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Dio's Rome.

by Ca.s.sius Dio.

DURATION OF TIME.

Q. Hortensius, Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Coss. (B.C. 69 = a.u. 685.)

L. Caecilius Metellus (dies,[2] then) Q. Marcius Rex alone.(B.C. 68 = a.u. 686.)

M. Acilius Glabrio, C. Calpurnius Piso. (B.C. 67 = a.u. 687.)

L. Volcatius Tullus, M. Aemilius Lepidus. (B.C. 66 = a.u. 688.)

(_BOOK 36, BOISSEVAIN_.)

The beginning of this book is missing in the MSS. The gist of the lost portion may in all probability be gathered from the following sentences of Xiphilinus (p. 3, R. Steph.):

"When the consuls drew lots, Hortensius obtained the war against the Cretans. Because of his fondness, however, for residence in the capital, and because of the courts (in which his influence was only second to Cicero's) he voluntarily relinquished the campaign in favor of his colleague and himself remained at home. Metellus accordingly started for Crete ...

"Lucius Lucullus at about this period worsted the lords of Asia,--Mithridates and Tigranes the Armenian,--in the war, and having compelled them, to avoid a pitched battle proceeded to besiege Tigranocerta. The barbarians did him serious injury by means of their archery as well as by the naphtha which they poured over his engines.

This chemical is full of bitumen and is so fiery that whatever it touches it is sure to burn to a cinder, and it can not be extinguished by any liquid. As a consequence Tigranes recovered courage and marched forth with an army of such huge proportions that he actually laughed heartily at the appearance of the Romans present there. He is said to have remarked that in cases where they came to make war only a few presented themselves, but when it was an emba.s.sy, many came. However, his amus.e.m.e.nt was of short duration, and he forthwith discovered how far courage and skill surpa.s.s any mere numbers. Relics of his subsequent flight were found by the soldiers in the shape of his tiara and the band that goes around it; and they gave them to Lucullus. In his fear that these marks might lead to his recognition and capture he had pulled them off and thrown them away."

[B.C. 69 (_a.u._ 685)]

[-1-] ... and because he had enjoyed the extremes of fortune in both respects, he allowed it. For after his many defeats and victories no fewer, he had a firm belief that he had in consequence become more versed in generals.h.i.+p. His foes accordingly busied themselves as if they were then for the first time beginning war, sending an emba.s.sy to their various neighbors, including among others Arsaces the Parthian, although he was hostile to Tigranes on account of some disputed territory. This they offered to vacate for him, and proceeded to malign the Romans, saying that the latter, should they conquer them while isolated, would immediately make a campaign against him. Every victorious force was inherently insatiable of success and put no bound to acquisition, and the Romans, who had won the mastery over many, would not choose to leave him alone.

[-2-] While they were so engaged, Lucullus did not follow up Tigranes, but allowed him to reach safety quite at leisure. Because of this he was charged by the citizens, as well as others, with refusing to end the war, in order that he might retain his command a longer time. Therefore they then restored the province of Asia to the praetors, and later, when he apparently acted in this way again, sent to him the consul of that year, to relieve him. Tigranocerta he did seize when the foreigners that dwelt with the natives revolted to the side of the Armenians. The most of these were Cilicians who had once been deported, and they let in the Romans during the night. Thereupon everything was laid waste except what belonged to the Cilicians; and many wives of the princ.i.p.al chiefs Lucullus held, when captured, free from outrage: by this action he won over their husbands also. He received further Antiochus, king of Commagene (the Syrian country near the Euphrates and the Taurus), and Alchaudonius, an Arabian chieftain, and others who had made proposals for peace.

[-3-] From them he learned of the emba.s.sy sent by Tigranes and Mithridates to Arsaces, and despatched to him, on his part, some of the allies with threats, in case he should aid the foe, and promises, if he should espouse the Roman cause. Arsaces at that time (for he still nourished anger against Tigranes and felt no suspicion toward the Romans) sent a counter-emba.s.sy to Lucullus, and established friends.h.i.+p and alliance. Later, at sight of Secilius,[3] who had come to him, he began to suspect that the emissary was there to spy out the country and his power. It was for this cause, he thought, and not for the sake of the agreement which had already been made that a man distinguished in warfare had been sent. Hence he no longer rendered them any help. On the other hand, he made no opposition, but stood aloof from both parties, naturally wis.h.i.+ng neither to grow strong. He decided that an evenly balanced contest between them would bring him the greatest safety.

[B.C. 68 (_a.u._ 686)]

[-4-] Besides these transactions Lucullus this year subdued many parts of Armenia. In the year of Quintus Marcius (Note by the author.--By this I mean that although he was not the only consul appointed, he was the only one that held office. Lucius Metellus, elected with him, died in the early part of the year, and the man chosen in his stead resigned before entering upon office, wherefore no one else was appointed.),--in this year, then, when summer was half way through (in the spring it was impossible to invade hostile territory by reason of the cold), Lucullus entered upon a campaign and devastated some land purposing to draw the barbarians, while defending it, imperceptibly into battle. As he could not rouse them for all that, he attacked. [-5-]In this engagement the opposing cavalry gave the Roman cavalry hard work, but none of the foe approached the infantry; indeed, whenever the foot-soldiers of Lucullus a.s.sisted the horse, the adversaries of the Romans would turn to flight.

Far from suffering harm, however, they shot backward at those pursuing them, killing some instantly and wounding great numbers. Such wounds were dangerous and hard to heal. This was because they used double arrow-points and furthermore poisoned them, so that the missiles, whether they stuck fast anywhere in the body or were drawn out, would quickly destroy it, since the second iron point, having no attachment, would be left within.

[-6-] Lucullus, since many were being wounded, some were dying, and some were being maimed, and provisions at the same time were failing them, retired from that place and marched against Nisibis. This city is built in the region called Mesopotamia (Author's note.--Mesopotamia is the name given to all the country between the Tigris and Euphrates.) and now belongs to us, being considered a colony of ours. But at that time Tigranes, who had seized it from the Parthians, had deposited in it his treasuries and most of his other possessions, and had stationed his brother as guard over it. Lucullus reached this city in summer time, and although he directed his attacks upon it in no half-hearted fas.h.i.+on, he effected nothing. For the walls being of brick, double and of great thickness, with a deep moat intervening, could be neither shaken down nor dug through and consequently Tigranes was not lending them a.s.sistance.[-7-] When winter set in, and the barbarians were behaving rather carelessly, inasmuch as they had the upper hand and were all but expecting to drive out the Romans, Lucullus waited for a night without a moon, when there was a violent storm of thunder and rain, so that the foe, not being able to see ahead or hear a sound, left the outer city (all but a few of them) and the intervening moat. He then a.s.sailed the wall at many points, ascending it without difficulty from the mounds, and easily slew the guards, not many in number, who had been left behind upon it. In this way he filled up a part of the moat--the barbarians had broken down the bridges in advance--and got across, since in the downpour neither archery nor fire could harm him. Immediately he captured nearly everything, for the inner circle was not very strong by reason of the confidence felt in the outer works beyond it. Among those that fled to the acropolis, whom he subsequently caused to capitulate, was the brother of Tigranes. He also obtained considerable money and pa.s.sed the winter there.

[-8-] Nisibis, then, he overpowered as described, but many localities of Armenia and the other countries around Pontus he lost. Tigranes had not aided the town in question through the idea that it could not be captured, but had hurried to the aforementioned places to see if he could acquire them before Lucullus, while the latter was occupied near the other city. Despatching Mithridates to his native land, Tigranes himself entered his own district of Armenia. There he was opposed by Lucius Fannius, whom he cut off and besieged, however, until Lucullus ascertaining it sent a.s.sistance. [-9-]Meanwhile Mithridates had invaded the other Armenia and surrounding neighborhood, where he fell upon and destroyed many of the Romans to whom he appeared unexpectedly as they were wandering about the country. Others he annihilated in battle, and thereby won back speedily most of the positions. For the men of that land were well disposed toward him because of kins.h.i.+p and because of his being hereditary monarch: they hated the Romans because the latter were foreigners and because they had been ill treated by those set over them.

Consequently they sided with Mithridates and afterward conquered Marcus Fabius, leader of the Romans in that place. The Thracians, who had formerly been mercenaries under Mithridates, but were then with Fabius, and the slaves present in the Roman camp gave them vigorous a.s.sistance.

Thracians sent ahead by Fabius to reconnoitre brought back to him no reliable report, and later, when Mithridates suddenly fell upon him as he was proceeding along in a rather unguarded fas.h.i.+on, they joined in the attack on the Romans. At the same instant the slaves (to whom the barbarians had proclaimed freedom) took a hand in the work. They would have crushed their adversaries, had not Mithridates while occupied with the enemy--although over seventy years old he was in the battle--been hit with a stone. This caused the barbarians to fear that he might die; and while they halted battle on this account, Fabius and the others were able to escape to safety.[-10-] The Roman general was subsequently shut up and besieged in Cabira, but was rescued by Triarius. The latter was in that vicinity on his way from Asia to Lucullus. Having learned what had happened he collected as large a force as was possible with the resources at hand and in his advance so alarmed Mithridates (probably by the size of the Roman detachment) as to make him withdraw before Triarius came in view. At this the Romans took courage, and pursuing the enemy as far as Comana, whither he had retired, won a victory over him.

Mithridates was in camp on the opposite side of the river from the point where the Romans approached, and was anxious to join battle while they were worn out from the march. Accordingly he himself met them first, and directed that at the crisis of the battle others should cross from another direction, by a bridge, to take part in the attack. But whereas he fought an equal conflict a long time he was deprived of reinforcements by the confusion on the bridge across which many were pus.h.i.+ng at one time, crowded all, together.

[-11-] Thereafter they both retreated to their own fortifications and rested, for it was now winter. Comana belongs to the present territory of Cappadocia and was reported to have preserved right through to that time the Tauric statue of Artemis and the race of Agamemnon. As to how these reached them or how remained there I can find no certain account, since there are various stories. But what I understand accurately I will state. There are two cities in Cappadocia not far apart and of the same name which contend for the same honors. Their myths and the relics they exhibit are alike, and both treasure a sword, which is supposedly the very one connected with the story of Iphigenia.

[B.C. 67 (_a.u._ 687)]

[-12-] To resume our narrative. The following year, in the consuls.h.i.+p of Manius Acilius and Gaius Piso, Mithridates encamped against Triarius near Gaziura, trying to challenge and provoke him to battle; for incidentally he himself practiced watching the Romans and trained his army to do so. His hope was to engage and vanquish Triarius before Lucullus came up and thus get back the rest of the province. As he could not arouse him, he sent some men to Dadasa, a garrison where the Romans'

baggage was deposited, in order that his opponent by defending it might be drawn into conflict. And so it was. Triarius for a time fearing the numbers of Mithridates and expecting Lucullus, whom he had sent for,[4]

remained quiet. But when news came of the siege of Dadasa, and the soldiers in fear for the place got disturbed and kept threatening that if no one would lead them out they would go to the rescue at their own bidding, he reluctantly left his position. As he was now moving forward the barbarians fell upon him, surrounded and overwhelmed by their numbers those near at hand, and encompa.s.sed with cavalry and killed those who, not knowing that the river had been directed into the plain, had fled thither.[-13-] They would have destroyed them utterly, had not one of the Romans, pretending to come from the allies of Mithridates--no few of whom, as I have said, were along with the expedition on an equal footing with the Romans,--approached the leader, as if wis.h.i.+ng to make some communication, and wounded him. To be sure, the fellow was immediately seized and put to death, but the barbarians were so disheartened in view of the occurrence that many of the Romans escaped.

When Mithridates had had his wound cured, he suspected that there were some others, too, of the enemy in the camp. So he held a review of the soldiers as if with a different purpose, and gave the order that they should retire singly to their tents with speed. Then he despatched the Romans, who were thus left alone. [-14-] At this juncture the arrival of Lucullus gave the idea to some that he would conquer Mithridates easily, and soon recover all that had been let slip: however, he effected nothing. For his antagonist, entrenched on the high ground near Talaura, would not come out against him, and the other Mithridates from Media, son-in-law of Tigranes, fell upon the Romans while scattered, and killed many of them. Likewise the approach of Tigranes himself was announced.

Then there was mutiny in the army; for the Valerians,[5] who had been exempted from military service and afterward had started on a campaign again, had been restless even at Nisibis on account of the victory and ensuing idleness, and also because they had had provisions in abundance and the bulk of the management, Lucullus being absent on many errands.

But it was chiefly because a certain Publius Clodius (whom some called Claudius) under the influence of an innate love of revolution solidified the seditious element among them, though his sister was united in wedlock to Lucullus. They were especially wrought up at that time, moreover, through hearing that Acilius the consul, who had been sent out to relieve Lucullus for reasons mentioned, was drawing near. They held him in slight repute, regarding him as a mere private citizen.

[-15-]Lucullus was in a dilemma both for these reasons and because Marcius[6] (consul the year before Acilius), who was en route to Cilicia, the province he was destined to govern, had refused a request of his for aid. He hesitated to depart through a barren country and feared to stand his ground: hence he set out against Tigranes, to see if he could repulse the latter while off his guard and tired from the march, and thus put a stop, to a certain extent, to the mutiny of the soldiers. He attained neither object. The army accompanied him to a certain spot from which it was possible to turn aside into Cappadocia, and all with one consent without a word turned off in that direction.

The Valerians, indeed, learning that they had been exempted from the campaign by the authorities at home, withdrew altogether.

[-16-] Let no one wonder that Lucullus, who had proved himself of all men most versed in warfare, and was the first Roman to cross the Taurus with an army and for hostile operations, who had vanquished two powerful kings and would have captured them if he had chosen to end the war quickly, was unable to rule his fellow-soldiers, and that they were always revolting and finally left him in the lurch. He required a great deal of them, was difficult of access, strict in his demands for labor, and inexorable in his punishments: he did not understand how to win over a man by argument, or to attach him to himself by kindliness, or to make a comrade of him by sharing honors or wealth,--all of which means are necessary, especially in a large body, and most of all in a body of soldiers. Hence the soldiers, as long as they prospered and got booty that was a fair return for their dangers, obeyed him: but when they encountered trouble and fell into fear instead of hopes, they no longer heeded him at all. The proof of this is that Pompey took these same men (he enrolled the Valerians again) and kept them without the slightest show of revolt. So much does man differ from man.

[-17-] After this action of the soldiers Mithridates won back almost all his domain and wrought dire devastation in Cappadocia, since neither Lucullus defended it, under the excuse that Acilius was near, nor Acilius himself. For the latter, who in the first place was hurrying on to rob Lucullus of the fruits of victory, now, when he learned what had taken place, did not come to the camp, but delayed in Bithynia. As for Marcius, the pretext which he gave for not a.s.sisting Lucullus was that his soldiers refused to follow him. When he reached Cilicia he received one Menemachus, a deserter from Tigranes, and Clodius who had revolted under Lucullus, and, fearing a repet.i.tion of the doings at Nisibis, he put him in command of the fleet; for Marcius, too, had one of his sisters as wife. Now Clodius, after being captured by the pirates and released by them in consequence of their fear of Pompey, came to Antioch in Syria, declaring that he would be their ally against the Arabians, with whom the people were then at variance. There, likewise, he caused some to revolt, and his activity nearly cost him his life.

[-18-] ... he spares.[7] In his eagerness for supremacy he a.s.sailed even the Cretans who had come to terms with him, and not heeding their objection that there was a state of truce he hastened to do them harm before Pompey came up. Octavius, who was there, had no troops and so kept quiet: in fact, he had not been sent to do any fighting, but to take charge of the cities. Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece, did, to be sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise Metellus to spare the villages, but on failing to persuade him made no active opposition. Metellus, after many other outrages, captured by treachery the city Eleuthera and extorted money from it. The traitors had repeatedly at night saturated with vinegar a very large brick tower, most difficult of capture, so that it became brittle. Next he took by storm Lappa, in spite of Octavius's occupancy, and did the latter no harm, but put to death the Cilicians, his followers. [-19-]Octavius, incensed at this, no longer remained quiet, but first used the army of Sisenna (that general had fallen sick and died) to aid here and there the victims of oppression, and then, when the detachment of Metellus had retired, proceeded to Aristion at Hieropydna, by whose side he fought.

Aristion, on the retreat from Cydonia about that time, had conquered one Lucius Ba.s.sus who sailed out to oppose him, and had gained possession of Hieropydna. They held out for a while, but at the approach of Metellus left the fortification and put to sea. There they encountered a storm, and were driven ash.o.r.e, losing many men. Henceforth Metellus was master of the entire island.

In this way the Cretans, who had been free through all preceding ages and had never owned a foreign lord, were enslaved; and from their subjugation Metellus obtained his t.i.tle. He was, however, unable to have Panares and Lasthenes (whom he had also captured) march in his triumph.

For Pompey had got them away beforehand by persuading one of the tribunes that it was to him they had submitted and not to Metellus.

[-20-] I will now relate the progress of Pompey's career. The pirates, occupied in plundering, kept troubling continually those who sailed as well as the dwellers on land. There was never a time when piracy was not practiced, nor may it cease so long as the nature of mankind remains the same. But formerly plundering was limited to certain localities and small bands operating only during the regular season on sea and on land; whereas at this time, ever since war had been carried on continuously in many different places, and many cities had been uprooted, while sentences hung over the heads of all the fugitives even, and fear confronted men in everything, large numbers turned to plundering. Now the bandit organizations on the mainland, being rather in sight of towns, which could thus perceive a source of injury close by, proved not so very difficult to overwhelm and were somehow broken up with a fair degree of ease; but those on the sea had grown to the greatest proportions. While the Romans were busy with antagonists they flourished. They sailed about to many quarters, adding to their band all of like condition, and some of these, after the fas.h.i.+on of allies, a.s.sisted many others.[-21-] How much they accomplished with the help of the outsiders has been told. When those nations were overthrown, instead of ceasing they did much serious damage alone by themselves to the Romans and Roman allies. They were no longer in small force, but were accustomed to sail in great expeditions; and they had generals, so that they had acquired a great reputation. They robbed and harried first and foremost sailors: for such not even the winter season was any longer safe; the pirates through daring and through practice and through success were now showing absolute fearlessness in their seamans.h.i.+p.

Second, they pillaged even craft lying in harbors. If any one ventured to put out against them, usually he was defeated and perished; but even if he conquered he would be unable to capture any of the enemy by reason of the speed of their s.h.i.+ps. Accordingly, they would return after a little, as if victors, to ravage and set in flames not only farms and country districts, but also whole cities. But other places they conciliated, so as to gain apparently friendly naval stations and winter quarters.

[-22-] As they progressed by these means it became customary for them to go into the interior, and they did much mischief even among those who had no sea-traffic. This is the way they treated not only those outside of their body of allies, but the land of Italy itself. Believing that they would obtain greater gains from that quarter and that they would terrify all others still more, if they refused to hold their hands even from that country, they sailed into the very harbor of Ostia, and also of other cities in the vicinity, burned the s.h.i.+ps and ravaged everything. Finally, as no setback occurred, they took up their abode on the land, disposing of whatever men they did not kill, and of the spoils they took quite fearlessly, as if in their own territory. And though some plundered in one region and others elsewhere,--it not being possible for the same persons to do harm the whole length of the sea,--they nevertheless showed such friends.h.i.+p one for another that they sent money and a.s.sistance even to those entirely unknown, as if to nearest kin. One of the largest elements in their strength was that those who helped any of them all would honor, and those who came into collision with any of them all would despoil.

[-23-] To such an extent did the supremacy of the pirates grow that their hostility became a matter of moment, constant, admitting no precaution, implacable. The Romans, of course, from time to time heard and saw a little of what was going on, inasmuch as imports in general ceased coming in and the corn supply was shut off entirely; but they gave no serious attention to it when they ought. On the contrary, they would send out fleets and generals, according as they were stirred by individual reports, but effected nothing; instead, they caused their allies all the greater distress by these very means, until they were finally reduced to extremities. Then at last they came together and deliberated many days as to what steps must be taken. Wearied by the continued dangers and noting how great and far reaching was the war raised against them, and believing, too, that it was impossible to a.s.sail the pirates all at once or individually, because the latter gave mutual a.s.sistance and it was impracticable to drive them back everywhere at once, the people fell into a dilemma and into great despair of making any successful stroke. In the end one Aulus Gabinius, a tribune, set forth his plan: he was either prompted by Pompey or wished to do him some favor; certainly he was not impelled by any love of the common welfare, for he was the vilest of men: his plan was that they should choose from among the ex-consuls one general with full powers over all, who should command for three years and have the use of a huge force, with many lieutenants. He did not actually utter the name of Pompey, but it was easy to see that if once the mult.i.tude should hear of any such proposition, they would choose him. [-24-] So it turned out. His motion was carried and immediately all save the senate began to favor Pompey.

That body was in favor of enduring anything whatever at the hands of the freebooters rather than to put so great command into Pompey's hands. In fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the very halls of the senate, but he eluded them somehow. When the people learned the intention of the senators they raised an uproar, going to the point of making a rush at them as they sat a.s.sembled: and if the elders had not gotten out of the way, the populace would without doubt have killed them. They all scattered and secreted themselves except Gaius Piso the consul (it was in his year and Acilius's that these events took place), who was arrested and condemned to perish for the others; but Gabinius begged him off. After this the leading men themselves gladly held their peace on condition of being allowed to live, but used influence on the nine tribunes, to have them oppose Gabinius. All of the latter, however, except a Lucius Trebellius and Lucius Roscius, out of fear of the mult.i.tude would not say a word in opposition; and those two men, who had the courage, were unable to redeem any of their promises by either word or deed. For when the appointed day came on which the motion was to be ratified, things went as follows.

Pompey, who was thoroughly anxious to command, and already by reason of his own ambition and the zeal of the populace no longer so much regarded this commission as an honor as the failure to win it a disgrace, seeing the opposition of those in power had a wish to appear as if compulsion were being used. In general he was as little as possible in the habit of revealing his real desires, but still more on this occasion did he feign reluctance, because of the ensuing jealousy, should he of his own accord lay claim to the leaders.h.i.+p, and because of the glory if he should be appointed unwillingly as the one most worthy to command.

[-25-] He now came forward and said: "Quirites, I rejoice at the honor laid upon me by you. All men naturally take pride in benefits conferred upon them by the citizens, and I, who have often enjoyed honors at your hands, scarcely know how to be worthily pleased at the present contingency. However, I do not think that you should be so insatiable with regard to my services, nor that I should incessantly be in some position of command. For I have labored since childhood, and as you know, you should be promoting others as well. Do you not recall how many toils I underwent in the war against Cinna, though I was the veriest youth, or how many labors in Sicily and in Africa before I had quite reached the age of iuvenis, or how many dangers I encountered in Spain, while I was not as yet a senator? I shall not say that you have shown yourselves ungrateful toward me for all these labors. How could I? Quite the reverse, in addition to the many other important favors of which you have deemed me worthy, the very fact that I was trusted to undertake the post of general against Sertorius, when no one else was either willing or able, and that I held a triumph, contrary to custom, after resigning it, brought me the greatest honor. I only say that I have undergone many anxieties and many dangers, that I am worn out in body and wearied in soul. Do not keep reckoning that I am still young, nor calculate that I have lived just so many years. For if you count up the campaigns that I have made and the dangers I have faced, you will find them far more in number than my years, and by this means you will more readily believe that I can no longer withstand the anxieties and the hards.h.i.+ps."

[-26-] "Some one might possibly reply: 'But you see that all such opportunities for toil are causes of jealousy and hatred.' This feature you hold in no account--you ought not properly even to pretend to regard it--but to me it would prove most grievous. And I must admit that I am not so much disturbed or troubled by any danger to be encountered in the midst of wars as by such exhibitions. For what person in his right mind could take pleasure in living among men who are jealous of him, and who would feel the heart to carry out any public enterprise, if destined in case of failure to submit to punishment and if successful to be the object of rancorous envy? In view of these and other considerations allow me to remain at peace and attend to my own business, so that now at last I may bestow some care upon my private affairs and not perish from exhaustion. Against the pirates elect somebody else. There are many who are both willing and able to serve as admirals, both younger and older men, so that your choice from so numerous a company becomes easy.

Of course I am not the only one who loves you, nor am I alone skilled in warfare, but--not seeming to favor any by mentioning names--equally so is A or B."

[-27-] At this point in his harangue Gabinius, interrupting, cried: "Pompey's behavior in this very matter, Quirites, is worthy of his character. He does not seek the leaders.h.i.+p, nor does he accept it without thought when granted him. An upright man has no business, generally speaking, to desire the annoyances incident to office, and it is Pompey's way to undertake all tasks imposed upon him only with due consideration, in order that he may accomplish them with corresponding safety. Precipitation in promises and in action, more hasty than the occasion demands, causes the downfall of many; but exact.i.tude at the start as well as in execution possesses a constant value and is to the advantage of all. You must choose not what would satisfy Pompey, but what is of benefit to the state. Not office seekers, but those who have capacity should be appointed to the business in hand; the former exist in very large numbers, but any other such man as my candidate you will not find. You recall, further, how many reverses of a serious nature we endured in the war against Sertorius through lack of a general, and that we found no one else among young or old adapted to it except the man before you; and that we sent him to the field in place of both consuls, although at that time he had not yet reached a mature age and was not a member of the senate. I should be glad if we did have many able men, and if I ought to pray for such, I would so pray: since, however, this ability does not depend on prayer or come of its own accord to any one, but a man has to be born with a natural bent for it, to learn what is pertinent and practice what is fitting and beyond everything to enjoy good fortune, which would very rarely fall to the lot of the same man, you must all unanimously, whenever such an one is found, both support him and make the fullest use of him even if he does not wish it. Such violence proves most n.o.ble both to him who exerts it and to him who suffers it,--to the former because he would be preserved by it, and to the latter because it would preserve the citizens, in whose behalf the excellent and patriotic man would most readily give up both body and soul.

[-28-] "Do you think that whereas this Pompey when a youth could conduct campaigns, be general, increase our possessions, preserve those of our allies, and acquire those of our adversaries, now, in the prime of life, when every man fairly surpa.s.ses himself, with a ma.s.s of additional experience gained from wars he could not prove most useful to you? Will you reject, now that he has reached man's estate, him whom while iuvenis you chose to lead? Will you not confide this campaign to the man, now become a member of the senate, to whom while still a knight you committed those wars? Will you not, now that you have most amply tested his mettle, commit the present emergency, no less pressing than former ones, to him for whom alone you asked in the face of those urgent dangers ere you had applied any accurate test at all? Will you not send out against the pirates one, now an ex-consul, whom before he could yet properly hold office you elected against Sertorius? Rather, do not for a moment adopt any other course; and Pompey, do you heed your country, and me. By her you were borne, by her you were reared. You must be a slave to whatever is for her advantage, not shrinking from any hards.h.i.+p or danger to secure it. And should it become necessary for you to lose your life, you must in that case not await your fated day but embrace whatever death meets you. [-29-] But truly I am ridiculous to give you this advice,--you who in so many great conflicts have exhibited both your bravery and your love for your country. Heed me, therefore, and these citizens here; do not fear because some are envious. Rather press on all the more for this very reason to a goal which is the friends.h.i.+p of the majority and the common advantage of us all, and scorn your traducers. Or, if you are willing to grieve them a little, take command for this very reason, that you may distress them by serving and winning glory contrary to their expectations, and that you may in person set an ending worthy of yourself beside your former accomplishments, by ridding us of many great evils."

[-30-] When Gabinius had thus expressed himself, Trebellius strove to make a dissenting speech; but as he did not receive leave to speak he proceeded to oppose the casting of a vote. Gabinius was incensed, and delayed the balloting regarding Pompey, but introduced a new motion concerning the same man. The first seventeen tribes to register an opinion decided that Trebellius was at fault and might be no longer tribune. And not until the eighteenth was on the point of voting the same way, was he barely induced to maintain silence. Roscius, seeing this, did not dare utter a word, but by a gesture of his raised hand urged them to choose two men, so that he might by so doing cut off a little of Pompey's supremacy. At this gesticulation of his the crowd gave a great threatening shout, whereat a crow flying above their heads was so startled that it fell as if smitten by lightning. After that Roscius kept not only his tongue but his hand still. Catulus was for remaining silent, but Gabinius urged him to make some speech, inasmuch as he ranked among the foremost in the senate and it seemed likely that through his agency the rest might reach a harmonious decision; it was Gabinius's hope, likewise, that he would join in approving the general desire from the fact that he saw the tribunes in bad straits.

Accordingly Catulus received permission to speak, since all respected and honored him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their advantage, and delivered an address about as follows:

[-31-] "That I have been exceedingly zealous, Quirites, in behalf of your body, all of you, doubtless, clearly understand. This being so, it is requisite for me to set forth in simple fas.h.i.+on and quite frankly what I know to be for the good of the State; and it is only fair for you to listen to it calmly and afterward to deliberate. For, if you raise an uproar, you will fail of obtaining some perhaps very useful suggestion which you might have heard, but if you pay attention to what is said you will be sure to discover definitely something to your advantage. I for my part a.s.sert in the first place most emphatically that it is not proper to confide to any one man so many positions of command, one after another. This has been forbidden by law, and by test has been found to be most perilous. What made Marius such a monster was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the briefest s.p.a.ce of time and being made consul six times as rapidly as possible: and similarly the cause of Sulla's frenzy was that he held command of the armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then consul. It does not lie in man's nature for a person, not necessarily young but mature quite as often, after exercise in authority for a considerable period to be willing to abide by ancestral customs.[-32-] I do not say this in any spirit of condemnation of Pompey, but because it does not appear at all advantageous to you on general grounds, and further it is not permitted according to the laws.

For if an enterprise brings honor to those deemed worthy of it, all whom that enterprise concerns ought to obtain honor; this is the principle of democracy: and if it brings labor, all ought to share that labor proportionately; this is mere equity.

"Again, in such an affair it is to your advantage for many individuals to have practice in exploits, so that as a result of trial your choice may be an easy one from among those who can be trusted for any urgent business; but if you take that other course it is quite inevitable that the scarcity should be great of those who will practice what they should, and to whom interests can be trusted. This is the chief reason why you were at a loss for a general in the war with Sertorius; previous to that time you were accustomed to employ the same men for a long period. Consequently, even if in all other respects Pompey deserves to be elected against the pirates, still, inasmuch as he would be chosen contrary to the injunction of the laws and to the principles laid down by experience, it behooves both you and him most strongly that it be not done.

[-33-] "This is the first and most important point I have to mention.

Second arises the consideration, that when consuls and praetors and those serving in their place can take offices and leaders.h.i.+ps in a way prescribed by the laws it is neither decent nor advantageous for you to overlook them and introduce some new office. To what end do you elect the annual officials, if you are going to make no use of them for such businesses? Not, presumably, that they may stalk about in purple-bordered togas, nor that endued with the name alone of the office they may be deprived of its duties. How can you fail to alienate these and all the rest who have a purpose to enter politics at all, if you break down the ancient offices, and entrust nothing to those elected by law, but a.s.sign a strange and previously non-existent position of command to a private individual? [-34-] If there should be any necessity of choosing, in addition to the annual officials, still another, there is for this, too, an ancient precedent,--I mean the dictator. However, because he held such power, our fathers did not appoint him on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months. Accordingly, if you need any such person, you may, without transgressing the laws or making light of the common welfare, designate either Pompey or any one else dictator,--on condition that he shall sway for not more than the time ordained, nor outside of Italy. You doubtless are not ignorant that this latter limitation, too, our fathers guarded scrupulously, and no instance would be found of a dictator chosen for any other country, except one sent to Sicily, and that without accomplis.h.i.+ng anything. But if Italy needs no such person and you would no longer endure, apart from the functions of dictator, even the name (this is clear from your anger against Sulla), how would it be right for a new position of command to be created, and that, too, for three years and embracing practically all interests both in Italy and without? What disasters come to cities from such a course, and how many men on account of lawless l.u.s.t for rule have often disturbed our populace and done themselves countless evils, you all alike understand.

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