Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 98

5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:31): "G.o.d saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." But among them were also the demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.

_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of Scripture--for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon (Isa. 14:12): "How art thou fallen ... O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning!" and it is said to the devil in the person of the King of Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): "Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of G.o.d,"--consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.

Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems, then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence.

This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively; thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning (Q. 58, A. 3). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant.

We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause, which can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg, which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely, G.o.d, cannot be the cause of sin.

Consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first instant of his creation.

Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is stated that "the devil sins from the beginning," "he is not to be thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning of sin": that is to say, because he never went back from his sin.

Reply Obj. 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken as according to G.o.d's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.

Dei xi, 15), that "He alone could discern light and darkness, Who also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall."

Reply Obj. 3: All that is in merit is from G.o.d; and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason does not hold good of sin; as has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: G.o.d did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them at once placed an impediment to their beat.i.tude, thereby destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the beat.i.tude which they had merited.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 6]

Whether There Was Any Interval Between the Creation and the Fall of the Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the angel's creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezech. 28:15): "Thou didst walk perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire; thou wast perfect ...'] in thy ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found in thee." But since walking is continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the devil's creation and his fall.

Obj. 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that "the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly"; which refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation.

Obj. 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin.

Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation and his sin.

Obj. 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of the devil (John 8:44): "He stood not in the truth": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), "we must understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it."

_I answer that,_ There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace; as we have said (Q. 62, A. 3). For since the angels attain beat.i.tude by one meritorious act, as was said above (Q. 62, A. 5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beat.i.tude after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.

If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his creation and fall.

Reply Obj. 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured by time. In this way by "walking" we are to understand the movement of free-will tending towards good.

Reply Obj. 2: Origen says, "The serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly," because of the first instant in which he was not wicked.

Reply Obj. 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a natural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to beat.i.tude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man; and therefore the argument does not hold good.

Reply Obj. 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved _Phys._ vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves, became night, "swelling up with pride," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act was common to them all; but in their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart from the wicked.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 7]

Whether the Highest Angel Among Those Who Sinned Was the Highest of All?

Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14): "Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of G.o.d." Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii).

Therefore, the highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all.

Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d made intellectual nature in order that it might attain to beat.i.tude. If therefore the highest of the angels sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the n.o.blest creature which is unfitting.

Obj. 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is, so much the more is he inclined towards G.o.d. Therefore so much the less can he turn away from G.o.d by sinning. And so it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Hom. x.x.xiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel who sinned, "being set over all the hosts of angels, surpa.s.sed them in brightness, and was by comparison the most ill.u.s.trious among them."

_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the p.r.o.neness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels we consider the p.r.o.neness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6, 7; x, 9, 10, 11). For they said that all the G.o.ds were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as 'G.o.ds' the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of "demons" the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith; because the whole corporeal creation is governed by G.o.d through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before G.o.d. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.

But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said (A. 2), the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view: because the angels' sin did not come of any p.r.o.neness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.

Reply Obj. 1: Cherubim is interpreted "fulness of knowledge," while "Seraphim" means "those who are on fire," or "who set on fire."

Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity, which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.

Reply Obj. 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are saved; for G.o.d knows beforehand the end of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and punis.h.i.+ng those of His justice. But the intellectual creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature was so made by G.o.d, that it lies within its own will to act for its end.

Reply Obj. 3: However great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently it was in his power not to follow it.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 8]

Whether the Sin of the Highest Angel Was the Cause of the Others Sinning?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect.

But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others'

sinning.

Obj. 2: Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was shown above (A. 2). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to G.o.d. Yet the sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.

Obj. 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against G.o.d, than to wish to be over another against G.o.d; because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a gloss on Ps. 103:26: "This dragon which Thou hast formed--He who was the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice." Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon "drew"

with him "the third part of the stars of heaven."

_I answer that,_ The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words: "Go [Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels" (Matt. 25:41). For the order of Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to (2 Pet. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave."

Reply Obj. 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches his meaning can a.s.sent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, "which everyone accepts directly they are heard" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].

Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto.

Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior.

Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their ultimate beat.i.tude of their own natural powers; especially because in the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel.