Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 21

SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 7]

Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of G.o.d Temporally?

Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of G.o.d temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of G.o.d, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal.

Therefore these names are not applied to G.o.d temporally, but eternally.

Obj. 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does not apply to G.o.d. Therefore nothing can be predicated of G.o.d temporally.

Obj. 3: Further, if any names are applied to G.o.d temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of G.o.d implying relation of G.o.d to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as "Lord" and "Creator,"

are applied to G.o.d from eternity.

Obj. 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in G.o.d, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case G.o.d would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in G.o.d also. But nothing temporal can be in G.o.d, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to G.o.d temporally.

Obj. 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lords.h.i.+p, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lords.h.i.+p is not really in G.o.d, but only in idea, it follows that G.o.d is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

Obj. 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic.

v). But relative things which are said of G.o.d and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of G.o.d to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of G.o.d from eternity, and not temporally.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to G.o.d temporally.

_I answer that,_ The names which import relation to creatures are applied to G.o.d temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself."

For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between _being_ and _non-being_ formed by reason, apprehending _non-being_ as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quant.i.ty; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quant.i.ty exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and pa.s.sion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.

Since therefore G.o.d is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to G.o.d Himself; whereas in G.o.d there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of G.o.d temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

Reply Obj. 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father,"

and "son," and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of G.o.d, which is His essence.

Yet both names are said of G.o.d temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either princ.i.p.ally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

Reply Obj. 2: As relations applied to G.o.d temporally are only in G.o.d in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to G.o.d only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" (Ps. 89:1).

Reply Obj. 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to G.o.d from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to G.o.d temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.

Reply Obj. 4: Relations signified by these names which are applied to G.o.d temporally, are in G.o.d only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that G.o.d should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in G.o.d should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that G.o.d is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.

Reply Obj. 5: Since G.o.d is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that G.o.d is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

Reply Obj. 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary [to consider the order] of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though G.o.d is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, G.o.d was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 8]

Whether This Name "G.o.d" Is a Name of the Nature?

Objection 1: It seems that this name, "G.o.d," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "G.o.d (_Theos_) is so called from _theein_ which means to take care of, and to cherish all things; or from _aithein_ that is, to burn, for our G.o.d is a fire consuming all malice; or from _theasthai,_ which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name "G.o.d" signifies His operation and not His nature.

Obj. 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "G.o.d" does not signify the divine nature.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "G.o.d" is a name of the nature.

_I answer that,_ Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.

Because therefore G.o.d is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as said in A. 1; hence this name "G.o.d" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of G.o.d intend to name G.o.d as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "G.o.d" is imposed to signify the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "G.o.d."

Reply Obj. 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone"

signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in _Metaph._ iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (Q. 12, A. 12). Thus the name "G.o.d" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name G.o.d intend to signify all this.

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NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 9]

Whether This Name "G.o.d" Is Communicable?

Objection 1: It seems that this name "G.o.d" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name "G.o.d" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" (2 Pet.

1:4). Therefore this name "G.o.d" can be communicated to others.

Obj. 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "G.o.d" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are G.o.ds" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name "G.o.d" is communicable.

Obj. 3: Further, this name "G.o.d" comes from operation, as explained.

But other names given to G.o.d from His operations or effects are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "G.o.d" is communicable.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name.

Therefore this name "G.o.d" is incommunicable.

_I answer that,_ A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable to those who partic.i.p.ate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus partic.i.p.ate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others.

Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any _suppositum,_ but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals.

Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some _suppositum._ Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.

Since, then, this name "G.o.d" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above (A. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3), it follows that this name "G.o.d" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who by nature are not G.o.ds," (Gal. 4:8), and a gloss adds, "G.o.ds not in nature, but in human opinion."

Nevertheless this name "G.o.d" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called G.o.ds who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are G.o.ds" (Ps. 81:6).

But if any name were given to signify G.o.d not as to His nature but as to His _suppositum,_ accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the partic.i.p.ation of some similitude.

Reply Obj. 2: This name "G.o.d" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although G.o.d Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular.

For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name "sun."

Reply Obj. 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from G.o.d to creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name "G.o.d" is given to G.o.d from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.

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TENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 10]