Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 28

FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 18, Art. 4]

Whether There Is Certainty in the Hope of a Wayfarer?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.

Obj. 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above (I-II, Q. 112, A.

5). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.

Obj. 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail.

Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore wayfarer's hope has no certainty.

_On the contrary,_ "Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness," as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, "I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him."

_I answer that,_ Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially and by partic.i.p.ation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power; by partic.i.p.ation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but on G.o.d's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is certain of G.o.d's omnipotence and mercy.

Reply Obj. 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but not to any deficiency in G.o.d's power or mercy, in which hope places its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.

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QUESTION 19

OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether G.o.d is to be feared?

(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;

(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?

(4) Whether servile fear is good?

(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?

(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?

(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?

(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?

(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?

(11) Whether it remains in heaven?

(12) Which of the beat.i.tudes and fruits correspond to it?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 1]

Whether G.o.d Can Be Feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot be feared. For the object of fear is a future evil, as stated above (I-II, Q. 41, AA. 2, 3).

But G.o.d is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore G.o.d cannot be feared.

Obj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in G.o.d.

Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.

Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), "we fear those things whence evil comes to us." But evil comes to us, not from G.o.d, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is ... in Me." Therefore G.o.d is not to be feared.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:7): "Who shall not fear Thee, O King of nations?" and (Malachi 1:6): "If I be a master, where is My fear?"

_I answer that,_ Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone's help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way G.o.d, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation to Him.

From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good.

Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.

In relation to G.o.d the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated from Him: and in this way G.o.d can and ought to be feared.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being the evil which a man shuns.

Reply Obj. 2: In G.o.d, we may consider both His justice, in respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that, accordingly, G.o.d is the object of both hope and fear, but under different aspects.

Reply Obj. 3: The evil of fault is not from G.o.d as its author but from us, in for far as we forsake G.o.d: while the evil of punishment is from G.o.d as its author, in so far as it has character of a good, since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly; although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "G.o.d made not death ... but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 19, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and Worldly Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness, shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, Q. 41, A.

4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.

Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.

Obj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good, since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils ...

believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.

Obj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all these other fears.

Obj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between them.

Obj. 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore "worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.