Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 29

On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).

_I answer that,_ We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us turn, so to speak, to G.o.d or away from Him. For, since the object of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man withdraws from G.o.d, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, he turns to G.o.d and adheres to Him.

This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.

Accordingly if a man turn to G.o.d and adhere to Him, through fear of punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 3) when we were considering the pa.s.sion of fear.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene divides fear as a pa.s.sion of the soul: whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to G.o.d, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to G.o.d, while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not numbered among these kinds of fear.

Reply Obj. 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity G.o.d becomes our Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)"; and by this same charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it does not include charity in its definition.

Reply Obj. 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man away from G.o.d, and which G.o.d's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are drawn to G.o.d, and which is inflicted or threatened by G.o.d. Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it secondarily.

Reply Obj. 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from G.o.d through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins, all of which alike however lead man away from G.o.d.

_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 3]

Whether Worldly Fear Is Always Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil.

Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of whom we read (Luke 18:2) that he "feared not G.o.d, nor regarded man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

Obj. 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.

Obj. 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil, since our natural gifts are from G.o.d. Now it is natural to man to fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is evil is forbidden by G.o.d. Therefore worldly fear is evil.

_I answer that,_ As shown above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 1; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2) moral acts and habits take their name and species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appet.i.te's movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appet.i.tive movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq. lx.x.xiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is always evil.

Reply Obj. 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of G.o.d: and in this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may have regard for men as being in opposition to G.o.d, and thus it is praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): "In his days he feared not the prince."

Reply Obj. 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as G.o.d's minister, according to Rom. 13:4, "For he is G.o.d's minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil." To fear the secular power in this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.

Reply Obj. 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]

Whether Servile Fear Is Good?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "if a man do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well done." Therefore servile fear is not good.

Obj. 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, "Why did I not die in the womb?" Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): "When a man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer loves the friends.h.i.+p of G.o.d which he has lost, his fear is born of pride, not of humility." Therefore servile fear is evil.

Obj. 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.

_On the contrary,_ Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, "You have not received the spirit of bondage," etc. says: "It is the one same spirit that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear." Therefore servile fear is not evil.

_I answer that,_ It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, "what is free is cause of itself" (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary to charity belongs to its very species.

This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of charity, or that the punishment is directed to G.o.d as its end, and that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end.

Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is evil.

Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to subject his affections to the yoke of justice.

Reply Obj. 3: Mercenary love is that whereby G.o.d is loved for the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be feared as the princ.i.p.al evil.

_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether Servile Fear Is Substantially the Same As Filial Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.

Obj. 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both fear G.o.d. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.

Obj. 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy G.o.d and to obtain favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from G.o.d and to be punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy G.o.d, and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 2, ad 2).

Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from G.o.d, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.

_I answer that,_ The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above (I-II, Q.

54, A. 2), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear correspond to different kinds of evil.

Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown above (A. 2). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are not the same substantially but differ specifically.

Reply Obj. 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the object, since each of them believes G.o.d and believes in a G.o.d, but in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand, servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard G.o.d in the same light. For servile fear looks upon G.o.d as the cause of the infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks to be separated by guilt. Consequently the ident.i.ty of object, viz.

G.o.d, does not prove a specific ident.i.ty of fear, since also natural movements differ specifically according to their different relations.h.i.+ps to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope looks upon G.o.d as the principle not only of the enjoyment of G.o.d, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.

_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]

Whether Servile Fear Remains with Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that "when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had prepared a place for it."

Obj. 2: Further, "The charity of G.o.d is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Now "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away when charity comes.

Obj. 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as punishment diminishes one's own good. Now love of G.o.d drives away self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "the love of G.o.d unto the contempt of self builds up the city of G.o.d." Therefore it seems that servile fear is driven out when charity comes.