Dio's Rome Volume II Part 10

[-45-] In these same years many tumults of a seditious character had arisen in the city, and especially in connection with the elections, so that it was fully six months before Calvinus and Messala could be appointed consuls. And not even then would they have been chosen, had not Quintus Pompeius Rufus, though the grandson of Sulla and serving as tribune, been cast into prison by the senate, whereupon the measure was voted by the rest who were anxious to commit some outrages, and the campaign against opposition was handed over to Pompey. Sometimes the birds had prevented elections, refusing to allow the offices to belong to interreges; above all the tribunes, by managing affairs in the city so that they instead of the praetors conducted games, hindered the remaining offices from being filled. This also accounts for Rufus having been confined in a cell. He later on brought Favonius the aedile to the same place on some small charge, in order that he might have a companion in his disgrace. But all the tribunes introduced various obstructive pleas, proposing, among other things, to appoint military tribunes, so that more persons, as formerly, might come to office. When no one would heed them, they declared that Pompey, at all events, must be chosen dictator. By this pretext they secured a very long delay: for he was out of town, and of those on the spot there was no one who would venture to vote for the demand (for in remembrance of Sulla's cruelty they all hated that policy), nor yet venture to refuse to choose Pompey, on account of their fear of him.[-46-] At last, quite late, he came himself, refused the dictators.h.i.+p offered to him, and made preparation to have the consuls named. These likewise on account of the turmoil from a.s.sa.s.sinations did not appoint any successors, though they had laid aside their senatorial garb and in the dress of knights convened the senate as if on the occasion of some great calamity. They also pa.s.sed a decree that no one,--either an ex-praetor or an ex-consul,--should a.s.sume foreign office until five years should have elapsed: this they did to see if people when it was no longer in any one's power to be immediately elected would cease their craze for office. For no moderation was being shown and there was no purity in their methods, but they vied with one another in expending great sums and fighting more than ever, so that once the consul Calvinus was wounded. Hence no consul nor praetor nor prefect of the city had any successor, but at the beginning of the year the Romans were absolutely without a government in these branches.

[B.C. 52 (_a.u._ 702)]

[-47-] Nothing good resulted from this, and among other things the market recurring every ninth day was held on the very first of January.

This seemed to the Romans to have taken place not by accident, and being considered in the light of a portent it caused trepidation. The same feeling was increased when an owl was both seen and caught in the city, a statue exuded perspiration for three days, a flash darted from the south to the east, and many thunderbolts, many clods, stones, tiles and blood descended through the air. It seems to me that that decree pa.s.sed the previous year, near the close, with regard to Serapis and Isis, was a portent equal to any: the senate decided to tear down their temples, which some private individuals had built. For they did not reverence these G.o.ds any long time and even when it became the fas.h.i.+on to render public devotion to them, they settled them outside the pomerium.

[-48-] Such being the state of things in the city, with no one in charge of affairs, murders occurred practically every day and they did not finish the elections, though they were eager for office and employed bribery and a.s.sa.s.sination on account of it. Milo, for instance, who was seeking the consuls.h.i.+p, met Clodius on the Appian Way and at first simply wounded him: then, fearing he would attack him for what had been done, he slew him. He at once freed all the servants concerned in the business, and his hope was that he might be more easily acquitted of the murder, now that the man was dead, than he would be for the wound in case he had survived. The people in the city heard of this about evening and were thrown into a terrible uproar: for to factional disturbances there was being added a starting-point for war and evils, and the middle cla.s.s, even though they hated Clodius, yet on account of humanity and because on this excuse they hoped to get rid of Milo, showed displeasure.[-49-] While they were in this frame of mind Rufus and t.i.tus Munatius Plancus took hold of them and excited them to greater wrath. As tribunes they conveyed the body into the Forum just before dawn, placed it on the rostra, exhibited it to all, and spoke appropriate words with lamentations. So the populace, as a result of what it both saw and heard, was deeply stirred and paid no further heed to considerations of sanct.i.ty or things divine, but overthrew all the customs of burial and nearly burned down the whole city. The body of Clodius they picked up and carried into the senate-house, arranged it in due fas.h.i.+on, and then after heaping a pyre of benches burned both the corpse and the convention hall. They did this, therefore, not under the stress of such an impulse as often takes sudden hold of crowds, but of set purpose, so that on the ninth day they held the funeral feast in the Forum itself, with the senate-house still smouldering, and furthermore undertook to apply the torch to Milo's house. This last was not burned because many were defending it. Milo for a time, in great terror over the murder, was hidden not only by ordinary citizens but under the guard of knights and some senators. When this other act, however, occurred, he hoped that the wrath of the senate would pa.s.s over to the outrage of the opposing party. They had a.s.sembled late in the afternoon on the Palatine for this very purpose, and had voted that an interrex be chosen by show of hands and that he and the tribunes and Pompey, moreover, care for the guarding of the city, that it suffer no detriment. Milo, accordingly, made his appearance in public, and pressed his claims to the office as strongly as before, if not more strongly.

[-50-] As a consequence of this, conflicts and killings in plenty began again, so that the senate ratified the aforementioned measures, summoned Pompey, allowed him to make fresh levies, and changed their garments.

Not long after his arrival they a.s.sembled under guard near his theatre outside the pomerium and resolved that the bones of Clodius should be taken up, and a.s.signed the rebuilding of the senate-house to Faustus, son of Sulla. It was the Curia Hostilia which had been remodeled by Sulla. Wherefore they came to this decision about it and ordered that when repaired it should receive again the former's name. The city was in a fever of excitement about the magistrates who should rule it, some talking to the effect that Pompey ought to be chosen dictator and others that Caesar should be elected consul. They were so determined to honor the latter for his achievements that they voted to offer sacrifices over them sixty[66] days. Fearing both of the men the rest of the senate and Bibulus, who was first to be asked and to declare his opinion, antic.i.p.ated the onset of the ma.s.ses by giving the consuls.h.i.+p to Pompey to prevent his being named dictator, and to him alone in order that he might not have Caesar as his colleague. This action of theirs was strange; it had been taken in no other case, and yet they seemed to have done well. For since he favored the ma.s.ses less than Caesar, they hoped to detach him from them altogether and to make him their own. This expectation was fulfilled. Elated by the novelty and unexpectedness of the honor, he no longer formed any plan to gratify the populace but was careful to do everything that pleased the senate.

[-51-] He did not, however, wish to hold office alone. Possessing the glory that lay in such a vote having been pa.s.sed he was anxious to divert the envy that arose from it. Also he felt afraid that, as the field was vacant, Caesar might be given him as colleague through the enthusiasm of the powerful cla.s.ses and the populace alike. First of all, therefore, in order that his rival might not think he had been entirely neglected and therefore show some just displeasure, he arranged through the tribunes that he should be permitted even in absence to be a candidate for the office, when the proper time came according to law.

Pompey himself then chose as a.s.sistant Quintus Scipio, who was his father-in-law and had incurred a charge of bribery. This man, by birth son of Nasica, had been transferred by the lot of succession to the family of Metellus Pius, and for that reason bore the latter's name. He had given his daughter in marriage to Pompey, and now received in turn from him the consuls.h.i.+p and immunity from accusation.[-52-] Very many had been examined in the complaint above mentioned, especially because the courts, by Pompey's laws, were more carefully const.i.tuted. He himself selected the entire list of names from which drawings for jurors had to be made, and he limited the number of advocates on each side, in order that the jurymen might not be confused and disturbed by the numbers of them. He ordered that the time allotted to the plaintiff be two hours, and to the defendant three. And what grieved many most of all, he revised the custom of eulogizers being presented by those on trial (for great numbers kept escaping the clutches of the law because commended by persons worthy of confidence); and he had a measure pa.s.sed that such prisoners should in future be allowed no one whomsoever to eulogize them. These and other reforms he inst.i.tuted in all the courts alike; and against those who practiced bribery for office he raised up as accusers those who had formerly been convicted of some such offence, thus offering the latter no small prize. For if any one secured the conviction of two men on charges equal to that against himself, or even on smaller charges, or if one man on a greater charge, he went scot free.

[-53-] Among many others who were thus convicted was Plautius Hypsaeus, who had been a rival of Milo and of Scipio for the consuls.h.i.+p. Though all three had been guilty of bribery he alone was condemned. Scipio was indicted, and by two persons at that, but was not tried, on account of Pompey: and Milo was not charged with this crime (for the murder formed a greater complaint against him), but being brought to trial on the latter charge he was convicted, as he was not able to use any violence.

Pompey kept the city in general well under guard and himself with armed soldiers entered the court. When some raised an outcry at this, he ordered the soldiers to drive them out of the Forum by striking them with the side, or the flat, of their swords. When they would not yield, but showed defiance as if the broadsides were being used for mere sport, some of them were wounded and killed.

[-54-] After this, the courts being convened in quiet, many were condemned on various charges, and, for the murder of Clodius, Milo among others though he had Cicero as a defender. That orator, seeing Pompey and the soldiers contrary to custom in the court, was alarmed and overwhelmed with dread, so that he did not deliver any of the speech he had prepared, but after saying a few words with effort in a half-dead voice, was glad to retire. This speech which is now supposed to have been delivered at that time in behalf of Milo he wrote some time later and at leisure, when he had recovered his courage. There is also the following story about it. When Milo, in banishment, made the acquaintance of the speech sent to him by Cicero, he wrote back saying that it was lucky for him those words had not been spoken in that form in the court; for he would not be eating such fine mullets in Ma.s.silia (where he was pa.s.sing his exile), if any such defence had been made.

This he wrote, not because he was pleased with his circ.u.mstances,--he made many ventures to secure his return,--but as a joke on Cicero, because after saying nothing important at the time of the defence he later both practiced and sent to him these fruitless words, as if they could now be of any service to him.

[-55-] In this way Milo was convicted; and so were Rufus and Plancus, as soon as they had finished their term of office, together with numerous others on account of the burning of the senate-house. Plancus was not even benefited by Pompey, who was so earnest in his behalf that he sent to the court a volume containing both a eulogy of the prisoner and a supplication for him. Marcus Cato, who was eligible to sit as a juryman, said he would not allow the eulogizer to destroy his own laws. But he got no opportunity to cast his vote; for Plancus rejected him, feeling sure that he would give his voice for condemnation: (by the laws of Pompey each of the parties to a suit was allowed to set aside five out of the number that were to judge him;) the other jurors, however, voted against him, especially as it did not seem right to them after they had condemned Rufus to acquit Plancus, who was on trial on the same charge.

And when they saw Pompey cooperating with him, they showed the more zeal against him, for fear they might be thought to be absolute slaves of his rather than jurymen. It should be said that on this occasion, too, Cicero accused Plancus no better than he had defended Milo: for the appearance of the courtroom was the same, and Pompey in each case was planning and acting against him,--a circ.u.mstance that naturally led to a second collision between them.

[-56-] After attending to these matters Pompey revived the law about elections (which had fallen somewhat into disuse) commanding those who seek an office to present themselves without fail before the a.s.sembly, so that no one who is absent may be chosen. He also confirmed the ordinance, pa.s.sed a short time previously, that those who had held office in the city should not be allotted to foreign governors.h.i.+ps before five years had pa.s.sed. He was not ashamed at this time to record such measures, although a little later he himself took Spain for five years more and granted Caesar, whose friends were in a terrible state of irritation, the right to canva.s.s for the consuls.h.i.+p (as had been decreed), even in his absence. He amended the law to read that only those should be permitted to do it who were granted the privilege by name and without disguise; but of course this was no different from its not being prohibited at all, for men who had any influence were certainly going to manage to get the right voted to them.

[-57-] Such were the political acts of Pompey. Scipio without enacting any new laws abolished the measures emanating from Clodius, with regard to the censors. It looked as though he had done this out of favor to them since he restored to them the authority which they formerly had: but it turned out to be the opposite. For in view of the fact that there were many worthless men both in the equestrian and in the senatorial orders, so long as it had not been permitted them to expel any one, either accused or convicted, no fault was found with them on account of those whose names were not expunged. But when they got back their old power and were allowed to do this and to examine the life of each man separately, they had not the hardihood to come to an open break with many and did not wish to incur any censure for not expelling those guilty of improper conduct, and for this reason no sensible person had any desire for the office any longer.

[-58-] This was the vote pa.s.sed with regard to the censors. Cato on the whole did not wish any office, but seeing Caesar and Pompey outgrowing the system of government, and surmising that they would either get control of affairs between themselves or would quarrel with each other and create a mighty strife, the victor in which would be sole ruler, he wished to overthrow them before they became antagonists, and hence sought the consuls.h.i.+p to use it against them, because as a private citizen he was likely to wield no influence.

[B.C. 51 (_a.u._ 703)]

His designs were guessed, however, by the adherents of the two men and he was not appointed, but instead Marcus Marcellus and Sulpicius Rufus were chosen, the one on account of his acquaintance with the law and the other for his ability in speaking. One special reason was that they, even if they did not employ bribes or violence, yet showed deference to all and were wont to exhort people frequently, whereas Cato was deferential to no one. He never again became a candidate for the office, saying that it was the duty of an upright man not to avoid the leaders.h.i.+p of the commonwealth if any person wished him to enjoy it, nor yet to pursue it beyond the limits of propriety. [-59-] Marcellus at once directed all his efforts to compa.s.s the downfall of Caesar,--for he was of Pompey's party,--and among the many measures against him that he proposed was one to the effect that a successor to him should be sent before the appointed time. He was resisted by Sulpicius and some of the tribunes,--by the latter out of good will toward Caesar. Sulpicius made common cause with them and with the mult.i.tude, because he did not like the idea of a magistrate who had done no wrong being stopped in the middle of his term. Pompey was starting from the city with the avowed intention of leading an expedition into Spain, but he did not at this time even leave the bounds of Italy, and after a.s.signing to his lieutenants the entire business abroad he himself kept close watch on the city. Now when he heard how things were going, he pretended that the plan of having Caesar detached from his command did not please him either, but he arranged matters so that when Caesar should have served out the time allowed him, an event not of the distant future, but due to occur the following year,--he should lay down his arms and return home to be a private citizen. In pursuance of this object he made Gaius Marcellus, a cousin of Marcus,[67] or a brother (both traditions are current), obtain the consuls.h.i.+p, because although allied to Caesar by marriage he was hostile to him; and he made Gaius Curio, who was also an oldtime foe of his rival, receive the tribunes.h.i.+p.

[B.C. 50 (_a.u._ 704)]

[-60-] Caesar was on no account inclined to become a private citizen after so great a command and one of such long standing, and was afraid that he might fall into the power of his enemies. Therefore he made preparations to stay in office in spite of them, collected additional soldiers, gathered money, manufactured arms, and conducted himself to please all. Meanwhile, desiring to settle matters at home somewhat beforehand, so as not to seem to be gaining all his ends by violence, but some by persuasion, he decided to effect a reconciliation with Curio. For the latter belonged to the family of the Curiones, had a keen intelligence, was eloquent, was greatly trusted by the populace and absolutely unsparing of money for all purposes by which he could either benefit himself or hoped to gain benefit for others. So, by buoying him up with many hopes and releasing him from all his debts which on account of his great expenditures were numerous, Caesar attached him to himself.

In view of the present importance of the objects for which he was working he did not spare money, since he could collect it from the people themselves, and he also promised various persons large sums, of which he was destined to give them not the smallest particle. He courted not only the free but the slaves who had any influence whatever with their masters, and as a result a number of the knights and the senators, too, joined his party.

[-61-]Thus Curio began to espouse Caesar's cause; not immediately, however, did he begin to show open activity, because he was seeking an excuse of fair semblance and was trying to appear to have transferred his allegiance not willingly, but under compulsion. He also took into consideration that the more he should a.s.sociate with his patron's enemies in the guise of their friend the more and the greater secrets of theirs he would learn. For these reasons he dissimulated for a very long time, and to prevent any suspicion of his having changed sides and not maintaining and representing still at this time an att.i.tude of unqualified opposition to Caesar as one of the leading spirits in the movement, he even made a public harangue against him, as a result of which he gained the tribunes.h.i.+p and prepared many unusual measures. Some bills he offered against the senate and its most powerful members, who were especially active in Pompey's behalf, not because he either wished or expected that any one of them would be pa.s.sed, but in order that, as they did not accept them, so no measure might be pa.s.sed against Caesar (for many motions to his detriment were being offered by many persons), and that he himself might transfer his support on this excuse.

[-62-]After this, having used up considerable time at various occasions on various pretexts, not a single one of which met with favor, he pretended to be vexed and asked that another month be inserted for the legislation that resulted from his measures. This practice was followed at regular periods, established by custom, but not for any such reason as his, and he himself, being pontifex, understood that fact.

Nevertheless he said that it ought to be done and made a fine show of forcing his fellow-priests. At last not being able to persuade them to a.s.sent to his proposal (of which he was very glad), he would not permit any other matter for this reason to voted upon. On the contrary he already began openly to justify Caesar's actions, since, as he said, he was unable to accomplish anything against him, and brought forward every possible proposition which was sure of not being accepted. The chief of these was that all persons in arms must lay these down and disband their legions, or else they should not strip Caesar of his weapons and expose him to the forces of his rivals. This he said, not because he wished Caesar to do it, but because he well understood that Pompey would not yield obedience to it, and thus a plausible excuse was offered the former for not dismissing his soldiers.

[-63-] Pompey, accordingly, as he could effect nothing in any other way, proceeded without any further disguise to harsh measures and openly said and did everything against Caesar. He failed, however, to accomplish aught. Caesar had many followers, among them Lucius Paulus, colleague of Marcellus, and Lucius Piso, his father-in-law, who was censor. For at this time Appius Claudius and Piso (though the latter did not desire it), were made censors. So Piso on account of his relations.h.i.+p belonged to Caesar, while Claudius opposed him, espousing Pompey's cause, yet quite involuntarily he rendered Caesar very efficient aid. He expelled very many both of the knights and the senators, overpowering his colleague, and in this made them all favor Caesar's aspirations. Piso on every account wished to avoid trouble and to maintain friends.h.i.+p with his son-in-law paid court to many people, being himself responsible for none of the above acts, but he did not resist Claudius when he drove from senate all the freedmen and numbers of the real n.o.bility, among them Sall.u.s.tius Crispus who wrote the History. When Curio, however, was about to have his name expunged, Piso, with the help of Paulus (whose kinsman he was), did beg him off. [-64-] Consequently Claudius did not expel him but made public in the senate the opinion that he had of him, so that he, indignant, rent his clothes. Marcellus followed him, and thinking that the senate would pa.s.s some severe vote against Curio and, because of him, against Caesar, brought forward propositions about him.

Curio at first opposed any decision being rendered regarding him; but on coming to realize that of the majority of the senators then present some really were attached to Caesar's cause and others thoroughly feared him, he allowed them to decide, saying incidentally only this: "I am conscious of doing what is best and most advantageous for my country: to you, however, I surrender both my body and soul to treat as you please."

Marcellus accordingly accused him, thinking that he would certainly be convicted, and then when he was acquitted by the majority the accuser took it greatly to heart: rus.h.i.+ng out of the a.s.sembly he came to Pompey, who was in the suburbs, and on his own responsibility, without the formality of a vote, gave him charge to keep guard over the city along with two legions of civilians. These soldiers were then present, having been collected in the following way and for the following purpose.

[-65-] Pompey before this, while he was still on friendly terms with Caesar, had given him one legion composed of those troops which according to the register belonged to him, inasmuch as he was not conducting any war and Caesar had need of soldiers. When they fell out with each other, in his desire to get this back from him and to deprive him of yet another he delivered a speech, stating that Bibulus required soldiers against the Parthians; and in order that no new levies should be raised,--for the matter was urgent, he said, and they had an abundance of legions,--he got it voted that each of them, himself and Caesar, must send one to him. Thereupon he failed to despatch any of those engaged in warfare under his own command, but ordered those whose business it was to demand that legion which he had given to Caesar. So nominally both of them contributed, but in reality Caesar alone sent the two. He knew what was being done, but complied with the demand, not wis.h.i.+ng to incur the charge of disobedience, particularly because on this excuse he intended to raise in turn many more soldiers.

[-66-] These legions, therefore, were apparently made ready to be sent against the Parthians, but when there proved to be no need of them, (there was really no use to which they could be put,) Marcellus, fearing that they might be restored to Caesar, at first declared that they must remain in Italy, and then, as I have said, gave them into Pompey's charge. These proceedings took place near the close of the year and were destined not to be in force for long, since they had been approved neither by the senate nor by the populace: accordingly, he brought over to Pompey's side Cornelius Lentulus and Gaius Claudius, who were to hold the consuls.h.i.+p the next year, and caused them to issue the same commands. Since they were allowed to give out letters to men appointed to office and to perform even so early some other functions belonging to the highest post in the state before they a.s.sumed it, they believed that they had authority also in this matter. And Pompey, although he was very exact in all other details, nevertheless on account of his need of soldiers did not investigate this action at all, nor the sources from which he was getting them, nor in what way, but accepted them very gratefully. Yet no such result was accomplished as one would have expected to come from so great a piece of audacity: they merely displayed their enmity toward Caesar, as a consequence of which they could not gather any further formidable equipment, and furnished to him a plausible excuse for retaining the troops that were with him. For Curio using the acts mentioned as his text delivered before the populace a violent arraignment both of the consuls and of Pompey, and when he had finished his term he at once set out to join Caesar.

DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY

41

The following is contained in the Forty-first of Dio's Rome.

How Caesar came into Italy, and how Pompey, leaving it, sailed across to Macedonia (chapters 1-17).

How Caesar subjugated Spain (chapters 18-37).

How Caesar sailed across to Macedonia to encounter Pompey (chapters 38-46).

How Caesar and Pompey fought at Dyrrachium (chapters 47-51).

How Caesar conquered Pompey at Pharsalus (chapters 52-63).

Duration of time, two years, in which there were the following magistrates, here enumerated.

L. Cornelius P.F. Lentulus, C. Claudius M.F. Marcellus. (B.C. 49 = a.u. 705.)

C. Iulius C.F. Caesar (II), P. Servilius P.F. Isauricus. (B.C. 48 = a.u. 706.)

(_BOOK 41, BOISSEVAIN_.)

[B.C. 49 (_a.u._ 705)]

[-1-] This is what he (sc. Curio) did then: later he came to Rome with a letter to the senate from Caesar on the very first day of the month on which Cornelius Lentulus and Gains Claudius entered upon office; and he would not give it to the consuls until they reached the senate-house, for fear that if they received it outside they might conceal it. Even as it was they waited a long time, not wis.h.i.+ng to read it, but at last they were compelled by Quintus Ca.s.sius Longinus and Mark Antony, the tribunes, to make it public. Now Antony for the favor he did Caesar at the time in this matter was destined to receive a great return and to be raised himself to heights of power. In the letter was contained a list of the benefits which Caesar had conferred upon the commonwealth and a defence of the charges which were brought against him. He promised that he would disband his legions and give up his office if Pompey would also do the same: for while the latter bore arms, he said, it was not just for him to be compelled to part with his and so be exposed to his enemies.

[-2-] The vote on this proposition was taken not individually for fear that through having respect to others or some element of fear the senators might express the opposite of their true opinion; but it was done by their taking their stand on this side or on that of the senate-chamber. No one voted that Pompey should cease to bear arms (for he had his troops in the suburbs), but all, except one Marcus Caelius and Curio, who had carried his letter, decided that Caesar must. About the tribunes I say nothing because no necessity was laid upon them to separate into two different groups; for they had authority to contribute their vote if they wished, or otherwise not. This, then, was the decision made, but Antony and Longinus did not allow any point in it to be ratified either on that day or the next. [-3-] The rest, indignant at this, voted to change their garb, but through the intervention of the same men did not obtain ratification of this measure either. Their opinion, however, was recorded and the appropriate action followed: namely, all straightway left the senate-house, and after changing their clothes came in again and proceeded to deliberate about vengeance to be taken on the obstructionists. They, seeing this, at first resisted but later became afraid, especially when Lentulus advised them to get out of the way before the votes should be cast: hence after many remarks and protestations they set out with Curio and with Caelius to Caesar, little heeding that they had been expelled from the senate. This was the determination reached at that time, and the care of the city was committed to the consuls and to the other magistrates, as had been the custom. Afterward the senators went outside the pomerium to Pompey himself, declared that there was a state of disorder, and gave to him both the money and soldiers. They voted that Caesar should surrender his office to his successors and send away his legions by a given day, or else be considered an enemy, because acting contrary to the interests of the country.

[-4-] When he was informed of this he came to Ariminum, then for the first time overstepping the confines of his own province, and after collecting his soldiers he bade Curio and the others who had come with him relate what had been done by them. After this was finished he inspirited them by adding such words as the occasion demanded. Next he set out and marched straight upon Rome itself, taking possession of all the intervening cities without a conflict, since the garrisons of some abandoned them by reason of weakness and others espoused his cause.

Pompey, perceiving this, was frightened, especially when he learned all his intentions from Labienus. The latter had abandoned Caesar and come as a deserter, and he announced all the latter's secrets to Pompey. One might feel surprise that after having always been honored by Caesar in the highest degree, to the extent of governing all the legions beyond the Alps whenever their head was in Italy, he should have done this. The reason was that when he had clothed himself with wealth and fame he began to conduct himself more haughtily than his position warranted, and Caesar, seeing that he put himself on the same level with his master, ceased to be so fond of him. As he could not endure this changed att.i.tude and was at the same time afraid of suffering some harm, he transferred his allegiance.

[-5-]Pompey as a result of what was told him about Caesar and because he had not yet prepared a force to cope with him changed his plans: for he saw that the dwellers in the city, yes, the members of the sedition themselves, even more than the others, shrank from the war through remembrance of the deeds of Marius and Sulla and wished to escape it in safety. Therefore he sent as envoys to Caesar, Lucius Caesar, a relative of his, and Lucius Roscius, a praetor,--both of them volunteering for the service,--to see if he could avoid his open attack and then make an agreement with him on some fair terms. The other replied to the same effect as in his letter, previously forwarded, and said also that he wished to converse with Pompey: but the people were displeased to hear this, fearing that some measures might be concerted against them. When, however, the envoys uttered many words in praise of Caesar, and finally promised besides that no one should suffer any harm at his hands and that the legions should immediately be disbanded, they were pleased and sent the same envoys to him again, and besought both of the opposing leaders with shouts, calling upon them everywhere and always to lay down their arms at the same time. [-6-] Pompey was frightened at this, knowing well that he would be far inferior to Caesar if they should both have to depend on the clemency of the populace, and betook himself to Campania before the envoys returned, with the idea that there he could more easily make war. He also commanded the whole senate together with those who held the offices to accompany him, granting them permission by a decree of absence, and telling them in advance that whoever remained behind he should regard as equal and alike to those were working against him. Furthermore he enjoined them to vote that all the public moneys and the votive offerings in the city be removed, hoping that from this source he could gather a vast number of soldiers. For practically all the cities of Italy felt such friendliness for him that when a short time before they had heard he was dangerously ill, they vowed they would offer public sacrifices for his preservation. That this was a great and brilliant honor which they bestowed upon him no one could gainsay; there is no one in whose behalf such a vote has been pa.s.sed, except those who later a.s.sumed absolute sovereignty: nevertheless he had not a sure ground of confidence that they would not abandon him under the influence of fear of a stronger power. The recommendation about the moneys and the votive offerings was allowed, but neither of them was touched; for having ascertained meanwhile that Caesar's answer to the envoys had been anything but peaceful and that he also reproached them with having made some false statements about him, that his soldiers were many and bold and liable to do any kind of mischief (such reports, tending to greater terror, as are usually made about such matters), the senators became frightened and hastily took their departure before they could lay a finger on any of the objects.

[-7-] For reason their removal was equally in all other respects of a tumultuous and confused appearance. The departing citizens, practically all of whom were the foremost men of the senate and of the knights and of the populace, nominally were setting out for war, but really were undergoing the experiences of captives. They were terribly distressed at being compelled to abandon their country and their pursuits there, and to consider foreign walls more native than their own. Such as removed with their entire household said farewell to the temples and their houses and their paternal threshold with the feeling that these would straightway become the property of their opponents: they themselves, not being ignorant of Pompey's intention, had the purpose, in case they should survive, of establis.h.i.+ng themselves in Macedonia or Thrace. And those who left behind on the spot their children and wives and their other most valued possessions appeared to have some little hope of their country but really fared much worse than the others, since being sundered from their dearest treasures they exposed themselves to a double and most hostile fortune. For in delivering their closest interests to the power of their bitterest foes they were destined to play the coward and yet themselves encounter danger, to show zeal and yet to be deprived of what they prized: moreover they would find a friend in neither rival, but an enemy in both,--in Caesar because they themselves did not remain behind, and in Pompey because they did not take the others with them. Hence they a.s.sumed a twofold att.i.tude in their decisions, in their prayers, and in their hopes: with their bodies they were being drawn away from those nearest to them, and their souls they found cleft in twain.

[-8-] These were the feelings of the departing throng: and those left behind had to face a different, but equally unpleasant situation. Bereft of the a.s.sociation of their nearest relatives, deprived, as it were, of their guardians and far from able to defend themselves, exposed to the enemy and about to be subject to the authority of him who should make himself master of the city, they were themselves distressed by fear both of outrages and of murders as if they were already taking place. In view of these same possibilities such as were angry at the fugitives, because they themselves had been left in the lurch, cursed them for it, and those who condoned their action because of the necessity still felt consequent fears. The rest of the populace entire, even if they possessed not the least kins.h.i.+p with those departing, were nevertheless grieved at their fate, some expecting that their neighbors, and others that their comrades would go far away from them and do and suffer many unusual things. Most of all they bewailed their own lot, seeing the magistrates and the senate and all the rest who had any power,--they were not sure whether a single one of them would be left behind,--cast out of their country and away from them. They reflected how those men, had not many altogether dreadful calamities fastened themselves upon the State, would never have wished to flee, and they likened themselves, made dest.i.tute of allies, in every conceivable respect to orphaned children and widow women. Being the first to await the wrath and the l.u.s.t of the oncoming foe, they remembered their former sufferings, some by experience and others by hearing it from the victims, all the outrages that Marius and Sulla had committed, and they therefore did not look to Caesar for moderate treatment.[68] On the contrary, because his army was const.i.tuted very largely of barbarians, they expected that their misfortunes would be far more in number and more terrible than those of yore.

[-9-] Since, then, all of them were in this condition, and no one except those who appeared to be good friends of Caesar made light of the situation, and even they, in consideration of the change of character to which most men are subject according to their circ.u.mstances, were not courageous enough to think that the source of their confidence was reliable, it is not easy to conceive how great confusion and how great grief prevailed at the departure of the consuls and those who set out with them. All night they made an uproar in packing up and going about, and toward dawn great sorrow fell upon them, induced by the action of the priests, who went about offering prayers on every side. They invoked the G.o.ds, showered kisses on the floors, enumerated how many times and from what perils they had survived, and lamented that they were leaving their country,--a venture they had never made before. Near the gates, too, there was much wailing. Some took fond leave at once of each other and of the city as if they were beholding them for the last time: others bewailed their own lot and joined their prayers to those of the departing: the larger number, on the ground that they were being betrayed, uttered maledictions. The whole population, even those that stayed behind, were there with all the women and all the children. Then the one group set out on their way and the other group escorted them.

Some interposed delays and were detained by their acquaintances: others embraced and clung to each other for a long time. Those that remained accompanied those setting out, calling after them and expressing their sympathy, while with invocations of Heaven they besought them to take them, too or to remain at home themselves. Meanwhile there were shrill sounds of wailing over each one of the exiles even from outsiders, and insatiate floods of tears. Hope for the best they were scarcely at all inclined to entertain in their condition; it was rather suffering which was expected, first by those who were left and subsequently by those who were departing. Any one that saw them would have guessed that two peoples and two cities were being made from one and that one was being driven out and was fleeing, whereas the other was being left to its fate and was being captured.

[-10-] Pompey thus left the city drawing many of the senators after him; some remained behind, either attached to Caesar's cause or maintaining a neutral att.i.tude toward both. He hastily raised levies from the cities, collected money, and sent garrisons to almost every point. Caesar, when he learned this, did not hurry to Rome: it, he knew, was offered as a prize to the victors, and he said that he was not marching against that place as hostile to him but against his political opponents in its behalf. And he sent a letter throughout all Italy in which he summoned Pompey to a kind of trial, encouraged all to be of good cheer, bade them remain in their places, and made them many promises. He set out next against Corfinium, which, being occupied by Lucius Domitius, had not joined his adherents, and after conquering in battle a few who met him he shut up the rest in a state of siege. Pompey, inasmuch as these citizens were being besieged and many of the others were falling off to Caesar, had no further hope of Italy but resolved to cross over into Macedonia, Greece, and Asia. He derived much encouragement from the remembrance of what he had achieved there and from the friends.h.i.+p of the people and the princes. (Spain was likewise devoted to him, but he could not reach it safely because Caesar had possession of both the Gauls.) Moreover he calculated that if he should sail away, no one would pursue him on account of the lack of boats and on account of the winter,--the late autumn being far advanced,--and meanwhile he would at leisure ama.s.s both money and troops, much of them from subject and much from allied territory. [-11-] With this design, therefore, he himself set out for Brundusium and bade Domitius abandon Corfinium and accompany him. In spite of the large force that Domitius had and the hopes he reposed in it--for he had courted the favor of the soldiers in every way and had won some of them by promises of land (having belonged to Sulla's veterans he had acquired a large amount in that reign)--he nevertheless obeyed orders. Meanwhile Pompey proceeded with his preparations to evacuate the country in safety: his a.s.sociates learning this shrank from the journey abroad, because it seemed to them a flight, and attached themselves to Caesar. So these joined the invader's army: but Domitius and the other senators after being censured by Caesar for arraying themselves in opposition, were released and came to Pompey.

[-12-]Caesar now was anxious to join issue with him before he sailed away, to fight it out with him in Italy, and to overtake him while he was still at Brundusium; for since there were not sufficient boats for them, Pompey had sent forward the consuls and others, fearing that they might begin some rebellion if they stayed on the spot. Caesar, seeing the difficulty of capturing the place, urged his opponent to accede to some agreement, a.s.suring him that he should obtain both peace and friends.h.i.+p again. When Pompey made no further response than that he would communicate to the consuls what Caesar said, the latter, inasmuch as they had decided to receive no citizen in arms for a conference, a.s.saulted the city. Pompey repelled him for some days until the boats came back.