Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 20

Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to G.o.d in Its Literal Sense?

Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to G.o.d. For all names which we apply to G.o.d are taken from creatures; as was explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are applied to G.o.d metaphorically, as when we say, G.o.d is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense.

Obj. 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from G.o.d than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.

ii). Therefore none of these names belong to G.o.d in their literal sense.

Obj. 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to G.o.d metaphorically by way of similitude."

Therefore not all names are applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.

_I answer that,_ According to the preceding article, our knowledge of G.o.d is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in G.o.d in a more eminent way than in creatures.

Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to G.o.d--viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to G.o.d, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to G.o.d; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from G.o.d to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to G.o.d only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of partic.i.p.ation being part of their signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of G.o.d for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that G.o.d is above all substance and all life.

Reply Obj. 3: These names which are applied to G.o.d literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to G.o.d metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 4]

Whether Names Applied to G.o.d Are Synonymous?

Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to G.o.d are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to G.o.d mean entirely the same thing in G.o.d; for the goodness of G.o.d is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.

Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

Obj. 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.

Obj. 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But G.o.d is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to G.o.d do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.

_On the contrary,_ All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to G.o.d are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good G.o.d" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name" (Jer. 32:18).

_I answer that,_ These names spoken of G.o.d are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of G.o.d, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above (A. 2), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows G.o.d from creatures, in order to understand G.o.d, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from G.o.d to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in G.o.d unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to G.o.d signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous.

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

Reply Obj. 3: The perfect unity of G.o.d requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 5]

Whether What Is Said of G.o.d and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated of Them?

Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to G.o.d and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally--viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of G.o.d and creatures, is predicated univocally.

Obj. 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.

Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to G.o.d, according to the word of Genesis (Gen. 1:26), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of G.o.d and creatures univocally.

Obj. 3: Further, measure is h.o.m.ogeneous with the thing measured.

But G.o.d is the first measure of all beings. Therefore G.o.d is h.o.m.ogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to G.o.d and to creatures.

_On the contrary,_ whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to G.o.d in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in G.o.d. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of G.o.d and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

Further, G.o.d is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of G.o.d and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.

_I answer that,_ Univocal predication is impossible between G.o.d and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in G.o.d unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it G.o.d, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence.

Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circ.u.mscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to G.o.d; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to G.o.d and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of G.o.d and of creatures.

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to G.o.d and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about G.o.d at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about G.o.d, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of G.o.d are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of G.o.d and creatures in an a.n.a.logous sense, i.e.

according to proportion.

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of G.o.d and creatures a.n.a.logically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name G.o.d only from creatures (A. 1). Thus whatever is said of G.o.d and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to G.o.d as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in a.n.a.logies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

Reply Obj. 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of partic.i.p.ation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an a.n.a.logical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal a.n.a.logical predication, which is being.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the creature to G.o.d is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q. 4, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that G.o.d and creatures should be in the same genus.

The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of G.o.d and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 6]

Whether Names Predicated of G.o.d Are Predicated Primarily of Creatures?

Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of G.o.d. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know G.o.d. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name G.o.d from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to G.o.d, are said primarily of creatures rather than of G.o.d, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to G.o.d and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, all names equally applied to G.o.d and creatures, are applied to G.o.d as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named"

(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to G.o.d and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to G.o.d rather than to creatures.

_I answer that,_ In names predicated of many in an a.n.a.logical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to G.o.d, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to G.o.d, because when said of G.o.d they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to G.o.d means only that G.o.d manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to G.o.d the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to G.o.d in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of G.o.d as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "G.o.d is good," it would then only mean "G.o.d is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to G.o.d would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" would apply primarily to creatures rather than to G.o.d. But as was shown above (A. 2), these names are applied to G.o.d not as the cause only, but also essentially.

For the words, "G.o.d is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to G.o.d rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from G.o.d to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply Obj. 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection would be valid if these names were applied to G.o.d only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as "healthy" is applied to medicine.

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