigation, does not exist.