In the World War Part 30

"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina, the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints, in the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina, the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the People's Secretary for Military Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai, and the People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, in the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic, to take part in the negotiations with the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace between the mentioned states and the Russian Federative Republic. With this end in view the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai and Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski are empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to issue declarations and to sign doc.u.ments in the name of the Workers'

and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government are bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions of the accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is understood the Council of People's Commissaries.

"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for International Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, Works, Commissariat.

"'The Manager of the Secretariat.

"'Kharkov, 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918.

"'In accordance with the copy.

"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.'

"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficulties to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian Republic determine that _the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary and the former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves and the Ukraine._

=Poland=

"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have not yet been exactly determined, _we want nothing at all from this new state_.

Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall choose its own fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the _form_ of the people's vote in this respect; _the more surely it expresses the general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased_. For I desire only the _voluntary_ attachment of Poland; only in the express _wish_ of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guarantee for lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that _the Polish question must not be allowed to delay the signing of peace by a single day_. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach us, we will not reject its advances--_the Polish question must not and shall not endanger the peace itself_.

"I should have been glad if _the Polish Government had been able to take part in the negotiations_, since in my opinion Poland is _an independent state_. The Petersburg Government, however, takes the att.i.tude that the present Polish Government is not ent.i.tled to speak in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as competent to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on this point in order to avoid possible conflict. The question is certainly one of importance, but it is more important still in my opinion _to set aside all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations_.

=German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas=

"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been most widely echoed in the Press, is the _difference of opinion between our German allies and the Petersburg Government_ anent the interpretation of _the right of self-determination among the Russian peoples_; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops.

Germany maintains that it _does not aim at any annexation of territory by force_ from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion is a double one.

"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that _the numerous expressions of desire for independence_ on the part of _legislative corporations, communal representations_, etc., in the occupied areas should be taken as the _provisional_ basis for the will of the people, to be _later_ tested by _plebiscite on a broader foundation_, a point of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in Courland and Lithuania ent.i.tled to speak for those provinces any more than in the case of Poland.

"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take place _after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from the occupied provinces_, while Germany, in reply to this, points out that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should here be noted that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the life of a state at all is _German property_. Railways, posts and telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands.

The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a condition of things which seems _practically impossible to maintain_.

"In both cases it is a question of finding a _middle way_, which moreover _must be found_.

"_The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations_.

"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they take time.

"_If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the general peace cannot be long delayed_, despite all efforts on the part of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some are unable to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general peace, but of a _separate peace with Russia_. This was the necessary recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would have been on a different footing--that is to say, _in a more limited sphere_--if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of treating for a general peace.

"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced that the fruit _has begun to ripen_, and that it is now only a question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable peace or not.

=Wilson's Message=

"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole world. This is _an offer of peace_, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson sets forth the principles upon which he seeks to establish a general peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be expected to furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that were the case, then negotiations would be superfluous altogether, and peace could be arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single a.s.sent. This, of course, is not so.

"_But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals on the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the Austro-Hungarian point of view_, and that there are among his proposals some which we can even agree to _with great pleasure_.

"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must, to begin with, point out two things:

"So far as the proposals are concerned with _our Allies_--mention is made of the German possession of _Belgium_ and of the _Turkish Empire_--I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am firmly determined _to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally with our own_. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete reciprocity with ourselves.

"In the second place, I have to point out that I must _politely but definitely decline_ to consider the Point dealing with our internal Government. We have in Austria _a parliament elected by general, equal, direct and secret ballot_. There is not a more democratic parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other const.i.tutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon matters of _Austrian internal affairs_. I speak of _Austria_ only, because I do not refer to _Hungarian_ internal affairs in the _Austrian Delegation_. I should not consider it const.i.tutional to do so. _And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state whatever._ Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the remaining Points, to state as follows:

"As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing to say. From my point of view I have _no objection to such public negotiations so long as full reciprocity_ is the basis of the same, though I do entertain _considerable doubt_ as to whether, all things considered, _it is the quickest and most practical method_ of arriving at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business.

But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be advisable _to publish incomplete results beforehand_ to the world. In such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their demands as high as possible in order to climb down gradually, using this or that expressed demand as matter for _compensation in_ other ways until finally an _equilibrium of the opposing interests is arrived at_, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from pa.s.sionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced _for tactical reasons_. And when the public takes up any such point with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as in itself _a defeat_, possibly by both sides. And this would not conduce to peaceable relations thereafter; it would, on the contrary, _increase the friction_ between the states concerned. And as in the case of commercial treaties, so also with _political_ negotiations, which deal with political matters.

"If the abolition of secret diplomacy is to mean that _no secret compacts are to be made_, that no agreements are to be entered upon without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realised and adherence thereto ensured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always be able to make a secret compact without the public being aware of the fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick by formalities, and _a question of more or less formal nature will never prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement_.

"Point 1, then, is one that can be discussed.

"Point 2 is concerned with the _freedom of the seas_. In this postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can here _fully and completely share America's desire_, the more so as the President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters'--that is to say, we are to understand the freedom of _the open sea_, and there is thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the sovereign rights of our faithful _Turkish_ Allies. Their standpoint in this respect will be ours.

"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any _future economic war_, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark.

"Point 4, which demands _general disarmament_, sets forth in particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this present war the free compet.i.tion in armaments to a footing sufficient for the _internal security_ of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ventured to express the same idea; it forms _part of my political creed_, and I am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same thought.

"As regards the _Russian clause_, we are already showing in deeds that we are endeavouring to bring about friendly relations with our neighbours there.

"With regard to _Italy, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro_, I can only repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation.

"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures of our enemies.

"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our enemies, who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on until the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by such concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advantage of being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk.

(_Applause._)

"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses among his Allies to persuade them on their part to declare _on what conditions they are willing to treat_; he will then have rendered the enormous service of having set on foot the _general peace negotiations_. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and I will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that _time, and the continuation of the war, cannot but affect the situations here concerned_.

"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example.

Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery upon its own population, and all this _only to lose for ever an advantage which it might have won_.

"Finally, as regards Point 13, it is an open secret that we are adherents to the idea of establis.h.i.+ng 'an independent Polish State to include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.' On this point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson. And if the President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal _League of Nations_ he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr.

Wilson, we are not only _agreed in essentials as to the great principles_ for rearrangement of the world after this war, but _our ideas as to several concrete questions bearing on the peace are closely allied_.

"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but that a discussion of these points might lead to a clearer understanding and bring us closer still.

"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other, are the two Great Powers in the hostile groups of states whose interests are least opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that _an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might form the natural starting point for a conciliatory discussion_ between all those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations.

(_Applause._) So much for Wilson's proposals.

=Petersburg and the Ukraine=