Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 97

Reply Obj. 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them.

Reply Obj. 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation.

Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.

Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to G.o.d by the movement of love, according as G.o.d is the principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to G.o.d as the object of supernatural beat.i.tude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.

Reply Obj. 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will.

First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the inclination of pa.s.sion or of habit; even though he does not err in his universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect.

In this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no pa.s.sions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above (Q. 59, A. 4); nor, again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.

_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 2]

Whether Only the Sin of Pride and Envy Can Exist in an Angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.

Obj. 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.

Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi), many vices spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil "is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet he is proud and envious."

_I answer that,_ Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride--not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride.

Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them, since for the appet.i.te to tend to the desire of something involves on its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other.

So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil's will G.o.d makes use of man for the Divine glory.

Reply Obj. 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.

Reply Obj. 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures.

Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger implies pa.s.sion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken for a pa.s.sion, but for a will resisting the good of another.

Reply Obj. 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them.

_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 3]

Whether the Devil Desired to Be As G.o.d?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as G.o.d. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appet.i.te, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such desire. But for any creature to be G.o.d's equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite.

Therefore an angel could not desire to be as G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin.

But to be likened unto G.o.d is the end to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as G.o.d, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.

Obj. 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of G.o.d; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation.

Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is said, in the person of the devil (Isa.

14:13, 14), "I will ascend into heaven ... I will be like the Most High." And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being "inflated with pride, he wished to be called G.o.d."

_I answer that,_ Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as G.o.d. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as G.o.d in the first way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any pa.s.sion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as an a.s.s does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident that G.o.d surpa.s.ses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another.

Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with G.o.d.

To desire to be as G.o.d according to likeness can happen in two ways.

In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened unto G.o.d. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be G.o.dlike, he commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of G.o.d. But he would sin were he to desire to be like unto G.o.d even in the right way, as of his own, and not of G.o.d's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto G.o.d in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to G.o.d; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as G.o.d. Not that he desired to resemble G.o.d by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since no creature can exist except by holding its existence under G.o.d. But he desired resemblance with G.o.d in this respect--by desiring, as his last end of beat.i.tude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appet.i.te away from supernatural beat.i.tude, which is attained by G.o.d's grace.

Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of G.o.d which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine a.s.sistance according to G.o.d's ordering.

This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli, iv.] that "he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast." These two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have final beat.i.tude of his own power, whereas this is proper to G.o.d alone.

Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto G.o.d.

From this we have the answer to all the objections.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 4]

Whether Any Demons Are Naturally Wicked?

Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is a cla.s.s of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are G.o.ds and the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked.

Obj. 2: Further, as the angels are created by G.o.d, so are men.

But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10): "Their malice is natural." Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.

Obj. 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious; yet they are G.o.d's creatures. Therefore, although the demons are G.o.d's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the demons are not naturally wicked."

_I answer that,_ Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.

Reply Obj. 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate pa.s.sion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or l.u.s.tful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit.

Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (De Div. Nom. iv).

_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 5]

Whether the Devil Was Wicked by the Fault of His Own Will in the First Instant of His Creation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of the devil (John 8:44): "He was a murderer from the beginning."

Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8), the "heaven," which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said that G.o.d said: "Be light made: and light was made," we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from "darkness," whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned.

Obj. 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation.

Obj. 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate. If ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby merited beat.i.tude. But with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above (Q. 62, A.